Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[SWJED]

6 August Fayetteville (NC) Observer - Bureaucracy, Turf Battles Slow Progress by Kevin Maurer.

Senior special operations officers believe that the creation of an African Command would alleviate the cumbersome bureaucracy that is slowing progress on the Horn of Africa.

Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa was created in 2002 to stop the influence of radical Islamists coming over the border from Somalia. The task force oversees an area roughly a third of the size of the continental United States and has or had forces working in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula.

But much of the Horn of Africa task force’s time is taken up by turf battles with the embassy, host nations and regional commands...

The creation of an Africa Command would allow one unit to set U.S. military policy for the region and create a cadre of planners who understand the region and have relationships with the host nations and embassies.

Africa is divided among three regional combatant commands.

U.S. Central Command, which oversees the Middle East, owns the Horn of Africa and Yemen. European Command controls sub-Saharan Africa, and Pacific Command controls all of the islands in the Indian Ocean...

Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, said an Africa Command would have some advantages.

Under a regional command structure, the staff would serve longer tours and “institutional” relationships between the command and the host nations and embassies would be created, Whelan said.

Unlike deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan where staff officers deploy in one unit, individual soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines deploy to the Horn of Africa staff for tours of six months to one year.

“This is where people come to check off their war on terror box,” said a senior noncommissioned officer.

Most of the officers are not trained in aid missions, and they are not around long enough to see projects and programs from start to finish.

“There is a learning curve with the staffs that go out to these missions,” Whelan said.

She said many officers have to learn new regulations and missions since most are military officers trained primarily for combat.

“It is a whole new and different world. If you are brand new to all of that, you have a little ramp-up time. That can complicate things,” she said.

Rear Adm. Richard Hunt, the commander of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, told civil affairs teams in a meeting in July that they will have to win the “hearts and minds” of the embassies first...

[Uboat509]

This will be interesting, I think. I doubt that CENTCOM will miss the HOA nor do I think that PACOM wants any part of Africa that they don't have to take. Both of those commands have plenty happening in their AORs to say the least but EUCOM is in a different situation. On the one hand, since the end of the cold war there just isn't a hell of a lot happening in Europe but on the other hand Africa is no dream AOR either. It lacks the resources and infrastructure that have allowed radical Islam to become so powerful in in the middle east and the character of Islam is different in much of Africa. I'm guessing that any command that takes over Africa is going to get last bite at the funding cake and what money they do get will be largely devoted to HA projects and training indig militaries. Not exactly anyone's dream assignment.

SFC W

[Tom Odom]

The Unified Command splits on Africa go back to the day when USCINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA (the CENTCOM grandaddy) covered the AO. The 3-way split today (as it was in my day) divides the area, disrupts command, and diverts funds. Commands are typically loath to give up portions of their AOs regardless of interest because the size of the AO drives allocation of funds.

As for C2 it really gets interesting in the case of ops like Support Hope where USEUCOM and USCENTCOM controlled portions of the pie--coupled with the issues of working with USTRANSCOM as the supporting command. All of this then works to confuse ops when overlayed against other agency divisions along geographic lines, especially State and AID, with individual country missions underneath.

As for radical Islam in Africa, the proverbial fat lady has not yet taken the stage. The vast wealth that certain regions on the continent hold have been masked somewhat by the overlay of war, corruption, and crippling poverty. In particular Nigeria with its oil and the Congo with its minerals are relevant examples. Islam is making greater inroads overtime; Somalia is a relevant case. Lebanese connections throughout Africa are strong, especially in the Congo and its diamond/gold sector.

My take on the idea of a command for Africa is that it would be good for no other reason that it would retain the funding allocated to it rather than have it shifted to other priorities within a larger, broader command.

best
Tom

[SWJED]

24 August Time Magazine - The Pentagon Plans for an African Command by Sally Donnelly.

In what may be the most glaring admission that the U.S. military needs to dramatically readjust how it will fight what it calls 'the long war,' the Pentagon is expected to announce soon that it will create an entirely new military command to focus on the globe's most neglected region: Africa.

Pentagon sources say that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is close to approving plans for an African Command, which would establish a military organization to singlehandedly deal with the entire continent of Africa. It would be a sign of a significant strategic shift in Administration policy, reflecting the need to put more emphasis on proactive, preventative measures rather than maintaining a defensive posture designed for the Cold War...

A defense source says the new command, which is part of Rumsfeld's ongoing worldwide reassessment of the military's division of labor, may be headed by Gen. William "Kip" Ward, a respected officer who is the Army's only four-star African-American general. Ward has boots-on-the-ground experience in Africa: he was a commander during the U.S.'s ill-fated mission in Somalia in 1993 and also served as a military representative in Egypt in 1998. Ward is currently the deputy commander at European Command, and as such oversees U.S. military relations with 43 African countries.

But a former military officer who thinks highly of Ward nonetheless says creating an entirely new command compounds an existing problem. "The size and number of headquarters already is skewed too far in favor of 'tail' at the expense of warfighting 'teeth.' Want to increase 'boots on the ground?' Eliminate or downsize some of these staffs, don't create more," says this observer.

Many military experts have long advocated paying more attention to Africa. While Central Command has had a small military contingent based in Djibouti (called Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa or 'CJTF-HOA') for several years, intelligence agencies and military officers have warned that the US should be spending more time and money in Africa....

[Bill Moore]

I'm still sitting on the fence on this one. Another HQs, another requirement for personnel and money in a period where both of these resources are harder to come by. On the other hand, Africa in my opinion is a strategic region for the GWOT, and although many recognize that missions in Africa are still sorely underfunded, so a HQs dedicated to Africa with its own pot of money, and furthermore a core of key staff officers that eventually become somewhat expert on Africa's various cultures should help us facilitate our national security objectives there. One could argue using that logic that we need equivalent commands for SE Asia and South Asia, but obviously that is beyond our resourcing ability. I would think another option would be to form a temporary Africa Command with a mandate for 10 years, with the charter to form something along the lines of NATO. This is is a long bridge, but perhaps not one too far, they already have ECOWAS and AO and other regional groups. Admittedly they lack consensus, funding, and capacity, but we could develop that over time, especially with some assistance by partner nations like Canada and Australia. I'm not anti-French, but the fact is their colonial legacy and even recent behavior in the region makes them undesirable in my book. 10 years may not be enough, but at time our government could determine if it was in our interest to extend their mandate. Off the cuff thoughts, but I think something along those lines facilitates a partial exit plan and a much more stable and productive Africa.

[SWJED]

My Prediction on Africa Command Coming True a Bit Faster than I Expected - Thomas P.M. Barnett Weblog

Africa: Africa Command Not European Command, Says Official - AllAfrica.com

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On edit - here is another related link - Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Horn of Africa (HOA). This is the official US Central Command page for CJTF HOA.

[SWJED]

African Command: The Newest Combatant Command by Lieutenant Colonel Paul P. Cale, US Army. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 2005.

African Command (AFRICOM) must be established as the newest Combatant Command in the Unified Command System. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) currently divides the Continent of Africa into areas of responsibility served by European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command. This current division of Africa, within the UCP, has led to the creation of "seams" between the current combatant command boundaries. EUCOM's focus is based on their expansion into the newest NATO countries on their Eastern border. CENTCOM's focus for the indefinite future is on OEF, OIF, and the future of U.S. presence in the Middle East. PACOM's focus has been and remains on the Asian continent. For these and other reasons that will be further developed the UCP must establish AFRICOM as its Combatant Command Headquarters on the African continent...

[SWJED]

A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan - Commander Richard G. Catoire, US Navy. Parameters article, Winter 2000-01.

... To date, US foreign policy for Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, has been reactive rather than proactive--generally driven by events rather than shaping events. Because of this tentative approach to the region, African problems have obliged the US military to undertake a continuing series of contingency operations, and the prospect for future interventions is high. If any region of the world warrants the kind of "shaping" now prescribed by US strategic doctrine, surely that region is Africa.

While US security interests in Africa are minimal and economic interests are currently limited (excepting the importation of oil and strategic minerals), the developed world does not ignore humanitarian tragedy. With its prominent position in the post-Cold War world, the United States will at times accede to international pressures to take the lead in addressing the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa. For the immediate future, such initiatives will require the capacity to intervene militarily when appropriate. US reluctance to accept this responsibility would undermine important international relationships and ultimately could require a far greater commitment and involvement of resources when events finally force the US hand.

It is in the best interests of the United States to stay actively involved in the region to ensure that strategic objectives are accomplished and that diplomatic and political goals are achieved. The Department of Defense already plays some role in US efforts in Africa to promote democratization, to increase respect for human rights, to promote conflict resolution, and to generate economic prosperity. Those efforts could be more effectively managed by structural change within the Unified Command Plan.

If any region of the world warrants careful US attention to potential coalitions to alleviate greater reliance on US resources, surely that region is Africa. This is a key unified command role which can best be accomplished by creating a unified or sub-unified command exclusively for Sub-Saharan Africa. The advantages of creating "an area-oriented senior US military command," even if it is only an "economy of force" command headquartered in the United States, would far outweigh any perceived disadvantages...

[SWJED]

29 August Marine Corps Times - DoD mulls proposed ‘Africa Command’ by Gordon Lubold.

... The proposed command, aptly called “Africa Command,” would include most of Africa, but would leave countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti to fall under the U.S. Central Command umbrella. Africa is currently divvied up between Central Command and U.S. European Command. Defense officials and observers have long considered the value of adding a new combatant command to the Pentagon’s list of five, but the issue has yet to take hold.

Now, however, it appears the Pentagon is making headway. The plan would require redrawing the lines of the Unified Command Plan, or UCP, which delineates U.S. Northern, Southern, Central, European and Pacific commands. Now add to that the possibility that there would be an “AfCom.

The outlines of a command for Africa appeared on a PowerPoint slide handed out at a briefing in the Pentagon on Tuesday. That briefing, about a major reorganization of the Pentagon’s policy branch, included a slide of a UCP Model that included the command, shown in orange. The map shows that several countries in eastern Africa would remain with Central Command, effectively creating the new command with all of what now belongs to European Command in Africa.

The briefing was led by Eric S. Edelman, undersecretary of defense for policy. Edelman is leading an effort to make his branch better reflect the way other government agencies are organized for global operations. The Pentagon’s policy branch will reorganize in a number of ways, but also restructure the way its offices are organized for dealing with operations around the world. The slide with the map of Africa Command appeared by way of explaining how the building’s new policy areas would better mirror the way other U.S. agencies organize themselves across the world...

[SWJED]

30 August Reuters - U.S. Considers New Military Command for Africa by Will Dunham.

... With several war-ravaged regions and great expanses of ungoverned territory, Africa presents optimal conditions for extremists aiming to secure a foothold, many experts contend.

"There is certainly an increasing awareness of the strategic importance of Africa," said U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter, a Pentagon spokesman, "because in the post 9/11 world we have a much better appreciation for (threats emerging from) ungoverned territories."

The Horn of Africa region is of particular concern for U.S. counterterrorism officials. The State Department says Somalia and the sparsely populated Trans-Sahara region, especially Mali and Mauritania, offer safe haven for militants.

Al Qaeda, responsible for the 2001 attacks on the United States, is thought to have a presence in eastern and northern Africa, and Islamic fundamentalism appears to be increasing in some parts of the continent.

The State Department says a small number of al Qaeda operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continue to pose the most serious threat to U.S. interests in the region.

Although it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups are present in western and central Africa, the department has said fund-raising, recruiting and other efforts by al Qaeda and its affiliates in South Africa, Nigeria and across the Trans-Sahara region remain a serious worry.

Carpenter said populations in certain parts of Africa are vulnerable to extremists due to ideology, poverty and disease.

"Many of the militaries in Africa desire to have interaction with the U.S. so that we can help to improve their capabilities, to defend their borders, to prevent the transit of terrorists, to be able to realize their economic potential," Carpenter added.

A U.S. military task force in the Horn of Africa, headquartered in Djibouti, has about 1,800 troops. Its mission is "preventive in nature," Carpenter said. The task force aims to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorist groups in the region, denying them safe haven and outside support, officials said.

Officials offered no timetable for a decision on an Africa Command and said no decisions have been made on where it would be headquartered or how many troops would be devoted.

"The intent of (creating an Africa Command) is not to put troops in Africa. It would be to streamline the focus and give appropriate undivided attention to the continent," a Pentagon official said.

[sgmgrumpy]

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/P...inter/henk.htm

The novelty of the post-Cold War strategic environment is reflected in the changing jargon of American military professionals. "Humanitarian assistance" and "peace operations" were hardly key concerns of the national military establishment in the mid-1980s, though they have become prominent a decade later. Since the early 1990s, US professional military literature has been increasingly preoccupied, some would say obsessed, with discussions of what are identified as unprecedented roles for the national military establishment.

Interventions with military forces often figure in discussions of US involvement in Africa; indeed, in the 1990s no part of the world has seen a greater number of such interventions than Sub-Saharan Africa. However, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian relief operations, and peace support interventions tend to obscure the more enduring and more significant diplomatic and economic links between the United States and African countries. They also obscure routine military-to-military relations in the region, which have expanded in the wake of the Cold War.

The United States conducts military operations in Africa, just as it exercises diplomacy and provides aid, to further US regional objectives. The demise of the Cold War had an obvious effect on US objectives in Africa, and while each US administration is expected to put its own imprint on the nation's foreign policy, some American activities reflect enduring interests. This article identifies a set of desirable conditions that appear to have become de facto US national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

[Eddie Beaver]

I explained my opposition to this in more detail on my blog earlier.

Essentially, the US needs to do a lot more on non-military fronts before they set an Africa Command up for failure.

A secondary point; an Africa command should be considered a test lab for tactics, organization and strategy. Why do we need to have a huge typical command structure? Such a command could be heavily focused on a small number of key personnel who help train African militaries in peacekeeping and stablization operations, develop important relations with governments, NGO's & civic organizations to counter AIDS, rampant crime and terrorism and place a heavy emphasis on developing the capabilities of police and auxilary forces to deal with natural disasters, disease epidemics, refugee crises and urban disorder. Why not focus on light infantry training (i.e. what H. John Poole advocates in "Terrorist Trails")?

If this command is focused on counterterrorism, it will be a tragic missed opportunity.

[Tom Odom]

Eddie,

I know you have read my book and my comments on support to Mobutu. I agree with your concerns and you state them well.

I would also say, however, that barring establishing an Africa Command, the continent will be what it has been to date, a European Command or Central Command after thought--until something like Rwanda or Sudan gets those commands' attention.

JTFHOA has a broad program and I am encouraged by it. I would--like you--prefer to see much greater emphasis on AIDS as a security issue. But again without that critical unified command with its budget and focus such efforts are very likely to get the chop.

Again great post on your blog!

Best

Tom

[Eddie Beaver]

Tom,

Agreed on Africa being an afterthought without the creation of an Africa command.

Perhaps a streamlined version of JTF-HOA could establish some semblance of progress in key countries and trouble spots.

Do you think it is realistic for us to pursue a stronger strategic and mil to mil relationship with South Africa, i.e. perhaps even establishing Africa Command on the ground there? I don't think Nigeria is the better option, especially with the intensity of their current and brewing crises.

(thank you for reading my blog post, I hope to write with more clarity and understanding in both the near future with more study of the subjects involved and in the mid-future (early next year) with some travels on the ground).

Stan,
Always good to have the voice of reason and experience added to Pentagon dreaming. You ask a very critical question that begs serious concern, not only for your reasons but for the wrong kinds of attitudes people could bring (an obsession with force protection to the point of rendering goals unattainable) and a question of quality personnel in case Africa command is inevitably treated as the red headed step child of priorities in a strategic landscape dominated by contractor-driven China fear and Middle East instability.

[marct]

Hi Eddie,

Really great blog post, although I think you might be being a touch too cynical in point two <wry grin>. Sure, the US has had a disastrous history in Africa but, as Tom noted, this might well be countered by the creation of an Africa Command. Personally, I think that anew command might be a good institutional starting point for creating integrated military and non-military teams (i.e getting some non-state actors in on our side). I would also view it as a chance to allow US allies (like us guys up here in de frozen North!) to get some decent logistical support and, if necessary, backup.

Marc

[Eddie Beaver]

Marct,

I agree now that the formation of an Africa Command would be a positive step, but I just see the utter lack of comprehension of Africa at the higher levels in government.

Obviously, there are a great number of talented, devoted and highly capable diplomats, soldiers and other members of the US and Allied governments who have a good handle on Africa and understand many of the complex dangers, trends and opportunities there. Their efforts and talents are regressed though when they're being undercut by strategic neglect from above.

Cynical? Maybe, probably. Viewing the stupidity of this administration over Liberia, Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe just makes me look at the past with less of a dumbfounded expression and more of an understanding of why we continue to make bad calls.

You are exceptionally right in we could and should do a lot more to offer support and work together in joint endeavors as allies and friends in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean political and cultural spheres and on the continent itself.

[Stan]

So well put, and by no means an easy task. Just ask Tom.

These days, if and when HA funds manage around a continuing resolusion, the fish bowl we know as the country team and eventually an assignments officer (typically the most junior and the least knowlegeable member in country with an already full plate) will or should begin a precious cycle of events that were originally intended to help the host nation. Basically, hopeless and a ton of paper. When the State dude does show, you better have one hell of a good presentation coupled with fresh bodies, mines, and whatever you can come up with for dinner, cause he's staying for that too !

That was the easy part.

The idea of an African Command leaves me wondering what kind of experience these good folks are coming with. Language and customs will not be nearly enough. Most have never tasted the games of DOS. Foggy Bottom produces some of the strangest members I have ever had the pleasure of dealing with.

We sat in one of the most inhospitable places in the world, and although the JTF had some fine soldiers along, things still went tango sierra in less than 45 days. With all that sierra going on, nobody in K/town was home. Tom had assembled a team that could get along in almost any situation, including Goma. By no means a small task. Mind you, these were senior NCOs and Officers with years and years of experience.

To now assemble a team of African Specialists and simply leave them to the dogs of the country team before they even get started, will be a fate far worse than Goma, Zäire.

I wish them the best of luck !
Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Or them like us, to complete the toast, my friend.

Hopefully an Africa command would build over time--just like any unified command and take advantage of those who have been on the ground in manning.

Remember, Stan, that guys like COL Fields and LTC Ball in 1993 and 1994 were allowing DHS to close African stations without comment. DHS closed the African Bureau and consolidated it with the Middle East Bureau. Fields wanted to close us; I saw MG Leide in Pretoria in Nov 93 and convinced him to keep us open. And then the fight to stand up a station in Rwanda took me 18 months to win--and cost me any chance of getting anything but another "prize" assignment, regardless of how much Jim Clapper, Jack Liede, or Pat Huges liked me. Those are the kind of guys (Ball and Fields) an African Command does not need.

Manned correctly, a dedicated command would do much to make courtship of the country teams an easier romance. For one thing, it would serve as a counterpart to State's African Bureau as well as Langley--and you know how much I love Langley.

Best regards my friend,

Tom

PS Your hardcopy book went in the mail today

[Stan]

Remember Ambassador Wells ? She could have been a Sergeant Major with diplomatic skills !!!

She not only was one hell of a lady, she also knew how to run the shop and could quickly identify people accomplishing their missions even in the sight of death. She later came to Estonia shortly after my retirement.

Although the Flags of the DHS were indeed tending to their own agendas (I hated what they were doing to you and, as an E7 other than my abilities and experience, had little to offer you), I still believe that if the Ambo is professional as was Mellisa (sp?) and able to recognize who was pulling their load, and keep the other bone-heads in check (that she did well) our bung hole in Goma would have been far easier to cope with and we probably would have had immediate help.

I think you told me on several occasions, that our ordeal in Goma would be settled or handled inside the Beltway. How correct you were. Goma simply provided the excitement and tourists.

I would then have to conclude that Flags will once again provide that fatal penstroke and fate of some fellow NCOs and Officers.

Thanks in advance for the Xmas gift ! I am pondering over yours.

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Wells I never met. I remember you speaking of her wisfully everytime you had to deal with the Charge or his Deputy.

But Dave Rawson in Rwanda followed by Bob Gribbin were completely different than the clutch of village idiots we faced in K Town. Just as the RPA impressed us both when we crossed the border, so Rawson (and later Gribbin) impressed me. It was almost like the "diplomats" in K-Town were mimicking the FAZ while we operated like the RPA in Kigali.

I remember blowing my stack one day in Goma because the Deputy accosted me and complained that General Nix and I were not keeping him informed of what we were doing. He in his very best British accent* proclaimed, "Tom, I am a 3 Star equivalent!"

I was tired and you were not there to drag me away. I told him, "You are a 3 Star Asshole!" and then followed with as polite an explanation as I could muster that the General and I were busy doing things like bringing in aircraft and God knows what else. He was so shocked by my initial burst that he actually listened and nodded his head at everything else I had to say. But he did leave the next day

It all goes back to leadership--if the leaders are self-interested prima donnas, the rest of the mission will tend to follow in their paths.
Best

Tom

*the gentleman in question was from Oklahoma