Dinner with Al Qaeda without precondition

[Schmedlap]

I had the experience of being involved in talks with individuals providing support to an insurgent faction in the same city in 2005 and 2007. In each circumstance, we were using what I would call a triangulation approach. There were the irreconciliable elements, the pragmatists, and us. We were trying to turn the pragmatists against the irreconciliables. In 2005, this did not work well for a variety of reasons:
- our lack of sophistication in negotiating the cultural terrain
- immature and sloppy intelligence (single sourced garbage that was little more than hearsay, fabrications, and rumor)
- the lack of flexibility that we had with funds and other support with which to facilitate the pragmatists' actions (the best that we could do was give them some confiscated weapons and limited ammunition)
- a general lack of confidence that the people had in our willingness to follow through, largely due to the political rhetoric back home

In 2007, all of these things factors were a mirror opposite of 2005 and, as a result, we got better results:

1. Better intelligence helped us to better prepare for such negotiations because:
   
   • better knowledge of the enemy and the pragmatists helped us to better determine how best to leverage the pragmatists against the enemy
   • better knowledge of the pragmatists helped us to determine what would motivate them (what did they want and what were they willing to accept or concede)
   • a better general understanding of the environment allowed us to discern when we were being lied to and/or what the pragmatists were uninformed about (and then we could decide whether/how to exploit their lack of information)
2. Greater flexibility and availability of funds gave us the credibility of immediately implementing concessions that would have sounded far-fetched only two years earlier. Being able to fork over cash to pay for something that you agree to lends you tremendous credibility. Equally important, it helps to initiate necessary movement much, much quicker.
3. In 2005, many, if not most, Iraqis thought we were pulling out. The re-election of Bush, an influx of tens of thousands more troops, and a country-wide push out of the FOBs really helped to reverse that perception. Combine that with our newfound ability to fork out large sums of cash on short notice and it became apparent that we were in it to win it (like Yzerman) and the tribes could trust us to back them up if AQI and AAS fought back too fiercely.

Our level of sophistication in dealing with the tribes also improved markedly, though I think the factors above would have been sufficient. In talking to some leaders, I think they have deluded themselves into thinking that they can make headway with the tribes just through skillful application of brainpower, political savvy, and their dynamic personalities. Aside from very few people having the latter two attributes, the Sheiks are too experienced and well aware of the dangers that they face. They are not going to be won over by a cocksure Army Captain in the same way that a naive college student will swoon at an Obama speech. These guys might have grown up without plumbing and may be illiterate, but they are experts at survival, incredibly savvy when it comes to interpersonal skills, and they can be stone cold, calculating pragmatists with no allegiance outside the edges of their city block. A friend of mine was trying to convince me that he was ready to make headway with the tribes on his upcoming deployment because his Arabic is strong, he's been studying the culture, doing lots of reflecting upon earlier deployments, and so on. My advice to him: Otto von Bismarck comes along once per generation. Don't assume that you're this generation's Bismarck.

[Rob Thornton]

Schmedlap said:

These guys might have grown up without plumbing and may be illiterate, but they are experts at survival, incredibly savvy when it comes to interpersonal skills, and they can be stone cold, calculating pragmatists with no allegiance outside the edges of their city block.

I agree, the leadership (those with charisma, resources, conviction and intellect) are sophisticated and shrewd in ways that escape many. I think this is in large part because we transfer our rationality to them.

Here, a school shooting occurs and it gets media coverage on all the major networks, massive investigations are launched, anyone who is remotely connected is interviewed, school is canceled for a week or more, parents then take off from work, brigades of psychologists are brought in and collectively we condemn the actions, review our gun laws, contemplate cameras in classrooms, counsel teachers that any child who gets angry or mentions guns is suspect of being a potential killer.

There, a SVBIED kills a hundred and people seemingly just pick up the pieces and continue to live their lives - almost immediately. This just did not happen overnight, and I don't think it just began in 2003 or 2001. Its hard for us to imagine the scale of the killing that went on there in the Iran and Iraq War, or the bloody way that Saddam Hussein played off the tribes (to include Kurd on Kurd) over the years. A government that bought people off, installed its own sheiks (aka the 1990 sheiks), had the power to forcibly resettle groups, gassed thousands, charged the families of those executed for the means used to kill them. His sons raped and tortured at their leisure, and Iraqis saw no end to it. These are hard, shrewd folks regardless of their education or infrastructure, their calculus has been honed through survival - meaning the ones that did not measure up did not get recycled or told they could still be on the soccer team.

I know a BDE level IA officer who I admire, like and have a great deal of respect for, but would not consider as someone I'd want to see promoted to high up because his calculus default always weighs in on what is best for him above all others. I don't consider it his fault, its what has kept him alive - not employed, not in a job, alive. Every move he makes he considers the range of possible consequences first as they apply to him, then his family and tribe, then other things ranked accordingly. For instance, he and I both knew several IA leaders who were accommodating AIF in either their area, or that they were themselves involved with illicit activities which were hurting not only the BN I was working with, but the BDE as a whole and the U.S. efforts writ large, but his willingness to do anything about it was extremely limited. He had to consider what came after - there is always an after if you don't rotate out of there. He had to live there. It was not until we'd changed the geometry by removing some of the consequences and created some new conditions favorable to our interests, and his while possibly adding in some incentives that it became too good to pass up.

He was never above seeing what else could be gotten out of the bargain, and he often did, because we most often did not understand what his threshold was, and what we had to give often seemed of little consequence to us. This not only advanced his position physically, but allowed him to ask for more the next time.

Hard times seem to hone those skills. Even today my Grandmother still haggles over small change. Its not the money, she has plenty, Its not just for the sake of arguing, she can do that with her son and daughters. Its a combination of her experiences from a time in America that is increasingly alien to a generation that buys off the Internet sight unseen, or picks up things- literally almost anything with the thought they will just try it out and if it does not work they can just return it for another, or just get rid of it with little consequence. We don't generally develop the types of shrewd negotiating skills we see elsewhere because we don't have to. We live in a society with fast food, relatively cheap goods, variable interest rates, disposable income, little consequence for behavior, rebates, refunds and host of other things to make life easier. When things don't go our way we cry, and demand justice to suit our individual position. The folks Schmedlap is referring to are the kind who are used going out an getting their justice, often at the expense of others - that is what they have known since they can remember.

Best, Rob

[MikeF]

Niel/Rob/Schmedlap,

All great posts, and it seems like we've had similar situations with differing outcomes. Rob, I'm in the process of trying to describe the engagements with AQI and other actions taking during "the Surge" that may have been innovative or creative enough to capture as a TTP, lessons learned, or simple case study.

Schmedlep brought another subject up indirectly that I've been considering for some time.

How do you train junior leaders to lead in an environment where they do not have direct authority/responsibility?

SF and FAO's train their leaders to negoitiate, coerce, exploit, etc in order to successfully navigate their way through mission sets. Many of us pick it up intuitively, but I think it must be instituted for greater success.

Now that we have to work with IA soldiers, tribal leaders, NGO's, PRTs, etc, we cannot rely on traditional means of leadership...i.e. I'm in charge so you will do what I say. This approach doesn't work. We have to learn how to teach our junior leaders a different form of leadership that is more collaborative and "people skills" focused.

One of my old first sergeants remarked that his time as a recruiter probably taught him the best lessons on how to persuade.

Just another issue I've been considering.

v/r

Mike

[Cavguy]

Mike,

Don't have a lot of time to reply now - but I still maintain that Dale Carnegie's How to Win Friends and Influence People was the most useful book I read for succeeding in COIN. Some things are cross-cultural. If you're an assh*le in English, you'll be an assh*le in Arabic/Pashtu/Dari.

Relates also to the "Lost in Translation" Thread.

Niel

[Schmedlap]

How do you train junior leaders to lead in an environment where they do not have direct authority/responsibility?

SF and FAO's train their leaders to negoitiate, coerce, exploit, etc in order to successfully navigate their way through mission sets. Many of us pick it up intuitively, but I think it must be instituted for greater success.
...
We have to learn how to teach our junior leaders a different form of leadership that is more collaborative and "people skills" focused.

The best education that I received in this area, outside of OJT in Iraq, were four courses that I recently took: Business & Public Policy, Business Ethics, Contract Law, and Property Law.

In Business & Public Policy, we did nothing but stakeholder analysis and we discussed everything in terms of INTERESTS and sought solutions that we knew would be imperfect, but would meet some interests and minimize other conflicts. It was not neat and tidy. It was perfect.

In Business Ethics, we had to think through issues from the most basic of human values, rights, and interests, starting from right to life, and then working up the hierarchy of needs, identifying those moral gray areas (as seen by us and the other stakeholders), and seeking a less undesirable outcome. Like the other course, it was perfect because it was imperfect.

Contract Law and Property Law simply force you to think about the most basic of human concepts of "mine" and agreements, promises, and obligations. An American will view those things significantly differently than an Iraqi or even a European. Starting from the basics and reevaluating has been enormously valuable.

GEN Petraeus encouraged the officer corps to broaden its education at civilian institutions. I have serious doubts about pursuing a career in business or law (I'm working on an MBA and JD); but the thought of just using these years as education for a return to the Army seems very worthwhile. With every passing day that I live amongst civilians and grow more and more disillusioned and disgusted with them, the prospect of returning to the Army soon after graduation seems more likely.

On a slightly related note - I am financing my own education. Had I used the Army's retention incentives, I would not have had nearly as much flexibility as I enjoy now to tailor my education as I see fit. It is also worth noting that I will likely return to the Army after my education, even though the Army is not paying for one dime of it. Perhaps it is time to reevaluate whether that incentive is even necessary and, if it is necessary, whether the means by which it is applied make any sense. I regarded it as too restrictive and too burdensome to be acceptable and opted to leave the Army and spend my own money instead.

[JHR]

In the 1970's the British listed Stephen Potter's Gamesmanship as one of the PME books for COIN or whatever we called it that day. Probably still applies but don't read it in public, people will stare when you start laughing.

JHR