The Pacific is not always pacific
but the name, applied to a US Military Command is fairly benign. As are the names Central, Northern and Southern. European is locale specifc but it's been around so long no one notices.
OTOH, naming a new Command for a specific and troubled continent at a time whee we're in one of our periodic 'throwing our weight around' modes is probably not very smart.
I have no question that the long standing division of the continent among three Commands should be rectified for many reasons but an innocuous name would soothe the concerns of many. Regardless, we've done it and named it.
That did not mean we then had to go shopping for an office building and get embarrassed by having our credit card rejected -- totally predictably -- in several countries. Hopefully, we will not be dumb enough to bully our way in somewhere.
If Southern Command can operate from Miami, so could Africom...
But remember that Southern Command operated for decades from Panama. And old SOUTHCOM hands will tell you that it was more effective then.Originally Posted by Ken White
As an old Africa hand, I kind of feel like that if none of our erstwhile partners on the continent want to host a training, advisory, and security assistance command, maybe we should just write them off.
What was the piece in the article that talked about the command being distributed throughout Africa in existing structures? While distributed commands face some challenges, it would seem to provide allot more capability to existing embassies and consulates. It would be more integrated with OGAs, get better & more timely Intel from the field, and probably reduce the public visibility of the overall command. These days IT and collaboration from fixed sites has some good advantages. Also consider it as one less Force Pro headache - plus helps ensure the command will not get bloated.
Rob,
Where is the fun in that?
Isn't building units, HQ and 'empire' the default game that all Western Militaries like to participate in?
A game for 2 to 1,000 players, it gives the satisfying illusion of progress without the problematic requirement for innovative thought or policy implementation...
No one loses a job or promotion for earnestly creating additional organisation and process in the face of a systemic problem.
Yours Cynically,
Mark
No question that the Command should be located
...there and as a visitor to SOUTHCOM then and later, no question said old hands are more than right. However, as you know, there's a reason SOUTHCOM is now (but probably not forever) in Miami. I'm merely thinking aloud that the same rationale applies to AfriCom at this time. Two or three years in the future will likely be a bit more propitious. I'm probably a tad over reactive on the PR angle in this and many things because I keep seeing us getting tromped in that arena -- and not only by erstwhile enemies...
Not being at all familiar with Africa and lacking a willing host you may be correct on a write-off but given we've announced the Command even that wouldn't be easy.
Participate in? I thought that was the
overriding reson d'être. In US parlance, flags and spaces make stars...
Rob, adding your comment to Mark's...
Great. We can work with this. We're already in Djibouti, I noted in my 13 Jun Jane's that our White Hatted friends say they're going to almost permanently keep a small deck Gator in the Gulf of Guinea for training and support. So we put the command in those two locations and this justifies the Command aircraft TDA to bump up from a C21 or UC 37 to a C20. Or maybe even a C40. Of course, a couple of SH 60s will be required to ferry from the LSD to the nearest airport. Plus extra spaces due to the aircraft support contract management and the distributed model. The potential is endless...
Seriously, the distributed model has merit, might be a worthwhile experiment.
The Americans Have Landed
Esquire magazine - The Americans Have Landed by Thomas P. M. Barnett.
A few years ago, with little fanfare, the United States opened a base in the horn of Africa to kill or capture Al Qaeda fighters. By 2012, the Pentagon will have two dozen such forts. The story of Africa Command, the American military's new frontier outpost...
Great Article
The balance between kinetics-direct action and whatever you want to call it - the other stuff. Inoculating Africa from Fundamentalist Islamism. The underlying question, can USAFRICOM continue to manage the balance?
I know I am probably in the minority on the SWC about this but it bothers me. The SOCCOM leadership in the GWOT, (I had an extensive class at NPS on the History of SOF taught by Dr. Kalev 'Gunner' Sepp, everyone in the class was SOF except myself, we had this conversation, I held my own but it was 12:1 against me on this very topic) mainly the ability to crossboundary amongst the COCCOM's. If I was the Commanding Officer of CJTF-HOA or of USAFRICOM I'd have a problem with independent 'wire within the wire' operations. Especially if a point target effort could undermine years of cultivation.
I look at it like this: when the German Codes were broken in WWII there had to be a balance, when and how to use the info gained to interfere with German actions. Too blatant a hit would tip the Germans that the code was broken, too little action and why break the code in the first place.
I see the DA piece as a necessity but not the primary action. It is like chemotherapy used once the patient is so sick there is no choice. As opposed to innoculations to prevent a patient getting sick in the first place.
-T
SF, CA and PsyOps should be
in my view, returned to the Army (and at least some SEAL teams to the Navy) and USSOCOM should keep the DA, SR and allied tasks. The major problem in the services has been the melding of the SOF culture with that of the broader service and that is a really significant issue, a big hazardous disconnect, that someone better get a handle on before it creates a minor disaster.
The two sides are totally distrustful of each other -- both with some very legitimate complaints and both with some self righteous flaky complaints. A major mistake the Army made IMO was to create the SF Branch. The cross fertilization that was available before at all ranks was more beneficial than is the slightly increased competence due to the formation of the branch. I realize that's not going to change either but some method of breaking down the barriers better be explored.
That is not to say that I disagree with SOF, I'm a firm believer and a former practitioner. JSOC was necessary, USSSOCOM was possibly not -- I give them credit though for being innovative, developing a rapid and effective procurement system and some great capabilities but they are over secretive (with some justification and then, most everyone is over secretive) and way too parochial. They're doing some innovative and very good things but it's supposed to be a national effort.
So let me join you in that minority. I am a SOF Believer of the first water but not a USSOCOM fan. I railed against Barbwire Bob when he was lobbying to get it set up -- not that anyone paid much attention -- and I think it was a mistake. Immaterial, really, it's here and Parkinson's Law will apply.
Thus, we will have dual chains of command in operation until a bunch of people get badly, totally, publicly killed by foul-ups due to that duality and the distrust for the community of the Big services (and vice versa). That's the American way. Regardless of how the Command morphs, I'd be willing to bet at some time, most if not all elements in theater will be responsible to the Theater Commander.
A while back when the formation of AFRICOM was first being bruited, I recommended a 2 HQ arrangement on a N-S axis. The E-W axis also works. I'd suggest the main site be in Equatorial Guinea--Bioko (the island formerly known as Fernando Po) would be my choice as the primary HQ with a forward operating facility based out of our current facilities in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti (with the appropriate plussing up to make it suitable for a 4-star to be in residence as required). This would be very fashionable--much like folks who winter in Miami and summer in Maine.Great. We can work with this. We're already in Djibouti, I noted in my 13 Jun Jane's that our White Hatted friends say they're going to almost permanently keep a small deck Gator in the Gulf of Guinea for training and support. So we put the command in those two locations and this justifies the Command aircraft TDA to bump up from a C21 or UC 37 to a C20. Or maybe even a C40. Of course, a couple of SH 60s will be required to ferry from the LSD to the nearest airport. Plus extra spaces due to the aircraft support contract management and the distributed model. The potential is endless...
Seriously, the distributed model has merit, might be a worthwhile experiment.
That would work well.
On a further note, I note the Navy now has the support mission at Lemonier and that is a good thing; they build better buildings, feed better and bigger meals and have great coffee 24 hours a day. I strongly recommend that where ever Africom goes, the Navy get the support package. For the good of the assigned troops...
I'm busy cogitating the four star quarters, the expat restaurants and chefs in Djibouti and the interface with the French.
Cultural Awareness
Well,
If we did go with a N/E/S/W HQs distro - we'd invariably learn how to screw up the following phrases "Hello", "How Much", and "Where is the bathroom". As for Navy chow - only if they hire the guys who run the Chief's mess.
Elitist!
Es verdad, Mon Ami, zu verstehen! Dame binjo?
elitist - am R not
Hey Ken,
Funny - from my Amharic lessons I can recall "Tenastaling" and "Terpezza" - there was no real incentive to learn as the only girls you could pursue in 1987were those from approved nations -plus we had a great guy who drove us around and made all our deals for us - on the other hand - when I PCS'd to Madrid as my follow on - I learned to habla might damn quick.
As for the CPO's mess - well, I'd be willing to take a per-diem cut to finance it.
R 2 - but Ditto moi ...
Yes, isn't it absolutely amazing the benefit offered by pillow speakers in the grasp of a new language?
If I were younger I'd do some research on that. I don't remember why but it sounds like a good idea. I think.
Something that's always fascinated me is the difference between truly cognitive skills and their genetic allies. Went to Monterey for Farsi, left early due to a UOR and never truly got proficient. Forgot most of it due to lack of practice then and swore it was totally gone. Then, 20 years later in Atlanta bumped into an old Iraniha Colonel from the Shah's day and amazingly most of it came back really quickly. Gone again now and not too many from Iran on the Redneck Riviera...
ISN, 2 Jul 07: Questioning AFRICOM's Intentions
As US plans for an African command (AFRICOM) operations base forge ahead, perceptions that the base's raison d'etre is to gain control over regional oil assets and counter growing Chinese influence are growing.
While Washington is proffering AFRICOM as a largely benign organization, Africans remain wary, having seen that a US military footprint in Djibouti led to operations such as Somalia, and believe that the Pentagon could not resist intervening to protect US investments in oil producing nations such as Nigeria or Equatorial Guinea if their regimes were toppled.....
Army Gen. William Ward to Lead Africa Command
11 July Reuters - Bush Picks Black General to Lead Africa Operations by Kristin Roberts.
More...U.S. President George W. Bush on Tuesday nominated Army Gen. William Ward, the highest ranking black in the U.S. military, to lead the new Africa Command and coordinate military operations on the continent.
Bush's decision in February to create Africa Command came after months of discussion inside the Pentagon and reflected increasing U.S. strategic interest in the continent and worry that Islamic militants were finding safe haven there...
Africa Command will first be part of European Command and have some operational capability by October. It should be a stand-alone, operational command by the end of fiscal year 2008, which ends September 30, 2008.
The Pentagon has not decided where to put Africa Command's headquarters. Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, in June said the command might set up staff offices at different places around the continent.
2 Aug 07 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Relations on Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?:
Theresa Whelan, Dpty Asst Secretary of Defense for African Affairs
Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute of International Affairs...there are fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his chief advisor on defense and security matters. The creation of a single U.S. DoD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DoD to better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership, to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DoD generally, or for AFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID has clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. DoD will seek to provide support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives succeed....
Wafula Okumu, South Africa Institute for Security Studies....For more than 50 years, Western developmental assistance to Africa was hampered by insecurity. The end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa laid the necessary pre-conditions for Africans to set their own integrated security and development agenda. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, meanwhile, precipitated a hard re-examination of international security assumptions in the West. What should emerge from these trends is engagement with Africa based on a convergence of interests. Africom essentially represents a re-packaging of current US military partnership initiatives with Africa under a coherent organisational structure. The skepticism it has raised among African states and societies indicates the need for Washington to reassure its prospective African partners that Africom acknowledges the lead role of Africans themselves in determining their own security, development and governance priorities. In the African context, this means at least a great an emphasis on poverty alleviation as it does on military professionalsim. US security assurances in Africa must therefore depend on quiet, sustained support for Africa’s own prescribed agenda for renewal.
J. Peter Pham, James Madison University...The hostility that it has faced so far points to the fact that Africom could turn out to be an expensive endeavor, both in terms of resources and long-term U.S.-Africa relations. It should not come as a surprise that Washington’s designs for Africa are now viewed with skepticism. Oil, China and terrorism are being seen to be the principal concerns of the U.S. initiative. If the coordination of a securitized development policy for Africa is part of the U.S. strategy, then it is seen by many local observers as essentially secondary and subordinate to the main aim....
...In the end, I know of no other factor which may have as much influence on how AFRICOM is initially received as the decision concerning its basing. The selection of the site will have both positive and negative impacts on the new command’s strategic effect and will, in turn, dictate AFRICOM’s ability to influence and support the various elements of American national power in helping build a secure, stable, and prosperous African continent.
Given the larger perspective of the history of colonialism and its still deleterious consequences, including those having to do with perceptions, as well as the practical question of infrastructure and security, I would counsel the basing of the command headquarters in the United States, with a forward, mobile headquarters deployed as needed. This option would afford maximum operational flexibility, while avoiding the negative consequences of opening ourselves to accusations of neo-colonialism and militarization. In this scenario, sub-components may, of course, be based on the continent in support of African initiatives, for example, a training mission working in partnership with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Accra might well indeed be based in Ghana....
Anyone have their fingers on a good US policy statement or strategy for the Horn of Africa? Is there one? How will this change policies and practices?
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