Congrats. Can you explain why you used the words "population control" measures when the term "securing the population" seems to be more popular with your colleagues?
Congrats and well-done Niel. Your paper speaks for many commany commanders out there.
I'll take a stab at this to test my knowledge, and y'all can critique if I'm off a bit.
RA,
Simply put, population control is the initial tactic one takes to ultimately achieving the desired endstate of "securing the population." The most descriptive example of population control existed in the Malaysia insurgency.
Population control can be achieved through movement controls (roadblocks, T-walls, curfews and restrictions on mounted and dismounted movement) and food-restriction measures (an extreme illegal measure of coersive incentives i.e. you help the insurgents then you don't eat).
Population control is used as a measure refered to in the COIN manual to "stop the bleeding." It is not happy nor nice, but it maybe necessary in extreme situations (i.e. Iraq circa late 2006/early 2007).
The effects of population control assert government control in an area, restrict an insurgents ability to maneuver and communicate, and it limits the enemies' ability to resupply people, guns, money, etc...All in all, it make life suck for everybody.
Coupled with intensive patrolling, intelligence gathering, and amnesty programs, population control can lead the community to feel safer, i.e. perceive that the government is securing the populace. As the populace feels safer, then they are more willing to work for the governmnent to provide information.
As the government gains information on the insurgency, it can degrade the enemy. As the population is secured and the enemy degraded, the government can transition towards stabilization and reconstruction operations.
There you have it. Classical counter-insurgency in a simple blogpost.
v/r
Mike
Works for me.
Note that Hearts and Minds are emphatically not being won, rather the ability of the opposition to sway minds is being severely degraded and thus said minds are being forcefully 'persuaded' to flock to the cause of true righteousness (or our side, whichever is appropriate... ).
Well said. Absolutely dead on. Don't you wished someone had taken 5 minutes at the career course to explain that to you prior to 2003?
The theory behind it is that the insurgent uses the population for everything - intel, support, medical, recruiting, etc. (Trinquier best covers this). So to "defeat" him we have to deny him access to his resources. We talk about "separating the insurgents from the populace", but how?
One of the historically effective ways is by various levels of population control. The more severe the problem, the more severe the measures needed. Bottom line is that by controlling where and how the population interact, you reduce the ability of the insurgent to organize and contribute. As with all measures, it only works at the appropriate time and level. The basics are ID cards and vehicle registration. The harsher methods include relocation and food rationing. What should be used depends on the situation.
It may be an impolitic term, but it accurately describes what must be done to (as Mike says) stop the bleeding so there is space to treat the wound, which takes longer.
Last edited by Cavguy; 11-06-2008 at 03:13 AM.
Excellent stuff. Always been a mystery to me why the US Army has refused to study Vietnam in detail.
I love how these days we say "complex war fighting" as if Vietnam was "simple." - and note, in Vietnam, you had to be good at COIN and War fighting at the time, on the same day, in the same AO.
A lot more can be gained from looking at the US in RVN than ever could looking at the UK in Malaya.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Sir,
I re-read The Village and then The Army in Vietnam during holiday leave in '05, shortly after returning from Iraq. Anger, frustration, disappointment, and disbelief are all words that describe how I felt throughout this holiday period. My wife and father couldn't understand why I was so mad at myself.
I'm going to ask my wife to read your article; it does a much better job explaining why than I ever could. Thank you.
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