Anti-Intellectualism In The Army

[Cavguy]

All,

Found this 2002 ARMY two part article from a discussion on another thread, and thought it may be relevant to some of our other discussions:

PART 1

PART 2

Money Quotes:

My purposes in this two-part article are to trace the origins and manifestations of this anti-intellectual bias within the American military tradition; to demonstrate the existence and pernicious effects of such an attitude even in the celebrated age of information now upon us; and to suggest measures for ensuring that the intellectual potential of the officers' corps is capitalized on in optimal ways without impairing the warrior ethos of the profession.

The only external difference between the Contemplative Man and the Active Man in the officers' corps today is that the former may seek a doctorate, teaching tour, fellowship, attache assignment or other mind-expanding opportunities that the latter avoids like the plague because under the present career management system such excursions will time him or her out of transiting career wicket X, necessary if the officer is to remain competitive for brigade command and a possible star.

The Army has taken a laudable principle-getting officers off their duffs, out of their offices and down with troops where they can master their branch skills and learn to operate in the field-and implemented it with such compulsive zeal that those officers now arriving at the top know nothing but the field.

An exaggeration? Yes, but there is no question that the present system has produced a lopsided general officer corps infinitely more comfortable with practice than with reflecting on practice.

Several of the Army's brightest and most articulate captains and majors of the early 1990s survived their outspoken forays into the world of contending ideas and are doing well in their careers as they climb toward their first star. Unfortunately, however, they read the career tea leaves and have now clammed up. Their lately developed reticence recalls to mind Liddell Hart's observation concerning young British uniformed intellectuals:
Ambitious officers, when they came in sight of promotion to the generals' list, would decide that they would bottle up their thoughts and ideas as a safety precaution until they reached the top and could put these ideas into practice. Unfortunately, the usual result, after years of repression for the sake of their ambition, was that when the bottle was eventually uncorked the contents had evaporated.

The Army is doubtless correct in insisting on the man of action as the predominant model for the combat commander-let there be no mistake about that. But it is dead wrong in assuming that uniformed intellectuals-- simply because they have not negotiated every wicket in a general officer qualification course that could only have been devised by Genghis Khan's G3-cannot be men and women of action and hence are unqualified to command the higher line echelons. Moreover, the Army is on questionable ground in assuming that those who have been anointed by a zero-defects performance at each of the stations of the cross are thereby fit to serve in every general officer slot, even those for which they obviously lack the necessary intellectual qualifications. Rather than denigrating and marginalizing the uniformed intellectual, the Army should hearken to President Bush's call for a "renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps." It should implement the necessary promotion and assignment adjustments to assure that the intellectual potential of the officers' corps is identified, cultivated and exploited in optimal ways, which would include service at the highest echelons.

It is time finally to acknowledge that the Active Man and Contemplative Man do merge in many versatile people, and that the Army has as much need for the qualities of the latter as for the former. The intellectual man-and woman-have a vital role to play in all professional endeavor, not least military endeavor, and it is thus a fool's game to squander precious intellectual capital on the basis of a historical anti-highbrow shibboleth. The army that rejects seminal thinkers, thereby depriving itself of innovative ideas and the instruments for continuous intellectual self-renewal, will ultimately be a defeated army, vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more wisely and quickly to the ever-evolving art and science of war.

More in the links. Thoughts?

[Shek]

Cavguy,

I think the opening quote captures the sense of anti-intellectualism beautifully.

Crossing the Plains on an expedition to Utah [in the 1850s], Major Charles A. May searched the wagons in an effort to reduce unnecessary baggage. When he reached the wagons of the light artillery battery, Captain Henry J. Hunt proudly pointed out the box containing the battery library. "Books," May exclaimed in astonishment. "You say books? Whoever heard of books being hauled over the plains? What in the hell are you going to do with them?" At that moment Captain Campbell of the Dragoons came up and asked permission to carry a barrel of whiskey. "Yes, anything in reason, Captain, you can take along the whiskey, but damned if these books shall go."

If given the choice of books vs. whiskey (in the absence of a General Order #1, of course ), what would the most popular choice be today? If I were a betting man, my money would be on the whiskey. As an interesting omission, the author doesn't mention that Captain Hunt would go on to be Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac and instrumental in the repulsing of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg.

Also, while not part of the article, I'd be curious to see others' reaction to the following quote from COL Mansoor in his book.

In the future, U.S. Army officers must spend as much time in the library as they do in the gym, or risk defeat in this kind of war.

-COL(R) Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise (p. 345)

While I agree with his statement now, prior to Iraq, I would have laughed at such a statement - why would you want to spend a handful of hours each week reading? Hopefully the current generation of company grade officers can see the folly of my previous thinking.

[patmc]

It may have been unique to FA, but I could probably count on one hand the number of FA officers I met that were more prone to lift a book than open it. Most of my classmates at OBC were sharp, well read, and informed. In the firing battery, our commander gave us readings, and we talked about history, politics, stategy, tactics, music, movies, anything to generate debate and discussions (though our Top 5 Best Bass Players of the 1970s discussion probably helped us slightly less than debating gun truck formations). My roomate and I in Iraq had a hobby of raiding MWR libraries for good books, and we spent the year trading. My last BN CDR assigned readings to all unit officers and senior NCOs to get them thinking for a deployment. He and the XO read and discussed OIF/OEF/COIN books, and asked us (the staff) for opinions during PT. We were expected to be strong, smart, and effective.

From the junior officers I know, there is hope.

[reed11b]

I certainly was referred to as "book smart" as a negative while I was in. Most officers were open to learning from non-army course work, but the NCO corp seemed to be of the opinion that they would be issued any knowledge they needed. Of course I was active from '93 to '97 (Not exactly banner years for the Army) and in the NG '01 to '06 (A time of severe transition for the guard) so my experiance may very little to do with current active duty NCOs. I would have to guess that the majority of the E6 and E7's I have meet through my job w/ the VA have been very intelligent, profesional and open. These soldiers were all my peers when I was on active duty, so perhaps I was part of a time of transition myself.
Reed
Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

[Shek]

Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

Reed,

There is an institutional bias, at least with regards to the officer promotion and selection system. On the path to battalion command, time in a muddy boots assignment post-company command is rewarded while a graduate school assignment is often considered a career killer. If you can make it to battalion (i.e., you "survived" despite going to graduate school), then your liability can turn into a capability, but it makes for a tough field grade hurdle.

Now, graduate school does not equal intellectual, and one can be an intellectual without graduate school, so don't read too much into that example, but I think it is sufficient to signal a bias.

[Rob Thornton]

At the SWJ get together last night at Sines we were laughing about the latest CAD FILEs cartoon in which the closing remark is "getting the most out of that online degree". The cartoon well characterizes the position we've placed ourselves in. Online degrees and combination programs like those with CGSC/ILE that combine to allow leaders to earn a degree while continuing to work a day job or while attending PME seem to offer a way address our education deficits in light of OE requirements.

However, as one of those working to complete an online degree on the side, I'm under no illusions about the limits of what such degrees can provide. While distance learning has gotten better and while it does get me a degree, the quality of interacting with a professor and fellow students in a real environment is absent. With the caveat that not all classroom environments are created equal, what I mean is that the time which is set aside to discuss the issues under scrutiny and build context is hard to replicate on discussion boards. The number of natural competitors which interrupt the building of context and understanding are numerous in the online degree program. It could be family concerns, the work load at the day job etc. As such, I'd qualify the education received through such programs as online and accelerated degree programs as inferior to being able to dedicate time almost exclusively to the thinking, writing and discussion that accompanies time set aside to attend a resident university program.

Now having said all that, I'm glad there are online degree programs as it gives me (and those like me) the opportunity to pursue a degree at a pace I can manage no matter if I'm TDY (currently), at home watching kids to give the wife a break, or at lunch. I did quit using TA as I was tired of incurring ADSOs while still paying for 20% and books while doing it on my time. I would not want to try and pursue a PhD in this manner, and am currently looking for options in that regard if that is the direction I decide to go.

Last week there was a good discussion about the requirements of the OE and the differences between training and education. Both are very important, however they are different. The best description I've heard is that training is better positioned to prepare us for the "known-knowns" and some of the "known-unknowns", while education is better positioned to prepare us for the unknown in terms of helping us think about things. The two are complementary, but some roles and responsibilities are characterized by requiring more of one then the other.

The discussion about complex, interactive environments at this weeks seminar turned to some of the deficiencies we are discovering in our DOTMLPF approaches. Note - Education is the unseen "E" and falls in behind the "L" in DOTMLPF. One senior mentor offered that it was "time to put an "E" as the first letter of TRADOC. Some joking occurred as it was mentioned that this might make it look like "E-Trade". The senior mentor, undaunted, said "we should spend less time worrying about how our acronyms sound and more about making sure the components and the relationship between the components are correct."

Ultimately I think the value we place on education must be articulated and accepted as it relates to the value it provides to the missions we undertake. This, like other related issues must be related back to elements of success or failure in terms we can acknowledge and which are visible. To really institutionalize it, we must resource it and reward it.

Best, Regards, Rob

P.S. Shek - I've got something I've been meaning to send you, and will try and get it to you this afternoon.

[John T. Fishel]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs. By single tracking FAOs, OPMS 21 made the FAO career more predictable. No longer would I and others be giving advice to would be FAOs that you need to be prepared to consider retiring as a Major a "successful" career because OPMS 21 made it all but certain that the successful FAO would make LTC and many would make COL. But because it took FAOs entirely out of branch competition it made it all but impossible for a FAO to command anything but a MILGP or DAO and certainly not a battalion or brigade. Thus, the only FAO generals we will ever see in the future will be products of the Fairy Godmother Office of PERSCOM - which you all know gives her favors entirely at random and very, very rarely. Put in concrete terms the days of Generals Abizaid, Valenzuela, Woerner, and Loeffke, among others, are gone to come no more - until or unless we change the personnel system to make FAOs competetive for GO rank.

A question arises from this that, I think, is more central to the thread: Are the leadership skill sets reuired for command at the unified combattant command the same as those required at lower levels of command? Does being an effective BN, BDE, DIV, and Corps commander translate into being a successful and effective COCOM? ( A little "wht if" history here: If Fred Woerner had been given 90 more days as CINCSO - as he requested - rather than 60 days, would the Oct 3, 1989 coup have succeeded and rendered Just Cause unnecessary? In other words, were Woerner's FAO skills more useful than Thurman's more traditional command and bureaucratic skills?)

Cheers

JohnT

[Shek]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs.

John,

It did this across the board - it sent the signal that if you valued a graduate education, you had to either go to a functional area or try to do it in your spare time as Rob described. The results of OPMS 21 are captured to extent by the oped by Dr. Wong out of the SSI: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB731.pdf.

I had heard him brief an interesting proposal that the Army create nominative graduate school, interagency, and NGO/IGO slots for senior CPTs and senior MAJs that would be weighed equally in the promotion/selection process with second command opportunities (e.g., for the infantry officer, this would be Ranger Regiment, RTB, Old Guard, etc.). Because of the nominative nature, it would signal to the board that these officers were not only ACOM, but top ACOM performers. His thoughts were that it would take a generation of officers before it would be accepted as part of the culture (i.e., BN and BDE CDRs would initially poo poo accepting a slot to work at State or USAID, go to grad school, or work with a NGO/IGO because it wasn't their path to BN and BDE command; however, once these officers had progressed to positions of command, they'd be able to say that accepting a slot wouldn't harm your chance for command).

However, an even simpler step would be to make the CSA reading list free issue for those that asked for books. On the one hand, we publish lists of books that we say we want soldiers, NCOs, and officers to read, but then we don't grease the skids by making it minimal to no cost. While the cost of purchasing the books shouldn't strain an officer's budget, the implicit signal that is being sent is still it's not important since the Army isn't funding it.

[Eden]

My sense is that anti-intellectualism in the Army has declined over the last decade or so. The career success of people like Mansoor, McMaster, and others seems to undermine the argument that you can't be both an intellectual and have a successful career - if you define that as brigade command and a shot at stars.

As it always has, the stresses of war have weakened the bureaucratic hammerlock maintained for years by an ossified personnel system. Merit - not career paths - seems to play a larger part than before in who rises to the top.

Having said that, there are two things we could do to encourage 'intellectuals'. Three, actually, but taking a flamethrower to HRC is not (yet) an option. First would be to make staying in more attractive to those 'intellectuals' who don't make the cut to, say, brigade command. Many of them might serve for another ten years or so if they weren't facing the prospect of increasingly peripheral/dead-end jobs with no prospect of promotion, raises, or the chance to meaningfully influence the course of events.
Secondly, and this is related, reduce the number of general and flag officers. Many, many general jobs today do not require general officers. A large percentage of one- and two-star jobs are little more than 'special project' posts that could be done as well or better by 'career colonels'. I suspect we would retain the services of more 'intellectuals' if we could offer them more hard work at the highest levels, rather than have them nursemaid a series of brigadier generals with one eye on their second star.

For an example, relook how George Marshall employed and nurtured 'intellectual' majors and lieutenant colonels prior to WWII. He had them doing things on their own that today would require at least a major general and a council of colonels.

[Cavguy]

Currently reading Tuchman's book on Stilwell and China for a grad school class.

If Stillwell was around today, he would have been a China FAO. He spent a good part of his career there, doing recon and MI work. He only had a few troop jobs and no combat experience in WWI. He became a 4-star and theater commander in WWII.

Something I was thinking about regarding this thread.

[patmc]

However, an even simpler step would be to make the CSA reading list free issue for those that asked for books. On the one hand, we publish lists of books that we say we want soldiers, NCOs, and officers to read, but then we don't grease the skids by making it minimal to no cost. While the cost of purchasing the books shouldn't strain an officer's budget, the implicit signal that is being sent is still it's not important since the Army isn't funding it.

Agree on this, but my unit did have a semi-recent CSA library in the S1 shop, where you could sign out the books. It was the bottom shelf of the S1's personal cubicle though, so unless you worked in S1 or were on staff, you probably did not go back there too much. BDE also had them available, and they were stored in the BDE Command Team secretary's office, right outside his and the CSM's doors. Not placed to sell well.

Leaders can force the issue and make their guys read a book for discussion. At OBC, my platoon was required to read A Message to Garcia, sign the inside cover, and pass it on to next guy. My first month at work, my commander asked me if I had ever read the book. I replied yes, he said good. From then on, any time I asked for guidance he would just say, "A Message to Garcia. LT Rowan, go do your job." We LTs then read Pegassus Bridge to prepare for our deployment trainup and determined the number one lesson from the book was don't be an Airborne PL, you probably won't last long. If leaders set reasonable timeline and pick good book, it will get read.

[Tom Odom]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

Very true. The Army's had a number of creative renaissances, followed by the doldrums of crushing drill and doctrine. Makes for an interesting study, but I fear that's yet another of those lessons that we have to constantly relearn.

[marct]

Very true. The Army's had a number of creative renaissances, followed by the doldrums of crushing drill and doctrine. Makes for an interesting study, but I fear that's yet another of those lessons that we have to constantly relearn.

Not just the US Army either . I just finished presenting a paper on ethnographic knowledge in Greek-Roman-Byzantine PME, and you can really see the waves of use / non-use over a 2000 year period.

[wm]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

I suspect that a lot of this phenomenon is tied to the need to "make a good showing" to get that good OER and that impact/end-of-tour award. What that translates to in the real world is a lot of wheel reinventing as folks rotate into new positions and have to come up with something "new" to make a mark. The folks with the corporate memory that might have suggested "Been there, done that, got the t-shirt and it didn't fit" have all PCS'd or ETS'd. So we oscillate between yesterday''s "good" ideas and the day-before-yesterday's "good" ideas, the latter masquerading as something new and different.

As the article pointed out, folks tend to get promoted based on what they have done in the past, not based on what they can be expected to do in the future. In such an environment, is it any wonder that a person would reach back and reuse what got him/her elevated to the current grade?

[Ken White]

That's the problem. At least in in my observation over the years that seems to me to be it. The Army -- all the services -- are pulled by several requirements that are, if not mutually exclusive at least sometimes difficult to reconcile.

First priority will always be to win in combat -- that takes a certain mentality, mental toughness and willingness to take risks, make decisions (for better or worse...) as well as a degree of physical toughness and stamina to cope with the demands of campaigning (I like that word). This ability is a cognitive skill and requires some study but much practice. It is effectively an experience derived skill requiring considerable personal discomfort and sacrifice. It has little relationship to any civilian pursuits. Not everyone is equipped to do it or wishes to.

Second priority is to be intellectually superior to all possible opponents. This requires a great deal of study in many fields, some of which have little apparent benefit to warfighting. It also requires an ability and desire to move easily back and forth between a military oriented world and the broader civilian and academic worlds. It too entails much sacrifice in sometimes similar but mostly quite different measures than the field campaigner. Not everyone is equipped or wants to do that either.

Both those Priorities require ever increasing technical knowledge but the first does not rise to the bar of excessive intellectual rigor while the second often does.

Third priority is to acquire, educate and train people to do those two things, to do so as fairly and equitably as possible and to rigorously select the very best for advancement in the two areas of expertise. Ideally, the process would select a number of 'Renaissance Men' (Usage of this term includes Females of many talents as well) who could or can move back and forth between the conflicting demands with facility and aplomb.

The problem in my observation in the US is that the third priority has been allowed -- no, forced -- to totally supersede the first two priorities. DOPMA * preceded the DA OPMS and forces OPMS -- all the services -- to do things that are massively contradictory to sensible management of the force and that are inimical to both priorities cited just above. Congress has micromanaged the effort for a number of reasons (including a lot of staffers who got RIFed and went to work for Congress with axes in hand...) to dictate an equitable outcome; to be fair, to control grade creep, to manage funding -- most of which have little to do with effective force management.

This system effectively presumes that all are 'Renaissance Men.' Since all are emphatically not such men (my guess would be < 5%), this produces an insoluble problem and, given some or even any pressure, the system defaults to the first priority...

What's needed is to acknowledge that life ain't fair and combat sure isn't, that the benefit of effective strategy and doctrine is a thing that cannot be assumed or wished to be equitable across the world; you have GOT to KNOW that your people do it better than others...

There are very few 'Renaissance Men' about; there are some to be sure -- and we all know one or more in the Armed Forces but it is a fact that there are not enough interested in a military career to populate the Officer Corps. Ergo, the process and system MUST recognize that everyone cannot be assumed to be equal. Simply because they aren't. A lot of factors and observations over the years indicate to me that there are a very few who make great commanders AND great Staffers; there are a great many more that do one thing well and the other less so **.

The problem is that in attempting to designing a one size fits all and 'fair' system, Congress and the DoD have ignored the Services varying needs and they have been forced to accept a cookie-cutter approach that is 'efficient' but not at all effective and does not meet varying Service needs.

The very differing requirements of Command and Staff work have been 'determined' to be not sufficiently different to require selective tracking; civilian personnel management principles that are not totally applicable to a military environment have been forced on all and the system has grown dysfunctional. Much of that is the fault of Congress; some is due to the personnel communities efforts to make their job easier and most of the rest of the problems can be laid to many thing including fate and the vagaries of war (and peace...).

Can such a system work at all? Obviously it does It has for many years. It produces an acceptable and competent product for the most part and has undoubtedly produced some great commanders and leaders in all the Services who can do both or all things well. I submit, however, that these are a smaller minority than is totally desirable and I further submit that in my observation, the number who achieve 'great' is declining over the past few decades. As one of my favorite LTGs once said, "All Generals are mediocre, I'm mediocre. The system will attack you if you're too good." That's not to say the FlagOs are not smart guys, they are -- but that they are systemically constrained.

The system thus does not. IMO, need to be totally scrapped but as a lowly Peon looking up at the august; I see that competition for promotion is way too intense and tends to breed a cut throat approach by some and I do not think that is fair to the Services, the Nation or the majority of the Officer Corps. I'm also pretty well convinced there are some folks who make great commanders and some who need to stay as Staff types or other specialists. I do realize that a command track and a staff track is unlikely in this country due to tradition if nothing else but that doesn't mean that such an idea is wrong.

* DOPMA dope:

The DOPM Officer Management System; an overview from RAND LINK (.pdf 52.6kb)

Ending Up or Out; Flaws in DOPMA LINK.
by Carlton Meyer, Editor G2Mil.com Retired Marine officer with some distinct views on current military topics. This, however, is a good summary.

Challenging Time in DOPMA; Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management, RAND Monograph LINK

** This applies to NCOs and even Privates as well. Let's face it, not everyone grooves on combat and living in the Boonies or urban grime with few or no creature comforts. Those who do not can do the job if necessary, millions have proved that and millions do it every day but those who like it will do a better job.

In any event, until the system is repaired -- I'd say replaced, really -- the differences between the very few 'Renaissance Men' and the many warfighters and many military intellectuals will continue to cause friction and oscillation toward one pole or the other as it has for many, many years. Look at old, 1950s Military reviews in your local library...

Not a major problem, broadly and effectively, an uneasy truce between the three categories will be maintained.

Defaulting to Priority One...

[John T. Fishel]

I mostly agree with you.

I would go further (as implied in my previous comment) that there are some who are good combat commanders but not so good theater commanders. Can anyone imagine Patton leading the combined invasion of Europe? So, we have tactical commanders, operational commanders, and strategic commanders - each requires some different skills. Then there are staff officers. There are also officers who make superb advisors but perhaps not nearly as good in command of US forces. At issue is how to get the military personnel system to do a better job of taking account these differences and making the best use of officers at all ranks and positions.

To return to the FAO example I used earlier: OPMS 21 made life much better and more predictable (or better because it was more predictable) for most FAOs. They could have a really interesting and rewarding career that would likely recognize their expertise as it does for the vast majority of their peers. That FAOs will not again be competetive for General is not a personal tragedy. But it is sad for the Army as an institution that it will have to put some Generals who simply can't hack it into positions that certain Colonels are eminently qualified for and would perform much better.

I have no answers but I do believe that we can design a system that takes account of all our requirements better than the current one does. That won't solve all problems - nor will any other proposal - but we should be able to reward multiple competencies and find 10 or so Renaissance Men and Women to fill the 4 star slots.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

Particularly this, which needs to be reiterated for emphasis:

...But it is sad for the Army as an institution that it will have to put some Generals who simply can't hack it into positions that certain Colonels are eminently qualified for and would perform much better.

I have no answers but I do believe that we can design a system that takes account of all our requirements better than the current one does. That won't solve all problems - nor will any other proposal - but we should be able to reward multiple competencies and find 10 or so Renaissance Men and Women to fill the 4 star slots.

Just so...

[Schmedlap]

... Dr. Wong out of the SSI... I had heard him brief an interesting proposal that the Army create nominative graduate school, interagency, and NGO/IGO slots for senior CPTs and senior MAJs that would be weighed equally in the promotion/selection process with second command opportunities (e.g., for the infantry officer, this would be Ranger Regiment, RTB, Old Guard, etc.).

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton. The real problem, in my opinion, is how to get the eggheads to Regiment and the gung-ho folks to Princeton. And it needs to be something more than telling the eggheads that Regiment will look good on their ORB and telling the gung-ho folks that they will get some time off to hook up with college chicks.

[reed11b]

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton. The real problem, in my opinion, is how to get the eggheads to Regiment and the gung-ho folks to Princeton. And it needs to be something more than telling the eggheads that Regiment will look good on their ORB and telling the gung-ho folks that they will get some time off to hook up with college chicks.

I disagree. You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. More productive would be getting the "egg-heads" to the jobs that they excel at, and having them available and valued as advisors and leaders. Up or out kills most of them off at around the BC level if I am hearing the council members right. I would rather keep them in non-leadership positions longer then lose them entirely.
Reed
Sorry for the rambling nature of some of my posts, sleep deprivation is starting to catch up.