Africom Stands Up 2006-2017

[Tom Odom]

It was from Uganda that the U.S. aided in the destabilization of Rwanda, which resulted in the 1994 genocide.

Here we go again with the US-Rwanda conspiracy but look at the author:

Jean Damu is the former western regional representative for N'COBRA, National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America, a former member of the International Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, taught Black Studies at the University of New Mexico, has traveled and written extensively in Cuba and Africa and currently serves as a member of the Steering Committee of the Black Alliance for Just Immigration. Email him at jdamu2@yahoo.com.

[Beelzebubalicious]

Tom, other than general suspicion of USG and US-military objectives in Africa, what do you think drives the persistence of these beliefs?

[Stan]

Military Review, January-February 2008

A short read, but I gotta disagree with more than half (for now).

The first effect is that Africa was never a number-one priority for any unified command. Each viewed its strategic imperative as being elsewhere, leaving Africa as a secondary or even tertiary concern.

Second, the three-part division of responsibility violates the principle of unity of command, increasing the likelihood of an uncoordinated DOD effort in Africa.

Third, owing to historical disinterest, DOD never developed a sizable cadre of dedicated African experts.

Lastly, Africa has never benefited from the advocacy
of a four-star commander whose undiluted mandate includes helping policymakers understand the perspectives of African countries and formulate effective African security policy.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, other than general suspicion of USG and US-military objectives in Africa, what do you think drives the persistence of these beliefs?

Well in the case of the Rwanda-US Conspiracy, that has long legs well sustained by our friends the French and their former allies (and closet buddies) the genocidal killers of the former regime. They play the conspiracy crowd/alternate media/radical history crowd like a fine violin. Here is an example.

DB: Are you saying you believe the RPF planned to incite genocide and began to do so back when they invaded in 1990?

JCN: Yes, because the final aggression that started on April 6th was the final attack, but since the beginning, they had planned to seize power and in order to seize power it was not in their interest to join a transitional government because they would eventually lose the elections anyway. Imagine any country, anywhere you go, the United States or any country from Europe, Asia…you can’t find a minority ruling the country. The only way for the RPF to do this, they had to find a shortcut that could help them seize and retain power and they have to use force and fear to maintain it. They also had to get support from all the countries that had their own interests in the region.

When the aggression started, the RPF told the world they wanted to bring back democracy to Rwanda. This was a smokescreen to hide their real agenda: minority rule. They got financial aid, advising, and military training from the U.K. and the United States through Uganda.

DB: Do you know who specifically was financing the RPF in the beginning, regardless of if they are foreign nationals or Rwandans?

JCN: U.S. and U.K. multinationals supported the RPF so that they could get access to loot Central Africa’s mineral resources, particularly in Zaire. To reach this goal, the RPF had to be connected to the Clinton Administration because they were the most influential in the U.N. There were also organizations that supported the Tutsi refugees based in the United States. Can you imagine the shameful attitude of the U.S. administration’s representative Herman Cohen against the Rwandan nation? He said that President Habyarimana’s body, the state symbol of Rwanda, would be dragged through the streets of Kigali and his government would be tried by a special tribunal.9

In a larger sense, Africa is no different than other post-colonial regions where Western neo-colonial aims are an assumption from which all facts are generated. As for the particular paper Mr Damu wrote for, I will leave that to you to form your own opinions.

[ancien]

Well, because they also pass the rabit to the Belgians, I feel inclined to respond to this without getting oftopic in this thread.
In the 60's they said that we interfiered to much in the internal problems of the Congo, so in a feuwe countries they started to protest.
Concerning Rwanda, they said that we did not responded, so the genocide spread out.
THEY shoud make up there mind

[MattC86]

Well in the case of the Rwanda-US Conspiracy, that has long legs well sustained by our friends the French and their former allies (and closet buddies) the genocidal killers of the former regime. They play the conspiracy crowd/alternate media/radical history crowd like a fine violin. Here is an example.



In a larger sense, Africa is no different than other post-colonial regions where Western neo-colonial aims are an assumption from which all facts are generated. As for the particular paper Mr Damu wrote for, I will leave that to you to form your own opinions.

This just reinforces that whole theme of alternative narratives and IO. We know its not true, and some people intellectually know its not true, but how do we "prove" it's not true?

I think any potential mission in Africa, under AFRICOM or a different combatant command, from FID to a Restore Hope-type OOTW could smack of neo-colonialism to certain people. That seems to be why it's hard to get Europe to participate there - Romeo Dallaire catalogued the Europeans' (particularly French and Belgian) fear of appearing imperialistic in their old colonial stomping grounds in Rwanda in 1994. The US wasn't an imperial power in Africa, yet we're tarnished with the same brush in the eyes of the world.

Speaking of FID, do we do those kind of operations in Africa, outside the Horn? Or is even that a larger footprint than we want?

Matt

[Tom Odom]

That seems to be why it's hard to get Europe to participate there - Romeo Dallaire catalogued the Europeans' (particularly French and Belgian) fear of appearing imperialistic in their old colonial stomping grounds in Rwanda in 1994

.

Yes depending on whom you ask. That is yes to the Belgians. I was surprised that Belgium agreed to participate in the first UNAMIR as neither side could view Belgian troops as neutral, especially the Paracommandos. I also believe that aside from some issues with the PC regiment that Dallaire reveals regarding their behavior, they did a good job under severe circumstances. The treatment of senior Belgian officers in the aftermath of the tragedy was pure merde dished out to cover political leaders who had agreed to the mission and set the ROE leading to the massacre of the Belgian troops.

Absolutely not in the case of the French; indeed the focus of French preoocupation with the Francophone bloc has been to not only maintain French ties with previous colonies but to expand that dominance into former Belgian colonies/protectorates. Where the rub came with the French and Dallaire was in missions assigned to the French should they come back once the war resumed. At one stage, Dallaire threatened to shoot them down. With what I have no idea. In any case, French Op Turquoise was very much a chameleon that changed colors from intervention to humanitarian based on world reaction to the announcement. As for the RPA view toward the French, nothing made senior leaders in the RPA get the deadly lock jaw look more quickly than discussing the French.

Stan had years longer than me on the ground in Zaire and he can relate Zairios/Congolese views toward the French better than I can. All of that aside, France still maintains a fixed view toward mainatining dominance in Francophone Africa. They are also more blatant in their exercise of that policy. Money is involved and the French are much more adept at its use in getting what they want. Cnonsequently in a case like Zaire where the average Zairios disliked if not openly despised seening French troops, the French still cultivated leaders on the basis of French interests using French money, favors, and if need be force. Nothing spoke that fact more clearly than French behavior after the genocide and their subsequent effort to resurrect Mobutu as a regional player because he could be bought and would protect their former clients from Rwanda.

We do dumb things because we don't pay attention to these factors untill it is too late. This is not the first time Africa as a continent has reacted with suspicion to the the idea of a unified command focused on the continent. The first time was when GEN PD Adams had US Strike Command and he got the mission--the logo of US Strike Command with the eagle swooping on the globe did not sit well in the newly emergent African nations of the early 1960s. We ended up adding to PD Adams title US CINCMEAFSA for Middle East and sub-Sharan Africa. That still did not go over very well so ultimately we ended up with the 3 way split as it stood until recently. Our announcement of Africa Command was clumsy and I can guarantee you our French friends did us no favors--even as we are working with them in Djibouti. I suspect that the announcement as it was made was more targeted toward African-American leaders than it was African leaders.

So while you are correct our history as not having any colonies on the continent (excluding of course Liberia) should have steered perceptions toward a less threatening message, I believe we were looking at this from a 180 degrees different perspective, one concerned with meeting US domestic demands that we take Africa seriously.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

Ah, memories of Paul D. and other CinCStrike/MEAFSA. Not to mention STRAC...

I think you points are all very correct and your final statement most particularly so.

[Stan]

Ah, memories of Paul D. and other CinCStrike/MEAFSA. Not to mention STRAC...

I think you points are all very correct and your final statement most particularly so.

Once you get the old boy fired up, he really smokes

[Ken White]

Once you get the old boy fired up, he really smokes

StriCom layout at Pope. My Battle group commander erred in front of Paul D. Said Colonel disappeared that night and was never seen at Bragg again, new Colonel arrived two days later...

[ancien]

.

Yes depending on whom you ask. That is yes to the Belgians. I was surprised that Belgium agreed to participate in the first UNAMIR as neither side could view Belgian troops as neutral, especially the Paracommandos. I also believe that aside from some issues with the PC regiment that Dallaire reveals regarding their behavior, they did a good job under severe circumstances. The treatment of senior Belgian officers in the aftermath of the tragedy was pure merde dished out to cover political leaders who had agreed to the mission and set the ROE leading to the massacre of the Belgian troops.

Absolutely not in the case of the French; indeed the focus of French preoocupation with the Francophone bloc has been to not only maintain French ties with previous colonies but to expand that dominance into former Belgian colonies/protectorates. Where the rub came with the French and Dallaire was in missions assigned to the French should they come back once the war resumed. At one stage, Dallaire threatened to shoot them down. With what I have no idea. In any case, French Op Turquoise was very much a chameleon that changed colors from intervention to humanitarian based on world reaction to the announcement. As for the RPA view toward the French, nothing made senior leaders in the RPA get the deadly lock jaw look more quickly than discussing the French.

Stan had years longer than me on the ground in Zaire and he can relate Zairios/Congolese views toward the French better than I can. All of that aside, France still maintains a fixed view toward mainatining dominance in Francophone Africa. They are also more blatant in their exercise of that policy. Money is involved and the French are much more adept at its use in getting what they want. Cnonsequently in a case like Zaire where the average Zairios disliked if not openly despised seening French troops, the French still cultivated leaders on the basis of French interests using French money, favors, and if need be force. Nothing spoke that fact more clearly than French behavior after the genocide and their subsequent effort to resurrect Mobutu as a regional player because he could be bought and would protect their former clients from Rwanda.

We do dumb things because we don't pay attention to these factors untill it is too late. This is not the first time Africa as a continent has reacted with suspicion to the the idea of a unified command focused on the continent. The first time was when GEN PD Adams had US Strike Command and he got the mission--the logo of US Strike Command with the eagle swooping on the globe did not sit well in the newly emergent African nations of the early 1960s. We ended up adding to PD Adams title US CINCMEAFSA for Middle East and sub-Sharan Africa. That still did not go over very well so ultimately we ended up with the 3 way split as it stood until recently. Our announcement of Africa Command was clumsy and I can guarantee you our French friends did us no favors--even as we are working with them in Djibouti. I suspect that the announcement as it was made was more targeted toward African-American leaders than it was African leaders.

So while you are correct our history as not having any colonies on the continent (excluding of course Liberia) should have steered perceptions toward a less threatening message, I believe we were looking at this from a 180 degrees different perspective, one concerned with meeting US domestic demands that we take Africa seriously.

Best

Tom

I take your explanetion greatly into account, sir.
But I would like to contribute on the Belgian part in UNAMIR.

Unamir was created under a UN mandate. The origine of the Arusha agreement started with the agreement of N'sele after the RPF invasion in 1990. From thereone it got evolved to the OAU and then to the UN. At all these negotiations from the beginning, GOR, FPR, Belgium, France, US where involved ore supervising these negosiations. With respect to you, sir, but the US goverment new verry wel why we where there. You wrote two papers envolving Belgian interventions in Africa, so maybe there is a answer in those documents.

When Belgium contributed forces to UNAMIR, it was presented on the media that it was a request of president Habyarimana because the french where not a option for the FPR.
The message of that story is that the Belgians arrived in Rwanda on a UN mission where Belgian civilians lived and worked. So, as a Belgian UN soldier, you are a hostage from day one.

At that time nobody cared about Rwanda. Until the 6 april. It is frustrating that there are a lot of people who write books about Rwanda genocide, and all they start from the shootdown of the airplane toward the invasion of zaire ore from the 6 april back to 1990 and from there a jump to 1961 and the previeus years. The Rwandan problem goos back a lot further in time, in a timeframe where there where no europeans. At that time, Africa was all about litle kingdoms.

I'am not going to attack gen. Dallaire on a open forum regarding a few statements about us in his book or interviews, ore am I going to discus his own action. At that time before the 6 april when nobody new Rwanda, Whe where the only ones who had a grip on the situation and not the UN. We where spread out over Kigali in smal units and that strategy became very importend after the 6th april, but was very dangoures. There is not one army in the entyre western world that would do what we did at that time, no armourded vehicles, no gunhelicopters, no artilery, no havy weapons and NO MANDATE. There where times when other forces of UNAMIR would not come out of there bases, BUT THE BELGIANS DID. Concirning gen. Dallaire, he hat a hard and unworkable mandate, and after the shootdown of the airplane, the genocide, the amputated mandate of UNAMIR II and the refugy problem, he had the CNNthing on his neck.

So when the rest of the regiment, the French an the Italians arrived, it was the wish of the Belgian goverment to stop the mission whitsh we where very angry about, but it was made after consulting the partners in that croked peacedeal including the US goverment. At that time all the countries should have hold the line like 2CDO did on there own, they where a example how to work in a crisissituation with a UN mandate.

You where in Kigali, so it is posible that you now camp Kigali, then you now how many soldiers there can be stationed.
The squad of LT Lotin, 1SGT Leroy, CPL Bassinne, CPL Debatty, CPL Dupont, CPL Lhoir, CPL Meaux, CPL Plescia, CPL RENWA, CPL Uytebroeck, hold the line for more than half a day, AND THAT IS WHO WE ARE!

About the French part, your book has not arrived yet, sir

regards,

[Tom Odom]

Ancien,

I made no criticism of the PC Regiment and intended that none be taken. General Dallaire's comments are a matter of public record and they dealt primarily with matters of behavior of young soldiers.

I understand the frustration of you and other regiment members after the death of your comrades. We did much the same in Somalia, just months earlier.

US pressure was indeed targeted toward a complete drawdown of all UN forces as the genocide began. Ambassador Albright at the UN refused to deliver that message and said so to the White House.

Finally as I said earler I believed then and still do that the PC Regiment performed well under dire circumstances and ROE that led to tragedy, What I found fault with was the Belgian government's decision to court martial officers for essentially following those ROE.

Best

Tom

[ancien]

Sir,I was not formulating criticism on your part or do I take it as criticism from you
I only want to ad some perspective insight in the Rwanda situation. For people who have no insight in the matter,they would make the wrong conclusion about us and the situation.

I now gen. Dallaire wrote about us in that matter, so did col. Marchal. For me as a soldier, I consider this below there position. For as long the military has existed in history, these event unfortunably happen. They both exepted the responsability of that mission, they could decline it, but for there personel reasens they exepted.

I olso take the stand, that putting a highranking officer in a courtroom concerning the squad of LT Lotin is very wrong. They where sacrafied. A intervention on camp Kigali by Belgian soldiers to rescue the squad could lead to sirieus danger to Belgian nationals in Rwanda, and the other UN units where not trained and willing to do so. But you wil not hear this coming from a politician.
We don't ask for honor in this, but we don't diserve to be castigated like that in the media. We worn the political leaders from the beginning that the peaceproces might break. Especialy, the Belgian politicians made huge diplomatic faulds in that matter.


regards,

[Cavguy]

All,

Found the following at Intel Dump:

AFRICOM's new logo/patch(?) below. I about snorted my drink all over the keyboard when I saw it.



Maybe I was just deployed too long or have it on the brain ... but quite a likeness to some ... ahem ... feminine parts.

Interesting choice of design. Can't believe no one involved in the production noticed the possible interpretations.

Judge for yourself. It's on http://www.africom.mil, so it's not a hoax.

[patmc]

If you want to make Africa happy, just stay in touch with Egypt.

[Tom Odom]

Maybe I was just deployed too long or have it on the brain ... but quite a likeness to some ... ahem ... feminine parts.

Well it is curiously inviting....

[Van]

Deliberate? It would certainly symbolize the underlying problem of Africa; Over-population.

[Tom Odom]

And where is home plate?

JIM
So let's say you get there...what's
uh, third base feel like?

KEVIN
Oh, man, that's kind of sad.

Jim shrugs, embarrassed.

OZ
Feels like warm apple pie, dude.

JIM
Apple pie...
(then)
McDonald's or homemade?

[Rob Thornton]

Marc - we expect a very detailed anthropological analysis on this - from the subliminal pieces of development - to the effects of wearing it in public Rob

[Wesley Morgan]

I'm glad someone else sees it too...