Is US Fighting Force Big Enough?

[SWJED]

Is US Fighting Force Big Enough? - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor

American's armed forces are growing bigger to reduce the strains from seven years of war, but if the US is confronting an era of "persistent conflict," as some experts believe, it will need an even bigger military.

A larger military could more easily conduct military and nation-building operations around the world. But whether the American public has the appetite to pursue and pay for such a foreign-policy agenda, especially after more than five years of an unpopular war in Iraq, is far from clear.

Last week, the Army released a new manual on "stability operations" that outlines for the Army a prominent global role as a nation-builder. The service will maintain its ability to fight conventional land wars, but the manual's release signals that it expects future conflicts to look more like Iraq or Afghanistan than World War II. While Defense Secretary Robert Gates has not publicly supported expanding the force beyond what is already planned, he has said the United States must prepare for more counterinsurgency wars like the ones it is fighting now - a hint that a larger military may be necessary.

Some analysts are certain of that need...

Much more at the link.

[Rob Thornton]

The article covers some good points and those quoted raise some good issues.

Frank Hoffman is quoted as saying,

"The Army is not fundamentally investing in new capabilities or creating any unique skill sets, or reducing training requirements or workload from conventional fighting,"

I think this is one of those issues that is evolving even as Mr. Lubold's article went to press. There is significant work being done to identify new requirements for personnel assessment, tracking and utilization being done on a number of levels. While it often seems like the institution moves on a geological wrist watch, that just may be indicative of its conservatory functions and the time required to demonstrate relevance. I would also note that there has been good dialogue at the leader level to adjust mission statements, CDR's guidance and pre-deployment training to reflect "D" METL use of resources (time being the most significant perhaps) vs. strict adherence to "C" METL. This is generally a leader call, and they seem to be making it. I think the institutions have done a reasonable job thus far in balancing their requirements while also resourcing initiatives in their PME or centers which can identify and explore rationale for change and acceptance of risk. It may seem like a small expenditure, but the returns have been fairly high yield with regard to helping military and civilian leaders understand the requirements of the policy objectives and the conditions.

Congressman Murtha is reported to have aruged

"Rep. Jack Murtha (D) of Pennsylvania recently argued that the cost of a bigger force is too much and could prevent the military from buying equipment."

That is a fair concern I think, but has to be considered against the context of the role military power is to play in achieving policy objectives. In this case it may not just pertain to military force but might also include military forces used in the full spectrum of operations IAW DoD Dir 3000.05.

We've recently seen how events in the U.S. economy affected world markets, is it a bridge too far to consider that what may happen in other places that while not demonstrating an immediate existential threat, may still require us to act in our interests, and possibly in a manner or timing that requires the employment military forces or force to do so? That may be hard to choke down among current domestic concerns, but if you wait to determine you need a bigger military until the time you need it, the consequences are probably OBE. Equipping the military to do the full spectrum of operations with the best available equipment is a tall order, but one that seems to be as much a question of priorities as sheer fiscal numbers. No easy answers there, but that is why when the budget goes to Congress, everyone needs to be educated.

Dr. Chu is quoted as saying:

"Few of those attempts, and fewer of those legislative proposals, ever mention the military," he says. If the country were to reverse that stand, "there won't be serious recruiting issues."

I think that gets to the other challenge, its one thing to put a number on the wall, its another thing to recruit, train, educate, and retain that number in a way that allows it to do the things you desire it to be able to do in a manner that reduces risk to your objectives. While I also applaud the expansion of national service opportunities, to omit the military from those opportunities might infer that legislators did not see it as national service, did not understand the requirements of growing the force they desire, or were concerned that to include military service might somehow be construed as unpopular by their target audience.

Every American should know that serving in its military is among the most important and best things they may ever do as Americans. It is among the greatest of ways to preserve the freedoms, opportunity and privileges they have inherited by birth and enjoy in life through the sacrifices of a relatively small number of Americans.

These are both tangible and intangible objects which so many in the world are envious of, and which must be defended against. Not only against those who would deny them to those in their own lands, but because as long as the freedoms we enjoy here at home exist they will remain attractive to others, and as such a threat to those who hate them. This makes our freedoms subject to attack, not only here at home, but abroad as we interact with others in trade or the exchange of ideas.

When military force is committed,it is done so to secure or advance some interest which translates to something we hold worthy here at home. As such every American should not only be afforded the opportunity to serve in our nation's military, but encouraged by its civilian leadership to do so where able.

Best, Rob

[dogtown]

This is actually something that has concerned me for some time. Looking back at the Cold War, we've always had a "quality over quantity" approach to military power and a result of that mindset is our increasing reliance on technology. Comparing the force requirements (and planning mindset) difference between Desert Storm and OIF make this even more clear, yet our obvious potential adversaries in the next fifty years come from the opposite mindset and threaten to overwhelm us with numbers. We appear to increasingly be attempting to make up our shortcomings in numbers with technology, and while that has proven useful in conflicts, it also highlights a danger anyone who's ignored basic land nav skills over GPS has no doubt learned.

How do we balance the issue of technology vs numbers? That seems to be the crux of the issue. Technology has always given us an edge in the fight and our inability as a national to mobilize the numbers like we have in the past has made it easier to support an emphasis on technology. How do we find the middle ground?

[AmericanPride]

I don't think it's neccessarily a conflict between quantity and quality, as that assumes the defense budget is fixed. The Iraq War has demonstrated that money can come to those who ask for it (depending who is asking who of course). I think the budget conflict is a small part of the larger issue (which may or may not be a "problem" depending on who loses out) of omni-balancing between political factions with an conservative, skeptical, and consequently expeditionary view of the world and the role of American military power in it and those factions with a more liberal and internationalist bent. Why are stability operations necessary for American political aims? Why is that capability not a priority or even a concern for the other great powers? Which demographics gain and which lose by the necessary domestic trade-offs created by doubling the size of the armed forces?

the context of the role military power is to play in achieving policy objectives.

I think that's the central issue as far as military planners are concerned. The larger issue, of course, is why we (used loosely) are pursuing particular policy objectives and the consequencese those decisions generate for the use, shape, and size of military power.

EDIT: My final point is that I do not think these issues are necessary or enduring because the questions (and consequently the answers) will change as our domestic situation changes and different political factions exercise varying degrees of influence.

[William F. Owen]

"We need an Army of XXX,000 "

If someone can tell me how many deployable Formations or Sub units, and of what types and capabilities, the US Army/USMC needs, then I think there is the bones of a discussion, but absolute numbers are meaningless.

IMO, the issue isn't the number of men. It's the X-number of men who can do A and also B. - and that is why, how many men you need in a Platoon, Troop, Squadron, Company, and what they must be able to do is the THE ARGUMENT, if you want to talk about how big an army you need.

[Rob Thornton]

If someone can tell me how many deployable Formations or Sub units, and of what types and capabilities, the US Army/USMC needs, then I think there is the bones of a discussion, but absolute numbers are meaningless.

Will, that is the challenge. It is rooted in the discussion about what you want your military to be capable of doing for you as an instrument of policy, and what kind of results are you willing to live with on the back end - which is generally the side that contains more unknowns. In this case it has an interesting twist, because while we know we'd like to have to other USG agencies doing some of these unknowns, the military remains the "tool" most likely to be doing them for a number of reasons. This is made somewhat more difficult because the capabilities to meet some of these types of requirements are not collective based, but resident in individuals.

I know allot of smart folks who have produced numbers - they all strike me as having some subjectivity in them, i.e. they are estimates. This is not bad, war and policy has a way of resisting business like efficiencies - it has always seemed like a good idea if you can have enough to keep something out of contact to retain your flexibility. The resulting question is can you afford it/live with it, and if not, can you sacrifice something else to get there? Its hard for folks (a population) to rationalize keeping something on hand when they cannot understand why, or how it relates to their interests in contrast to other seemingly more immediate needs. This may be more true when we say we not only need to recruit good people, but as we train, educate and develop them, we must find ways to retain them and their families.

A professional military takes more time and resources to build and sustain then a conscript one (relative to size and not accounting for costs brought on in respect to effectiveness and efficiencies); however a professional military can do things "differently" that a conscript one.

A conscript expansion offers some flexibility, but you have to be able to live with what the implications and consequences are on a number of levels to rely on conscription to fill out/augment your base formations. Again, what do we want our military to do, and can we live with the notion that regardless of what we thought we wanted it to be able to do 5 years ago, new policy requirements will inevitably create situations that were unanticipated and don't fall neatly into that established lane. How much is the flexibility to better achieve your objectives worth? How much risk are you willing to assume and where?

Best, Rob