Mandatory Reading For Anyone Interested in the Middle East: The Israeli Lobby

[zenpundit]

Well, let's say for argument's sake that U.S. " flips" policy on Israel in order to pursue its national interests. For a change of such a magnitude - I assume you would agree that it would be significant - what concrete benefits can the Arab governments then deliver in return beyond what we are already receiving now ?

There's not really anything that I factually disagree with I disagree with in your response. Our aid to Israel is a leash on the extremity of Israeli behavior so when ( for example) the IDF was shelling Beirut, Ronald Reagan could pick up the phone and tell Menachim Begin to knock it off and the hard-boiled Israeli P.M. felt compelled to listen. Much like our aid to Egypt is a bribe to stay at peace with Israel and keep the largest Arab state in friendly hands.

That the US could secure grudging Israeli cooperation during Gulf War I. was possible primarily because of the longstanding relationship the two countries have maintained. It is not accidental that Israel was not involved ( except peripherally) in the last three major wars in the Mideast, that was U.S. policy to damp down the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As a matter of capabilities, what may be unused today may be wanted tomorrow. And given a choice, whose military would you want as a client, Israel or Syria's ? Or Israel and any 5 Arab states ?

[Tom Odom]

Well, let's say for argument's sake that U.S. " flips" policy on Israel in order to pursue its national interests. For a change of such a magnitude - I assume you would agree that it would be significant - what concrete benefits can the Arab governments then deliver in return beyond what we are already receiving now ?

I am not advocating a flip in policy. I do believe that an more centrist approach (or balanced approach) would bring greater benefits for both US and ultimately Israeli strategic goals. I would say that neither Walt nor Mearsheimer advocate a flip either. Our efforts as an "honest broker" in the process over the past several decades has been overcome by our declarations as Israel's ally. The greatest single result of that schism was the steady expansion of the settlements on the West Bank and Gaza. Those settlements cost us--the US--greatly in the region and now they are costing Israel in dismantling them, at least in Gaza.

Reagan was not the "leash" that pulled the IDF out of Beirut, though we did push for that. Sharon's leadership ultimately pulled him back after he made the unilateral decision to go in.

As I said earlier, the Israeli military is designed for its own playing field; that design goes deeper than just the units and the equipment. Issues of sustainablity, deployability, and the economy itself play a large role on Israeli strategic and operational design. The single time that the IDF got involved in combined operations with Western military forces was during the 1956 War; the Israeli "threat" against the Suez Canal gave the British and the French the coordinated pretext to seize the canal zone. It was the US under President Eisenhower who stood against that slight of hand operation.

Meanwhile, we did build the 1990 coalition with Egyptian, Syrian, and other Arab forces because incorporating those forces served ours and their interests.

best
Tom

[zenpundit]

Hi Tom,

Reagan was not the "leash" that pulled the IDF out of Beirut, though we did push for that.á Sharon's leadership ultimately pulled him back after he made the unilateral decision to go in.á

Excerpt from the diplomatic cable sent to P.M. Begin August 12, following the phone call from Pres. Reagan:

"...Israeli air strikes and other military moves have stopped progress in negotiations. I find this incomprehensible and unacceptable.
...I cannot stress enough to you how seriously I regard this situation. Ambassador habib must be enabled to fulfil these last steps in his mision. The cease-fire must be kept. Our entire future relations are at stake if this continues.
...Israeli military actions of the past several hours have made further alteration of that package impossible. If so, or for any other reason, the package must stand as it is, we will look to Israel to accept it fully without further discussion, so that the agony of Beirut may be ended"

[ emphasis mine]

Schultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph, Page 70.

The former SecState goes on to write:

" Begin called President Reagan back within several minutes. ' I have just talked with the minister of defense and the chief of staff. Now there is no firing at all' he told the president."

Very tough language to use with an ally, essentially an ultimatum, yes ?
That there were factors internal to Israeli decision-making at play then in Lebanon, I do not doubt but the pressure here put on Begin was extraordinairy - if you proceed then you jeopardize American support for the state of Israel. Hence my use of the term " leash".

Alternatively, we could say U.S. support is a " safety-net". Regardless, it changes Israel's defense posture from the extreme dynamic that prevailed at the time of the Six Day War.

I agree with you on Israel's settlement policy BTW - a generally counterproductive effort on Israel's part with the exception, perhaps, of solidifying their hold on Jerusalem, nothing of strategic value has been added.

[Tom Odom]

Yep tough language and certainly Sec State Schultz is a great source...

But I would still not say leash as in cause in effect; the actions preliminary to those phone calls were equally causal and most were internal to the Israeli decisionmaking apparatus. Sharon was known for using the phrase "creating facts on the ground" in his military and later political career. The decision to expand the "incursion" into Lebanon was his; Begin ended up holding the proverbial bag and ultimately hung it back around Sharon's neck when the Sabra and Shatilla camp massacres came to light.

But I would agree that Schultz and Reagan did the right thing; they did use pressure and they made it stick, at least temporarily. I remember watching the episode go ahead from the sidelines in Turkey, thinking the initial multinational mission to extract the PLO and take them to Tunis was a good move. But then the decision to go back in as nominal peace enforcers made me very uneasy.

The dynamic in the region that has changed the most is external to the region: the end of the Cold War. The USSR as a source of arms, advisors, and potential backer is gone. The Camp David Accords were instrumental in removing the Egyptian-Israeli dispute as a source for Cold War brinkmanship as in the October 1973 War. Afterwards, Syria was left alone with the USSR as its supplier; 1982 pretty much showed the Syrians were not up to taking the IDF on in a conventional fight. With the collapse of the USSR in the late 80's we soon saw Syrian forces deployed as Coalition forces against Iraq.

But now in the current conflict and changed global arena, I believe that certain realities must affect how we do business. Camp David is now nearly 30 years old; during those decades, its requirements have sapped the majority available foreign aid monies (the last figure I saw was around 90%). Neither Israel nor Egypt fit the economic profile for that level of assistance. I am not saying "turn off the spigot"; dramatic moves in foreign policy carry large risks. But with the press of needs elsewhere (outside Iraq and Afghanistan), reallocation of some of those monies is overdue.

Anyway enjoyed the discussion and that's the point.

Best
Tom

[zenpundit]

Me too ! A stimulating conversation, thanks Tom!