Grand Strategy

[ipopescu]

I do agree with Wilf that it is an important definition for those concerned with execution; believe that is less true so for the masses and even those fields of academe not directly concerned -- and that would include Historians IMO. Still, strategy is, I think, a frequently misused word...

Here's how Oxford's Hew Strachan put it a couple of years ago (in Survival I think) in an article aptly titled "the lost meaning of strategy":
“The word strategy has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities...One of the reasons we are unsure what war is is that we are unsure about what strategy is or is not. It is not policy; it is not politics; it is not diplomacy. It exists in relation to all three, but it does not replace them.”

In an upcoming article for Contemporary Security Policy, I've chosen to stick to the following definition: strategy is the process of using military and non-military means to accomplish the desired political ends in a conflict; it is first and foremost a pragmatic enterprise whose role is to show the ways in which resources are employed to achieve the desired ends set by policy.

I personally don't like using the word grand strategy as a synonym to "foreign policy". It makes more sense in my opinion to think of strategy instrumentally, as something that helps one use the resources at its disposal to achieve the desired goals determined by its foreign and national security policy.

In the academic world, one of the most often quoted definitions comes from political scientist Barry Posen: "A grand strategy is a nation-state’s theory about how to produce security for itself." Another common one comes from historian Paul Kennedy and moves in the direction of using grand strategy and foreign policy interchangeably: "the crux of grand strategy lies in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) interests"

[Ken White]

I think the problem with both Posen and Kennedy is that in the first case, he presumes a sense of continuity that will not exist for long in any society and not long at all in a democratic one due to the changes elections bring. The second case, Kennedy's solution, is as you say, mixing, commingling, conflating or otherwise confusing two sets of actions which probably should be viewed separately. I think it's safe to say he adds no clarity to my question.

Looking forward to the conference report...

[Ron Humphrey]

it raises questions.

How do you propose to get a coherent and lasting Grand Strategy in a nation that has changes in its political character every two, four, six and / or eight years?

This has always been my biggest issue with the idea of any real "Grand Strategy".

If you look at it in the simplest form I think you can probably keep it to Where do you want to be/have/exist in blank years.

Family planning
Career planning
etc.

Difference is in those you are truly limited to the realistic understanding that you probably only have control of what you do and outside influences will have to be dealt with as they come from where-ever you are on your path.

In governmental planning your not. Limited to you that is, you can also include influencers on a large scale which will work to affect the paths of others be it encouragement or discouragement of a given action or more often simply trying to enable political changes which you perceive to be more in line with your own.

So in response to the question you pose I would postulate that although it's true those cycles in leadership here are guaranteed to affect things in relation to our actions it's not necessarily true that they have to affect our FP in as dramatic a fashion as they tend to. Perhaps the fact that so many leaders come in presuming that others really care what you do as much as how you do what you do.

Regardless it doesn't seem completely out of the realm of possibility for those parts of our greater defense community that don't change out as often to be able to help those that do come up with a given set of general directions which wouldn't change because its things that both sides could agree upon.

I know thats garbled but hopefully you get what I'm trying to say

[Ken White]

So in response to the question you pose I would postulate that although it's true those cycles in leadership here are guaranteed to affect things in relation to our actions it's not necessarily true that they have to affect our FP in as dramatic a fashion as they tend to...

with you. That is, the idealist and even the pragmatist that is I agree. The cynic that 45 years of Guvmint service has made me OTOH says "I wish..."

Egos. I think it's egos, Ron. They just can't help thinking they can do it better ...

Regardless it doesn't seem completely out of the realm of possibility for those parts of our greater defense community that don't change out as often to be able to help those that do come up with a given set of general directions which wouldn't change because its things that both sides could agree upon.

You'd think so. Perhpas there are two parts to that. First, most of the parts of the defense community do change over perhaps too rapidly. Even on the civilian side where you'd expect more continuity. In a little over 15 years of Civil service I had six distinct jobs in four pay grades in three locations (and directly under under six Colonels and four three stars...). So the presumed continuity is not always there; we probably move people too often.

Secondly, it's been my observation that most Administrations I've seen in the 50 plus years I've been paying attention are not really comfortable with the Armed Forces. Eisenhower was an obvious exception and in his own way, Bush 43 was also. All the others were basically uncomfortable with the military and that includes Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, Ford and Bush 41 who were all junior officers in one war or another. Kennedy and Ford were less uncomfortable than the others but Truman was almost anti-military in many respects. Notice I left out Johnson and Reagan whose 'service' doesn't really count.

Long way of getting to the point that most admins don't interface well and the Pentagram likes it that way -- gives them more freedom. Plus we have a culture that (quote)encourages speaking out(unquote) and will crucify you all too often if you do that too regularly or loudly. That does not encourage unbiased advice and one grows up in the system inclined to be circumspect. Few are willing to be outcasts for being outspoken. That's wrong but is unlikely to change.

Add to that the major problem: At what point, even if you give bold and accurate advice only to see that advice discounted and you get told to just do it, do you accept that the guidon is planted and execute the order?

[Ron Humphrey]

Add to that the major problem: At what point, even if you give bold and accurate advice only to see that advice discounted and you get told to just do it, do you accept that the guidon is planted and execute the order?

However I guess you do what we always end up doing one way or the other.

You head out where you've been directed, but since you know there's a darn good chance your gonna be flanked you do so in such a way as to hopefully be able to capitalize in the mis-direction to your advantage.

A says go right
B says go left
c&D say whatever the %## they want and

(E)nemy chooses to head straight in at you

If your lucky you put a minefield in the right place

[William F. Owen]

Because Political science is even less academically well founded than Military thought, I'd also submit that "Grand Strategy" may not actually be useful or even needed.

There is very little writing that disputes or even confirms the usefulness of the taxonomy of Tactics-Operations-Strategy and even then, "Grand Strategy."

In this case, I don't know what the answer is. I merely asking the question.

My own work on infantry doctrine, was made a whole lot easier, when I stopped using the words "Firepower" and "assault". I found they were actually blocks rather than enablers.

[Bob's World]

The fact that America has operated without a "Grand Strategy" for so long, may well be an argument that supports Wilfs proposition above; or we may learn tragically that you can only drive at high speed for so long with you your headlights on before you encounter major obstacle that you can simply cut around or bull over. I don't know the answer to that one either, but I have a suspicion...

America has one over arching objective, and two main supporting objectives. The first is to maintain the American way of life. The following two are to secure the homeland and to maintain access to markets and resources. In conjunction with those objectives we have over the last 60 years or so shifted (some would argue "drifted" is more apt) from "doctrines" of "Containment" to "Intervention" to "Preemption."

What is really lacking is some statement of understanding of the envriornment that we are operating within, and how that then shapes how such doctrines can best be applied in order to best sustain the main objectives in a manner that does not abuse our global neighbors in the process. This is what I would hope that a Grand Strategy would provide. A vision and a context within which to achieve that vision. This would guide all of US government in how we approach our day to day business and craft our plans; and also help our friends and foes alike to interpret our words and actions more clearly and thereby avoid dangerous misinterpretations of deed or intent.

Such a product would be incredibly complex in its creation, but must be equally simple in its final form. Few things are harder than converting complexity to simplicity, but that would have to be the goal for this to be effective. I hope the new administration takes this on. Such a product would shape the parameters of everything from the recent "Stimulus package" to the way ahead in Afghanistan and Iraq.

[Ken White]

The fact that America has operated without a "Grand Strategy" for so long...

If I'm correct, it revolves around four and eight year increments of change.

America has one over arching objective, and two main supporting objectives. The first is to maintain the American way of life. The following two are to secure the homeland and to maintain access to markets and resources. In conjunction with those objectives we have over the last 60 years or so shifted (some would argue "drifted" is more apt) from "doctrines" of "Containment" to "Intervention" to "Preemption."

More people would argue that we have been intervening around the world for over 200 years and that 'containment' was neither a doctrine or as pervasive as many seem to wish to think. We -- and other nations -- have also never hesitated to use pre-emption when it struck the fancy.

...I hope the new administration takes this on. Such a product would shape the parameters of everything from the recent "Stimulus package" to the way ahead in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I regrettably conclude you're likely to be disappointed in that...

[Bob's World]

I fear you are correct, but we do our best and press on regardless.

[Ken White]

We always have. In spite of them.

The kids make it work.

[ipopescu]

[QUOTE=Bob's World;66964]

The fact that America has operated without a "Grand Strategy" for so long, may well be an argument that supports Wilfs proposition above...
What is really lacking is some statement of understanding of the envriornment that we are operating within, and how that then shapes how such doctrines can best be applied in order to best sustain the main objectives in a manner that does not abuse our global neighbors in the process. This is what I would hope that a Grand Strategy would provide. A vision and a context within which to achieve that vision. This would guide all of US government in how we approach our day to day business and craft our plans; and also help our friends and foes alike to interpret our words and actions more clearly and thereby avoid dangerous misinterpretations of deed or intent.

When I raised a similar argument with a senior NSC official who worked in the Bush 43 White House I got a lot of push back and was referred to the 2006 National Security Strategy as a clear expression of such a strategy; I was also assured that the classified part of NSS, as well as the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP-GWOT) provide the kind of overarching framework that I was complaining that was missing.
I ultimately believe it is a matter of interpretation and of how one defines the notion of grand strategy (hence my focus on having some commonly accepted notion of the term when debating it). For example, some of the most respected scholars such as Gaddis gave favorable initial reviews of Bush's grand strategy
I believe that one can find a general set of principles guiding the foreign policy of most administrations; sometimes they are written in formal documents, sometimes they can be inferred from their rhetoric and their actions. I also believe that there is some amount of continuity between administrations due mostly to external conditions. I understand and generally agree with Ken's point that due to changes in political leadership every four or eight years it is unlikely to have specific grand strategies passed on from one president to the next. However, I believe an argument could be made that on many particular issues the de facto policies do carry on from one administration to the next. For example, I don't think (actually that's more of a hope) Obama's decision on Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, or even Iran will be that much different from a McCain administration (or from Bush's, if you buy Chris Brose's argument)
So, while in some ways I share your general hope that the Obama administration will be able to develop a Grand Strategy of its own, I am much more worried about them being able finding specific solutions to the many policy challenges they face in Af-Pak (as they say now), Iraq or Iran. I believe I ultimately would prefer if they would focus less on grandiose plans and more on finding pragmatic solutions to the many problems they face. I guess you could argue that the latter may require the former, but I'm not sure that's really the case.

[DavidPB4]

The term grand strategy has an accepted use in war as the set of overall priorities that govern a war effort to its conclusion. In peacetime, a nation's overall goals in the world are open-ended. Thinking in terms of different timeframes may be more useful to peacetime thinking, and clarity in long-range foreign policy may be a better descriptor of what we need.

We still live in a nuclear era but not one with the stability of the Cold War. This is not because we face adversaries who are necessarily more likely to use nuclear weapons, although the possibility cannot be excluded. It is because the growing power and spreading number of other nuclear states will reduce over the next two or three decades the influence that America presently can exert around the world. As the educational gap closes, it will also be harder for the United States to maintain a lead over other large nations in civilian technology. America may even become less competitive if educational disparities at home become larger and if the problems in our private sector cannot be solved.

To an extent, our future problems are the result of our past success: other nations are now trying to follow our example, at least selectively, to enhance their power. Whether selective modernization can succeed remains to be seen but for the next half century the prospect is that we will be relatively less powerful than we were in the twentieth century.

So what should we do?

First, we must practice what we preach. We cannot improve education and economic opportunities for our own people if life in our urban areas remains as it is. The needs identified in the new counterinsurgency guide should apply first and foremost to the United States.

Second, in foreign policy, we will need to strengthen a sense of global community or belong to a community of nations that can hold its own and become more inclusive. Traditionally, we have stressed independence as our goal for other countries and for ourselves. The various iterations of counterinsurgency doctrine have been different ways to achieve this goal, which worked to our advantage as long as our share of relative world power held steady. But if our share diminishes over the next several decades, the external security of all states in the world will diminish. Independence will not be enough. We will need to imagine what stronger ties of community could work in such a fundamentally changed situation.

[jmm99]

from ipopescu
When I raised a similar argument with a senior NSC official who worked in the Bush 43 White House I got a lot of push back and was referred to the 2006 National Security Strategy as a clear expression of such a strategy; I was also assured that the classified part of NSS, as well as the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP-GWOT) provide the kind of overarching framework that I was complaining that was missing.

In short, we will tell you, the People, part of the national policy, which we admit has some holes in it. But, our classified annex fills all of the holes - you, the People, can trust us on that. Totally nuts - but that is how the NSC has operated as long as I can remember.

[Bob's World]

Good discussion all. I will be attending the conference at Duke this week, and look forward very much to both the programmed events, as well as the opportunity to conduct sidebar conversations and to hear the nature of the questions that emerge from the audiance.

(Oh, and I have spent a lot of time with the NSS and NIP-GWOT and other threat-based strategic documents, and they are not what I would consider "grand strategy." Similarly, I do not believe there would be any need to classify any aspect of a grand strategy, because as I said earlier, it is as much for our allies and opponents as it is for ourselves.)

[jmm99]

My objections to classified national policy are two-fold:

1. Practical: Blowback when the public finds out about the policy, and disagrees with it - or doesn't know what it should do with it.

2. Logical: A classified national policy known only to selected members of the administration cannot be a national policy. It can, of course, be an administration policy.

So, total agreement with

from BW
Similarly, I do not believe there would be any need to classify any aspect of a grand strategy, because as I said earlier, it is as much for our allies and opponents as it is for ourselves.

NSC stuff dealing with contingency plans or definite future plans is another story. Although, taking the Pentagon Papers as an example, the government and the People would have been better off if some of those documents had not been classified and had been released (even in redacted, executive summary form). Of course, that would have been inconvenient for the politics of the administrations in power.

[ipopescu]

However, I look forward to hearing what comes out of the conference (my policy); I await your report with bated breath (my strategery)

As promised , here are some of the more interesting observations that came up at the recent TISS/Duke conference "American Grand Strategy after War." Fellow SWC member Col. Robert Jones (aka Bob's World) was there as well, so he may also want to add on to this. But here's what I took away as food for thought. The following represent an assortment of the points made by various participants.

- There was a "Grand Strategic Deficit" over the past twenty years. We are worse in 2009 than in 1989. In the first seven years after Pearl Harbor, the US government did a far better job in regards to grand strategy than in the first seven years after 9/11.

- Truman's grand strategy was a more pronounced departure from Roosevelt's ideas than most historians recognized. FDR was blinded by his personal confidence that he can "domesticate"/"socialize" the Soviet Union and Stalin. His post-war vision of close cooperation btw the Four Policeman had a "utopian" quality. General point: planning for the post-war period during the war is often far different than the peace that emerges after the conflict ends; policy-makers need to constantly reassess their assumptions.

-Grand Strategy can emerge in three ways: 1. Ex-Ante (plan ahead, execute successfully (Bismarck), 2. Ex-post (people "discover" it later, i.e. deterrence), and 3. Incrementalism (formulate a strategy, it fails initially, you modify it, eventually gets "locked-in"), i.e. containment

-Was post WWII planning really more coherent than post-9/11?

- In the contemporary environment, greatest challenges to US interests come from domestic structures in other countries, not from the distribution of power in the system. We know we want troubled states to be at least stable in the short run and democratic in the long run, but we do not know how to help along that process.

-Process is very important in strategic planning. Eisenhower's Project Solarium as an example of successful strategy-making, and Obama should emulate that. But, as a counterpoint and theoretical observation: aren't you more likely to get bigger changes in grand strategy in the absence of formal planning mechanisms? Isn't so-called "zero-based" strategic planning a form of Kabuki theater most of the time inside the US government?

-American democracy is anti-strategic; consensus available at most only at the "bumper-sticker" level, but conflicts soon emerge when one move to policy, resource allocation, etc.
Related remark: US is unusually difficult to govern: separation of powers, weak government permeable to interest groups, coordination problems, partisan split/ideological polarization on the rise. Hard to maintain a coherent grand strategy

- There is a belief that partisan/domestic policy interests are botching the debate and that previous generations were far better in this regard. But the 40s looked better only when analyzed by the people in the 50s, the 50s and 60s when analyzed from the 70s, the Cold War consensus when analyzed from the 90s...

- wrong to think of "external constraints" vs. "domestic political interests" as the two factors shaping grand strategic options. The way people perceive the national interests and threats to them IS influenced of their political views. The big debate is on deciding on what our interests are.

- grand strategy or grand strategies of containment?

- Grand Strategy difficult in a moment of triumph; Bush 41 had process (great NSC team) without purpose, Clinton had purpose (i.e. enlarging MKTS and democracy promotion) without process

-US govt doesn't do "strategic interaction" btw grand strategy-operational art- military tactics; politicians need to understand in detail the workings of the military instrument in order to talk meaningfully about grand strategy. The academy should assist in educating policy-makers about what the military can and cannot do

-Strategy does at least three things: 1. relates means to ends; 2. clarifies policy by setting priorities. 3. conceptualizes resources as means (you need a strategy to transform a resource into a means)

-Post Cold War administrations focused on avoiding a new Cold War and managing great power relations peacefully, so was not there a grand strategy after all?

-Domestic policy and foreign policy are much more closely related than scholars often assume (Clinton's impeachment, Bush's response to Katrina spilled over in foreign policy as well)


Lastly, the paper presented addresses US grand strategy after WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Post-Cold War &pre 9/11, and Iraq. They are available here: http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/tiss/AGSReadings.php
The keynote address by John Gaddis is posted here:
http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/centers/t...egyDetails.php

[Ken White]

There was a "Grand Strategic Deficit" over the past twenty years.

That's for sure...

In the contemporary environment, greatest challenges to US interests come from domestic structures in other countries, not from the distribution of power in the system. We know we want troubled states to be at least stable in the short run and democratic in the long run, but we do not know how to help along that process.

I question that on two levels. Not at all sure we really care if other States are stable as long as there is no adverse impact on us. Nor am I sure that we do not know how to 'help' as much as we are constrained by our own domestic politics from doing so in the most efficient manner.

Eisenhower's Project Solarium as an example of successful strategy-making, and Obama should emulate that. But, as a counterpoint and theoretical observation: aren't you more likely to get bigger changes in grand strategy in the absence of formal planning mechanisms? Isn't so-called "zero-based" strategic planning a form of Kabuki theater most of the time inside the US government?

Interesting thought and postulation. Eisenhower had enough self confidence and experience to let a Solarium run and sort the fallout -- few Presidents since have had those attributes and Obama certainly doesn't. That factor is what has caused the apparent Kubuki effect you note.

American democracy is anti-strategic; consensus available at most only at the "bumper-sticker" level, but conflicts soon emerge when one move to policy, resource allocation, etc.
Related remark: US is unusually difficult to govern: separation of powers, weak government permeable to interest groups, coordination problems, partisan split/ideological polarization on the rise. Hard to maintain a coherent grand strategy.

In reverse order, I'd say it's impossible for us and the great and powerful are afflicted by the same short attention span that prevails in most Americans.

... But the 40s looked better only when analyzed by the people in the 50s, the 50s and 60s when analyzed from the 70s, the Cold War consensus when analyzed from the 90s

That's why all us old folks are not as upset about things today as most of you younger persons are

The way people perceive the national interests and threats to them IS influenced of their political views. The big debate is on deciding on what our interests are.

Heh. No kidding. And that 'decision' is strongly influenced by the ideology of the deciders...

grand strategy or grand strategies of containment?

Makes no difference; our political milieu precludes either. Even the Cold War containment was not nearly as continuous and coherent as many today seem to believe.

Bush 41 had process (great NSC team) without purpose, Clinton had purpose (i.e. enlarging MKTS and democracy promotion) without process.

True. Ideology again.

US govt doesn't do "strategic interaction" btw grand strategy-operational art- military tactics; politicians need to understand in detail the workings of the military instrument in order to talk meaningfully about grand strategy. The academy should assist in educating policy-makers about what the military can and cannot do.

Good thought and I agree but doubt it will happen, too far from historic precedent. I suspect we will continue to stumble about sort of aimlessly.

Post Cold War administrations focused on avoiding a new Cold War and managing great power relations peacefully, so was not there a grand strategy after all?

Not in my view -- aimless wandering in the same direction. Had there been such a strategy, we would've treated Russia differently.

Domestic policy and foreign policy are much more closely related than scholars often assume (Clinton's impeachment, Bush's response to Katrina spilled over in foreign policy as well).

Amen to that. The Kennedy's went to Viet Nam for US domestic reasons; the Recessions of the 1950s left the US in the economic doldrums and the Brothers K decided to 'help' Viet Nam. Domestic politics are well involved in all our wars -- and everyone else's as well.

Thanks for the information.