American taxpayers have paid for hundreds of journalists to be embedded among United States forces in Iraq. Not all have justified the expenditure. “Embedded” reports tend to offer big conclusions about the war based on a snapshot of evidence. That is emphatically not true of this magisterial history by Michael Gordon, the military correspondent of the New York Times, who was given unparalleled access to America's top commanders as they prosecuted the war, and Bernard Trainor, a retired marine general. With mountains of fresh detail on the war's planning and progress, and judicious analysis, “Cobra II”, named after the invasion's code-name, will be hard to improve upon.
The authors also argue that America's bad policies have turned the occupation of Iraq into a fiasco—a fiasco that was not inevitable. They give George Bush's national security chiefs a pasting. The best, such as Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, were feeble; the worst vain and incompetent—and the worst of all were Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, and General Tommy Franks, who commanded the invading troops.
For 18 months beforehand, Mr Rumsfeld bullied his officers into writing war-plans bound by his dogmas. With utter faith in the technological superiority of America's troops, and a profound ignorance of Iraq, he saw to it that America invaded the country with around one-third of the soldiers that many of his generals wanted. Those who questioned the tactic were chased sneeringly away.
A visceral aversion to protracted peacekeeping led Mr Rumsfeld to want to withdraw most of these troops within a few weeks of occupying Iraq. Such a move would only be possible if the country's institutions, including the army and police, survived the invasion intact, which Mr Rumsfeld, of course, predicted that they would. He also assumed that allies would send peacekeepers to help out. Some military planners urged a more cautious approach; one wise man suggested preparing a force of American policemen in case Iraq's police collapsed. They were ignored.
General Franks proved the defence secretary's perfect ally. Oafish and proud of it, the general was only interested in grabbing Iraq, not in rebuilding it. This was unfortunate as Mr Rumsfeld had volunteered his department for that task—in part, it appears, to spite Colin Powell at the State Department. A month before the invasion, America still had no post-war plan.
On the battlefield, of course, America scored crushing victories. Yet the nature of the opposition it encountered—completely unlike what the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had predicted—should have raised alarms. The first American serviceman killed in combat was shot by a man dressed in civilian clothes riding in a civilian car—and so it continued. Saddam Hussein's much talked-up Republican Guard units melted away; the war featured no big battle between regular forces. But in many towns where the CIA had predicted that American troops would find cheering crowds—and even suggested distributing American flags for them to wave—they encountered bitter resistance from irregular, often suicidal, fighters. Many of these were members of pro-Saddam militias raised to fight Iraq's rebellious Shia. Some were foreign Islamist fanatics. Across southern and central Iraq, Saddam had built them thousands of armouries—many of which, no doubt, they are drawing upon still.
Without good battlefield intelligence, the Americans were unable to capitalise fully on their gross technological advantage. Their victories often owed more to traditional soldiering skills, with brave infantrymen shooting and moving under fire. Messrs Gordon and Trainor describe almost every significant firefight of the campaign. Casual readers may forgive themselves for skimming the odd clash.
Despite its title, the book says little, and almost nothing new, about America's shambolic occupation. As American troops took Baghdad, Mr Rumsfeld initially cancelled plans to send even the paltry reinforcements envisioned in the war-plan. That left only 1,200 all-important infantrymen to patrol a city of 6m; and a single cavalry squadron in western Iraq, which includes the rough town of Fallujah. America's allies sent few reinforcements. As the Iraqi state and the security forces collapsed, the Americans could only watch the mayhem around them.
How much America has learned from the disaster, only history will show. In the short term, the signs are hopeful. Several of those who emerge favourably from this account are now in senior positions: General John Abizaid, for example, who had predicted that American troops would be considered an “antibody” in the Arab world, has General Franks's job; and Zalmay Khalilzad, a shrewd diplomat, once side-lined by the defence secretary, is now America's ambassador in Baghdad. But America has not admitted its grave faults in Iraq, or made an example of any of those most responsible. “Cobra II” makes very clear that, at the very least, Mr Rumsfeld's head should have rolled.
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