Is US Fighting Force Big Enough?

[SWJED]

Is US Fighting Force Big Enough? - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor

American's armed forces are growing bigger to reduce the strains from seven years of war, but if the US is confronting an era of "persistent conflict," as some experts believe, it will need an even bigger military.

A larger military could more easily conduct military and nation-building operations around the world. But whether the American public has the appetite to pursue and pay for such a foreign-policy agenda, especially after more than five years of an unpopular war in Iraq, is far from clear.

Last week, the Army released a new manual on "stability operations" that outlines for the Army a prominent global role as a nation-builder. The service will maintain its ability to fight conventional land wars, but the manual's release signals that it expects future conflicts to look more like Iraq or Afghanistan than World War II. While Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not publicly supported expanding the force beyond what is already planned, he has said the United States must prepare for more counterinsurgency wars like the ones it is fighting now - a hint that a larger military may be necessary.

Some analysts are certain of that need...

Much more at the link.

[Rob Thornton]

The article covers some good points and those quoted raise some good issues.

Frank Hoffman is quoted as saying,

"The Army is not fundamentally investing in new capabilities or creating any unique skill sets, or reducing training requirements or workload from conventional fighting,"

I think this is one of those issues that is evolving even as Mr. Lubold's article went to press. There is significant work being done to identify new requirements for personnel assessment, tracking and utilization being done on a number of levels. While it often seems like the institution moves on a geological wrist watch, that just may be indicative of its conservatory functions and the time required to demonstrate relevance. I would also note that there has been good dialogue at the leader level to adjust mission statements, CDR's guidance and pre-deployment training to reflect "D" METL use of resources (time being the most significant perhaps) vs. strict adherence to "C" METL. This is generally a leader call, and they seem to be making it. I think the institutions have done a reasonable job thus far in balancing their requirements while also resourcing initiatives in their PME or centers which can identify and explore rationale for change and acceptance of risk. It may seem like a small expenditure, but the returns have been fairly high yield with regard to helping military and civilian leaders understand the requirements of the policy objectives and the conditions.

Congressman Murtha is reported to have aruged

"Rep. Jack Murtha (D) of Pennsylvania recently argued that the cost of a bigger force is too much and could prevent the military from buying equipment."

That is a fair concern I think, but has to be considered against the context of the role military power is to play in achieving policy objectives. In this case it may not just pertain to military force but might also include military forces used in the full spectrum of operations IAW DoD Dir 3000.05.

We've recently seen how events in the U.S. economy affected world markets, is it a bridge too far to consider that what may happen in other places that while not demonstrating an immediate existential threat, may still require us to act in our interests, and possibly in a manner or timing that requires the employment military forces or force to do so? That may be hard to choke down among current domestic concerns, but if you wait to determine you need a bigger military until the time you need it, the consequences are probably OBE. Equipping the military to do the full spectrum of operations with the best available equipment is a tall order, but one that seems to be as much a question of priorities as sheer fiscal numbers. No easy answers there, but that is why when the budget goes to Congress, everyone needs to be educated.

Dr. Chu is quoted as saying:

"Few of those attempts, and fewer of those legislative proposals, ever mention the military," he says. If the country were to reverse that stand, "there won't be serious recruiting issues."

I think that gets to the other challenge, its one thing to put a number on the wall, its another thing to recruit, train, educate, and retain that number in a way that allows it to do the things you desire it to be able to do in a manner that reduces risk to your objectives. While I also applaud the expansion of national service opportunities, to omit the military from those opportunities might infer that legislators did not see it as national service, did not understand the requirements of growing the force they desire, or were concerned that to include military service might somehow be construed as unpopular by their target audience.

Every American should know that serving in its military is among the most important and best things they may ever do as Americans. It is among the greatest of ways to preserve the freedoms, opportunity and privileges they have inherited by birth and enjoy in life through the sacrifices of a relatively small number of Americans.

These are both tangible and intangible objects which so many in the world are envious of, and which must be defended against. Not only against those who would deny them to those in their own lands, but because as long as the freedoms we enjoy here at home exist they will remain attractive to others, and as such a threat to those who hate them. This makes our freedoms subject to attack, not only here at home, but abroad as we interact with others in trade or the exchange of ideas.

When military force is committed,it is done so to secure or advance some interest which translates to something we hold worthy here at home. As such every American should not only be afforded the opportunity to serve in our nation's military, but encouraged by its civilian leadership to do so where able.

Best, Rob

[dogtown]

This is actually something that has concerned me for some time. Looking back at the Cold War, we've always had a "quality over quantity" approach to military power and a result of that mindset is our increasing reliance on technology. Comparing the force requirements (and planning mindset) difference between Desert Storm and OIF make this even more clear, yet our obvious potential adversaries in the next fifty years come from the opposite mindset and threaten to overwhelm us with numbers. We appear to increasingly be attempting to make up our shortcomings in numbers with technology, and while that has proven useful in conflicts, it also highlights a danger anyone who's ignored basic land nav skills over GPS has no doubt learned.

How do we balance the issue of technology vs numbers? That seems to be the crux of the issue. Technology has always given us an edge in the fight and our inability as a national to mobilize the numbers like we have in the past has made it easier to support an emphasis on technology. How do we find the middle ground?

[AmericanPride]

I don't think it's neccessarily a conflict between quantity and quality, as that assumes the defense budget is fixed. The Iraq War has demonstrated that money can come to those who ask for it (depending who is asking who of course). I think the budget conflict is a small part of the larger issue (which may or may not be a "problem" depending on who loses out) of omni-balancing between political factions with an conservative, skeptical, and consequently expeditionary view of the world and the role of American military power in it and those factions with a more liberal and internationalist bent. Why are stability operations necessary for American political aims? Why is that capability not a priority or even a concern for the other great powers? Which demographics gain and which lose by the necessary domestic trade-offs created by doubling the size of the armed forces?

the context of the role military power is to play in achieving policy objectives.

I think that's the central issue as far as military planners are concerned. The larger issue, of course, is why we (used loosely) are pursuing particular policy objectives and the consequencese those decisions generate for the use, shape, and size of military power.

EDIT: My final point is that I do not think these issues are necessary or enduring because the questions (and consequently the answers) will change as our domestic situation changes and different political factions exercise varying degrees of influence.

[William F. Owen]

"We need an Army of XXX,000 "

If someone can tell me how many deployable Formations or Sub units, and of what types and capabilities, the US Army/USMC needs, then I think there is the bones of a discussion, but absolute numbers are meaningless.

IMO, the issue isn't the number of men. It's the X-number of men who can do A and also B. - and that is why, how many men you need in a Platoon, Troop, Squadron, Company, and what they must be able to do is the THE ARGUMENT, if you want to talk about how big an army you need.

[Rob Thornton]

If someone can tell me how many deployable Formations or Sub units, and of what types and capabilities, the US Army/USMC needs, then I think there is the bones of a discussion, but absolute numbers are meaningless.

Will, that is the challenge. It is rooted in the discussion about what you want your military to be capable of doing for you as an instrument of policy, and what kind of results are you willing to live with on the back end - which is generally the side that contains more unknowns. In this case it has an interesting twist, because while we know we'd like to have to other USG agencies doing some of these unknowns, the military remains the "tool" most likely to be doing them for a number of reasons. This is made somewhat more difficult because the capabilities to meet some of these types of requirements are not collective based, but resident in individuals.

I know allot of smart folks who have produced numbers - they all strike me as having some subjectivity in them, i.e. they are estimates. This is not bad, war and policy has a way of resisting business like efficiencies - it has always seemed like a good idea if you can have enough to keep something out of contact to retain your flexibility. The resulting question is can you afford it/live with it, and if not, can you sacrifice something else to get there? Its hard for folks (a population) to rationalize keeping something on hand when they cannot understand why, or how it relates to their interests in contrast to other seemingly more immediate needs. This may be more true when we say we not only need to recruit good people, but as we train, educate and develop them, we must find ways to retain them and their families.

A professional military takes more time and resources to build and sustain then a conscript one (relative to size and not accounting for costs brought on in respect to effectiveness and efficiencies); however a professional military can do things "differently" that a conscript one.

A conscript expansion offers some flexibility, but you have to be able to live with what the implications and consequences are on a number of levels to rely on conscription to fill out/augment your base formations. Again, what do we want our military to do, and can we live with the notion that regardless of what we thought we wanted it to be able to do 5 years ago, new policy requirements will inevitably create situations that were unanticipated and don't fall neatly into that established lane. How much is the flexibility to better achieve your objectives worth? How much risk are you willing to assume and where?

Best, Rob

[William F. Owen]

In this case it has an interesting twist, because while we know we'd like to have to other USG agencies doing some of these unknowns, the military remains the "tool" most likely to be doing them for a number of reasons. This is made somewhat more difficult because the capabilities to meet some of these types of requirements are not collective based, but resident in individuals.

This is the root or my concern. The US Military and others is/are trying to do things which are NOT best facilitated by the military instrument. Bandying numbers around is like saying the meaning of life is 47. It may be true, but there is simply no evidence that it is, since it assumes the answer is a number. As they say in Isreal, "How much is a suit for an orphan?"

The question should not be "Is the Force big enough?" - but what can the force of X number do?

[Ron Humphrey]

Gentlemen,

Just on the face of it doesn't or at least shouldn't this conversation be more about what missions international politics are likely to dictate than what forces are likely to be assigned to do?

By this I mean to say Responsibilities / Capabilities should be of primary discussion. As the roles of the Joint Chiefs and others is to inform the decisions of their political masters rather than direct them it would seem rather counter-productive to worry about that over which those within the military hierarchy have little control. If instead our defense leadership are able to effectively present what acceptable responsibilities are within normal considerations and accepting that there will be exceptions for which we much be prepared, than perhaps we end up with a more appropriate and balanced version of what the endstrength should look like.

Unclear I'm sure but not quite sure how else to put it?

[Rob Thornton]

Will, a reasonable question:

The question should not be "Is the Force big enough?" - but what can the force of X number do?

I'd also say its counterpart might be:

What can a force of "X" not do?


Also worth considering:
"X" is not always going to be quantitative; "X" has a qualitative aspect as well, and that one is defined by the requirements. The requirements = policy/military objectives + conditions. Which may get to the root of what Ron is asking as both the conditions and the policy/military objectives are subject to change in ways that cannot be predicted very well. They are both interactive, and unstable.

Best, Rob

[Ski]

Instead of focusing on vaporifics like "how many people do we need" I suggest some of the bigger brains in CAC start working on a strategy to equip, resource, train, and sustain an Army that loses 50% of its budget due to severe economic malaise.

Defense funding is discretional. The upcoming baby boomer retirement phase is going to put immense strain on the federal budget, with special insight required on how to fund Social Security and Medicare. Since defense has the largest piece of the pie, it is most likely to get cut when other entitlement programs start running out of money.

I'd start with looking deeply at the 1920-1935 period with the American and major European armies.

[Rob Thornton]

Ski - I would suggest that its a good idea, but the responsibility to do so rests within DA and OSD? Best, Rob

[AmericanPride]

Since defense has the largest piece of the pie, it is most likely to get cut when other entitlement programs start running out of money.

I think that depends on who is holding (the most) power when that decision comes to the forefront. I doubt that forcing large numbers of highly visible professionals (read: servicemembers) into a poor economy will attract political support from the military itself or from pro-military demographics. There's several historical examples of similar problems occurring (the demobilization of the Continental Army in 1781 and the Bonus Army in 1932). A strong and publicly popular Chief of Staff could (attempt to) preserve the institution against an unpopular and divided Congress. Truman, for example, I believe holds the lowest ever recorded popularity for a President after his dismissal of MacArthur in 1951. The general pacifism of the 1930s does not exist in strength, and so I think it would be extremely difficult to make drastic and lasting cuts to the defense budget without first changing America's attitude toward the military and its on-going operations around the world.

[Old Eagle]

The U.S. Armed Forces are correctly sized now. They will also be correctly sized in the future, regardless of what that size is. However, that "size" (really a capability/capacity cap) will limit what we use that force for. It will mean that the U.S. cannot run willy-nilly (especially unilaterally) at every boogie man that raises its ugly head. Other elements of national power will have to play a greater role.

And for those potentially massive, can't afford to lose contingencies, we'll have to have well-prepared alliances and coalitions to lend a hand.

This is not being fatalistic or idealistic, it's simply being realistic.

[Ski]

Rob

HQDA and OSD do not write doctrine for the Army.

CAC does, and that's why they should start putting on their thinking caps and get cracking.

[selil]

At a Homeland Security meeting recently the speaker was talking about the "ALL HAZARDS MISSION CAPABILITY" of DHS. I started grumbling. Continually they threw that homilie about all hazards out. Well dang it where is the zombie outbreak response plan? Oh you say that likely won't happen? Well suddenly you aren't all hazards.

If you want a "good enough" or "better than the rest" military you are setting a totally different goal. Those are metrics that are determined by outside entities actions. I think I would rather start with a grand unified theory of military training and create the flexible, trainable, large scale, go just about anywhere military. Mission specific units should be at a minimum and the military size should about 1 percent of the US population.

[Rob Thornton]

HQDA and OSD do not write doctrine for the Army.

Ski - I know, but they do write and inform defense policy. Until the DoD civilian leadership and senior service and Joint military leadership (to include the Joint and Service staffs) have that discussion and submit budgets based on what they think we need to do the job we're asked to do, the issue of the doctrine required to make use of what you have is a cart before a horse.

It may be something of a chicken and egg - but my point was TRADOC does not set the DoD budget, they address DOTMLPF issues. This means until we come to some agreements on ends, ways and means, roles and missions, etc. its may not be a good idea to address the DOTMLPF issues in such a way that become either self constraining, or do not meet the needs of policy. Lets not forget the role of the GCCs in interpreting and responding to both steady state/or standing policy objectives, and those new objectives created by crisis - it becomes a Policy/Mil OBJ + Conditions that create the requirements to which the force providers must generate resources and capabilities to meet. The services and functional commands should not go down the road of taking stuff off the menu that the GCCs are asking for - that is a decision that gets into the three branches of Govt (Exec/Legis/Jud) real quick. We owe them the costs and the consequences, but the authority belongs to the civilain leadership.

I share some of your concerns, but I don't think its a good idea for the military to set conditions which will constrain the policy needs and requirements based on what we anticipate to be funding short fall.

I'm not in CAC, but my sense is they are doing the things they need to be doing based on their mission - e.g. they are writing the doctrine that needs to be written.

Best, Rob

[120mm]

I am in CAC and I wished it were so, Rob.... But it's not necessarily so..., but in the words of Forrest Gump, "that's all I'm going to say about that..."

Personally, I think we can, as a country, make our military smaller, but only while simultaneously increasing the scope and effectiveness of our non-military elements of power, as well as increasing our HUMINT to a manifold extent.

[Ken White]

I think...

This means until we come to some agreements on ends, ways and means, roles and missions, etc. its may not be a good idea to address the DOTMLPF issues in such a way that become either self constraining, or do not meet the needs of policy.

It has been my observation over the years that we're highly unlikely to ever get such an agreement that has the slightest permanence and therefor lends itself to the coherent development of doctrine -- or even of force structure. The Politicians will always want and get wiggle room barring a major existential threat -- as WW II was perceived to be.

Accordingly, this:

...my sense is they are doing the things they need to be doing based on their mission - e.g. they are writing the doctrine that needs to be written.

is probably as correct as it can be under the circumstances.

As it has generally been and will most likely continue to be...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,
I think we are in agreement. There is always going to be tension because of the relationship to domestic policy (and politics) and foreign policy. It never ends.

While some general doctrinal principals can be produced that are enduring in light of the above conditions is good, my concern is that for the supporting institutions to try and guess what those conditions will be vs. responding to the needs of the policy and the GCCs tasked to realize them results in developing capabilities as we'd like them to be vs. capabilities that meet the changes in requirements.

The added danger in that may be that before long we start seeing the conditions as we'd prefer they be vs. as they are because we force fed the kool-aid through out all the instituions and it got the whole DOTMLPF body drunk.

So doctrine just keeps ambling along, sometime bringing back old ideas under new names, sometimes reflecting new requirements in new ways, sometimes blending old and new.

120's point:

Personally, I think we can, as a country, make our military smaller, but only while simultaneously increasing the scope and effectiveness of our non-military elements of power, as well as increasing our HUMINT to a manifold extent.

is a good one, and we are finding out just how hard increasing capacity in the other elements of national power is to do. Not just in terms of recruiting, training, educating, appropriating, retaining - but also in terms of cultural functions, laws and rice bowls. Last year I heard a comment by a retired GO who linked the ability to build capacity in the other elements of power to congressional committees - there was a good dose of "where you sit is where you stand" in the remark, and I think its probably true.

Again Ken's point about the politics of power and the conflict between domestic and foreign policy holds true. The rational for change seems to be such that it must be both immediate and undeniable, i.e. existential in a way that keeps you up at night either worrying about your vote as it relates to retaining your job, or worrying about the huns at the door. The problem with the former is historically (throughout time and place) it seems to be more important than the latter. The problem with the latter is you don't always know it until its a done deal. Both may be made more likely given the level of self interest, lack of education on the issues and lack of personal accountability present throughout a given society.

Best, Rob

[sapperfitz82]

Did we see this disconnect (size vs. capability) play out with Rumsfeld's plan for Iraq?

I mean, did he believe that the size force we sent in could do the job because some previous size force in our history would have?

Does the failure of that force to contain the insurgent threat mean our military needs a (surge) size more troops to get the requisite number of men capable of doing the job? Or was it simply a numbers problem?

Is this an indicator of anything?

I have seen a dramatic drop in aggressive patrolling in Afghanistan from 02-03 to 05-06 and have heard of more of the same from friends there now. (Foxhole view, I know) A ten fold increase has not lead to more strategic success if one defines that as denying freedom of maneuver to the enemy. With 70K plus troops, there should be one in every valley.

Do these examples point to a misuse (or under-use) of our troops on the ground? If so, and if our current conflict is what is driving the "bigger military" idea I think there is any easier answer.

Our performance in this war as a military has not been as good as it could be. I don't mean this on a personal or personel level. I am speaking of raw capability and results.

The size military we currently have is capable of a great deal more. Barring a land war with China or Russia, the size is probably big enough if policy remains reasonable.

My pratical experience leads me to believe that there is an enormous amount of waste out there. Few soldiers spend more time on patrol than in the FOB. None, I would hazard a guess (SOF excluded). We need to recalibrate our force's incentives for going home and squeeze more productivity from the ones already deployed. This would reduce the perceived need for a larger Army.

I would propose linking redeployment to mission accomplishment. For instance, X BDE, you will pacify Anbar, you will meet these goals (civil, military, infastructure, political.....) and you will go home. Higher obviously verifies completion/success. If this takes 6 months, great, two years, fine, ten years, so be it. Individual replacement begins after two years on a points system.

Instead of "making it" to 365 days, however you do that, and punching out, this would give commanders a reason to risk casualties, be more aggressive, generally go after the enemy continously. Points for awards, patrols, whatever, are incentives for the soldiers. Also, knowing that their deployment is a mission makes it much easier to understand "why" they are there.

Not sure it is a good idea, but it is less expensive than adding a division.