Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[Stan]

Hello SGM !

Overall, I think it's very thorough, but a tad too general.
Some of the information is a bit dated. Areas such as FMF and IMET and worse, HIV/AIDs.

Congo (then Zaire) for example, where we annually sent upwards of 70 people to the States under IMET, only produced a few bright stars. FMF related equipment was truely sad if the equipment stayed around long enough.

The paper lists Congo's HIV/AIDs Prevalence Rate at the 5 to 15% range. CDC's studies in the late 80's indicated 35%. I suppose it could have declined, but I'm not sure how.

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Stan

you are correct on the AIDs rate; it is higher. Also spot on assessment of IMET and other security assistance; it has to be done by country, otherwise it is not only useless, it is dangerously misleading.

I did note that the report did discuss Attache and FAO slots and that is a good thing.

more later when I get to read it in detail

best all

Tom

[Stan]

Tom,
As always, dead on the money. How the Hotel do we classify the entire continent as one ?
My trips to Chad would open my eyes. Holes in every building. Hell it looked like an impact zone for M1s.

What did LTC Babbit say in one of his profound reports on the Congo civil war ? Wait for it !

I got it, "A solid shot tank round was found in a residencial area."

How hard did we laugh ? I had cramps for weeks They are now considered UXO

OK, I'm done (for now).
have a safe trip !

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

What did LTC Babbit say in one of his profound reports on the Congo civil war ? Wait for it !

Yep!

Also I remember the "nixon" routine when he flew back in from Bukavu--"I was not spying"--as we steered him onto the plane out of Goma.

Then again he ended up advising VP Al Gore on Africa

After I was over in Rwanda and went back to the States for a couple of weeks with VP Kagame's visit to see the SecDef, I ran into one of my classmates from French in 1983, Gus Lorenz He was working OSD-ISA-Africa and we of course worked on Kagame's visit as ISA was the action office. Gus had gone to ZAMISH (for the uninitiated that was the US security assistance offcice in Zaire); you probably knew him.

Anyway he was somewhat upset because I had over the past year--as you know--hammered the point that the FAZ (Zairian military) was broken. He felt that I was too harsh; I suspect because he wrongly felt it reflected on ZAMISH personnel. Of course, my replacement in Zaire did her best to rebuild the FAZ's reputation in the next 2 years; 1996 thru 1998 proved just how correct we were and how wrong they were.

But again on Brazza, I often wondered as they were our escape hatch and we were their escape hatch, what would have happened had the two Congo's gotten their rhythm of discontent in synch. I guess we could have hijacked the ferry and hid in the middle of the river.


Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

It is about time we did this. Unified Command divisions of Africa have been a long standing cause of operational confusion. I certainly felt its effects during Op Support Hope and studied the same phenomenon in earlier Congo adventures.

Tom



The ebird link is http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20060118411954.html

Tom,

Have you had any involvement in the creation of AFRICOM? I have a Yale grad student working with me over the summer doing some research on it, and I'm trying to figure out who to link him up with. He's contacting Mike Smith who is now at State, and he and I are going to try to get to EUCOM and JTF-HOA over the summer (who could pass up a visit to Djibouti in August!!).

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

Have you had any involvement in the creation of AFRICOM? I have a Yale grad student working with me over the summer doing some research on it, and I'm trying to figure out who to link him up with. He's contacting Mike Smith who is now at State, and he and I are going to try to get to EUCOM and JTF-HOA over the summer (who could pass up a visit to Djibouti in August!!).

Steve,

Dr, Hans Pawlisch at the Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman, was wanting me to put in for the command historian position. I can send you an email address for him next week when I go back to work.

Best

Tom

[SWJED]

24 June Washington Post - North Africa Reluctant to Host U.S. Command by Craig Whitlock.

A U.S. delegation seeking a home for a new military command in Africa got a chilly reception during a tour of the northern half of the continent this month, running into opposition even in countries that enjoy friendly relations with the Pentagon.

Algeria and Libya separately ruled out hosting the Defense Department's planned Africa Command, known as AFRICOM, and said they were firmly against any of their neighbors doing so either. U.S. diplomats said they were disappointed by the depth of opposition, given that the Bush administration has bolstered ties with both countries on security matters in recent years.

Morocco, which has been mentioned as a possible site for the new command and is one of the strongest U.S. allies in the region, didn't roll out the welcome mat, either. After the U.S. delegation visited Rabat, the capital, on June 11, the Moroccan foreign ministry strongly denied a claim by an opposition political party that the kingdom had already offered to host AFRICOM. A ministry statement called the claim "baseless information."

Rachid Tlemcani, a professor of political science at the University of Algiers, said the stern response from North African governments was a reflection of public opposition to U.S. policies in the predominantly Muslim region...

[Mark O'Neill]

As much as I understand the apparent imperative to have Africa Command in North Africa, I suspect that the answer is going to be very similar all over the place in any of the Islamic North. Notwithstanding that, I think that collocation with the OAU in Addis would make the most sense in terms of the mission and role of the command.


Nor, do I think that it will be that different in West Africa.

Ultimately I still think that (barring some massive, unforeseen act of influence) the Command might end up somewhere in Anglophile sub-saharan Africa. (RSA, Botswana (at least then it would be collocated with the SADC) etc... Would also address some basic force protection issues and perhaps meet an administration preference for a democracy.

[Tom Odom]

As much as I understand the apparent imperative to have Africa Command in North Africa, I suspect that the answer is going to be very similar all over the place in any of the Islamic North. Notwithstanding that, I think that collocation with the OAU in Addis would make the most sense in terms of the mission and role of the command.


Nor, do I think that it will be that different in West Africa.

Ultimately I still think that (barring some massive, unforeseen act of influence) the Command might end up somewhere in Anglophile sub-saharan Africa. (RSA, Botswana (at least then it would be collocated with the SADC) etc... Would also address some basic force protection issues and perhaps meet an administration preference for a democracy.

Mark,

I concur on southern Africa. It would also help with infrastructure issues that would cripple a HQs effectiveness in Western Africa.

Best

Tom

[SteveMetz]

As much as I understand the apparent imperative to have Africa Command in North Africa, I suspect that the answer is going to be very similar all over the place in any of the Islamic North. Notwithstanding that, I think that collocation with the OAU in Addis would make the most sense in terms of the mission and role of the command.


Nor, do I think that it will be that different in West Africa.

Ultimately I still think that (barring some massive, unforeseen act of influence) the Command might end up somewhere in Anglophile sub-saharan Africa. (RSA, Botswana (at least then it would be collocated with the SADC) etc... Would also address some basic force protection issues and perhaps meet an administration preference for a democracy.

I absolutely cannot imagine the South Africans allowing it. They remain almost pathologically leery of being seen as an American proxy. For a long time, they refused assistance from the African Crisis Response Initiative.

I would think Ghana would be the most likely choice--they're reasonably close to the U.S., a functioning democracy, and sort of centrally located. Uganda also might be a possibility. You're right about Botswana but it's harder to get in and out of Gabarone than Accra or even Kampala. I would also think that Senegal might make the short list. I'd like to see that simply because it would make heads explode in France.

[SWJED]

Esquire magazine - The Americans Have Landed by Thomas P. M. Barnett.

A few years ago, with little fanfare, the United States opened a base in the horn of Africa to kill or capture Al Qaeda fighters. By 2012, the Pentagon will have two dozen such forts. The story of Africa Command, the American military's new frontier outpost...

[TROUFION]

The balance between kinetics-direct action and whatever you want to call it - the other stuff. Inoculating Africa from Fundamentalist Islamism. The underlying question, can USAFRICOM continue to manage the balance?

I know I am probably in the minority on the SWC about this but it bothers me. The SOCCOM leadership in the GWOT, (I had an extensive class at NPS on the History of SOF taught by Dr. Kalev 'Gunner' Sepp, everyone in the class was SOF except myself, we had this conversation, I held my own but it was 12:1 against me on this very topic) mainly the ability to crossboundary amongst the COCCOM's. If I was the Commanding Officer of CJTF-HOA or of USAFRICOM I'd have a problem with independent 'wire within the wire' operations. Especially if a point target effort could undermine years of cultivation.

I look at it like this: when the German Codes were broken in WWII there had to be a balance, when and how to use the info gained to interfere with German actions. Too blatant a hit would tip the Germans that the code was broken, too little action and why break the code in the first place.

I see the DA piece as a necessity but not the primary action. It is like chemotherapy used once the patient is so sick there is no choice. As opposed to innoculations to prevent a patient getting sick in the first place.

-T

[Ken White]

in my view, returned to the Army (and at least some SEAL teams to the Navy) and USSOCOM should keep the DA, SR and allied tasks. The major problem in the services has been the melding of the SOF culture with that of the broader service and that is a really significant issue, a big hazardous disconnect, that someone better get a handle on before it creates a minor disaster.

The two sides are totally distrustful of each other -- both with some very legitimate complaints and both with some self righteous flaky complaints. A major mistake the Army made IMO was to create the SF Branch. The cross fertilization that was available before at all ranks was more beneficial than is the slightly increased competence due to the formation of the branch. I realize that's not going to change either but some method of breaking down the barriers better be explored.

That is not to say that I disagree with SOF, I'm a firm believer and a former practitioner. JSOC was necessary, USSSOCOM was possibly not -- I give them credit though for being innovative, developing a rapid and effective procurement system and some great capabilities but they are over secretive (with some justification and then, most everyone is over secretive) and way too parochial. They're doing some innovative and very good things but it's supposed to be a national effort.

So let me join you in that minority. I am a SOF Believer of the first water but not a USSOCOM fan. I railed against Barbwire Bob when he was lobbying to get it set up -- not that anyone paid much attention -- and I think it was a mistake. Immaterial, really, it's here and Parkinson's Law will apply.

Thus, we will have dual chains of command in operation until a bunch of people get badly, totally, publicly killed by foul-ups due to that duality and the distrust for the community of the Big services (and vice versa). That's the American way. Regardless of how the Command morphs, I'd be willing to bet at some time, most if not all elements in theater will be responsible to the Theater Commander.

[SWJED]

Focus on U.S. Africa Command - SWJ Blog. Kudos to many who posted here (on this thread) for pointers to reference material - much appreciated!

As a lead-in – to this much longer than usual SWJ Blog entry – I thought I’d post some recent news as well as recent and not-so-recent background / reference material on the establishment of our newest Combatant Command – U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and issues that will impact on AFRICOM’s mission.

Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right. Getting it right includes ensuring that AFRICOM receives the necessary resources (people and funding) and is enabled to pursue operations utilizing all instruments of national power – read interagency…

Please post to comments below (or on this thread at Small Wars Council) any additional relevant material (articles, studies, presentations…) for addition to the SWJ Reference Library – Thanks!...

[Stan]

AllAfrica regarding AFRICOM - "South Africa's defence minister says not only the Southern African Development Community but most of the African Union rejects the United States' new Africa Command (Africom), reports a South African newspaper."

Any country that allowed itself to be a base for the US strategic command in Africa (Africom) would have to live with the consequences, Lekota said.

Africom's recent creation has been interpreted as the US suddenly recognising the strategic importance of Africa to the US.

Last month it was reported that Lekota was not responding to US requests for him to meet the first Africom commander, Gen Kip Ward.

Briefing the media yesterday, Lekota said the Southern African Development Community (SADC) defence ministers had, at the summit in Lusaka this month, decided that no member states would host Africom and more armed US soldiers.

He said this was also the "continental position" of the African Union.

However, Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has evidently already offered her country as a base for Africom.

Simon Tisdale wrote in the London-based Guardian: "Africom marks the official arrival of America's 'global war on terror' on the African continent."

[TROUFION]

It needs some heavy Public Relations work. This has to be a sell situation, the US and Gen Ward in particular need to go on an all out media blitz, selling the benefits, the needs, the new softer approach, the low profile HQ, no battalions will be based there etc. Can't just stand it up and expect them to all love the idea. Hell the Al Qeada types and maybe even china are probably stoking the counter-media, starting rumors of colonization, invasion and permamnent basing of armor divisions etc.

[Old Eagle]

The Grunt (troufion) is dead on.

The SADC made grand pronouncements based on our enemies' ability to sell the "counterstory" to what's really going on. This is KILLING me!!!

AFRICOM is a good news story for the US, UN, Africa, ALCON. While we have dithered, our enemies (with some healthy skeptism by the MSM) have twisted the story line. AFRICOM is now being portayed as a boogie man and those of you w/African experience understand that a combination of RUMINT and the supernatural have a huge effect on the audience.

Get on message. Get the message to the people. Put a face on this story.

[Ken White]

it. Our egos are too big. "We're from America and we're here to help" is supposed to be all it takes. Never is -- then we get our feelings hurt, act stupidly and start kicking shins.

State and DoD are equally bad at it.

Killing USAID and USIA were not the smartest moves we've made lately.

[wm]

Get on message. Get the message to the people. Put a face on this story.

This latest on line account definitely is not what you were calling for, now is it?

Sept. 17, 2007 issue - America is quietly expanding its fight against terror on the African front. Two years ago the United States set up the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership with nine countries in central and western Africa. There is no permanent presence, but the hope is to generate support and suppress radicalism by both sharing U.S. weapons and tactics with friendly regimes and winning friends through a vast humanitarian program assembled by USAID, including well building and vocational training. In places like Chad, American Special Forces train and arm police or border guards using what it calls a "holistic approach to counterterrorism." Sgt. Chris Rourke, a U.S. Army reservist in a 12-man American Civil Affairs unit living in Dire Dawa, in eastern Ethiopia, says it comes down to this: "It's the Peace Corps with a weapon."

Sometime in the coming months, after a vetting process to find a good partner country, the United States plans to establish a new headquarters in Africa to spearhead this armed battle for hearts, minds and the capture of terror suspects. The Pentagon says Africom—the first new U.S. strategic command established since 2002—will integrate existing diplomatic, economic and humanitarian programs into a single strategic vision for Africa, bring more attention to long-ignored American intelligence-gathering and energy concerns on the continent, and elevate African interests to the same level of importance as those of Asia and the Middle East. Africom joins 10 other commands, including CENTCOM in Florida, the now famous nerve center for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the establishment of a major American base in Africa is inspiring new criticism from European and African critics of U.S. imperial overreach.

[Beelzebubalicious]

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVE:BALANCE OF POWER?
by
Lieutenant Colonel Mary Jo Choate
United States Marine Corps

"The military components of the TSCTI are solid, but there needs to be more investment in the other elements of national power, especially the Economic element. The U.S. needs to dig deep into its pockets, and convince the global community to do likewise, to support long-term programs to reduce poverty and social alienation. Although the TSCTI is touted as an interagency program, the majority of its “face” is military. The interagency partnerships and dovetailing programs are insufficiently tied to TSCTI, and the Information element of national power – both the Information Operations and Public Diplomacy, depending on whether the target audience is the bad guys or the good guys (the people of Africa; the taxpayers and elected officials at home in the U.S.) – needs to be leveraged more often and more effectively. This is how we win hearts, minds and future resources. A program without funding is a fantasy."