Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[Tom Odom]

That seems to be why it's hard to get Europe to participate there - Romeo Dallaire catalogued the Europeans' (particularly French and Belgian) fear of appearing imperialistic in their old colonial stomping grounds in Rwanda in 1994

.

Yes depending on whom you ask. That is yes to the Belgians. I was surprised that Belgium agreed to participate in the first UNAMIR as neither side could view Belgian troops as neutral, especially the Paracommandos. I also believe that aside from some issues with the PC regiment that Dallaire reveals regarding their behavior, they did a good job under severe circumstances. The treatment of senior Belgian officers in the aftermath of the tragedy was pure merde dished out to cover political leaders who had agreed to the mission and set the ROE leading to the massacre of the Belgian troops.

Absolutely not in the case of the French; indeed the focus of French preoocupation with the Francophone bloc has been to not only maintain French ties with previous colonies but to expand that dominance into former Belgian colonies/protectorates. Where the rub came with the French and Dallaire was in missions assigned to the French should they come back once the war resumed. At one stage, Dallaire threatened to shoot them down. With what I have no idea. In any case, French Op Turquoise was very much a chameleon that changed colors from intervention to humanitarian based on world reaction to the announcement. As for the RPA view toward the French, nothing made senior leaders in the RPA get the deadly lock jaw look more quickly than discussing the French.

Stan had years longer than me on the ground in Zaire and he can relate Zairios/Congolese views toward the French better than I can. All of that aside, France still maintains a fixed view toward mainatining dominance in Francophone Africa. They are also more blatant in their exercise of that policy. Money is involved and the French are much more adept at its use in getting what they want. Cnonsequently in a case like Zaire where the average Zairios disliked if not openly despised seening French troops, the French still cultivated leaders on the basis of French interests using French money, favors, and if need be force. Nothing spoke that fact more clearly than French behavior after the genocide and their subsequent effort to resurrect Mobutu as a regional player because he could be bought and would protect their former clients from Rwanda.

We do dumb things because we don't pay attention to these factors untill it is too late. This is not the first time Africa as a continent has reacted with suspicion to the the idea of a unified command focused on the continent. The first time was when GEN PD Adams had US Strike Command and he got the mission--the logo of US Strike Command with the eagle swooping on the globe did not sit well in the newly emergent African nations of the early 1960s. We ended up adding to PD Adams title US CINCMEAFSA for Middle East and sub-Sharan Africa. That still did not go over very well so ultimately we ended up with the 3 way split as it stood until recently. Our announcement of Africa Command was clumsy and I can guarantee you our French friends did us no favors--even as we are working with them in Djibouti. I suspect that the announcement as it was made was more targeted toward African-American leaders than it was African leaders.

So while you are correct our history as not having any colonies on the continent (excluding of course Liberia) should have steered perceptions toward a less threatening message, I believe we were looking at this from a 180 degrees different perspective, one concerned with meeting US domestic demands that we take Africa seriously.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

Ah, memories of Paul D. and other CinCStrike/MEAFSA. Not to mention STRAC...

I think you points are all very correct and your final statement most particularly so.

[Stan]

Ah, memories of Paul D. and other CinCStrike/MEAFSA. Not to mention STRAC...

I think you points are all very correct and your final statement most particularly so.

Once you get the old boy fired up, he really smokes

[Ken White]

Once you get the old boy fired up, he really smokes

StriCom layout at Pope. My Battle group commander erred in front of Paul D. Said Colonel disappeared that night and was never seen at Bragg again, new Colonel arrived two days later...

[ancien]

.

Yes depending on whom you ask. That is yes to the Belgians. I was surprised that Belgium agreed to participate in the first UNAMIR as neither side could view Belgian troops as neutral, especially the Paracommandos. I also believe that aside from some issues with the PC regiment that Dallaire reveals regarding their behavior, they did a good job under severe circumstances. The treatment of senior Belgian officers in the aftermath of the tragedy was pure merde dished out to cover political leaders who had agreed to the mission and set the ROE leading to the massacre of the Belgian troops.

Absolutely not in the case of the French; indeed the focus of French preoocupation with the Francophone bloc has been to not only maintain French ties with previous colonies but to expand that dominance into former Belgian colonies/protectorates. Where the rub came with the French and Dallaire was in missions assigned to the French should they come back once the war resumed. At one stage, Dallaire threatened to shoot them down. With what I have no idea. In any case, French Op Turquoise was very much a chameleon that changed colors from intervention to humanitarian based on world reaction to the announcement. As for the RPA view toward the French, nothing made senior leaders in the RPA get the deadly lock jaw look more quickly than discussing the French.

Stan had years longer than me on the ground in Zaire and he can relate Zairios/Congolese views toward the French better than I can. All of that aside, France still maintains a fixed view toward mainatining dominance in Francophone Africa. They are also more blatant in their exercise of that policy. Money is involved and the French are much more adept at its use in getting what they want. Cnonsequently in a case like Zaire where the average Zairios disliked if not openly despised seening French troops, the French still cultivated leaders on the basis of French interests using French money, favors, and if need be force. Nothing spoke that fact more clearly than French behavior after the genocide and their subsequent effort to resurrect Mobutu as a regional player because he could be bought and would protect their former clients from Rwanda.

We do dumb things because we don't pay attention to these factors untill it is too late. This is not the first time Africa as a continent has reacted with suspicion to the the idea of a unified command focused on the continent. The first time was when GEN PD Adams had US Strike Command and he got the mission--the logo of US Strike Command with the eagle swooping on the globe did not sit well in the newly emergent African nations of the early 1960s. We ended up adding to PD Adams title US CINCMEAFSA for Middle East and sub-Sharan Africa. That still did not go over very well so ultimately we ended up with the 3 way split as it stood until recently. Our announcement of Africa Command was clumsy and I can guarantee you our French friends did us no favors--even as we are working with them in Djibouti. I suspect that the announcement as it was made was more targeted toward African-American leaders than it was African leaders.

So while you are correct our history as not having any colonies on the continent (excluding of course Liberia) should have steered perceptions toward a less threatening message, I believe we were looking at this from a 180 degrees different perspective, one concerned with meeting US domestic demands that we take Africa seriously.

Best

Tom

I take your explanetion greatly into account, sir.
But I would like to contribute on the Belgian part in UNAMIR.

Unamir was created under a UN mandate. The origine of the Arusha agreement started with the agreement of N'sele after the RPF invasion in 1990. From thereone it got evolved to the OAU and then to the UN. At all these negotiations from the beginning, GOR, FPR, Belgium, France, US where involved ore supervising these negosiations. With respect to you, sir, but the US goverment new verry wel why we where there. You wrote two papers envolving Belgian interventions in Africa, so maybe there is a answer in those documents.

When Belgium contributed forces to UNAMIR, it was presented on the media that it was a request of president Habyarimana because the french where not a option for the FPR.
The message of that story is that the Belgians arrived in Rwanda on a UN mission where Belgian civilians lived and worked. So, as a Belgian UN soldier, you are a hostage from day one.

At that time nobody cared about Rwanda. Until the 6 april. It is frustrating that there are a lot of people who write books about Rwanda genocide, and all they start from the shootdown of the airplane toward the invasion of zaire ore from the 6 april back to 1990 and from there a jump to 1961 and the previeus years. The Rwandan problem goos back a lot further in time, in a timeframe where there where no europeans. At that time, Africa was all about litle kingdoms.

I'am not going to attack gen. Dallaire on a open forum regarding a few statements about us in his book or interviews, ore am I going to discus his own action. At that time before the 6 april when nobody new Rwanda, Whe where the only ones who had a grip on the situation and not the UN. We where spread out over Kigali in smal units and that strategy became very importend after the 6th april, but was very dangoures. There is not one army in the entyre western world that would do what we did at that time, no armourded vehicles, no gunhelicopters, no artilery, no havy weapons and NO MANDATE. There where times when other forces of UNAMIR would not come out of there bases, BUT THE BELGIANS DID. Concirning gen. Dallaire, he hat a hard and unworkable mandate, and after the shootdown of the airplane, the genocide, the amputated mandate of UNAMIR II and the refugy problem, he had the CNNthing on his neck.

So when the rest of the regiment, the French an the Italians arrived, it was the wish of the Belgian goverment to stop the mission whitsh we where very angry about, but it was made after consulting the partners in that croked peacedeal including the US goverment. At that time all the countries should have hold the line like 2CDO did on there own, they where a example how to work in a crisissituation with a UN mandate.

You where in Kigali, so it is posible that you now camp Kigali, then you now how many soldiers there can be stationed.
The squad of LT Lotin, 1SGT Leroy, CPL Bassinne, CPL Debatty, CPL Dupont, CPL Lhoir, CPL Meaux, CPL Plescia, CPL RENWA, CPL Uytebroeck, hold the line for more than half a day, AND THAT IS WHO WE ARE!

About the French part, your book has not arrived yet, sir

regards,

[Tom Odom]

Ancien,

I made no criticism of the PC Regiment and intended that none be taken. General Dallaire's comments are a matter of public record and they dealt primarily with matters of behavior of young soldiers.

I understand the frustration of you and other regiment members after the death of your comrades. We did much the same in Somalia, just months earlier.

US pressure was indeed targeted toward a complete drawdown of all UN forces as the genocide began. Ambassador Albright at the UN refused to deliver that message and said so to the White House.

Finally as I said earler I believed then and still do that the PC Regiment performed well under dire circumstances and ROE that led to tragedy, What I found fault with was the Belgian government's decision to court martial officers for essentially following those ROE.

Best

Tom

[ancien]

Sir,I was not formulating criticism on your part or do I take it as criticism from you
I only want to ad some perspective insight in the Rwanda situation. For people who have no insight in the matter,they would make the wrong conclusion about us and the situation.

I now gen. Dallaire wrote about us in that matter, so did col. Marchal. For me as a soldier, I consider this below there position. For as long the military has existed in history, these event unfortunably happen. They both exepted the responsability of that mission, they could decline it, but for there personel reasens they exepted.

I olso take the stand, that putting a highranking officer in a courtroom concerning the squad of LT Lotin is very wrong. They where sacrafied. A intervention on camp Kigali by Belgian soldiers to rescue the squad could lead to sirieus danger to Belgian nationals in Rwanda, and the other UN units where not trained and willing to do so. But you wil not hear this coming from a politician.
We don't ask for honor in this, but we don't diserve to be castigated like that in the media. We worn the political leaders from the beginning that the peaceproces might break. Especialy, the Belgian politicians made huge diplomatic faulds in that matter.


regards,

[Jedburgh]

GAO, 15 Jul 08: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command

....The initial concept for AFRICOM, designed and developed by DOD, met resistance from within the U.S. government and African countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, which is critical to synchronizing DOD efforts with other U. S. government agencies. DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation in the command. According to DOD, other agencies have limited resources and personnel systems which have not easily accommodated DOD’s intent to place interagency personnel in the command. Second, DOD has encountered concerns from civilian agencies and other stakeholders over the command’s mission and goals. For example, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development officials have expressed concerns that AFRICOM will become the lead for all U.S. efforts in Africa, rather than just DOD activities. If not addressed, these concerns could limit the command’s ability to develop key partnerships. Third, DOD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of the command’s presence in Africa. Uncertainties related to AFRICOM’s presence hinder DOD’s ability to estimate future funding requirements for AFRICOM and raises questions about whether DOD’s concept for developing enduring relationships on the continent can be achieved....

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 4th Qtr 08, Special Feature:

U.S. Africa Command and the Principle of Active Security

....Active Security is a persistent and sustained level of effort focused on security assistance programs that prevent conflict in order to contribute to an enhanced level of dialogue and development. The goal of Active Security is to enable our partners to marginalize the enemies of peace; minimize the potential for conflict; foster the growth of strong, just governments and legitimate institutions; and support the development of civil societies.....

The Road to a New Unified Command

.....It is exhilarating to create a new command in order to reflect the growing importance of our African partners, but turning it into a reality requires incredible amounts of detailed work, dedication, and energy. We appreciate the efforts of all who contributed to our establishment—from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, other participating U.S. Government agencies, Country Teams in Africa, and fellow unified commands (especially U.S. European Command). We also thank those who participated in the Implementation Planning Team and transition team, and ultimately the Servicemembers, civilians, and contractors of U.S. Africa Command. Achieving full unified command status is a major accomplishment, one that leads to greater security and stability on the continent of Africa and its island nations.

USAFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?

The U.S. Government is in a unique position to leverage a momentous and historic shift in military focus: that it is now possible to mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict by working with allies and partners to shape the international environment and thus promote stability and security.1 U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) is the embodiment of this opportunity. Though American efforts to date represent steps in the right direction, they are nonetheless overly reliant on the Armed Forces and, as such, do little to alleviate the perception of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. But the Government can mitigate and reverse this perception by implementing an integrated 3D (diplomacy, development, and defense) security engagement policy.....

Legal Impediments to USAFRICOM Operationalization

.....When one considers the broad mandate of U.S. Africa Command, one recognizes that the Department of Defense has made a serious departure from the historic role of the geographic combatant commander. The creation of this command is more than the paper transfer of areas of responsibility from the rosters of other commands; it marks a major shift in military function away from kinetic operations and toward capability-building via strategic engagement. Yet while the command sprints toward full operationalization, the realities of the operating environment appear overlooked. One finds a fragmented international agreement framework that, although satisfactory for the previous combatant commands, undermines the flexibility in engagement that is the raison d’ être of U.S. Africa Command. The limited existing framework lacks parity among sovereign states. Clearly, a concerted effort by Defense, with State approval, to negotiate and conclude comprehensive Status of Forces and Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreements will facilitate long-term USAFRICOM strategic objectives. Additionally, while the command hopes to fully engage its African partners, its fiscal hands are tied. A statutory regime that strictly limits the U.S. military contribution to stability, security, health, and welfare is unworkable. Authority for these efforts must be vested in the commander, using specifically appropriated funding. Accordingly, legislation that validates the nontraditional role of USAFRICOM should be favorably considered by Congress......