The Gill Doctrine (Indian CT)

[Bill Moore]

The Gill Doctrine, A Model for 21st Century Counter-terrorism?

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/public...9/Article1.htm

I think as you read through this paper you'll see many common concepts that we have discussed extensively within the SWJ council, such as:

When fighting terrorists armed with military-issue hardware, the definition of what constitutes ‘minimal force’ requires recalibration. If terrorism is after all a new way of warfare, then the Government must be prepared to combat it on a war-footing. At the same time, there remains an overwhelming need to insulate the local population from suffering disproportionate collateral damage. For this reason, the use of area weapons and airpower is to be avoided, even if the result is heightened casualties on one’s own side.

he spent much of his time trying to mobilize Punjab’s Sikhs against extremist violence.21 Where he differed from his more politically-correct colleagues was in the depth of expectation he placed upon such efforts. Whilst pacifists in the Police attempted to put the cart before the horse and rally the population against terrorism before aspiring for operational dominance, Gill reversed these priorities.

One of the Gill Doctrine’s most significant contributions to the study of low intensity conflicts has been the concept of a ‘societal Stockholm Syndrome.’23 This concept holds that even in instances where popular support for militancy appears high, it may not be so in reality. Rather, such support might only amount to a survival tactic adopted by populations living continuously under the shadow of the gun. Once this point is appreciated by counter-terrorist strategists, it becomes possible to develop a response to terrorist violence that balances political sustainability with operational effectiveness.

These are the areas I think he has in common with our doctrine, even if we fail to put them in practice. The point I want to focus on in this post is that the ability to rapidly and continuously put to put pressure on the enemy (i.e. wage a war of attrition) is to enable local police or paramilitary forces to take action. These are the forces on point, and all too often they are under equipped, under trained, and poorly led, thus we rely too heavily on speciality commando/SWAT like elements who are not able to protect the populace or respond to crisis 24/7 in a responsible time. Commandos and SWAT elements have a critical role to play, but not at the expense of ignoring action at the local level by local forces. The palace guard will never defeat an insurgency. I think back to a couple of recent school shootings in the U.S., where the police were sitting outside waiting on the SWAT teams to arrive while our kids were being shot. We are past the point of ridiculous if the common police officer isn't trained and equipped well enough to confront a unstable teenager with a rifle. Instead they conduct crowd control outside while some whacked out kid has freedom of movement to continue his rampage, all because they are waiting on grossly overweight SWAT team members (obviously poorly trained) to arrive several minutes later (VA) to respond to the incident. This same mind has creep into our COIN practices, and we need to aggressively reverse it by sufficiently training, arming, and equipping local forces to deal with the threats at their level.

The ‘three possibles’ outlined above triangulate the actions encapsulated within the Gill Doctrine, enclosing it within a complete analytical model that captures its essentials. Rapid and Sustainable Attrition (RASTA – an Indian word for ‘way’) was the guiding objective according to which the progress of counter-terrorist efforts was measured. While the Punjab Police were able to attain the first two ‘possibles’ within 19 months of Gill’s appointment as Police chief, the third was not achieved until 1992. Terrorists could be identified and surgically neutralized on the basis of good local intelligence, and at a very rapid pace, but lack of political resolve undercut the Punjab Police’s efforts. Not until the political establishment in New Delhi allowed Gill to continue his efforts without interference from would-be peacemakers, did attrition of terrorist cadres become both rapid and sustainable.

Gill's comments on police based intelligence and identity based terrorist groups are gold. His ideas will be highly valuable when we're advising a nation on how to best defeat the threat within their borders.

Moderator Adds

This thread should be read alongside the main, wider thread Understanding Indian Insurgencies

[SWJED]

Good read. Thanks for posting this Bill.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

A good find and very interesting. I am surprised the author's work has not appeared on Kings of War blogsite, as he was (is) a Kings College London PhD student.

For reasons I do not understand Indian COIN and CT experience appears to be ignored here in the UK. Anecdote suggests diplomatic and institutional relations between India and the UK still have an imperial legacy to forget.

Indian police officers did visit our national police training college and sometimes went to see CT work in Northern Ireland. No idea about military to military relations.

Gill's advocacy of ground-based intelligence gathering -v- that at a national level needs careful thought. There is a great difference between learning about the context of local operations (situational awareness) and the individual or group details for action. Can communities provide the detail is often the refrain? This article shows communities over time can, if the police are close to the community.

The UK experience in Northern Ireland, certainly in the early years, when the threat was high was that desperate measures were taken to get individual or group details - that later were regretted (Sir David Omand, a UK "guru" on intelligence has made comments similar to this). Note the Army superceded the police (RUC) as the lead agency in those years; not that the Army was the sole operator or decision-maker.

More recent UK experience indicates that almost no intelligence of value or impact has come from the community; cited by Peter Clarke, the police CT co-ordinator.

Constant learning is required and a wider outlook than just "Western" examples.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Bill, This is a great post. I am reading it again for the second time. Most interesting.

[jmm99]

for comparison

Small Wars Journal
Restraint as a Successful Strategy in the 1999 Kargil Conflict
Colonel Devendra Pratap Pandey, Indian Army
Posted by SWJ Editors on June 15, 2008

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008...ssful-stra.php

[Ron Humphrey]

It does bring up a lot of considerations which seem to have been somewhat overlooked or mis-identified throughout our own operations, thus providing great food for thought.

A couple of things though in regards to the applicability to ops such as OIF, OEF. Many of the approaches taken through the GILL Doctrine would seem to require that the largest portion of Counter-Terrorist/Counter-Insurgent forces be local in gaining the acceptance of the populous as legit and concrete. The face of the wars(per se) must be local in order to almost all portions be it humint, security, community programs, etc. The reason I state this is that it would seem were this not so such as in OIF,OEF the enemies would simply have to find ways to tie any such efforts to the "outsiders" in order to continue facilitating their identity driven recruiting efforts.

Thus the overwhelming importance of using local forces for local security.
It would seem to point towards those areas in which Coalition forces can contribute greatly to the overall efforts through both, monetary, and political assistance, while keeping most kinetic activities performed soley by ISAF to those areas outside the greater population density's. Does bring up some new thoughts on several former threads.

Perhaps especially one about determining Endstates?

PS: On learning from India I was also surprised by how little I have seen related to how India approached the Kashmir operations both in operational contexts and even more so political/social governance personnel in tandem with military ops.