Anti-Intellectualism In The Army

[Shek]

Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

Reed,

There is an institutional bias, at least with regards to the officer promotion and selection system. On the path to battalion command, time in a muddy boots assignment post-company command is rewarded while a graduate school assignment is often considered a career killer. If you can make it to battalion (i.e., you "survived" despite going to graduate school), then your liability can turn into a capability, but it makes for a tough field grade hurdle.

Now, graduate school does not equal intellectual, and one can be an intellectual without graduate school, so don't read too much into that example, but I think it is sufficient to signal a bias.

[Rob Thornton]

At the SWJ get together last night at Sines we were laughing about the latest CAD FILEs cartoon in which the closing remark is "getting the most out of that online degree". The cartoon well characterizes the position we've placed ourselves in. Online degrees and combination programs like those with CGSC/ILE that combine to allow leaders to earn a degree while continuing to work a day job or while attending PME seem to offer a way address our education deficits in light of OE requirements.

However, as one of those working to complete an online degree on the side, I'm under no illusions about the limits of what such degrees can provide. While distance learning has gotten better and while it does get me a degree, the quality of interacting with a professor and fellow students in a real environment is absent. With the caveat that not all classroom environments are created equal, what I mean is that the time which is set aside to discuss the issues under scrutiny and build context is hard to replicate on discussion boards. The number of natural competitors which interrupt the building of context and understanding are numerous in the online degree program. It could be family concerns, the work load at the day job etc. As such, I'd qualify the education received through such programs as online and accelerated degree programs as inferior to being able to dedicate time almost exclusively to the thinking, writing and discussion that accompanies time set aside to attend a resident university program.

Now having said all that, I'm glad there are online degree programs as it gives me (and those like me) the opportunity to pursue a degree at a pace I can manage no matter if I'm TDY (currently), at home watching kids to give the wife a break, or at lunch. I did quit using TA as I was tired of incurring ADSOs while still paying for 20% and books while doing it on my time. I would not want to try and pursue a PhD in this manner, and am currently looking for options in that regard if that is the direction I decide to go.

Last week there was a good discussion about the requirements of the OE and the differences between training and education. Both are very important, however they are different. The best description I've heard is that training is better positioned to prepare us for the "known-knowns" and some of the "known-unknowns", while education is better positioned to prepare us for the unknown in terms of helping us think about things. The two are complementary, but some roles and responsibilities are characterized by requiring more of one then the other.

The discussion about complex, interactive environments at this weeks seminar turned to some of the deficiencies we are discovering in our DOTMLPF approaches. Note - Education is the unseen "E" and falls in behind the "L" in DOTMLPF. One senior mentor offered that it was "time to put an "E" as the first letter of TRADOC. Some joking occurred as it was mentioned that this might make it look like "E-Trade". The senior mentor, undaunted, said "we should spend less time worrying about how our acronyms sound and more about making sure the components and the relationship between the components are correct."

Ultimately I think the value we place on education must be articulated and accepted as it relates to the value it provides to the missions we undertake. This, like other related issues must be related back to elements of success or failure in terms we can acknowledge and which are visible. To really institutionalize it, we must resource it and reward it.

Best, Regards, Rob

P.S. Shek - I've got something I've been meaning to send you, and will try and get it to you this afternoon.

[John T. Fishel]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs. By single tracking FAOs, OPMS 21 made the FAO career more predictable. No longer would I and others be giving advice to would be FAOs that you need to be prepared to consider retiring as a Major a "successful" career because OPMS 21 made it all but certain that the successful FAO would make LTC and many would make COL. But because it took FAOs entirely out of branch competition it made it all but impossible for a FAO to command anything but a MILGP or DAO and certainly not a battalion or brigade. Thus, the only FAO generals we will ever see in the future will be products of the Fairy Godmother Office of PERSCOM - which you all know gives her favors entirely at random and very, very rarely. Put in concrete terms the days of Generals Abizaid, Valenzuela, Woerner, and Loeffke, among others, are gone to come no more - until or unless we change the personnel system to make FAOs competetive for GO rank.

A question arises from this that, I think, is more central to the thread: Are the leadership skill sets reuired for command at the unified combattant command the same as those required at lower levels of command? Does being an effective BN, BDE, DIV, and Corps commander translate into being a successful and effective COCOM? ( A little "wht if" history here: If Fred Woerner had been given 90 more days as CINCSO - as he requested - rather than 60 days, would the Oct 3, 1989 coup have succeeded and rendered Just Cause unnecessary? In other words, were Woerner's FAO skills more useful than Thurman's more traditional command and bureaucratic skills?)

Cheers

JohnT

[Shek]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs.

John,

It did this across the board - it sent the signal that if you valued a graduate education, you had to either go to a functional area or try to do it in your spare time as Rob described. The results of OPMS 21 are captured to extent by the oped by Dr. Wong out of the SSI: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB731.pdf.

I had heard him brief an interesting proposal that the Army create nominative graduate school, interagency, and NGO/IGO slots for senior CPTs and senior MAJs that would be weighed equally in the promotion/selection process with second command opportunities (e.g., for the infantry officer, this would be Ranger Regiment, RTB, Old Guard, etc.). Because of the nominative nature, it would signal to the board that these officers were not only ACOM, but top ACOM performers. His thoughts were that it would take a generation of officers before it would be accepted as part of the culture (i.e., BN and BDE CDRs would initially poo poo accepting a slot to work at State or USAID, go to grad school, or work with a NGO/IGO because it wasn't their path to BN and BDE command; however, once these officers had progressed to positions of command, they'd be able to say that accepting a slot wouldn't harm your chance for command).

However, an even simpler step would be to make the CSA reading list free issue for those that asked for books. On the one hand, we publish lists of books that we say we want soldiers, NCOs, and officers to read, but then we don't grease the skids by making it minimal to no cost. While the cost of purchasing the books shouldn't strain an officer's budget, the implicit signal that is being sent is still it's not important since the Army isn't funding it.

[Eden]

My sense is that anti-intellectualism in the Army has declined over the last decade or so. The career success of people like Mansoor, McMaster, and others seems to undermine the argument that you can't be both an intellectual and have a successful career - if you define that as brigade command and a shot at stars.

As it always has, the stresses of war have weakened the bureaucratic hammerlock maintained for years by an ossified personnel system. Merit - not career paths - seems to play a larger part than before in who rises to the top.

Having said that, there are two things we could do to encourage 'intellectuals'. Three, actually, but taking a flamethrower to HRC is not (yet) an option. First would be to make staying in more attractive to those 'intellectuals' who don't make the cut to, say, brigade command. Many of them might serve for another ten years or so if they weren't facing the prospect of increasingly peripheral/dead-end jobs with no prospect of promotion, raises, or the chance to meaningfully influence the course of events.
Secondly, and this is related, reduce the number of general and flag officers. Many, many general jobs today do not require general officers. A large percentage of one- and two-star jobs are little more than 'special project' posts that could be done as well or better by 'career colonels'. I suspect we would retain the services of more 'intellectuals' if we could offer them more hard work at the highest levels, rather than have them nursemaid a series of brigadier generals with one eye on their second star.

For an example, relook how George Marshall employed and nurtured 'intellectual' majors and lieutenant colonels prior to WWII. He had them doing things on their own that today would require at least a major general and a council of colonels.

[Cavguy]

Currently reading Tuchman's book on Stilwell and China for a grad school class.

If Stillwell was around today, he would have been a China FAO. He spent a good part of his career there, doing recon and MI work. He only had a few troop jobs and no combat experience in WWI. He became a 4-star and theater commander in WWII.

Something I was thinking about regarding this thread.

[patmc]

However, an even simpler step would be to make the CSA reading list free issue for those that asked for books. On the one hand, we publish lists of books that we say we want soldiers, NCOs, and officers to read, but then we don't grease the skids by making it minimal to no cost. While the cost of purchasing the books shouldn't strain an officer's budget, the implicit signal that is being sent is still it's not important since the Army isn't funding it.

Agree on this, but my unit did have a semi-recent CSA library in the S1 shop, where you could sign out the books. It was the bottom shelf of the S1's personal cubicle though, so unless you worked in S1 or were on staff, you probably did not go back there too much. BDE also had them available, and they were stored in the BDE Command Team secretary's office, right outside his and the CSM's doors. Not placed to sell well.

Leaders can force the issue and make their guys read a book for discussion. At OBC, my platoon was required to read A Message to Garcia, sign the inside cover, and pass it on to next guy. My first month at work, my commander asked me if I had ever read the book. I replied yes, he said good. From then on, any time I asked for guidance he would just say, "A Message to Garcia. LT Rowan, go do your job." We LTs then read Pegassus Bridge to prepare for our deployment trainup and determined the number one lesson from the book was don't be an Airborne PL, you probably won't last long. If leaders set reasonable timeline and pick good book, it will get read.

[Tom Odom]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

[Steve Blair]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

Very true. The Army's had a number of creative renaissances, followed by the doldrums of crushing drill and doctrine. Makes for an interesting study, but I fear that's yet another of those lessons that we have to constantly relearn.

[marct]

Very true. The Army's had a number of creative renaissances, followed by the doldrums of crushing drill and doctrine. Makes for an interesting study, but I fear that's yet another of those lessons that we have to constantly relearn.

Not just the US Army either . I just finished presenting a paper on ethnographic knowledge in Greek-Roman-Byzantine PME, and you can really see the waves of use / non-use over a 2000 year period.

[Ken White]

That's the problem. At least in in my observation over the years that seems to me to be it. The Army -- all the services -- are pulled by several requirements that are, if not mutually exclusive at least sometimes difficult to reconcile.

First priority will always be to win in combat -- that takes a certain mentality, mental toughness and willingness to take risks, make decisions (for better or worse...) as well as a degree of physical toughness and stamina to cope with the demands of campaigning (I like that word). This ability is a cognitive skill and requires some study but much practice. It is effectively an experience derived skill requiring considerable personal discomfort and sacrifice. It has little relationship to any civilian pursuits. Not everyone is equipped to do it or wishes to.

Second priority is to be intellectually superior to all possible opponents. This requires a great deal of study in many fields, some of which have little apparent benefit to warfighting. It also requires an ability and desire to move easily back and forth between a military oriented world and the broader civilian and academic worlds. It too entails much sacrifice in sometimes similar but mostly quite different measures than the field campaigner. Not everyone is equipped or wants to do that either.

Both those Priorities require ever increasing technical knowledge but the first does not rise to the bar of excessive intellectual rigor while the second often does.

Third priority is to acquire, educate and train people to do those two things, to do so as fairly and equitably as possible and to rigorously select the very best for advancement in the two areas of expertise. Ideally, the process would select a number of 'Renaissance Men' (Usage of this term includes Females of many talents as well) who could or can move back and forth between the conflicting demands with facility and aplomb.

The problem in my observation in the US is that the third priority has been allowed -- no, forced -- to totally supersede the first two priorities. DOPMA * preceded the DA OPMS and forces OPMS -- all the services -- to do things that are massively contradictory to sensible management of the force and that are inimical to both priorities cited just above. Congress has micromanaged the effort for a number of reasons (including a lot of staffers who got RIFed and went to work for Congress with axes in hand...) to dictate an equitable outcome; to be fair, to control grade creep, to manage funding -- most of which have little to do with effective force management.

This system effectively presumes that all are 'Renaissance Men.' Since all are emphatically not such men (my guess would be < 5%), this produces an insoluble problem and, given some or even any pressure, the system defaults to the first priority...

What's needed is to acknowledge that life ain't fair and combat sure isn't, that the benefit of effective strategy and doctrine is a thing that cannot be assumed or wished to be equitable across the world; you have GOT to KNOW that your people do it better than others...

There are very few 'Renaissance Men' about; there are some to be sure -- and we all know one or more in the Armed Forces but it is a fact that there are not enough interested in a military career to populate the Officer Corps. Ergo, the process and system MUST recognize that everyone cannot be assumed to be equal. Simply because they aren't. A lot of factors and observations over the years indicate to me that there are a very few who make great commanders AND great Staffers; there are a great many more that do one thing well and the other less so **.

The problem is that in attempting to designing a one size fits all and 'fair' system, Congress and the DoD have ignored the Services varying needs and they have been forced to accept a cookie-cutter approach that is 'efficient' but not at all effective and does not meet varying Service needs.

The very differing requirements of Command and Staff work have been 'determined' to be not sufficiently different to require selective tracking; civilian personnel management principles that are not totally applicable to a military environment have been forced on all and the system has grown dysfunctional. Much of that is the fault of Congress; some is due to the personnel communities efforts to make their job easier and most of the rest of the problems can be laid to many thing including fate and the vagaries of war (and peace...).

Can such a system work at all? Obviously it does It has for many years. It produces an acceptable and competent product for the most part and has undoubtedly produced some great commanders and leaders in all the Services who can do both or all things well. I submit, however, that these are a smaller minority than is totally desirable and I further submit that in my observation, the number who achieve 'great' is declining over the past few decades. As one of my favorite LTGs once said, "All Generals are mediocre, I'm mediocre. The system will attack you if you're too good." That's not to say the FlagOs are not smart guys, they are -- but that they are systemically constrained.

The system thus does not. IMO, need to be totally scrapped but as a lowly Peon looking up at the august; I see that competition for promotion is way too intense and tends to breed a cut throat approach by some and I do not think that is fair to the Services, the Nation or the majority of the Officer Corps. I'm also pretty well convinced there are some folks who make great commanders and some who need to stay as Staff types or other specialists. I do realize that a command track and a staff track is unlikely in this country due to tradition if nothing else but that doesn't mean that such an idea is wrong.

* DOPMA dope:

The DOPM Officer Management System; an overview from RAND LINK (.pdf 52.6kb)

Ending Up or Out; Flaws in DOPMA LINK.
by Carlton Meyer, Editor G2Mil.com Retired Marine officer with some distinct views on current military topics. This, however, is a good summary.

Challenging Time in DOPMA; Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management, RAND Monograph LINK

** This applies to NCOs and even Privates as well. Let's face it, not everyone grooves on combat and living in the Boonies or urban grime with few or no creature comforts. Those who do not can do the job if necessary, millions have proved that and millions do it every day but those who like it will do a better job.

In any event, until the system is repaired -- I'd say replaced, really -- the differences between the very few 'Renaissance Men' and the many warfighters and many military intellectuals will continue to cause friction and oscillation toward one pole or the other as it has for many, many years. Look at old, 1950s Military reviews in your local library...

Not a major problem, broadly and effectively, an uneasy truce between the three categories will be maintained.

Defaulting to Priority One...

[wm]

It is cyclic. As soon as we get back to business as usual, the green machine will dampen creative thought in favor of regimen. That mantra then becomes a cultural bias against intellect--which is seen as effete if not actually disloyal.

For example as an exercise tied to the Army's early 80s renaissance, Airland Battle was a thinking man doctrine for it's day. As it grew older and we got past Desert Storm, the thinking died and doctrine replaced it while TTP served as a poor substitute for initiative.

Tom

I suspect that a lot of this phenomenon is tied to the need to "make a good showing" to get that good OER and that impact/end-of-tour award. What that translates to in the real world is a lot of wheel reinventing as folks rotate into new positions and have to come up with something "new" to make a mark. The folks with the corporate memory that might have suggested "Been there, done that, got the t-shirt and it didn't fit" have all PCS'd or ETS'd. So we oscillate between yesterday''s "good" ideas and the day-before-yesterday's "good" ideas, the latter masquerading as something new and different.

As the article pointed out, folks tend to get promoted based on what they have done in the past, not based on what they can be expected to do in the future. In such an environment, is it any wonder that a person would reach back and reuse what got him/her elevated to the current grade?

[Schmedlap]

... Dr. Wong out of the SSI... I had heard him brief an interesting proposal that the Army create nominative graduate school, interagency, and NGO/IGO slots for senior CPTs and senior MAJs that would be weighed equally in the promotion/selection process with second command opportunities (e.g., for the infantry officer, this would be Ranger Regiment, RTB, Old Guard, etc.).

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton. The real problem, in my opinion, is how to get the eggheads to Regiment and the gung-ho folks to Princeton. And it needs to be something more than telling the eggheads that Regiment will look good on their ORB and telling the gung-ho folks that they will get some time off to hook up with college chicks.

[reed11b]

I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton. The real problem, in my opinion, is how to get the eggheads to Regiment and the gung-ho folks to Princeton. And it needs to be something more than telling the eggheads that Regiment will look good on their ORB and telling the gung-ho folks that they will get some time off to hook up with college chicks.

I disagree. You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. More productive would be getting the "egg-heads" to the jobs that they excel at, and having them available and valued as advisors and leaders. Up or out kills most of them off at around the BC level if I am hearing the council members right. I would rather keep them in non-leadership positions longer then lose them entirely.
Reed
Sorry for the rambling nature of some of my posts, sleep deprivation is starting to catch up.

[Schmedlap]

You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. More productive would be getting the "egg-heads" to the jobs that they excel at, and having them available and valued as advisors and leaders.

I'm not arguing for or against that. Dr. Wong's concern seemed to be not enough cross training between tactical leadership and educational self-actualization. My observation was simply that - if that is his goal - his solution probably will not achieve it.

Sorry for the confusion - I worded it poorly so that it sounded like I was stating a general opinion, rather than an opinion about his opinion.

[Van]

What I got out of COL Matthews article was that the intellectual and the political hack are often regarded as interchangable, and graduate degrees are a tool for promotion in lieu of military competence. He cited many examples of senior leaders with remarkable intellectual accomplishments who denigrated the "intellectual officers" coming from things like White House fellowships.

It almost came across as a cop-out; 'I can't slam political hacks 'cause there is one (or more) in my rating chain, so I'll slam their achievements (and ignore my three masters degrees).' Rather than take people to task for being suck-ups, attack them for being thinkers not doers.

I suggest that the U.S. Army does have intellectuals, but unless they want to get tarred with the careerist/politician brush, they are forced to conceal it (much like telling the young MI 2LT to go to the gym so combat arms guys will be more inclined to listen to him.)

[rant] This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan. (BTW - excellent sources report the Air Force has the same problem.) And in the Army's infinite wisdom, CAS3 has been dismantled and passed to the branches, where it is not a priority... [/rant]

There's still hope, if we can pressgang GEN Caldwell and GEN Patreus to stick around for five or eight more years, we might be able to hold onto some of the gains in appreciation of intellectual achievement by soldiers.

[Ken White]

Amazing how well that works -- but generally only on the right kind of people...

And that's a good thing.

Added: Whoops, Ol' Reed snuck in ahead of this slow hunt and pecker. Yes.

The 'challenge' was directed at Schmedlap's comment above and was to be issued to guys with really short hair to get 'em to go to Princeton and to guys with a Doctorate in Scorpolostopical Studies to get them to learn to enjoy yelling 'Hooah!'

That, a challenge, will work with a lot of good guys -- though not with all. Further, as Reed says:

"...You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. "

That is a very true statement -- if the force is to be manned at current levels or if an increase is possible or needed.

Cut the size of the force (a possibility but certainly another thread) and you can get enough masters of all things but I do not believe it possible at current strengths.

[120mm]

In my drill life, I teach ILE for reservists. This year, the good folks who write Phase II have removed all the "intellectual" classes to distance learning, except for the class which is intended to demonstrate that History, as well as other "soft" sciences, are undervalued in today's society.

Instead, we get to spend 16 hours on transformation.

How cool is that?

[Ken White]

to me. Er; I thought we'd already transformed -- except for the FCS, of course...

[Rob Thornton]

I would go further (as implied in my previous comment) that there are some who are good combat commanders but not so good theater commanders.

John, you bring up an interesting point, perhaps made more so by the types of operational requirements being taken on at the 05 and 06 levels. For some this may be back to the future, for many this is something they did not anticipate. Some of these requirements look an awful lot life "force generator" functions. From my perspective we are getting a look at the dual nature of even FG commands, where a least some of the requirements and qualities we once assigned to 2, 3 and 4 star commands are being both pushed down, and growing from the bottom up based on conditions.

I thought Ken's post #16 was superb in that it outlined the competing priorities. I'd say its worth considering that while they can sometimes be viewed in conflict, as priorities they seem to be converging on commanders in the field (John and Ken can ref. COL T's opening remarks in the case study interview).

As we go down the road of SC MAGTFs and SC BCTs, as well as functional based CJTFs designed to support a comprehensive USG approach and integrate MNPs to achieve political purposes in complex interactive environments, the consequences of the institution emphasizing one priority at the expense of the other 2 may prove acute and put the policy objective at risk. Consider that while there may be less institutional risk in full spectrum, multi-function organizations than say building specialized force structures which may prove unsustainable, mitigation of that risk is contingent upon reconciliation to an acceptable level those competing priorities which can help you bridge the operational requirements gap.

A recent discussion at a seminar I was at last week serves as another illustration of competing priorities and requirements - and references Shek's post #8. The issue was relative to achieving Unity of Effort through better shared understanding during the planning and implementation of comprehensive USG efforts. The discussion was that the USG develop "Gold" planners - i.e. those educated and trained in the assessment, design and planning methodologies of DoD and the broader Inter-Agency (as built around S/CRS). I'd caveat this by saying it was qualified as beneficial that the USG have multiple perspectives/approaches because each has strengths that very depending on the OE. However, to facilitate unity of effort, there is a need to have folks literate and functional on both processes / languages. All good up to this point.

However, when we went down the road of establishing a standard for a Gold Planner it brought up other questions. Consider the ways we articulate the requirements for "Joint Qualified" officers. There is a JPME standard and Joint billets are mandated by law. If you go down the purple road to find your way on the gold one, the legislation and programmatic lines have some interesting DOTMLPF implications (more perhaps for the non-DoD agencies). While as an institution we value command (leadership with responsibility and authority) above all other positions, the requirements for staff officers in support of CDRs with new requirements would also seem to have grown.

It seems that just as our policies and strategies are emphasizing different approaches to achieve our FP objectives based on what we perceive as relevant experience, our understanding of what is required from the institution to meet those requirements has to be questioned as well, or the institution risks its relevancy. This may be hard for us to swallow, and make for a rough road. It is interesting how this could become a test of wills between the institutions and the Executive's appointed civilian leadership. I think Secretary Gates has set an interesting precedence in "being heard" by the DoD bureaucracy while still making it palatable for the institution(s) - leadership defined. How his successor (assuming there is one) will manage it will be interesting. With regard to transformation we may indeed be in Kansas Toto


Sidebar discussion:

Since I brought up the "Gold Planner" - consider the requirements on the other USG agencies - they have no THC (Transportation, Hospital and Convalescent) accounts of the type that make PME as we know and enjoy it possible. In order for them to produce Gold planners on the scale that would make them relevant, they will need to grow considerably, or be augmented in a way that makes it possible (such as LTG Caldwell offering the Inter-Agency to put some ACU faces to their spaces so they could attend ILE). If the requirement for Gold Planners were to get codified in any new legislation - it almost has to go along with a significant increase in numbers and ($$$) to make it possible.

Best, Rob