Afghanistan: What is it ?/ What is it not?

[Dr Jack]

Perhaps multi-faceted insurgency is a better descriptor but even that lacks oomph.

In my small group at CGSC, I've been arguing consistently that there are multiple operation centers of gravity due to the distinct and diverse nature of these groups. Each enemy has to be looked at as a unique entity. My SGA wasn't buying it, but today I listened to another SGA who I'm taking an elective with who reinforced my point of view, so I feel a little less out in the galaxy.

I think the concept of Center of Gravity at the operational level -- as the "source of power" -- is not as clear when there are disparate "franchise" entities such as AQAM who are compartmented in recruiting, financing, training, etc. In this case, there is no unified operational center of gravity since each entity draws "power" from the strategic center of gravity - the ideology. Attacking these different entities at the operational level may cause a fracturing effect to further compartment operational level components of the franchise.

My 2 cents...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Dr Jack -

I really like the point you made about the Center of Gravity being their ideology. That is absolutely (IMHO) right on the money and having spent a lot of months in Afghanistan over the past four years I can say that it is a shared trait among all the disparate players within that country. I will add that part and parcel to that ideology is a great distrust and dislike of the western ideology.

The challenge becomes how do you kill your enemy with all the technology and destruction we bring to the fight while at the same time 'winning the hearts and minds' of the populace. It is a daunting task to kill a mid-level Taliban leader responsible for IED's that have killed coalition soldiers without using a bomb to do it. Our strategy of fighting from FOBs, Fire Bases, etc... have been a limiting factor to how much success we can make out there on the battlefield. I have witnessed large scale US/UK/ANA operations used to sweep the Tagab Valley and route the Taliban only to have no one hold that ground once we left. A year later these same villages were infested with Taliban again, so now try to convince that villager who is trying to stay out of the fight that he needs to support you again is daunting to say the least. He has done that song and dance and will not do it again...now he has thrown his hat in with the Taliban. It isn't rocket science it's simply survival out there for most of these Afghans and since we cannot hold ground and provide the hearts and minds types of services needed plus (most importantly) maintain the security gained from pushing the Taliban out this will continue to be the process...

PT
SENDS

[slapout9]

Interesting paper from the Air Force along the lines that Dr. Jack mentions.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...endersonj.html

[Rob Thornton]

Michael Gerson had a related article in the Washignton Post today:

Brief excerpt...

This theory may be most severely tested in Pakistan's tribal regions, by a kind of irrational violence that defies PowerPoint summary. Pakistan's remote, impoverished North-West Frontier Province and federally administered tribal areas are administered effectively by no one. And into this vacuum of civilization has gathered a ghastly collection of killers, cutthroats and Islamist ideologues. Al-Qaeda leaders mix and marry into Afghan Taliban families. The Haqqani network launches attacks on U.S. troops within Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban issues threats against the White House and New York.

[Eden]

...but selecting 'ideology' as the insurgent's center of gravity is just wrong, unless your definition of center of gravity is far different than mine. To me, the center of gravity is that from which your enemy draws his strength and which allows him to apply that strength most usefully. Some of the players in Afghanistan are wild-eyed Islamist radical fanatics - many are not.

This is not the thread to discuss what that center of gravity is, but I would accept their sanctuary in Waziristan, drug money, Pathan tribal support, international moneymen, or extensive network of ratlines before I would agree that their ideology is what gives them their strength.

I mean, is our COG 'free-market capitalism', or 'liberal democracy'? Could al-Qaida win if they would just get us to abandon the Constitution? I submit that if every insurgent in Afghanistan converted to Mormonism tomorrow, we would still have a fight on our hands.

This is just a pet peeve of mine. Every discussion on COG I ever had at the War College or CGSC ended by someone saying it was 'the will of the people'. Well, no kidding, but how is that a useful concept in wartime? I mean, if we could change their will by peaceful means, we wouldn't have to use force at all, would we?

[Ron Humphrey]

But I wonder what feedack I could get on an idea that occurred to me about a year or so ago.

L&S- In order to determine what "COG" you need to focus on at the operational level you may to look much closer to home, for in your weakness or strengths might be found the most accurate foci as opposed to searching in what you think you know of the enemy?

When we seek to determine a direction for "targeting" we in essense seek to know that which is very uncertain. If instead one focus on that which you know the best(ie: your own) it may be that the sudden recognition of an enemy's weakness is not far behind.