Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency

[Entropy]

Problem I have, John, is when those principles and lessons are operationalized for current and future action. For example, when Army planners and thinkers consider the problem in Astan there seems to be a common consensus that more troops are needed on the ground and applied in a way that pushes them out into small combat outposts in order to secure the population, to separate the insurgents from the people, and from the building the nation can begin. Coin expert John Nagl has recently said as much on a recent Frontline show on Astan. But this is my whole point and criticism of what happens when principles turn to hard and fast rules, to a fetish, to dogma, and directs current and future actions on the ground.

As one who is much more knowledgeable on Afghanistan than Iraq, I share your fear. For example, there are places in Afghanistan where "protect the population" is not going to work (in my judgment), but, there are places it likely will work. FWIW, my view is that in Afghanistan there is no single principle or "truth" that will lead to success - the country is much more diverse than Iraq and much too diverse for any single strategy. My main worry is that we don't understand Afghanistan well enough to successfully discover and employ a winning strategy to begin with.

I also agree about the danger of hard-and-fast rules and the blind importation of strategies from one theater or period of history to somewhere else. On the other hand, I don't think one should preclude such templating either as long as a proper and cogent analysis of the situation justifies it.

I might therefore suggest the problem you identify is really a symptom of another problem - a failure to properly analyze and understand the operating environment compounded by a failure by the conventional forces, more generally, to prepare to operate in those environments. As Rob eloquently pointed out, Neil was placed in a position where he was forced to develop an ad hoc solution with little in the way of a PME and doctrinal foundation. Had that foundation existed, Neil's essay would likely be on something other than Krepenivich and the current debate of COIN would be quite different.

So I think the point others have tried to make is that Neil (and so many others) should never have been put in the position of making ad hoc decisions with a significant (and preventable) educational deficit. It therefore seems prudent to me to provide officers with a diverse PME background that covers the full spectrum of conflict so they are prepared to better understand their operating environment and, by extension, better able to develop sound strategies and tactics for that environment. An additional effect of this approach is that officers will more easily recognize when and where a particular COIN (in this case) approach will work and where it will not. So the entire problem you identify is due in large part to effects of not properly preparing for COIN to begin with.

If I understand your argument correctly, your fear is that ad hoc solutions implemented in Iraq are being elevated to the level of "truth" or sound principle without sound and rigorous analysis. I tend to agree (to a certain extent at least) and strongly believe that challenging these ideas is both necessary and beneficial. By continuing to challenge accepted wisdom you are continuing to perform a valuable service to the armed forces and nation in this regard.

[jmm99]

the larger thrust of MAJ Smith's article. I suppose I got it intellectually (Lat. scio - I know) after a couple of months of reading posts here (including most of Smith's). I've been getting it emotionally (Lat. credo - I believe) more recently. You sum it well here.

from mikef
Niel’s article speaks for my generation of officers muddling through what seemed like a “new” form of warfare to us. We did not grow up with the mentorship of Vietnam vets in our outfits. We studied the “real” battlefields of the Fulda Gap.

In a sense, we were running backs focused on debating the merits of the “in and out” offense. Should we run directly up the middle or sweep outside? We measured success in terms of our yards per carry, perfecting the guard or tackle pull, and getting bigger, faster, and stronger. Creativity and innovation came with counters, options, and tight-end motions. In reality, executing a perfect tank gunnery or navigating through a successful NTC rotation was our Superbowl- how seemingly trivial in today's world. We busied ourselves with concern over uniform standards, minimizing DUI's, and carefully choreographing our USR scores.

Dusting off a Krepenivich or Galula book was like discovering a passing game. You mean the quarterback can throw the ball??? WTF??? First, we were mad at ourselves for not thinking about it first. Second, we were immensely frustrated to find out that this passing game had been around for hundreds of years. Why didn’t our coach tell us about this???

My reaction to the above (and this thread) was WTF happened within the Army to "Lessons Learned" after Vietnam ?

Brief explanation: I managed to educate myself pretty well about Korea and Vietnam - the key events of my pre-Baby Boomer cohort (born ca. 1925-1945). After the last chopper left the roof, I still kept up with Vietnam as books came out; but my focus shifted to SW Asia (primarily the terrorists) and Afghanistan (payback for Nam). Saw Gulf I under Bush I; and Gulf II under Bush II - and what can you say about the initial stage in each (A+). I realized we had a serious problem in Iraq when the National Museum was looted. As to the Army's system of continuing military education, naive me assumed that the small war aspects of Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc. were being taught and implemented as a significant part of every officer's education and training. If I was reading this small wars stuff, I assumed the nabobs were also reading it - even if their primary commitment was to more conventional warfare. I guess not so.

------------------------------------
Still it was hard for me to believe that the Army (as an institution) could be that stupid. But, when Smith (in a post a couple of months ago - not sure of exactly when) used the term "criminal negligence" causing deaths, I thought: "Pretty damn strong words, boyo." Words that would not be lightly used by a serving officer, unless he really believed them. And, others here agreed. Anyway, there is daylight in this swamp (JMM).

Brief comment on "criminal negligence": Before writing this in draft on my wp, I did seriously search through MCM 2008 for all instances of negligence. The sole question was this - can I find a UCMJ provision under which I could mount a plausible prosecution (assuming arguendo that I could somehow determine which "someones" to prosecute). The answer is that there is not; not even under Art. 134. So, my unsolicited legal advice is to avoid charging "criminal negligence", at least publically. The rest of the facts should be powerful enough to carry your case - and, if not, hyperbole will not be of any help.

PS: - we are getting our first snow of the year (just a few inches). So, tomorrow the hillside should be nice and white - a Grandma Moses view.

I'll be back later with more blah-blah on learning methodology; where with some better definition of terms and explanations, we might actually end up with a synthesis. Mike's point seemed to deserve more primacy.

[slapout9]

I guess I am going to have to get in this. Go through the great classics Galua,Trinquier,Kitson and count how many times you see the word POLICE OPERATIONS. But few mention that, they call them COIN principles

Just Like jmm when I saw the looting start any cop around could have told you that you better do something fast.

Cavguy's link to his second article goes into great detail about how with a historic reference point he adapted and monitored for variances his operation as it was executed. Can't beet that. But it wasn't COIN or history that did it. It was his personal leadership more than anything! All the Way, Sir

Gian is right about Astan it want be about protecting the people, it will be about which drug lord to take out and the consequences of that. It will give new meaning to the word "Drug War."

[Cavguy]

Brief comment on "criminal negligence": Before writing this in draft on my wp, I did seriously search through MCM 2008 for all instances of negligence. The sole question was this - can I find a UCMJ provision under which I could mount a plausible prosecution (assuming arguendo that I could somehow determine which "someones" to prosecute). The answer is that there is not; not even under Art. 134. So, my unsolicited legal advice is to avoid charging "criminal negligence", at least publically. The rest of the facts should be powerful enough to carry your case - and, if not, hyperbole will not be of any help.

I didn't use "criminal negligence", however, I did use "gross professional negligence" here.

The full quote was:

I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.

Your advice is appreciated and heeded. My words were not meant in a legal sense in any capacity, and perhaps I should have chosen with more care. I do consider it a form of malpractice - COIN is part of the spectrum of warfare, and we were largely ignorant of it, resulting in mistakes and errors that were avoidable, fueling an insurgency that cost lives before we re-learned that which was knowable. I think it would be inexcusable if we allowed it to happen again. However, I will try and restrain my inner voice a little better ....

[Ken White]

I didn't use "criminal negligence", however, I did use "gross professional negligence"

MAJ Smith, I was dead wrong in misquoting you...Perhaps, that was my "inner voice" speaking.

I believe I have said on more than one occasion that the failure of the Army to embed the Doctrine, to organize train and equip for post attack occupation and for the possibility of FID or COIN operations was a major failure by the senior leadership of the Army for over 28 years, (1975-2003) and that that omission was borderline criminal malfeasance -- and I probably left out the 'borderline' on occasion. I have also said that concentration on the threat of the USSR from 1975 until 1990 was correct but need not have totally excluded 'small wars' (and, for part of the time, it was partially included) -- but failure to adapt to an obviously changed world from 1990 until 2003 was inexcusable IMO.

I have also occasionally cited senior miscreants by name and have excoriated DoD and previous administrations for not pressing the issue. I wouldn't say all that were I still serving; I'm not so I have said it and will say it again.

I believe it extremely important that the Army not forget and not repeat that error.