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Thread: How To Win

  1. #41
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    Default Slim is missing the point

    posted by jmm99, It is in their own enlightened self-interest to assist in doing so, and also in the interests of their populations. But, as Sheriff Slim says, the mission is "to preserve and encourage a safe community", not to build one.
    Good post, but one that I thinks supports a PCE approach. One element of good governance is providing security to its populace, failure to do so is a failure of the government of the worst type. Your argument only addressed one aspect of the government, which is the police. Jone's is arguing for a Whole of Government Approach, so at the town level, we're talking about everything the Mayor can influence, and what is overlapped on top by county, State, and Federal Government.

    Sheriff Slim sounds like he lives/works in a relatively safe community, but I would argue the mission statement would change if you were a cop in a city where certain sections of it were controlled by gangs (or insurgents). Law enforcement then has an obligation to build a safe community, failure to do so could result in the people organizing to address the security problem (outside the law), or seeking relief by joining forces with the criminals or insurgents because the government failed them.

    You're points on targeting the criminals were correct. This is the apparent weakness in the population centric approach, although Jones did state it allowed TCE when applicable. Of course if it is applicable if you're fighting an insurgency; however, the there are different ways to get after the threat. Using Jones' example of the Civil Rights Movement, the government took away their cause, thus prevented an increase in tension and defused the situation. The government may be able to turn the populace against the insurgent as we did in Al Anbar. Ultimately the government must get the people to support the government without coercion or the government loses. All that said, key enemy subversives must still be neutralized. The difference is now the TCE is a supporting activity, not the main effort, and never a strategy.



    There is much to disagree with in Jones' article, but

  2. #42
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Huh?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    ...To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution...
    I can generally agree with the first four paragraphs. The one dissected above and below herein sort of confuses me. Sorry, you'll have to forgive me, I'm old...

    I could make a very valid argument that the American Revolution was in fact started by a small faction of trouble makers and that many in the populace of the time here were in fact being ridiculous -- but all that is for another thread and another time. For this thread:
    ...Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.
    Now that what is happening to us? In what way are we blind? What could we do to avoid 'it?'

  3. #43
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default

    Just got home awhile ago and read my emails and I was going to tell everyone that Col. Jones had agreed to reply to this thread,but......it looks like he is already here

  4. #44
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    Default The challenge

    To simply blame your failures on a small faction of trouble makers, or on some particular ideology and demand that the populace stop being rediculous and recognize the effectiveness of their governance and be happy is the kind of stereotype that we Americans laugh at in stories about the American Revolution. Now that it is happening to us, it appears we are just as blind as our British cousins were. Ironic, yes. Tragically avoidable? Equally yes, I say.
    First, I think there are many cases where a handful of trouble makers did mobilize the population. The government may or may not have set conditions where the populace is susceptable to being mobilized. Your argument remains valid, because it is still a contest for winning over the population, but don't forget that many insurgents initially rely on coercion to mobilize support or neutrality. To counter that coercion requires something of a TCE to eliminate that threat.

    As for American ideas, your article was full of them. You did mention that the population has a duty to raise up against their government if it is seen as unworthy. Tell me how that fits the situation in the UK, where a internal and external actors are attempting to mobilize/radicalize the Muslim population to conduct terrorist attacks if the UK doesn't allow them to practice Sharia Law. Based on your argument, the Muslims have an obligation to raise up and fight the government, and we as Americans have an obligation to provide moral support.

    I assume this is not your intention, but simply reading your article would indicate you may recommend supporting these radical groups if the government can't respond to their call for change. What they're advocating is a far cry from a Civil Rights Bill. The government could meet them half way, and compromise and perhaps develop one government with two laws, but I just don't think that will work.

    My example is harsh, and perhaps even unfair, but I think it demands an answer. It may go a long ways to clarify what your intended strategy is.

    I could take it further, and argue we should have supported Castro (actually I think we should have, they would no longer be communist if we did), Idi Amin, etc.

  5. #45
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    All,

    Ok, as the author of this debate, I imagine I have a duty to show up and either defend my position or fall back. This is all very interesting, and very helpful to me to see which points spoke to people (good or bad). This is definitely a spiral development learning process for me, and I am constantly refining my thinking and will absolutely look seriously at all of the comments provided here.
    Good on you, and many thanks for showing up. Makes you a class act.
    A fair criticism was "there is nothing new here." True enough. Insurgency has not changed. What I had hoped to offer that was new was perhaps some small nuances on the various aspects of this dynamic that I believe would tilt our engagement toward being both more in tune with how we see ourselves as Americans, and toward greater success as well.
    not being an American, I'll probably never understand, but my guess is that the heart of the issue is people not living in fear of their lives from violence. If it takes a dictator to make that happen, I have no problem with it. Stop the killing and all else follows
    One thing that has changed is the environment. The real heart of the current surge in globalization is the way populaces are connected with each other like never before.
    I think this is not correct. The vast majority of the world does not have computer and internet access. There are now more nation states than there have ever been, so nationalism is still key. Conflict is mostly about land, and who controls it.
    Populaces like never before have access to information that gives choices as to who to grant sovereignty to, and also gives them courage to act (i.e., they know they are not alone, and they don't have to belive the official gov't line).
    reference my last.
    but I stand by for additional intellectual punishment!
    take out the word "intellectual" and it sounds like you went to a British Public School!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  6. #46
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    Default Hello, Bill Moore,

    What I described was meant as an example, not as an argument. An example of what ? - A safe community whose residents are themselves involved enough to engage in Populace-Centric Engagement of the Threat (whatever it might be). In short, the endgoal of our little excursion in COIN theory - Pleasantville. To repeat, Pleasantville is the endgoal.

    How you get from Unpleasantville to Pleasantville will depend on how screwed up Unpleasantville is. And, depending on where our particular Unpleasantville lies on the spectrum, the mission statements will have to be adapted for each of the three components I've mentioned: 1. judicial system; 2. police; and 3. military.

    I've left out other components, not because they are unimportant; but because you have to crawl before you can walk. I did not present anything that purported to be a complete solution.

    And, to anticipate Ken White, I am fully cognizant that changing Unpleasantville into Pleasantville may not be possible - in short, we may have to be satisfied with a somewhat better Unpleasantville, that is "acceptable".

    Wherever Unpleasantville is on the spectrum, I think we can agree that it is necessary to know the "bad people", "the ones we're not sure of" and the "good people". And, to separate the "bad people" from the rest of the population. I suppose I could cite Galula and Trinquier chapter and verse here, but you already know them.

    So, the particular solution, in any case, will involve both Populace-Centric Engagement and Threat-Centric Engagement in some mix. To argue otherwise, makes about as much sense as arguing that the US Army should be an all-conventional force or an all-counter-insurgency force.

    Now, if Unpleasantville is a particularly nasty place, the initial solutions will have to be very authoritarian (relative to what we in our US criminal justice system believe is acceptable) - and the military will have primacy in addressing the problem. If the environment can be stabilized, then police and judicial systems (again, probably not your friendly district court) can start to do their thing. And, other components, as needed, as well. If the ACLU would somehow help - use it.

    I believe an interesting at-home exercise for all here would be to imagine a situation where your little Plerasantville is about to be occupied by a military force, whose ideology is diametrically opposed to the mainstream ideology of Pleasantville, and which you cannot defeat by conventional military means. How would you organize the insurgency ? Sort of 2008 Red Dawn in Pleasantville. How nasty could you make Pleasantville ?

  7. #47
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Default Perspectives, Perspectives

    The more this discussion progresses the more I keep thinking about the whole idea of Insurgent, causes, coercion, etc and it occurs to me that honestly isn't the greatest thing any insurgent these days has going for them is that they don't really have to wait for a govt to get to the point where it can't provide enough services but rather with the information age and of course massive growth of younger population simply choose to propogandize new and often unfeasible requriements for a govt that are very far outside of its ability to address simply due to the lack of need for such things before.

    In this context pretty much any country US, UK, Canada, Iraq, Balkans, Russia, China, you name it are easy targets for outside interests simply due to how foreign they are and what "new" requirements they or their cause bring with them.

    ??
    Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours

    Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur

  8. #48
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    Default Hi, Bob's World - Governance & Ideology

    Starting first with governance, where you use the American Revolution as an example, you define your terms as follows.

    (from bob's world)
    I will just add that there is a significant difference between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance."
    ....
    Good vs Effective must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question. If that populace is not satisfied, then that governance is not good, regardless of how effective it might be.
    A few months back, Marc Tyrell and I discussed - with general agreement between the two of us - the failure of the US to gain support from either Canadian language group (from my perspective, the French speakers) in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.

    There, I used the term "legitimate government" (also in quotes there) in a manner substantially the same as your definition of "Good Governance" - that is, it must be measured from the perspective of the populace in question.

    In 1776-1815 Canada, we have the French-Canadians (from my viewpoint), the Scots and English (from Marc's viewpoint) and the United Empire Loyalists who came to Canada after the Revolution (again from Marc's viewpoint). No doubt that that mixed population came to the conclusion that the Crown was both "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance".

    So, however you define it formally, we agree that "Good Governance" depends on the "perspective of the populace in question."

    Now, moving to the "States", we can examine the perspective of the colonists as a matter of history. All who examine the historical record can agree that there were three groups in the North American colonies (excluding Canada): UELs, Neutrals and Rebels. Where people differ is what %s belonged to each group, variations by region, etc. Which brings me to my practical question.

    How do we measure "Good Governance" in a particular country today with the sort of accuracy that would allow accurate intelligence analysis to inform a counter-insurgency effort ? Would you poll the populace to determine the "UELs, Neutrals and Rebels" ? What questions would you ask ? In short, what is your outlline for using the concept of "Good Governance" in the field ?

    -----------------------------------
    Ending up with Ideology, you and I would have some differences as to what is the "American Ideology" - even in (or perhaps because of) the stripped-down version you present. However, there is little point to two lawyers yammering on about Con Law and the Foundations of our Republic.

    To me, there is a more basic issue which goes to the heart of the question - should we be marketing "American Ideology" at all (assuming arguendo that we could agree on what that is); and, if so, to what extent and to what purpose ?

    If our focus is on the population of a foreign land, it seems more logical to me to learn the ideologies which are native to that land - and market the indigenous ideology that is most likely to aid us in reaching our endgoal (assuming that we know what that is). E.g., in a given country, communism might be the best answer, simply because the other ideologies are not going to be helpful (even if some of them are closer to "American Ideology").

    Note that I have no objection to presenting the "American Ideology" (assuming arguendo as above) to explain where we are coming from - to inform others. Perhaps that is what you are saying; but you seemed to be propounding a broader agitprop agenda than that.

  9. #49
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    Default Formal & Informal Governance

    This article, recently threaded here, has a good comment on the dichotomy between formal and informal governance in Afghanistan:

    (pp.4-5)

    Key to understanding the operating environment is both understanding the specific causes of conflicts in your tactical area of operations and understanding exactly what “governance” means to local Afghans. Coalition forces have proven notoriously incapable of differentiating between conflicts involving insurgents, vice local conflicts over scarce resources vice intra- or inter-district struggles over the distribution of power. Related to this, there does not appear to be widespread understanding of the relationship between the informal and formal structures of political power.

    In its most basic sense governance is the provision of essential services, such as human security, food, water and shelter, as well as an acceptable degree of conflict resolution and justice for wrongs committed. This basic type of governance has been prevalent in rural Afghan communities for centuries; however, it is under threat today not only by insurgents but also by attempts to overlay a more formal governance structure on top of the informal structures. There has been historically, and it remains today, tension between the informal structures of political power (the mullahs, the mahliks, the tribal shuras) and the imposed, formal structures of political power (District and Provincial Governors, the ANP) at the local level. All politics is local, especially in Afghanistan. Understanding this distribution of local power is vital if we are to promote “legitimacy” of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster. A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome. And it should not be assumed that ANA or ANP, just because they are Afghans, inherently understand the tensions between the two structures of local governance or that they will be necessarily capable of maintaining a suitable environment of co-existence without substantial prompting, persuading and persistent encouragement.

    Comprehensive understanding of the operating environment only comes through persistent and pervasive interaction with the people who determine the social dynamics of the environment. [italics in original] ...
    http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs...tt-agoglia.pdf

    The article does not outline a methodology for determining the precise metrics of support for one form of governance or the other. The concept of "pervasive interaction with the people" looks field anthropological.

    The comment quoted does not as such distinguish between "Effective Governance" and "Good Governance"; but (see quote from p.3 below) they do speak in terms of "legitimacy and effectiveness."

    Based on the following comments, "the imposed, formal structures of political power" is neither (the context is primarily the Pashtun areas):

    (from above)

    Templating a Westernised formal government structure in place of the informal governance that occurs in rural Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster.

    (p.3)

    In many parts of the country, especially outside of major population centers, the legitimacy and effectiveness of GIRoA is under considerable threat not only from insurgents but also from widespread corruption and patronage, traditional tribal power structures, a xenophobic society in the south and east, and a lack of tangible, synchronized reconstruction and development.
    The authors recognize primacy in their focus on the population, with secondary focus on the enemy's armed force:

    (p.6)

    3. Protect the people. If SCHB is to work, it is vital coalition forces (and by default the ANA) achieve the right balance between “hunting insurgents” to disrupt, and protecting the population and contributing to building human capacity. The former - killing and capturing insurgents - does not always contribute positively to the need to protect the people and build capacity and in our attempts to kill or capture we often sacrifice longer term enduring positive effects for short term tactical effects. This distinction between being population centric in our operations, which should be the main effort, vice being enemy centric, which is a supporting effort and a means to the end, sets the tone for the way we conduct operations, the way we interact with the people, and the way we relate to ANA, ANP and other GIRoA agencies. We do not have the balance consistently right across Afghanistan.
    A caution is probably due here - based on history.

    From the fall of DBP in 1954 to approximately May 1959 (start of the Laos dustup and formation of Transportation Group 559), one can fairly argue that the Diem government should have employed a population-focused approach - it did to some extent. In later 1959 through 1964, the PAVN (NVA) unleashed its cadres into SVN (roughly 100K southern Viet Minh traveled north in 1954-1955 for training and incorporation into PAVN).

    After those 1959 events, GSV faced (but did not really recognize) the advent of the Second Indochina War - an externally-supported threat. See, Pentagon Papers, vol. I (esp. last section before the documents annex); and Fall's, The Two Viet-Nams, for a more professional analysis. The point is that the balance in a "small war" can shift rather quickly.
    Last edited by jmm99; 11-12-2008 at 05:31 AM.

  10. #50
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad. Not a call to coddle criminal actors.

    Instead of focusing on keeping any particular government in power regardless of their relationship with their own populace so long as they support our Government; Instead of chasing “threats” on an ever expanding list of “Violent Extremist Organizations” with the goal of "defeat the threat, defeat the problem"; Instead of either of these approaches I simply suggest that the true COG, the source of all strength and power, for any government and any Insurgency is the populace from which it arises.

    To date, even where the populace is recognized as important, the position is usually one of “how can we get this populace to support its government and how can we separate them from the insurgent”? This is usually coupled with an engagement program aimed at building host nation capacity to defeat the insurgent and facilitating that effort with U.S. enablers; while at the same time essentially trying to bribe the populace with all types of aid based upon what WE think they need.

    What I am suggesting is to simply begin with the populace in mind, and to always keep them in mind as the focus of your engagement throughout. If there is an insurgency (not to be confused with a handful of violent nut jobs like Tim McVeigh), then by definition there is a movement with some degree of active and (primarily) tacit popular support. You must understand why that is before you can aid a government in addressing the problem.

    Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings. Insurgent acts are criminal acts, so the government is technically and legally correct to blame the insurgent and to prosecute him for his actions. That will not, however solve the problem. He exists for a reason. Determine that reason, and design a program of engagement to address it. The focus of this engagement must not be on dumping aid on the populace (which often makes the problem worse by highlighting the failure of their own government to provide such services), but to instead focus on fixing the failures, with any engagement with the populace being executed with and through the populaces own government.

    Meanwhile, if you have VEOs operating in the area, they must be dealt with AS A SUPPORTING EFFORT to the larger operation. First, sort out the PURPOSE for each organization operating. If it is a nationalist insurgency, is it a revolution, a separatist movement, or is it a resistance movement (that you likely gave rise to with your own clumsy misguided intervention efforts in the first place)? Tailor your engagement, again working through and with the Host Nation security forces, accordingly. If it is merely a criminal organization, deal with it as such. If it is an isolated group of malcontents, likewise. If it is a cell of either state or non-state actors working to incite insurgency to support their own agendas (unconventional warfare); then you must tailor a “counter unconventional warfare” campaign to deal with the specific threats. One cannot simply apply a blanket Counterterrorism approach to every group that uses terrorism as a tactic. To do so tears at the very fabric of the populace you are trying to support (yes, it is the job of government to support the populace).

    So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 11-12-2008 at 01:20 PM. Reason: grammer

  11. #51
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Bob, you post not only has a lot to offer about COIN but it also has a lot to do with LE (Law Enforcement). We can deal with the violent elements but other branches of guvmint (Thats Southern slang) have to deal with the why are people doing this in the first place and what do we need to change to stop it. See our drug discussion at Small war in Mexico.

  12. #52
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, in a sense you've answered my questions

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    I hope everyone is keeping in mind as they read any of the articles that I have written, or the strings of commentary provided here, that what I am proposing, in its simplest terms, is merely a change of priority and focus, and a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad...
    Which were:""Now that what is happening to us? In what way are we blind? What could we do to avoid 'it?'"" However, I think that one item in your recent comment:
    Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings...
    will significantly impact the ability of the US to do what you suggest. That statement gets me to the not fully answered item in my queries:
    So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.
    I suspect most here -- most in the US, maybe even the world -- would agree with that. Many of us have long believed along those lines to one degree or another. The question is:

    How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?

  13. #53
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Default Partial answer and ramble.....

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?
    I don't know that you can...without some major restructuring and rethinking of some basic operating methods.

    Most US things these days run on a two-year election cycle. It's short term thinking at its finest...or worst. As an institution the government (and by extension our education system) doesn't value history or the contextual thinking that goes with good history, so they look for brand names or Band-Aids that can be slapped on and carry something through the next election cycle. Since the average decision-maker only knows the US system, he or she assumes that it must be best...because it's worked for him or her. I think it also matches up with the technology obsession that seems to drive much of our thinking. If you can build a better chip, or change a blown fuse, certainly you should be able to apply the single part idea to something as complex as a region or a culture....

    To break the cycle you'd need some good, long-term planning (as in something more than two years or less), and people who actually have ability with cultural and historical analysis (and this isn't as common as many might suspect). Then you'd have to have leaders who are willing to listen to and act on those recommendations. Needless to say, I'm not overly optimistic.
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

  14. #54
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Instead of focusing on keeping any particular government in power regardless of their relationship with their own populace so long as they support our Government; Instead of chasing “threats” on an ever expanding list of “Violent Extremist Organizations” with the goal of "defeat the threat, defeat the problem"; Instead of either of these approaches I simply suggest that the true COG, the source of all strength and power, for any government and any Insurgency is the populace from which it arises.

    To date, even where the populace is recognized as important, the position is usually one of “how can we get this populace to support its government and how can we separate them from the insurgent”? This is usually coupled with an engagement program aimed at building host nation capacity to defeat the insurgent and facilitating that effort with U.S. enablers; while at the same time essentially trying to bribe the populace with all types of aid based upon what WE think they need.

    What I am suggesting is to simply begin with the populace in mind, and to always keep them in mind as the focus of your engagement throughout. If there is an insurgency (not to be confused with a handful of violent nut jobs like Tim McVeigh), then by definition there is a movement with some degree of active and (primarily) tacit popular support. You must understand why that is before you can aid a government in addressing the problem.

    Rare is the government that is going to admit its failures and shortcomings. Insurgent acts are criminal acts, so the government is technically and legally correct to blame the insurgent and to prosecute him for his actions. That will not, however solve the problem. He exists for a reason. Determine that reason, and design a program of engagement to address it. The focus of this engagement must not be on dumping aid on the populace (which often makes the problem worse by highlighting the failure of their own government to provide such services), but to instead focus on fixing the failures, with any engagement with the populace being executed with and through the populaces own government.
    An alternative view of governments is that they largely exist as another form of welfare. They tend not to do much that has real value-add to the society they allegedly rule. With perhaps the exception of defense and law enforcement, societies would tend to be well shut of them. One might view a government as legitimate only insofar as the rest of the folks in the country do not find the tax (AKA diversion of some part of the fruits of one's labors away from one's own use) required to keep this otherwise useless collection of leeches as too onerous. Instead of executing policies through the government, a better approach may be to convince the government to be less intrusive in the lives of those who allow it to live off the fat of the land.
    (yes, it is the job of government to support the populace).
    As noted above, this last is just backwards in large measure--the function of most of the pieces of government is to provide some work to what would otherwise be a portion of the populace that is without much value (except perhaps as entertainment--maybe that explains the surge in actors/actresses/pro athletes getting elected lately). The general populace provides support to them by paying them and allowing them to think their "work" has real value. Government, on the view esposed in this response, is actually a form of welfare, as noted previously. The populace supports government, not vice-versa.
    So again, I am not saying that we need to stop doing anything, we just need to change our priorities, change our focus, change our leads, and do a better job of seeking first to understand WHY things are the way they are before going in and apply a “Made in America”, one size fits all, solution.
    Changing focus makes a great deal of sense. Success entails a need to get the governments elsewhere to recognize that they only are allowed to continue as long as the demands they put on the producers of value in their country are not viewed as excessive. Once the general populace starts to feel that the diversion of their productive work to support the "village idiots" who "govern" them gets too high, change is inevitable. If the government resists too much, then that change will probably become violent. Replacement movements (AKA rebels, insurgents, guerrillas, etc.) gain purchase because they suggest that they will be less of a drain on the people's earnings than the incumbent government is. (Alternatively, they claim that they will provide some value to offset the economic drain they put on the people.)

    However, since those who govern anywhere tend to be deluded into thinking that they are producers of something of real worth, the likelihood that the light will dawn on them is quite small, IMHO. This, BTW, is also the explanation for why one rarely finds a government that admits its "failures and shortcomings." To do so would be to deny the government's "value-add" and acknowledge its true status as "value-less."
    Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
    The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris

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    Default Re: post # 50. Simply, ....

    an excellent point summary. Period.

    And, it includes an unintentional "funny" as well. The concept of a COL at SOCOM making a "a call to coddle criminal actors" gave me a mind's-eye picture that I wish I had the talent to draw. Anyway, thanks for a bit of cheer in what is a bleak, rainy day outside.

    --------------
    Since Tim McVeigh is mentioned, and the Civil Rights Movement has also been mentioned, I offer a brief comment. Some might well argue that the CRM was not an insurgency - whatever. Along with the CRM went another movement - let's call it the Anti-CRM; and parts of that were definitely into terrorist territory. From that latter movement, descended a number of groups and individuals who moved far out of the mainstream of their populace - and, for that matter, far out of the mainstream of "right wing groups".

    Unfortunately, Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols (a Michigander from Dexter, not far from the U of M) were not "nut jobs". From all I've read of them and the case, they had their ideology; probably saw themselves as patriots; and took it as their right and duty to rebel against what they perceived to be an oppressive government. The Turner Diaries and the Declaration of Independence make a bad combination.

    While people can say "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", that equation fails when you are the recipient of the terrorist's act - whatever he might think of himself.

    --------------------
    I do have one question based on your first sentence: "... a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad."

    Could you give us a point summary on that, as well. That is a question that many have raised and are raising - e.g., who is in charge in Iraq ? (not seeking an answer for that country, but a generalized one for the future).

  16. #56
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The question is:

    How do you get the Elephant to turn and to be agile?
    Maybe you take the DoD off point for awhile. Maybe there is some value to the statement that the military should not be in the business of nation building. Maybe some of the hard won lessons that the Army has learned about COIN, should really be lessons learned by other organizations. You can not take the military out of the equation in OIF and OEF, but perhaps you can seriously evaluate the need to use military force in the future. As a soldier, I am always gung-ho to "go in" be it a shooting war or peacekeeping, but I also recognize that the military has limits. It may be the most multi-funtional agency we have, but it is not the only, and at times it has seemed that way. When I deployed to New Orleans in 2005, all the people on the ground were from the DOD. Where the heck was FEMA? When my unit was doing civil affairs like missions, where the heck were the NGOs, State, Contractors, etc etc. I will now retire to my bunker to sit out the returning fire
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    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    In theory, State Department, through its Country Ambassadors, is in charge; the civilian lead for US engagement in every country where we operate. This is made murky by the concept of "GWOT," which is a DoD lead, and requires engagement of various types in countries around the world. State will say "We don't have the people and the resources to lead." Which is true. DoD has the people and the resources, but is too threat centric in its approach, and while State does not interfere with "war," what of all of the short of war engagement required to keep a situation from sliding into full blown conflict? Result is confusion, inefficency, and a generally disjointed scheme of engagement.

    Its complicated. We work better with simple. ("Don't complify, simplicate!"). Easiest way from my foxhole is to simply call an end to the GWOT. I can work with guidance like:
    "The war is over, but the mission continues. State, take point. Defense, help them formulate a plan of action and be prepared to provide a lionshare of the manpower and resources to implement it. Rework these VEO lists to sort out insurgents from criminals and terrorists. Also ensure whatever plan you bring me is focused on those countries where we have vital national interests, and is not designed to simply keep 'friendly dictators' (like friendly fire, it isn't) in power or sustain the status quo in the face of heavy resistance from the populace and the major changes that have occured in world over the past 20 years. The Cold War has been over for two administrations, so ensure this plan looks at the whole of government and recommends institutions, policies, and relationships that are long overdue for a major revision. Also, ensure that you have a detailed plan for assessment of all of the major players involved in any given region on the front end of any engagement. And never forget, there are those out there, both state and non-state who want to see us fail, and failure is not an option."

    The President-elect is not a Cold Warrior. What was widely attacked as his greatest weakness, lack of foreign policy experience, may in fact be his greatest strength. We are well into a new, post Cold War era. This will require new forms of engagement that recognizes the growing power and options for sovereignty that populaces have, and that is a book that has not been written yet. We enter uncharted ground, but we go forward aware of our vulnerabilities, and armed with a national ideology well suited to the world that is emerging. Not to control that world, but to hopefully lead by example and to use our positon and influence to make it a better world for everyone. Idealistic? Certainly, but then I am an American, and idealism comes easy to us.

  18. #58
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    Default All makes sense and I'm sure many here agree. Know I do...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    In theory, State Department, through its Country Ambassadors, is in charge . . . This is made murky by the concept of "GWOT," which is a DoD lead . . . DoD has the people and the resources, but is too threat centric in its approach. . . what of all of the short of war engagement required to keep a situation from sliding into full blown conflict? Result is confusion, inefficency, and a generally disjointed scheme of engagement.
    I really do agree. "However," he said, clearing his throat...

    I'm not at all sure the GWOT or Long War is the problem; it doesn't help, certainly but that dichotomy existed long before 9/11 and the GWOT concept. It even existed prior to Goldwater-Nichols although in a less obvious and powerful version. Since G-N, DoD has been fairly well funded and has extended the reach and clout of the CinCs while State has been consistently underfunded and undermanned. The fault for that can be laid at the feet of the Congress while acknowledging that neither DoD nor State has been exactly forthcoming, helpful or above board in this matter.

    Thus, I think just eliminating dumb terminology won't fix it, it'll be applying a band aid -- and a Sponge Bob bandaid (apply appropriate TMs to the foregoing) at that; We Americans excel at that and most of them are worthless. You've got to turn Congress, DoD AND State around. Thus my question HOW do you do what you suggest.
    Its complicated. We work better with simple. ("Don't complify, simplicate!"). Easiest way from my foxhole is to simply call an end to the GWOT. I can work with guidance like:
    "The war is over, but the mission continues. State, take point. Defense, help them formulate a plan of action and be prepared to provide a lionshare of the manpower and resources to implement it . . . The Cold War has been over for two administrations, so ensure this plan looks at the whole of government and recommends institutions, policies, and relationships that are long overdue for a major revision . . . And never forget, there are those out there, both state and non-state who want to see us fail, and failure is not an option."
    I strongly agree conceptually, practically, I think you forget:
    The President-elect is not a Cold Warrior. What was widely attacked as his greatest weakness, lack of foreign policy experience, may in fact be his greatest strength...
    while all that is true and he can -- may well -- dictate what you suggest. Unfortunately, long experience shows us that his predecessors have done such diktats with little success. His ability to get Congress, DoD and State to do what he tells them is severely constrained by the bureaucracy and those in it who will not agree with him and can -- and will -- stall until he's gone. Thus my question, how do you get the Elephant to turn? Much less be agile...
    ...Idealistic? Certainly, but then I am an American, and idealism comes easy to us.
    Yes it does and me, too. However, over 45 years of working for our Fedrul Guvmint done taught me to be one a them awful cynics, too.

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    Default Well Bob..

    While there is little specific in your writing that I directly disagree with, something about the style and tone remind of a lot of the writing out in the late 90's prior to 9/11. The common theme I was seeing at that time was that the role of the US and the DoD was to be a "global good neighbor". What was meant by this was that we needed to support and foster democratic governments wherever possible to reduce the animosity towards our country.
    While some of that appealed to the humanitarian in me, much of it sounded like the "democratic manifesto". This I felt would be seen as hostility in many parts of the world. History has validated this as far as I am concerned. If you want to be a "global good neighbor" you have to value all human life and treat people as equals. I feel that this is likely beyond our means as well. Ideology and absolutes tend to bite us in the rear. I appreciate your attempts to avoid absolutes in your writing, but an ideological undertone remains. SO what is the US and DoD's role in the world? So the GWOT is a non-starter, but what do we replace it with? What resources does the State Department need and where do we get them from? If I did not value what you have written so far, I would not push as hard, since proving people wrong is not my thing.
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Default I should have something intelligent to add, but ...

    All my mind's eye sees is - A pink bunny in a tux, with a bullwhip, turning elephants ....

    I like that concept; but it won't replace Roadrunner and Ole Wily Coyote..

    I did have a relevant thought before the cartoon flooded my head - that being that the respective functions of DoS, DoD, and the rest of the cats that have to be herded - now image of a border collie herding cats intervenes - have to be defined by numerous laws, regs and interagency agreements.

    Thought also occurs that some of this may be found in the Operational Law Handbook (2007; should be a 2008 update out or soon). Perhaps, we should be looking at the present normative structure - and working from there ?

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