Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[TROUFION]

The last post here was 2 weeks ago any news on the status?

Further a quick google of African sites popped up this article. It provides a different perspective.

http://allafrica.com/stories/200702140349.html

Here is a quote:

"The African Union and the Peace and Security Council were established to entrench democracy, create economic development and monitor and secure peace but have not been allowed to develop and mature enough to deal with the continent's problems. Africa does not need another US base aimed at "promoting" peace and development. Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which would be forced to engage with US interests on military terms."
Business Day (Johannesburg) OPINION, February 14, 2007, Posted to the web February 14, 2007, Michele Ruiters, Johannesburg SA.

The author's focus seems a bit off as he is more concerned about a physical base and the troops he believes would be stationed there. He is concerned about the cultural effects of a large footprint set up, not about a C2 organization that facilitates and coordinates effort. But it is an indication that prior to setting up USAFRICOM a lot of PR work needs to be done. That is unless I'm missing something, the intent of the new command seems very beneficial from my understanding:

The Boston Globe’s Bryan Bender reports:

" The Pentagon, which crafted the proposal with the aid of the State Department and other government agencies, envisions the new command to be unique among its global combat headquarters. Because African nations do not pose a direct military threat to the United States, Defense officials said, the AFRICOM operation would focus far less on preparing troops for major combat in the area. Instead, it would stress military training programs to help local governments secure their borders and take steps to guard against crises such as Darfur as well as contain outbreaks of deadly diseases such as AIDS and malaria . Unlike in other traditional command posts, the four-star general who would be in charge of AFRICOM would probably have a civilian counterpart from the State Department to coordinate nonmilitary functions of the US government. The expectation is that diplomacy and economic and political aid will often prove more critical to achieving US goals in Africa than relying on military solutions."

[SWJED]

28 May Washington Post - U.S. Africa Command Brings New Concerns by Walter Pincus.

The creation of the Defense Department Africa Command, with responsibilities to promote security and government stability in the region, has heightened concerns among African countries and in the U.S. government over the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, according to a newly released study by the Congressional Research Service.

The Africa Command (AFRICOM) was announced in February by the Bush administration and is scheduled to begin operations in October with temporary headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. AFRICOM would have traditional responsibilities of a combat command "to facilitate or lead [U.S.] military operations" on the continent, but would also include "a broader 'soft power' mandate aimed at preemptively reducing conflict and would incorporate a larger civilian component to address those challenges," according to the CRS study...

[John T. Fishel]

The essence of the Pincus story (and, presumably, the CRS report) is that there is interagency conflict and resentment over the establishment of AFRICOM and DOD's greater resources. So, what's new?

As I see it, there are 2 problems here: 1) We inadequately fund State and USAID and related efforts. 2) We do not create effective unity of command where we should. The latter is more of a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan than in AFRICOM's AOR where the American ambassador to a country is legally and clearly in charge. The problem there comes from #1 where the Combattant Commander may have inordinate influence because of his control of resources. Given this disparity he can often provide the funds needed to ensure an ambassador's success or, by witholding them, guarantee failure.

[SWJED]

The essence of the Pincus story (and, presumably, the CRS report) is that there is interagency conflict and resentment over the establishment of AFRICOM and DOD's greater resources. So, what's new?

As I see it, there are 2 problems here: 1) We inadequately fund State and USAID and related efforts. 2) We do not create effective unity of command where we should. The latter is more of a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan than in AFRICOM's AOR where the American ambassador to a country is legally and clearly in charge. The problem there comes from #1 where the Combattant Commander may have inordinate influence because of his control of resources. Given this disparity he can often provide the funds needed to ensure an ambassador's success or, by witholding them, guarantee failure.

... and in the absence of unity of command, it would be nice to at least have unity of effort. Sometimes I think that our cultural intelligence efforts should focus on our interagency partners - at least then we might lower our expectations of who does what and when.

[John T. Fishel]

You are so right. Unity of command is a subset of unity of effort. I despair of ever getting unity of command in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Unity of effort, however, is possible and often achieved especially when combattant commanders define their mission as supporting the ambassadors in their AOR. Unfortunately, when they don't (and sometimes even when they do) their control of resources may thwart unity of effort.

[wm]

You are so right. Unity of command is a subset of unity of effort. I despair of ever getting unity of command in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Unity of effort, however, is possible and often achieved especially when combattant commanders define their mission as supporting the ambassadors in their AOR. Unfortunately, when they don't (and sometimes even when they do) their control of resources may thwart unity of effort.

One wonders how we could achieve either unity of effort or unity of command on the African continent. DoS is divided into a number of petty fiefdoms worldwide (AKA Ambasadorships). USAID seems (from the outside anyway) to be rather autonomous within State, and each of of its various funding activities often seem responsible only to themselves. AFRICOM may appear to have the advantage of internal unity of command, but one wonders how true this is. It will still need to draw on the resources of other U&S commands (like JFCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM) to get much done. Does the JS J3 shop have another 3-star who can be detailed as another "czar" to manage US interagency efforts in Africa.

Seriously, though, we seem to be working with an outmoded concept to some degree. The notion of the "country team" has been overcome by globalization. Perhaps we ought to think about "region teams" instead. Forming AFRICOM may well be a step by DoD towards recognizing the need to readress American organization for international relationship building. But, are the other elements of US government involved in international affairs working towards an organization to support the same type of regional focus?

[TROUFION]

There was talk at the begining of the establishment of JTF HOA, when AFRICOM started looking like a possibility, of establishing the senior position in AFRICOM as a psuedo-proconsul. This position would be the senior Civilian Ambassador for the continent, to subordinate all the other Ambassdors to the one. It was/is a radical idea that the DoS would most likely have trouble digesting. BUT it would lend Unity of command and much needed credibility to the AFRICOM combined DoD-DoS concept.

And talking of Unity of Effort, I have always thought Unity of Effort was developed by those folks out there who have never been in command, who want to protect fiefdoms, turf, and who do not want to be subordinate to anyone. Unity of Command is what it is, the best method to organize a unified action in any and all environments. The argument of complex situations never held water with me. There always has to be a single position of command to break impasses and to ensure a unified methodology, a single intent.