How To Win

[Tom Odom]

...and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him. The spanner does not tell the plumber how to fix the leak, any more than the brick layer tells an architect how to built a house.

As a Lieutenant Colonel, Wilf I was intimately involved in strategic level policy on central Africa. I wrote the campaign plan for the area in Kigali for US European Command and it was picked up virtually word for word. Your methaphor is both inaccurate and misleading. Inaccurate in that the trades have a direct effect on the total design because the design can only use what a trade can provide. Misleading in that there are any number of colonels, majors, and captains who have had strategic effect.

Tom

[slapout9]

1-What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea.


2-Here is some white man/western thinking. In another article Colonel Jones talked about an International Civil Rights Act that correlates to our domestic Civil Rights Act. Both based upon our Constitution and used to guide our Domestic and Foreign Policy.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rS4Qw4lIckg


Link to SWJ original article by Colonel Jones
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/46-jones.pdf

[Ken White]

I noticed the same item Wilf highlighted:

"...PCE is driven by the key concepts that governance is of, by and for the people; that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best; and that insurgency occurs when governance fails."

but took it differently, I cued in on this portion "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.

* As it appears we tried (are trying???) to do in both Afghanistan and Iraq and is flat not going to happen...

The principal benefit of his paper to me is that it espouses removal of DoD from de facto primacy in foreign affairs and accurately points out that this:

Threat-Centric Engagement (TCE): A program of engagement designed to defeat a specific enemy or alliance of separate enemies. TCE is driven by the key concept that ultimate victory is achieved by defeating the threat.

is not the best way to look at the rest of the world bar a potential existential threat.

I gotta agree with Slap; "What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea." I'm about as rank as anyone and I have some good ideas. Occasionally. Well, rarely...

Added: Wilf chimed in ahead of this with:

"My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall."

I agree. Being de facto Johnny on the Spot has worked fairly well for the US Armed Forces and DoD since the late 50s in the foreign policy business -- that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is.

[slapout9]

[QUOTE=Ken White;59358] "...that populaces have the right to choose the form of governance which suits them best..." as meaning stick our big nose in only where it's wanted but do not try to manipulate that want and at all costs do not try to impose a form of of government that is alien or inappropriate * on another nation.

Exactly!!

[Tom Odom]

Added: Wilf chimed in ahead of this with:
Quote:
"My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall."

I agree. Being de facto Johnny on the Spot has worked fairly well for the US Armed Forces and DoD since the late 50s in the foreign policy business -- that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is

Wilf the fear as you state it is a red herring when it comes to soldiers versus diplomats as in many cases soldiers are in fact diplomats. Separation of affairs political from affairs military at the strategic level is a impossible and trying to do that is dangerous.

Secondly it is often a soldier's duty as a diplomat or a strategist to advise and counsel policy makers on where policy should go. In reality things move so fast that the folks on the ground may in fact be setting policy. That works well if the framework is established for what they can and cannot do. Where it goes astray is when those limits are not set.

I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda. Switching to the present time, I believe we could have used more of that in the senior ranks of the military circa 2002 into 2005.

Ken, the defacto Johnny on the spots may in fact be there because they were put there to do the job. The country team is designed to do just that. It is not always a succes but with the right mix of people and proper training and leadership it works quite well. Without a country team or an element on the ground to do those sorts of things, you get decision-making from a distance without any reality from the scene.

I agree with Ken in that I read the colonel's piece as suggesting we set strategy according to the reality of the place, not what we decide it should be.

Tom

[Ken White]

I seem to have that problem here a lot; my fault for lack of clarity and using too much shorthand I guess. Penalty of a wordy old Dude who thinks he's a comedian trying to be brief. Apologies to all. I'll try to do better.

Wilf the fear as you state it is a red herring when it comes to soldiers versus diplomats as in many cases soldiers are in fact diplomats. Separation of affairs political from affairs military at the strategic level is a impossible and trying to do that is dangerous.

Totally agree, the issue is who has primacy -- who's in charge?

Secondly it is often a soldier's duty as a diplomat or a strategist to advise and counsel policy makers on where policy should go. In reality things move so fast that the folks on the ground may in fact be setting policy. That works well if the framework is established for what they can and cannot do. Where it goes astray is when those limits are not set.

I totally agree and I acknowledge that those on the spot do set often policy and must do so; again, the issue is who's the adviser and who's the decider on the spot...

I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda. Switching to the present time, I believe we could have used more of that in the senior ranks of the military circa 2002 into 2005.

I also agree totally with that. That, in fact, is the point of my comments.

Ken, the defacto Johnny on the spots may in fact be there because they were put there to do the job. The country team is designed to do just that. It is not always a succes but with the right mix of people and proper training and leadership it works quite well. Without a country team or an element on the ground to do those sorts of things, you get decision-making from a distance without any reality from the scene.

I think we have a misunderstanding. I totally agree with this and with the country team concept -- and nothing I have written says one thing remotely in opposition to that; so I'm unsure why you would assume that I'm opposed to an idea that works.

What I am opposed to as I thought I rather specifically said is the de facto situation that lets the geographic CinCs set much of our foreign policy as opposed to the DoS doing that. I fully understand that due to several reasons, not least funding and reach, DoD is doing that by default and not particularly because (in some cases) they want to do so.

I'm also aware of the fact that State is not capable of doing that well at this time and I believe I mentioned that; What I'm pointing at is a, IMO, to be desired situation versus what I know (and understand why) is.

Just as the Ambassador -- flawed though he may be -- has primacy on the Country Team (and is a fool if he does not listen carefully to his DAO), so State should have primacy in regional policy and they, not DoD, should set the policy (but not the specifics) of contacts and operations about which they -- and the National command authority -- should listen to DoD (who need to be more forthright and honest in their advice...).

If you saw this from me ""...that does not mean that all has worked well for the United States in that business or that such is an ideal state and I, for one, do not think it is."" and thought that was a knock on anyone or anything, it was not -- it was merely a comment that perhaps too briefly stated my opinion that DoD (as a corporate entity) has over the years made some decisions by default or specific Administration permissively that were in strong contradiction to State positions and that some of those have been in error. A few have been correct and State was wrong. That and I did not clearly state my broad point -- I agree with Jones that a threat centric approach has not been good for the Nation.

I agree with Ken in that I read the colonel's piece as suggesting we set strategy according to the reality of the place, not what we decide it should be.

That, too...

[William F. Owen]

I believed it was my duty and I still do to tell poltical appointees what was possible and what was not possible in both Zaire and Rwanda.

Exactly! I have no argument with that, but I assume that you limited your advice to that flowed from your military expertise, and relevant local experience.

Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.

...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.

I also submit that the circumstances where this may be appropriate or actually in the interest of the US Govt. are pretty limited. When the Aliens turn up, they will say "take me to your leaders." Not "how can we meet your requirements?"

[Tom Odom]

and why is a Colonel writing about Strategic Level foreign Policy? He is more than qualified and entitled, but ultimately it's nothing to do with him.

Let's go back to where I came in and it was due to this statement. I agree that State should have lead and with Ken's concerns on Unified Commands. But when you state that the colonel has nothing to do with strategic policy that is an erroneous statement. If he takes his teams on the ground as an instrument of said policy, his effective or ineffective implementation of that policy influences, guides, and even sets strategic policy.

Secondly, I don't see their being any risk of Lt Cols setting foreign policy. That's not my complaint. The job of the military is to be an instrument of foreign policy, not an obstacle to it. - though limitations will obviously exist, and the military has to advise on these.

Well again I did it as a LTC and I had to fire 2 Majors who tried to do it when they decided the policy set by the CT was in error.

...but in the context of this thread, "meeting the requirements of a target populace for good governance," is not a military task. If the diplomats want this, then the military helps it happen, in the context of the military instrument.

Sure it is, one done in conjunction with the foreign policy as captured in the campaign plan. Saying it is not a military task is wishful thinking; we had enough of that in 2003 I would submit.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

1-What does his rank have to do with anything? A good idea is good idea.

You are signing (get it?) to the choir. Rank has nothing to do with it. Sometimes the lower the rank, the better the idea.

As a Lieutenant Colonel, Wilf I was intimately involved in strategic level policy on central Africa. I wrote the campaign plan for the area in Kigali for US European Command and it was picked up virtually word for word.

Probably because you were the best qualified in that circumstance, based on proximity and experience. You were doing what countless British Army officers have done for generations, all over the empire, usually with beneficial strategic effect.

My fear is that you end up with soldiers telling diplomats and politicians what the end state should look like, instead of preparing to deal with the cards as they fall.

"War is the setting forth of policy with an admixture of other means."