How To Win

[William F. Owen]

I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda.

Exactly! I have no argument with that, but I assume that you limited your advice to that flowed from your military expertise, and relevant local experience.

Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.

...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.

I also submit that the circumstances where this may be appropriate or actually in the interest of the US Govt. are pretty limited. When the Aliens turn up, they will say "take me to your leaders." Not "how can we meet your requirements?"

[Tom Odom]

and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.

Let's go back to where I came in and it was due to this statement. I agree that State should have lead and with Ken's concerns on Unified Commands. But when you state that the colonel has nothing to do with strategic policy that is an erroneous statement. If he takes his teams on the ground as an instrument of said policy, his effective or ineffective implementation of that policy influences, guides, and even sets strategic policy.

Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.

Well again I did it as a LTC and I had to fire 2 Majors who tried to do it when they decided the policy set by the CT was in error.

...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.

Sure it is, one done in conjunction with the foreign policy as captured in the campaign plan. Saying it is not a military task is wishful thinking; we had enough of that in 2003 I would submit.

Tom

[slapout9]

De Oppresso Libre-(To Liberate The Oppressed) is the motto of Special Forces and since oppression is often part of the cause of an Insurgency it certainly is a Military problem.

Colonel Jones makes some very good points about this and why poor governance is the true root cause that has to be dealt with, and since violent force has often already been used it will be a military problem. But it is a special military problem hence the reason SF was created in the first place.

Governments are created to provide for the health and safety of ALL the people, but insurgencies start whenever Governments begin to protect only certain members of the populace and forget or ignore the other members and that begins the process of an alienated populace that either begins an insurgency internally or the alienated populace will be subject to exploitation by an outside element or both.

Which is why Colonel Jones makes the point that COIN operations are so protracted and costly in nature and are prone to reignite at some point in the future. The core problem of poor governance was never completely solved. Which will lead to certain portions of the populace becoming alienated again and creating a rich source of recruits for the future cause.

He also makes the point or warning about our being careful about being on the right side of the revolution...a good piece of advice IMO. Again COIN takes so long because we often choose the wrong side to support because of some idealogical dispute(hearts and minds thing again) as opposed to looking at the environment/situation these people are in and how poorly they are being treated by their government.

[William F. Owen]

De Oppresso Libre-(To Liberate The Oppressed) is the motto of Special Forces and since oppression is often part of the cause of an Insurgency it certainly is a Military problem.

Well De Oppresso Libre is certainly more catching that "Selectively free the oppressed in line state department policy and ensuring that we end up with a foreign leader who is well disposed towards to the US, regardless of his/her human rights record."

PCE sounds good, but it must be done in line with overall interest of the US Govt, and that may well mean allowing people to be oppressed, if you want to do business with the leadership that has their hands on the power.

[William F. Owen]

But when you state that the colonel has nothing to do with strategic policy that is an erroneous statement. If he takes his teams on the ground as an instrument of said policy, his effective or ineffective implementation of that policy influences, guides, and even sets strategic policy.

I said Strategic Level FOREIGN Policy. I am not saying Colonels should not have missions or aims with Strategic Effect. Clearly there are times when they should. I am saying Colonels should not set or define policy. They should carry it out. If they are setting or defining foreign policy then there is something clearly wrong.

Soldiers are instruments of policy. They should have nothing to do with formulating the policy, bar advisory input.

I submit T.E. Lawrence as an object lesson in someone failing to understand the bounds of carrying out policy and setting it.

[Tom Odom]

I said Strategic Level FOREIGN Policy. I am not saying Colonels should not have missions or aims with Strategic Effect. Clearly there are times when they should. I am saying Colonels should not set or define policy. They should carry it out. If they are setting or defining foreign policy then there is something clearly wrong.

No, you said this. Using bold and an all caps response does not change what you said in the first place.

and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.

As for the pronoiuncement that Colonels do not set or define foreign policy, that makes great slogan but is in fact in error. Much of what emerges as a nation's foreign policy toward another nation begins on the ground. What the colonel is writing about has eveything to do with him and his mssion.

Tom

[wm]

Funny thing about the military and political spheres—they proceed toward success in almost exactly opposite ways. Successful political change is implemented slowly and incrementally by way of consensus. Successful military operations tend to be quick and violent. I suspect it is very valuable to have a country team whose members include people who can assess what kind of action needs to be taken and then act. In fact, I pointed out in a thread a long time go that we need to have state and defense joined at the hip to make this stuff work right.

Long ago and far away in the Land of Ahs (the marketing campaign used by the Kansas department of tourism when I lived there in the mid 80s), the Army taught me during CGSC about a thing called the "country team." I guess that hummer is passé now.
One would think that DoD and DoS should be joined at the hip throughout the planning and execution process whenever the US gets ready to involve itself in some OCONUS adventure. Likewise, one would think that a similar relationship would exist between DoD and DHS for a CONUS-focused operation.
It is not clear to me that we need a bunch of Ph.D's in uniform to solve the problem in Iraq. Someone else on this thread masterfully described a Ph.D. as a person who has gone from a macroscopic grasp of knowledge to becoming an expert in a piece of minutiae (I admit I have wordsmithed that other post greatly). What we really need are people who can see that many folks are stakeholders and have a part to play in the solution; we need people without blinders on or otherwise afflicted with tunnel vision. We need some folks who are wise, not just smart. Solomon, where are you???

[William F. Owen]

As for the pronoiuncement that Colonels do not set or define foreign policy, that makes great slogan but is in fact in error. Much of what emerges as a nation's foreign policy toward another nation begins on the ground. What the colonel is writing about has eveything to do with him and his mssion.

So do you mean that when the man on the ground comes to write his reports, and recommends actions, that such recommendations could be said to be "setting and defining foreign policy."

I guess the line from "Charlie Wilson's War" - "we don't have a policy on Afghanistan" - must have been true.

[Tom Odom]

So do you mean that when the man on the ground comes to write his reports, and recommends actions, that such recommendations could be said to be "setting and defining foreign policy."

I guess the line from "Charlie Wilson's War" - "we don't have a policy on Afghanistan" - must have been true.

Ignoring the later sarcasm, I mean the sum total of interaction on the ground--be that writing reports, meeting with counterparts including the Vice Presient/Secretary of Defense one on one, or sharing information with a senior operations officer or a senior intelligence officer--enter into the creation and defining of foreign policy. If one is summoned to the VPs office and he is poised to pull out of a reciprocal program, then what you say in that office and how you react defines where the foreign policy that established that program in the first place. That is but one example.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Ignoring the later sarcasm,

No sarcasm intended. At was an attempt at mood lightening, observational humour.

I mean the sum total of interaction on the ground--be that writing reports, meeting with counterparts including the Vice Presient/Secretary of Defense one on one, or sharing information with a senior operations officer or a senior intelligence officer--enter into the creation and defining of foreign policy. If one is summoned to the VPs office and he is poised to pull out of a reciprocal program, then what you say in that office and how you react defines where the foreign policy that established that program in the first place. That is but one example.

All those things are good. In the British Army, that is what the "MILO" -military liaison intelligence officers - used to do. Maybe they still do. I have not carried a drunken one back to his hotel in 15 years.

Sure, always good to have military input from the coal face, but that is distinctly different from an officer on the ground, deciding to back X group against another or to reverse a policy already in place. Best he can do, is to argue his case and then act when instructed to do so, his plans first having been scrutinised by the diplomats. Historically the best I can offer is the difference between Allenby's success in the Palestine campaign, versus MacArthur getting himself sacked in Korea.

To whit, and my concern in this thread, while I applaud the Col Jones's insights as to "PCE", his paper does not, to mind, make clear that PCE is a going to have to be set against a very stringent and very specific policy context.

"...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." cannot be, or underpin, an overall approach to operations. It's like basing FM-3 on the universal declaration of human rights. Military Force is for the breaking of will, not the building of nations.