How To Win

[Ken White]

and follow its broad guidance. That would certainly be different...

Regrettably, the ONLY 'normative' structure in Washington is Congress and until you fix it or fire it up somehow; little will be accomplished. I think it has something to do with the Golden Rule, he who has the gold rules...

My suspicion is that competition for dollars, egos and turf outweigh the legal aspects...

[jmm99]

the Constitution does that - and generally vests foreign affairs and military powers in the Executive Branch. So, there are some ways to work around Congress without reducing yourself to the status of John Yoo. But, that still leaves a lot of cats to be herded in the Executive Depts. I was suggesting that's where the idealized US Embassy organizational plan begins.

PS: I will send a suitable portion of my big L by suitable common carrier. My daddy told me to always listen to SNCOs with respect - and share generously with them so they might let you win at poker.

[Ken White]

Not only the raw dollars and amount thereof -- that's pretty straightforward. Hmm. Bad choice of words, let me restate that -- that's pretty well standardized. The problem is what pots those dollars are in -- and Congress micromanages that to the nth degree...

State may get more money -- but they'll get it in appropriations that are spent in the US, not in some other country.

Which is why the Coast Guard, the CIA, the FBI, the Air National guard and a whole host of other organs and agencies have significantly increased the population of West Virginia among other things...

And State's National Passport Agency is in New Hampshire...

Anyway, the Executive agencies do indeed have some problems but many can be ascribed correctly to Congress and the way it does business.

[jmm99]

with one senior senator and another who began as a dinosaur trainer. But, New Hampshire ?? ....

Given your logic - which my daddy told me to follow without fail, the only solution then is to move the host nation populace to West Virginia - thereby insuring that all appropriated $ are spent in the US.

Works for me.

[slapout9]

--------------------
I do have one question based on your first sentence: "... a corresponding change of who is the supported agency for U.S. engagement abroad."

Could you give us a point summary on that, as well. That is a question that many have raised and are raising - e.g., who is in charge in Iraq ? (not seeking an answer for that country, but a generalized one for the future).

I will take a shot at this and see how well I understand PCE.
If I understand the theory, I would give the example of...Iran. We supported the Shah and look where that has gotten us. I am not saying we should have supported his overthrow and neither does the PCE theory, but it would have alerted us to stand back and see what happens or better yet advised the Shah to make some changes or he will have big problems and we will not support him since it would conflict with the long term interests of his people and US interests.

[Bob's World]

I appreciate your attempts to avoid absolutes in your writing, but an ideological undertone remains. SO what is the US and DoD's role in the world? So the GWOT is a non-starter, but what do we replace it with? What resources does the State Department need and where do we get them from?
Reed

Of course I don't think that I am absolutely right either, but I do over emphasize the shift to truly focusing on the populace because up until now there has been so much emphasis in the other direction. Those who think every organization that has any contact with AQ, regardless of how small, is a ‘VEO” and needs to be added to the target list don’t need any help. Those who think that continuing to prop up regimes around the world that do not represent any form of Popular Sovereignty simply because they are willing (when, and to the extent that it is convenient) to support U.S. actions or provide access to resources is good policy also don’t need any help. So if I appear to overstate a counter position, it is simply because as jimm99 is fond of saying, an elephant is hard to turn. (However, remember, I am a Green Beret, and "too hard" is not an assessment we put much stock in)

I did not just wake up and come to the positions that I take. It is based on years of study of Insurgency history and theory, history (the cold war and American Revolution are particularly relevant; all while also being neck deep in actually having to design and direct actual GWOT engagement and working day in and day out with senior SOF leadership. Some key conclusions from this:

1. Insurgency and counterinsurgency is best understood if one considers it as a continuous dynamic between every populace and its governance. Most sit comfortably in what I would call “Phase zero,” and it is the daily efforts of civilians who enforce laws, provide services, maintain infrastructure, etc, within a governing context that allows the populace to operate within the system to express their dissatisfaction and implement change that keeps those states in that phase. If the services fall short, or if the system does not allow legal dissent, or if some segment of the populace is in someway excluded or even disrespected, conditions will creep up into Mao’s phase one of insurgency. This makes effective COIN civilian business, and it is only when the situation has deteriorated terribly that the military is required to help bring it back to where the civilians can once again handle things.

2. The U.S., in the course of bearing the mantle of “World Leadership” following WWII and in certainly leading the effort to win the Cold War was forced to make a series of compromises to our core principles and ideology as a nation in our engagement policies in order to win that war. The Middle East was a major battlefield, and we sustained governments like the Saudis in power; overthrew governments in Iran, Syria, and Iraq (twice for Iraq); supported the formation of Israel, etc; all in the name of winning the Cold War; and it worked. We won. The problem was that we did this for so long, and so many important political and economic relationships were tied to this line of engagement; and 3 generations of Americans also saw this as “normal,” so we did not stop waging the Cold War when it ended. This left frozen in place a regional system of governances that were sustained not by the will of their own people, but by the will of our Government. In effect, bad governance abounded, and the U.S. stood between those populaces and any chance of effecting change of their own governments.

3. Globalization accelerated at the same time the Cold War ended. This allowed a couple of key things to occur in the Middle East that accelerated conflict there. First, it connected these many distinct Muslim populaces with each other, both within the region, and without, allowing movements to challenge the status quo to grow and feed upon each other. It also allowed the rise of non-state powers to wage Unconventional Warfare (the efforts of an outside party to incite insurgency within another state). Bin Laden saw an opportunity to achieve his two primary goals of taking down the Saudis and removing U.S influence from the region, and began a UW campaign. The time was right, and his message spoke to these populaces in a major way. This caused many to join AQ outright. More importantly it generated tremendous popular support that facilitates and funds his networked operations, and encourages and supports nationalist insurgencies throughout the region.

4. When we were attacked we discounted the effects of the nature of our engagement in the region and focused on destroying AQ. While this is natural and understandable given the circumstances, it also enflamed the underlying causes of the conflict at the same time that we were engaging the outward manifestations. We were attacking the symptoms, and not the root causes. Nothing I propose should be taken as a call to stop attacking the symptoms; instead I am saying that we need to shed several flawed assumptions about the nature of the conflict and refocus our engagement on the root causes of the conflict in a manner that places populaces first, and that we need to modify our engagement against the symptoms in accordance with this fresh understanding so that we do not inadvertently make the problem worse.

This is why Colonels muddle around in strategy. Far enough removed from the policy to be able to look at it objectively, and close enough to the actual art of insurgency and counterinsurgency to truly understand what is going on in those types of conflicts.

So, what is the U.S.’s role? Use our power and influence to secure a good future for our own people, but to revise how we go about doing that to better operate within the world as it currently exists. We need to set some time tested techniques aside and develop new tactics for the current environment.

What is DoD’s role? First, to fight and win our nation’s wars; to deter those wars where ever possible; to put the credibility behind our nation’s policies; to be an example of patriotism and professionalism not just to the American people, but to the world; and to recognize that the military will always be the “excess” capacity that our government has to deal with crisis, be it at home or abroad, regardless of the nature of that crisis.

What does State need? First they need the mission. Once they have the mission, we can sort out roles. Clearly DoD will continue to provide a lion’s share of support. Do we need a new, non-military organization heavy on “governance” skills? Perhaps. It’s a new world and we need to look at new options.

What do we replace GWOT with? I recommend “Peace.” As Admiral Olson recently said: “What we've been calling "GWOT" or "The Long War" is the new normal that will endure."


Guys look, I am a strategist. There are good men out there fighting and winning the tactical fight. My oldest son is a SPC 4 infantryman on his second tour in Iraq as part of that good fight. We fought the good tactical fight in Vietnam too, and lost because we had the wrong strategy. Our strategy for this current fight is flawed as well. If some part of my work helps us make that strategy better, then I will have done what I could to help make sure that all of that great effort is not in vain.

[Ken White]

Pun intended.

For JMM:

Re: NH, no clue but I'll bet money that somewhere, some time, there was a powerful Senator or Congressman from NH on one of the Foreign Affairs Committees in Congress that needed some bacon. There are examples from all -- repeat, ALL -- government agencies all over the country, every State -- and they almost invariably increase the cost to those agencies of doing business. They also breed inefficiency...

Slapout said:

"I am not saying we should have supported his overthrow and neither does the PCE theory, but it would have alerted us to stand back and see what happens or better yet advised the Shah to make some changes or he will have big problems and we will not support him since it would conflict with the long term interests of his people and US interests."

That's the common wisdom version and it may be partly correct; it is also partly incorrect. One could strongly disagree on both the US interests and Iranian population aspects.

I think the issue with PCE and with your example is that the near term ('people-centric" ??? -- or for the USG policies, perceived voter centric ???) view is allowed to shape policy as opposed to the great benefit of a longer term approach. People sometimes; often, in fact; think they want things that are really in the "Be careful what you want, you may get it" vein. Iran in 1979 is a good example -- the Ayatollahs killed more people in two years than the Shah had in 25. Been downhill there ever since also. For the US as well...

I'll address Bob's excellent post separately after I run an errand...

[Eden]

I've been wrestling with your work for the last few days - thought-provoking and useful it certainly is. I suffer from the historian's curse in that one can almost always come up with an example to undercut any argument, but in general it is hard to disagree with your central premise.

I think that the one remaining objection I have is that you seem to conflate terrorism and insurgency. Insurgency does, in the majority of cases, arise in response to government's failure to satisfy the desires and needs of the populace. Any counterinsurgency strategy, as you point out, must focus on meeting those desires and needs. The art comes in balancing military and non-military action.

Terrorism, however, often arises out of well-governed spaces. In the 70's and 80's, terrorists were Irish, German, Italian, Japanese - not always third-worlders. In teaching this point, I sometimes show my students a clip from Die Hard. Classical terrorist theory, in fact, seeks to provoke 'poor governance' rather than exploit it. As for our modern breed of terrorists, wouldn't you agree that promoting our brand of governance in the Islamic world is just as likely to provoke more terrorist activity?

[Bob's World]

Eden,

Ok, first you made me go look up "conflate," but no, I don't "fuse together," or "confuse" the two; I actually try to do the opposite. Terrorism is a tactic, not a purpose for action. Many organizations, legal and otherwise, use terrorism as at tactic. The aerial bombing campaigns of the cities or Europe and Asia during WWII for example were arguably terrorist acts, but the sides were judged by there purpose for acting.

The term is generally not very helpful. Typically a group, like the ones you named, chose terrorism as a tactic to support their insurgent purpose. Not all, but most. One of my major concerns is that our intel community is run amok labeling every organization that uses terrorism as simply "Terrorists." Does this mean I simply apply Counterterrorism tactics against these many diverse organizations to win? Many would seem to think so.

No, to defeat (or better in the case of an insurgent, "neutralize"), an organization you must understand its purpose for existence and its purpose for action. If the US was willing to go into a country and kill every male taller than an M4, yes, CT tactics will solve the problem. Thank God we are not. So, if we are going to apply more civilized tactics, we better be smarter about how we go about it, or we will likely get mired into a long drawn out affair.

But implied in your observation is the fact that we must be precise in our terms as well as wise in our engagement.

When a populace conspires against its own governance it is insurgency.
When that governance acts to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
When an external government (or now, non-state actor like AQ) seeks to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency it is Foreign Internal Defense.

Now, to step beyond doctrine a bit, when one seeks to defeat or neutralize another entity that is waging UW (again, like AQ), you are probably more acurately waging "CounterUnconventional Warfare" than you are CT. CT is so one-dimensional that it tends to degenerate to capture kill operations. CUW would be a much more holistic family of engagement that includes CT as a major LOO.

(And while what I have given you is what most of us SF guys see as the definitions, other than the CUW part that I am seeking to add to our jargon, the joint definitions and those of the civilian agencies vary tremendously)

Bob

[Ken White]

Seriously. However, in the best spirit of bipartisanship, I will now dispatch Sappers against your wire...

...I do over emphasize the shift to truly focusing on the populace because up until now there has been so much emphasis in the other direction.

For openers, I agree with your points 1. through 4. with a caveat on 4. -- you say

When we were attacked we discounted the effects of the nature of our engagement in the region and focused on destroying AQ. While this is natural and understandable given the circumstances...

I'm not certain that the reaction was chosen was natural -- visceral, yeah but not natural. I do strongly believe it was not well thought out and was a great example of the short term-ism that is a natural and inescapable product of our governmental system and it's four to eight year -- two year if you count House elections which can have a strong effect even in off years -- cycles. My impression is that our strategists rarely consider that while our 'political masters' actually live it. BIG disconnect there...

This is why Colonels muddle around in strategy. Far enough removed from the policy to be able to look at it objectively, and close enough to the actual art of insurgency and counterinsurgency to truly understand what is going on in those types of conflicts.

I agree that they should and am glad that they do but there are two minor problems that affect the value of that involvement.

1. The egos of Generals and Politicians on the national stage too frequently cause them not to listen to Colonels. That is a lick on the seniors and not on the Colonels.

2. While I think it important and beneficial that the Colonels do this, they are victims of their experience and tend to emphasize the military aspects (branch peculiar at that I might add) in their solutions. Even when rejecting current military mantras...

So, what is the U.S.’s role? Use our power and influence to secure a good future for our own people, but to revise how we go about doing that to better operate within the world as it currently exists. We need to set some time tested techniques aside and develop new tactics for the current environment.

I can agree with that...

What is DoD’s role. . . What does State need? First they need the mission. Once they have the mission, we can sort out roles. Clearly DoD will continue to provide a lion’s share of support. Do we need a new, non-military organization heavy on “governance” skills? Perhaps. It’s a new world and we need to look at new options.

I can even agree with that. Partly. I would suggest that we first need to assess -- truly ASSESS -- whether it is in our real and long term interest to continue trying to shape the world to our liking.

At least, in the terribly inefficient and costly while far from effective way we have been doing it since 1953.

What do we replace GWOT with? I recommend “Peace.” As Admiral Olson recently said: “What we've been calling "GWOT" or "The Long War" is the new normal that will endure."

Not to be snide but good luck with that. Ain't gonna happen. There are too many malcontents in the world, too many pressures and the big guy is too inviting a target. We are not going to be given any peace.

That does not mean that we need to continue our current approaches and 'strategies.' No one messes with 600 pound Gorillas -- unless the gorilla proves himself so utterly lacking in agility that he can be annoyed to distraction if not defeated by a young chimpanzee...

That's where we are. If I weighed 600 pounds, I'd stay out of the Chimps cage but if one got close to me, I'd just kill him. Other than that, I'd leave them alone if they left me alone. Some of them -- not most -- would be likely to respond by standing off at a distance and throwing whatever came to hand. Not a prob; I can throw also -- and bigger stuff, harder -- and should be willing to prove that to them at the slightest provocation. They'll soon quit...

... We fought the good tactical fight in Vietnam too, and lost because we had the wrong strategy.

Went there, did that. I submit the strategy was wrong, it put us in the country, so we agree on that but I think you mean (forgive me if I'm wrong) that our operational effort was significantly flawed and the TTP selected were inappropriate. That's what led to the loss. IOW, the strategy may have been flawed to an extent but the greater problem was selection of operational and tactical methods that were not appropriate. I submit the same thing could be said of todays conflicts.

Re: Viet Nam though, the strategy may have been wrong but it was the best that could be seen given available information at the time; it was a Cold war reaction. As you point out, that very artificial period of world history is gone. Future strategy should not be constrained by it.

Our strategy for this current fight is flawed as well. If some part of my work helps us make that strategy better, then I will have done what I could to help make sure that all of that great effort is not in vain.

I can only applaud that as an intent and a goal and I wish you success.

I do agree that our strategy is flawed. I also suggest that an even larger problem is that once again our operational techniques were initially more problem than solution and only recently have matured to an extent -- I still question some of it, particularly in Afghanistan. Thus, I believe it absolutely imperative (redundancy for emphasis) that FID and COIN be embedded in US doctrine and training from today forward. We cannot predict where or when we may have to deploy or what we may have to do -- nor should we waste time and effort even trying or arguing about it (Gratuitous smack to all Naglites and Gentilites -- beware of all fanatics... ) -- so we must be full spectrum capable. Period.

I believe we can do that, that we must do that and that it is affordable if approached correctly. That does not negate my strong belief that it is in our strategic interest to avoid if at all possible such commitments.

Back to stragetry.

My only suggestion is that any US strategy HAS to account for our fractious populace, our woefully ignorant and dangerous Congress and and even more ignorant and woeful news media -- which can affect, albeit only slightly, the first two bodies. The finest militarily designed and oriented strategies that do not take into account the vagaries and attributes of the society that provides the Armed force and its strategists will fail. More importantly, such a strategy must take our system of government (as it really works, not the idealized civics view thereof) and its limitations into account and it absolutely must not accord the US with abilities and agility it cannot have.

[jmm99]

Well, Mr. White, you were quite right in suggesting we follow the money. The available structures to play-out "COIN's" role in the "GWOT" are very much limited to the organizational charts, funding streams, etc., established by Congress and signed-on by the Executive (with or without "signing statements").

The whole schema is tied at the hip to the appropriation and budgetary classifications. Absent recourse to the legislative process, you would have to be something more than a John Yoo to make any serious deviations from the present structure.

So far as change here is concerned, me thinks we are left with the axiom: "Change what you can change. Accept what you cannot change. Have the wisdom to know the difference."

True that dollars, egos and turf > the "law" as we have it. I can't do much about dollars, egos and turf. So, I'm left with the legal aspects created by them.

BTW: the Constitution is not directly helpful. The Operational Law Handbook was quite helpful. After reading about 20 pages, the "Congressional intent" became very obvious. Suggest a read of Chapter 11 (about 60 pages) - and, for more enjoyable fare, read Chapter 21 (SOCOM; 16 pages).

----------------------------------------
Here are the relevant constitutional provisions, as I see them:

Article I

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....
....
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
....
Section 9. ....
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

Article IV

Section 3. ....
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States

Article II

Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States ....
....
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States
....
... and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, ... and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law. But the Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
....
Section 3. ...
... he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Not a very specific plan, is it ? Note that the above provisions come into play when considering SOFA stuff.

---------------------------------------
This reference (may by now be updated for 2008) I found very helpful in bringing daylight to my swamp:

Operational Law Handbook (2007), 666 pages
The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center & School
International and Operational Law Department
600 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2007.pdf

The key to what is in place, what can be changed and what can't be changed (without amendment of many statutes) is found in Chapter 11, Fiscal Law, pp. 239-300. Its focus is on Title 10 (DoD) and Title 22 (DoS).

This excerpt pretty much sums the situation generally.

(p.299)

XV. CONCLUSION

A. Congress limits the authority of DoD and other executive agencies to use appropriated funds. The principal fiscal controls imposed by statute, regulation, and case law are Purpose, Time and Amount. These controls apply both to CONUS activity and OCONUS operations and exercises. The Comptroller General, service audit agencies and inspectors general monitor compliance with rules governing the obligation and expenditure of appropriated funds. .... Those found responsible for funding violations will face adverse personnel actions and possibly criminal sanctions.

B. JAs must ensure that the military’s participation in a Title 22 foreign assistance activity or in a Title 10 military cooperation or humanitarian operation accomplishes the commander’s intent and complies with U.S. fiscal law, regulations and policy.

While SOCOM must abide by U.S. fiscal law, regulations and policy applicable to it, it has a separate statutory authorization and funding schema. See Chapter 21, Special Operations, pp. 501-516. And a friendly agency (do they really exist - cf. friendly foreign intelligence services ?) can sometimes be convinced to write checks.

------------------------------------------
The following sections also bear on specific issues, relating back to the more general fiscal policy.

Chapter 6, Emergency Essential Civilians, pp. 119-124

Chapter 7, Contingency Contractor Personnel, pp. 135-143

Chapter 12, Deployment Contracting, pp. 303-319

Chapter 15, International Agreements, pp. 395-404

Chapter 17, Combating Terrorism, pp. 423-434 [1]

Chapter 20, NEO, pp. 493-498

Chapter 21, Special Operations, pp. 501-516 [2]

Chapter 22, Civil Affairs, pp. 517-526

Chapter 26, Joint Operations, pp. 559-600

Footnotes to above:

[1] From the Manual:

p. 434:
D. Status of Enemy Participants in Conflict. Taliban and al-Qaida lack some or all of the four attributes specified in Article 4, GC III; thus, they are unlawful enemy combatants (See January 22, 2002 NSC statement of U.S. policy regarding al-Qaida and Taliban detainees).

I happen to agree that Taliban and al-Qaida lack some or all of the four attributes specified in Art. 4. But, by jumping directly into GC III, Art. 4, the Bush Administration made life much easier for defense counsel of Taliban and al-Qaida detainees. So, in "Defending Hamdan", the defense offered expert evidence that the Taliban and AQ-Ansar did meet those attributes. That may have led to the partial verdict - juries do not publish opinions.

IMO: in fact and law, Taliban and al-Qaida cannot get past the "accept and apply" requirement of common Art. 2 of the GCs; and would then be subject only to the provisions of common Art. 3 of the GCs, if at all. See, "Defending Hamdan" (in Law Enforcement) for the argument.

[2] The following may have an update.

CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22017; Updated December 6, 2006 -
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress -
Richard A. Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert, Specialists in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

------------------------------------
PS: Bob's World - Don't blame it on me - Ken started that elephant thing. "Green Baret", a article of cover, da head ? (a Marine would have fun with that one); but, if you want to be one, you sure as hell have earned the right to so self-define. The last clause is serious; the rest ain't.

[Ken White]

Well, Mr. White, you were quite right in suggesting we follow the money. The available structures to play-out "COIN's" role in the "GWOT" are very much limited to the organizational charts, funding streams, etc., established by Congress and signed-on by the Executive (with or without "signing statements").

If you really believe that, I have a bridge I can let go for a mere pittance...

You are, I'm sure, aware that those items are mutable -- and that's an understatement -- and can be changed at either end of Pennsylvania Avenue with great speed and frequently some slight of hand.

And sometimes at both ends without the knowledge of the other end causing some,to me, amusing contretemps. Lord help the poor guys caught in the middle...

The whole schema is tied at the hip to the appropriation and budgetary classifications. Absent recourse to the legislative process, you would have to be something more than a John Yoo to make any serious deviations from the present structure.

The classifications are the 'pots' I mentioned. If the rest of that means Congress can and will ignore the law and the Constitution and do pretty much what it wants, I agree. If it is to imply their hands are tied and they cannot do that, as I mentioned, I have this bridge...

So far as change here is concerned, me thinks we are left with the axiom: "Change what you can change. Accept what you cannot change. Have the wisdom to know the difference."

On this we can totally agree. I'd strongly suggest that a thorough knowledge of how the US government works is advised before one starts laying out policy advocating change. How it really works, not how it's supposed to work. Take a look at the Federal Budget and ponder the fact that it is beyond opaque, it is virtually incomprehensible to most. Those accounting classifications? They and many other things the GAO and many in government have tried to discard; many have tried to get the US government to use a standard commercial accounting process and GAAP. Guess who doesn't want to do that? Congress -- they like opacity...

True that dollars, egos and turf > the "law" as we have it. I can't do much about dollars, egos and turf. So, I'm left with the legal aspects created by them.

Not to worry, Congress and the new Imperialer Presidency will likely take care for that for you.

BTW: the Constitution is not directly helpful.

As I said -- I'll add that documents which are ignored (in particular by both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue) rarely are much help.

The Operational Law Handbook was quite helpful. After reading about 20 pages, the "Congressional intent" became very obvious. Suggest a read of Chapter 11 (about 60 pages) - and, for more enjoyable fare, read Chapter 21 (SOCOM; 16 pages).

I'll pass, as you point out, a new version will be out soon. Uh, and which Congress was that, the one whose intent was obvious? Same number as next Quarters?

I'll also point out without giving away anything here that SOCOM has many other funding sources proving that yet again what you see is often not what you get...

Not a very specific plan, is it ? Note that the above provisions come into play when considering SOFA stuff.

Wasn't meant to be as you know; and true -- if they're heeded. My wife rarely moves the sofa, I understand I'm a lucky man and that some folks make a habit of of moving sofas on whims...

[slapout9]

The Important thing to remember about PCE is there are lives in the Balance.

Lives In The Balance by Jackson Browne
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t1z58...eature=related

[jmm99]

I have to reject your kind offer of the bridge. After reviewing your sales brochure, I am simply unable to see how the bridge would fit into my terrain - based on the state of my present situational awareness, of course. As you may or may not know, my primary concern is to preserve the separation of the 600-pound gorilla and the young chimps who live in my back yard. I cannot see, at present, how the bridge would help in addressing that concern.

[Ken White]

The Important thing to remember about PCE is there are lives in the Balance.

cost lives no matter what and there is not likely to be a balance...

So, don't go unless you gotta -- and if you do go, you better be ready to kill most everything.

[Ken White]

I have to reject your kind offer of the bridge.

If you must.

After reviewing your sales brochure, I am simply unable to see how the bridge would fit into my terrain - based on the state of my present situational awareness, of course.

I agree, thoughtless of me to offer it with the Type A brochure; I'll forward the Type B and you'll note that the Bridge, like an erector set, can be multi purpose and its components can be assembled in many ways. Thus a gorilla proof -- but regrettably not totally chimp proof -- enclosure can be fabricated.

Much research has shown that complete Chimp proofing is not possible ergo one must devise alternate strategies. Elephant are quite wise if slow to act; gorillas are also wise and can act very rapidly when they wish to. This is a good thing.

[Bob's World]

One blogger's response to a follow-on feature that explored this concept a bit more:

http://www.registan.net/index.php/20...-for-pakistan/

[William F. Owen]

When a populace conspires against its own governance it is insurgency.
When that governance acts to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
When an external government (or now, non-state actor like AQ) seeks to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency it is Foreign Internal Defense.

I would add the context of,

• When a populace conspires to use military or violent means against its own governance it is insurgency.
• When that governance acts militarily to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
• When an external government uses military force (or now, non-state actor like AQ) to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
• When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency, by military means, it is Foreign Internal Defense.

[Bob's World]

I would add the context of,

• When a populace conspires to use military or violent means against its own governance it is insurgency.
• When that governance acts militarily to prevent or put down such an uprising it is COIN.
• When an external government uses military force (or now, non-state actor like AQ) to support an insurgency it is Unconventional Warfare.
• When an external government seeks to assist a government the prevention or putting down of an insurgency, by military means, it is Foreign Internal Defense.

That is one way of defining it to be sure, and you are not alone. Personally I find it much easier to grasp the true dynamics at work, and therefore the true solutions required to the problem, by looking at the military aspect as not some separate event, but as a capability that is brought into a much larger event when it rises to a level that the civil government can not handle by itself.

Phased in as needed, phased out as not needed. Sometimes bringing warfighting capabilities, and other times bringing the vast civil capabilities inherent in the manpower, training, organization, and equipment capacity that the military has on hand and uncommitted when not warfighting. Civil capacity is by designed pretty much maxed out. The governmental "reserve" is really its active military force first for overseas engagement, and reserve component military force for domestic engagement.

To look at insurgency and its many related missions as "military operations focused on defeating the threat" does two very dangerous things in my mind:

1. It focuses a solution on a symptom of a problem vs the causes of the problem.

2. It lets the Civil government off the hook for their failure that brought us here in the first place.

By looking at support to a foreign country's insurgency as "COIN" does one very dangerous thing: It causes you to look at their war as your war, and then you beging to take over, and then your very presence expands the insurgency by adding a "resistance" component to the "revolutionary" or "separatist" movement you came to help with. By keeping our intervention in the context of FID, we can focus on repairing the breach between the failed government and the revolting populace.

[William F. Owen]

1. It focuses a solution on a symptom of a problem vs the causes of the problem.

2. It lets the Civil government off the hook for their failure that brought us here in the first place.

Yes and no. I absolutely agree that insurgencies are born from political social problems - as Clausewitz notes "War is a setting forth of policy" so insurgencies are like any other form of warfare.

The military should be applied to military problems. Politicians should be applied to the politics/social problems. Trying to get soldiers to do "social work" is pure poison and who ever came up with that needs to ditch it, some time soon, and keeping it going really does let the civilians off the hook, to solve the problem. All wars require all the instruments of policy. Insurgency is no different.

If the US is trying to do FID, then changing the local governments policy is the task of the State Department and not the DoD. All military action has political and social consequences. The only thing currently lacking is the effective teaching of the enduring fact.