How To Win

[Surferbeetle]

Posted at PNAS, Growth, innovation, scaling, and the pace of life in cities by:

1. Luís M. A. Bettencourt
2. José Lobo
3. Dirk Helbing
4. Christian Kühnert
5. Geoffrey B. West

In this work, we show that the social organization and dynamics relating urbanization to economic development and knowledge creation, among other social activities, are very general and appear as nontrivial quantitative regularities common to all cities, across urban systems. We present an extensive body of empirical evidence showing that important demographic, socioeconomic, and behavioral urban indicators are, on average, scaling functions of city size that are quantitatively consistent across different nations and times [note that the much studied “Zipf's law” (ref. 31) for the rank–size distribution of urban populations is just one example of the many scaling relationships presented in this work]. The most thorough evidence at present is for the U.S., where extensive reliable data across a wide variety of indicators span many decades. In addition, we show that other nations, including China and European countries, display particular scaling relationships consistent with those in the U.S.

[Bob's World]

Latest thoughts found on the ISAF Blog: http://isafcoin.blogspot.com


http://isafcoin.blogspot.com/2010/05...-model_15.html

[M-A Lagrange]

BW,

Just one word: BRAVO.
You have captured in this model what is ramping in the back of my mind since several month and years.

Saying so, I have a question for you. You assert that strong centralised government is needed (I mostly agree with that). But if I look at France, a historically strongly centralised country, tendency nowadays is to go for decentralisation (mainly for financial reasons). So my question is: don’t you think that centralised governance is also part of the problem in insurgency as it does not allow population to have her piece of autonomy? Knowing that, in such case, you give opportunities for weakness.

Sincerely

M-A

[Bob's World]

BW,

Just one word: BRAVO.
You have captured in this model what is ramping in the back of my mind since several month and years.

Saying so, I have a question for you. You assert that strong centralised government is needed (I mostly agree with that). But if I look at France, a historically strongly centralised country, tendency nowadays is to go for decentralisation (mainly for financial reasons). So my question is: don’t you think that centralised governance is also part of the problem in insurgency as it does not allow population to have her piece of autonomy? Knowing that, in such case, you give opportunities for weakness.

Sincerely

M-A

M-A,

Thanks, I hope that there is something here that people can draw upon. As to government, what I said was that "Many believe that establishing a strong central government is the key to resolving insurgency."

In the final sentence prior to the conclusion I state my belief, and that is "Self-Determination is the path to Good Governance." Whatever flavor a particular populace believes is right for them.

Bob

[Ken White]

Really. Only suggestion I'd make is change the name. The Jones Model it is and will always be but if it is to be adopted, it generally will require a bland, non-name so some quite senior person can adopt it as <i>his or her</i> idea. * Very few will dutifully and properly acknowledge the importance of subordinate's input and ideas...

It's good enough and important enough to need adoption...

* Partly tongue in cheek. Only partly...

[Greyhawk]

I like this description:

Know your place:

COIN is the role of the GIROA; the coalition is supporting with FID

Is that policy, or "opinions he expresses here are his own"?

[slapout9]

BW,outstanding. It should be applied to our own country first, then maybe the politicos would realize just how bad off we are. We are at 5 and sliding fast on all 4 causal factors. I like the fact that you point out that democracy does not appear in the constitution, to that I would add neither does Capitalism......Government is good when it is done by the people,for ALL the people, and not by a few Tali-banksters.


PS Ken is right on the name......May I suggest the Robin Hood Model!

[Entropy]

BW,

Beautifully written and well argued essay!

My first question is: How does one distinguish the Somalia/Bangladesh/Liberian exceptions to your model?

[Bob's World]

I like this description:



Is that policy, or "opinions he expresses here are his own"?

A growing number within the SOF Community recognize that when dealing with an Insurgency, COIN is the mission of the Host Nation; and that those who are there as guests are conducting FID, or IDAD, or SFA or some similar supporting mission. It helps keep your head clear and avoid mission creep when you don't assume the primary mission for yourself. It also helps to avoid perceptions that you are in fact in charge, and intend to stay that way, with a puppet regime at your beck and call. When one appreciates that creating perceptions of Legitimacy in the HN Government is arguably the number one mission; every little bit helps.

The conventional community, by and large, sees COIN through the lens of the hard lessons learned in Iraq. They also, by and large, see FID as a Special Forces mission. It may seem like a nuance to not call what we are doing "COIN", but it is a critical nuance. Perhaps an essentianl one.

[Bob's World]

BW,

Beautifully written and well argued essay!

My first question is: How does one distinguish the Somalia/Bangladesh/Liberian exceptions to your model?

Western society is quick to judge States elsewhere as "failed" and typically apply a ruler that consists of "things expected in a Western, Westphalian State" to measure with.

Is Somalia a failed state by that measure? Certainly. Is Somalia also a state that is ripe for "insurgency"? Now, that is another question altogether. I think many states, primarily in Africa, are in the process of rejecting the forms of government and borders drawn for them by Europeans and finding their own way to a form of governance that works for them. I fear it will be a long and bloody path. Us judging them as "failed" and working to force them back to the conditions they are working to escape will not be particularly helpful.

Is Bangladesh "failed"? No, I think Bangladesh is just very poor, over populated, and situated in a flood zone. Everyone there knows this, this is how it has always been. When it comes to Effectiveness of governance, they score very low by western standards. When it comes to "Good Governance" I sense they do okay as assessed by their own populace. There are States in Europe who may well be far closer to insurgency than Bangladesh is; and no one is taking that risk as seriously as they should.

Liberia? I don't know much about how the Liberian populace feels about their government. That is the critical measure. We assess them and have concerns about how WE feel about the Liberian government, and our fears are valid as to how they affect us. If, however, the populace of Liberia perceives the governance to be "Good" there is low risk of insurgency.

The point being that the U.S. in the 1960s was on the cusp of insurgency with the African American populace. The leadership of Dr. King kept iit less violent than it would have been naturally, and the passing and enforcing of the civil rights act moved that segment of the populace back down the curve into the "peace" zone. It is well for all Americans to remember that if one were to assess and plot where key segments of American society lay on the Jones Model, they would not all plot in the same place. Some, as Slap indicated, are trending upwards in their perceptions. But as I told a hardcore, Tea Party attending, retired Marine Colonel friend of mine. "You're mad as hell, and extremely concerned about the direction government is going, but you are no where close to becoming an insurgent are you?" "No," he replied. "That's becuase you have hope. You know, that no matter what, in 3 years you will get to vote and that your vote will count, and that it 7 years no matter what you will have a new President." "Damn straight," he replied.

When we chip away at the puplic trust in our system, we chip away at our national security. By understanding the Jones Model, one understands not just what to focus on in Afghanistan; but also what to focus on in dealing with the Saudis or the Israelis, but when approaching domestic policy issues as well.

The "failures" that lead to insurgency are likely trending upward among populaces who live in states whose stability we take for granted (stabilty is never "granted," it is maintained and earned daily through the efforts of officials striving to provide good governance to all, equally); while those same factors may well be trending downward in states that we see as "failing" in other ways.

In other words, if you don't know what to look for, you will likely be looking for the wrong things, in the wrong places; and miss what is really important.

[slapout9]

Some, as Slap indicated, are trending upwards in their perceptions. But as I told a hardcore, Tea Party attending, retired Marine Colonel friend of mine. "You're mad as hell, and extremely concerned about the direction government is going, but you are no where close to becoming an insurgent are you?" "No," he replied. "That's becuase you have hope. You know, that no matter what, in 3 years you will get to vote and that your vote will count, and that it 7 years no matter what you will have a new President." "Damn straight," he replied.

When we chip away at the puplic trust in our system, we chip away at our national security. By understanding the Jones Model, one understands not just what to focus on in Afghanistan; but also what to focus on in dealing with the Saudis or the Israelis, but when approaching domestic policy issues as well.

Except, I think there are factions of the Tea party and other groups that no longer have any hope and they are preparing for an insurgency. I was talking with some LE friends awhile ago and there is some scary stuff goin on that hasn't been present since the 60's and 70's When people show up at Political rallies......with Guns.... that is sending a very dangerous message.

[Bob's World]

Except, I think there are factions of the Tea party and other groups that no longer have any hope and they are preparing for an insurgency. I was talking with some LE friends awhile ago and there is some scary stuff goin on that hasn't been present since the 60's and 70's When people show up at Political rallies......with Guns.... that is sending a very dangerous message.

The best yards are those that are maintained regularly throughout the year. Populaces are much the same.

As I said, all four causal perceptions must be monitored and nurtured constantly to keep a populace in "peace." What often causes governments to stumble is that they take themselves too seriously, and discount the perceptions of the people in favor for those perceptions they form of themselves from their fine offices, surrounded by those who owe their positions to their patronage.

Are there some Americans who question the legitimacy of the President? Certainly, you see this when they call for his Birth Certificate. There were many who questioned the legitimacy of President Bush as well due to the "hanging chads" in Florida. No one factor will result in insurgency, but when the factors begin to stack up it is best to nip it in the bud long before it goes violent. Thank God we addressed the Civil Rights movement as soon as we did, in the manner we did; but event that was long over due.

Insurgencies happen for a reason. Good Governance is hard.

[Chris jM]

To echo the above praises, great concept and great article.

Putting the Jones model to work, I'm interested in the underlying problems in Pakistan as seen through this lens.

What is their underlying cause? A lack of justice? A lack of governmental legitimacy, especially in the tribal areas? How much of their population perceives their situation as hopeless?

[Bob's World]

To echo the above praises, great concept and great article.

Putting the Jones model to work, I'm interested in the underlying problems in Pakistan as seen through this lens.

What is their underlying cause? A lack of justice? A lack of governmental legitimacy, especially in the tribal areas? How much of their population perceives their situation as hopeless?

It is too easy to focus on the surface issues. The violence, the poverty, the lack of infrastructure, the corruption, etc. All important indicators of deeper problems, but perhap not anything that time, money and effort should be committed against directly.

At the end of the day, the question for the U.S. in Pakistan is what are the naitonal interests that must be nurtured there.

The second question is then how to best nurture those interests in a manner that does not contribute to perceptions of poor governance;

and ideally implemented in a manner that encourages enhancements of good governance instead. Interests are best nurtured in a stable state, so it is in our interest to encourage and promote good governance. Such an approach is also likely to reduce the likelihood of dienfranchised members of that populace coming to the conclusion that they can only achieve their nationalist aims by first breaking the support of the US to that country / region.

[MikeF]

It is too easy to focus on the surface issues. The violence, the poverty, the lack of infrastructure, the corruption, etc. All important indicators of deeper problems, but perhap not anything that time, money and effort should be committed against directly.

At the end of the day, the question for the U.S. in Pakistan is what are the naitonal interests that must be nurtured there.

The second question is then how to best nurture those interests in a manner that does not contribute to perceptions of poor governance;

and ideally implemented in a manner that encourages enhancements of good governance instead. Interests are best nurtured in a stable state, so it is in our interest to encourage and promote good governance. Such an approach is also likely to reduce the likelihood of dienfranchised members of that populace coming to the conclusion that they can only achieve their nationalist aims by first breaking the support of the US to that country / region.

COL Jones,

Sir, as I said before, I like your model. As a matter or manner of application, we're now getting into the realm of bargaining, negoitiation, and arbitraion. Game theory and economics provides some useful tools to understand these games; however, I'm still unsure how to arbitrate the hearts (emotions) of perceived poor governance.

[Bob's World]

COL Jones,

Sir, as I said before, I like your model. As a matter or manner of application, we're now getting into the realm of bargaining, negoitiation, and arbitraion. Game theory and economics provides some useful tools to understand these games; however, I'm still unsure how to arbitrate the hearts (emotions) of perceived poor governance.

We can encourage, we can promote, we can enable. At some point we may even say enough, our national interest here are so extremely great, your governance is so extremely poor, that we conduct UW and assist the populace to form a new governance. That is why we have UW on the books.

What we need to begin stepping away from, however, IMO, are those relationships where we in fact promote Poor Governance. Where we have important national interests at stake, but where the government has come to act with impunity due to its reliance on the US to keep them safely in power out of our concern for those interests. This is where, in this new information age, we set ourselves up to be targets of "terrorist" attacks.

We came out of the Cold War proudly proclaiming that we stand for Democracy and the Rule of Law. Fine. Both of those pursuits, however, can lead to insurgency and terrorism if propogated among a populace that percieves itself to be hopelessy trapped under Poor Governance.

I would suggest the we modify our tune slightly. To proudly stand for Self Determination and Good Governance. Rule of Law and Democracy in some form are apt to follow in good time, and when they do it will be among a populace that is much more likely to perceive it's governance to be "Good."

[slapout9]

The best yards are those that are maintained regularly throughout the year. Populaces are much the same.

As I said, all four causal perceptions must be monitored and nurtured constantly to keep a populace in "peace." What often causes governments to stumble is that they take themselves too seriously, and discount the perceptions of the people in favor for those perceptions they form of themselves from their fine offices, surrounded by those who owe their positions to their patronage.

Are there some Americans who question the legitimacy of the President? Certainly, you see this when they call for his Birth Certificate. There were many who questioned the legitimacy of President Bush as well due to the "hanging chads" in Florida. No one factor will result in insurgency, but when the factors begin to stack up it is best to nip it in the bud long before it goes violent. Thank God we addressed the Civil Rights movement as soon as we did, in the manner we did; but event that was long over due.

Insurgencies happen for a reason. Good Governance is hard.

BW, yes all 4 factors have to come into play. But where your model may need to be adjusted is when you are dealing with a developed country vs. a less developed country. The economic driver is more pronounced in developed countries, by that I mean a country such as the US which may be about to cut social services (California) has a greater chance of a Civil Emergency than a less developed country which has never known any type government supported population centric survival programs. I just invented that term

In our case when the private sector fails and it has failed if the government does not step in and support the Entire population vs. a small protected class than Civil Disturbance is sure to follow. Watch California it is 1/8 of the US economy depending upon which estimate you believe. If those cuts happen on the scale that the Govenator is proposing....watch out.

The best selling COIN manual is about to be replaced by another manual, The US Army Civil Disturbance manual. I just watched the John Nash movie this weekend "A Beautiful Mind". In it there is a scene where he proves that Adam Smith was wrong! It is the "Governing Dynamics" that matter!

Which leads me to my final point about hope, if people can not survive economically until the next election cycle (years) it isn't going to matter. When the private sector fails all that is left is the government, when the government fails all that is left is Civil Emergency. Which is in your paper and I agree it is really a more appropriate term then this Insurgency stuff.

Time for more coffee.

[Entropy]

BW,

You've sold me on your model as it pertains to insurgency, but I think we might disagree on it's application to Afghanistan.

Western society is quick to judge States elsewhere as "failed" and typically apply a ruler that consists of "things expected in a Western, Westphalian State" to measure with.

That's correct and I would ask whether we (the US and ISAF) are not making that misjudgment with respect to Afghanistan. Afghanistan, I would argue, is more like Somalia (and I agree with your description of Somalia) than the Philippines or Mao's China, or Malaya or any number of insurgencies.

The second issue I have is related: As you're well aware, there is more than one "populace" in Afghanistan and, as you've argued before, there's more than one "insurgency." This gets back to a point I've made many times before: Afghanistan's internal conflicts are not merely defined by insurgency but are a continuation of Afghanistan's civil war. The conditions which brought about the civil war have not fundamentally changed, rather those conditions and the civil nature of Afghanistan's internal conflicts are subsumed into what we call the insurgency. We think of ourselves and our goals assuming legitimacy, but in some ways we are just another faction, albeit the biggest and baddest, in Afghanistan's great political game. It is dangerous, IMO, to only think of Afghanistan in terms of insurgency and fail to recognize that our toppling of the Taliban did little to address long-standing internal conflicts.

My third point is that placating one population and moving them down the Jones scale below the violence threshold (and for Afghanistan the violence threshold line is comparatively much lower on the scale than most other countries/peoples) may cause another population to rise above the threshold and engage in violent insurgency. I cannot say for certain one way or the other, but I question the assumption underlying our strategy that there is a form of central governance in Afghanistan that will satisfy all parties. What I mean by this is that the conditions for "peace" or "suppression" of the insurgency may be mutually exclusive for the various populaces in Afghanistan and that "good" governance may mean, in the end, minimal or no centralized governance at all. This goes back the the fundamental question on whether the "nation" of Afghanistan, as defined by its political borders, can be a viable nation-state to begin with. I question whether Afghanistan's factions can perceive any kind of strong central governance as anything other than a vehicle to further factional interests or as a direct threat to those interests.

You seem to have some hope for Karzai's "peace jirga" which I do not share. It's clear to me that Karzai and the other major players either lack the leadership ability or the inclination to transform Afghanistan's factional interests into some kind of national interest. Or perhaps we need to recognize that goal is a long way off - the equivalent of expecting one who can't walk to run a marathon. The peace jirga is likely to end up as most of large jirga's do - a failure with, at best, transitory effects.

COIN is the role of the GIROA; the coalition is supporting with FID

Finally, we need to recognize that our mere presence in Afghanistan is enough cause for some in Afghanistan to engage in "insurgency." In another thread here, someone asked about Afghanistan's period of relative internal peace during much of the 20th century. This period was also a nadir for foreign interference in Afghanistan. Correlation =/= causality, but one might argue that Afghanistan's factions might come to a stable accommodation if only they were left alone.

And since you brought up MLK, I thought you might be interested in this Clausewitzian analysis of King's strategy by Seydlitz89 (I don't know his real name, but WILF, I believe, knows him).

[Bob's World]

________________________________________
Good comments all. As I developed this model over the past 8 years (yes, I'm a slow learner), one of the primary goals was to produce a tool that helped to look at all insurgencies with a fresh perspective; not necessarily to divine some one size fits all solution.

I do think this applies to a country like France or the US as well as it does to a country like Afghanistan or Algeria; because all of the above are populated by and governed by humans. The issues, the degree that one thing is relative to another, the perspectives and tolerances all will vary widely between countries, and between distinct populace groups within countries. This is human nature.

As to Afghanistan, this model has only been applied to Afghanistan in my head. I think the current approaches are generally consistent, but I would suggest a refinement here and there for consideration, using this model to make my case.

As to the Peace Jirga, I HAVE to put a lot of stock in it. It is our best chance for a resolution within the timeframe available that satisfies the populaces of Afghanistan; as well as those of the Coalition countries. Nothing will make everyone perfectly happy, but then again, the pursuit of perfection is rarely the path to happiness.

[Entropy]

I do think this applies to a country like France or the US as well as it does to a country like Afghanistan or Algeria; because all of the above are populated by and governed by humans. The issues, the degree that one thing is relative to another, the perspectives and tolerances all will vary widely between countries, and between distinct populace groups within countries. This is human nature.

As to Afghanistan, this model has only been applied to Afghanistan in my head. I think the current approaches are generally consistent, but I would suggest a refinement here and there for consideration, using this model to make my case.

I don't disagree. I think your model is widely applicable which makes it a great tool for analysis. I think your model strongly reinforces the principle of subsidiarity, which itself is a model to determine the appropriate level of centralization in governance (and is a principle which I personally subscribe to).

Your model, however, is constrained by outside factors - on-the-ground reality, political limitations and our own preconceptions and mindsets. So when we think of "good governance" in the context of Afghanistan, we are limited by what exists (the current government) and what is reasonably possible. Your model helps, IMO, to expose some of those constraints and suggest alternatives - for example, we might consider the possibility that fostering more decentralized governance in Afghanistan is preferable to trying to improve the existing highly-centralized system. As an analysis tool, your model is useful because it should cause strategists and policymakers to question long-standing assumptions and consider alternatives.

Sadly, I think you're right that we are still largely rooted in Iraq. It seems to me we are applying lessons learned there to Afghanistan without adequately considering that Afghanistan carries a much different set of constraints which are incompatible with the COIN/FID methods employed in Iraq. This isn't just a military problem, but one that afflicts strategy and policy at the highest levels.

Also, eight years isn't slow. Hell, it wasn't until I was over thirty that I finally developed the introspective ability and maturity to find a compatible wife, much less be a good husband!