Grand Strategy

[CR6]

We have bombed a number of dictators and I am hard pressed to think of a single case where it had the desired effect.

I'm interested in your perspective on Operation Allied Force.

[SethB]

I'm interested in your perspective on Operation Allied Force.

I haven't forgotten to answer you!

Based upon what I've read, and I claim no deep knowledge of the war, NATO sought to end genocide in Kosovo by forcing concessions on the part of Slobodan Milosevic.

The air assault included strikes on three kinds of targets. Military targets, infrastructure, and senior leadership.

It is my understanding that the initial BDA was overly optimistic, that NATO claimed to have destroyed far more military material than it actually did, and that there was a great deal of international outrage over the destruction of civilian infrastructure, something which we have done in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq.

It has been my impression that grinding up military units is the most effective way of persuading the enemy. Attacks on infrastructure and leadership may be helpful where they decrease military effectiveness or raise the costs of resisting, but the costs from destroying things like power plants and transmission facilities are high, especially if we intend to hold the ground.

Further, when the enemy is largely independent of things that can be attacked (like the Vietnamese during Linebacker II and, strangely enough, Germany during the 1940's) then attacks on infrastructure my be a waste of time, and an opportunity cost. I say Germany because the peak of their industrial output was at a time when they endured nightly air raids. Precision guided munitions may change the ability to hit the target, but the weak link, at least in the 1990s, seemed to be finding targets, especially when the enemy could and would mock up fake equipment to draw the US/NATO into wasting bombs on telephone poles.

Lastly, I don't know how much of Milosevic's decision to concede was based on air attack vs. how much was based on Russian pressure, given the regions history.

If you were there or know more about it, I would be glad to hear from you. My understanding of airpower is imperfect, to say the least!

ETA: As always, someone else said it first and better. I agree with Pape:

Robert Pape argues that many air power practitioners in the West have misunderstood the true value of precision-guided munitions (PGM) in the wake of Desert Storm. It is widely believed that PGMs enable the United States to win wars within just days, by targeting the enemy leadership. Robert Pape, however, argues that the true value of PGMs lies in the support of ground power. They have rendered joint operations between air and ground forces in conventional campaigns so much more effective that air power is now doing most of the work.