Anti-Intellectualism In The Army

[Cavguy]

All,

Found this 2002 ARMY two part article from a discussion on another thread, and thought it may be relevant to some of our other discussions:

PART 1

PART 2

Money Quotes:

My purposes in this two-part article are to trace the origins and manifestations of this anti-intellectual bias within the American military tradition; to demonstrate the existence and pernicious effects of such an attitude even in the celebrated age of information now upon us; and to suggest measures for ensuring that the intellectual potential of the officers' corps is capitalized on in optimal ways without impairing the warrior ethos of the profession.

The only external difference between the Contemplative Man and the Active Man in the officers' corps today is that the former may seek a doctorate, teaching tour, fellowship, attache assignment or other mind-expanding opportunities that the latter avoids like the plague because under the present career management system such excursions will time him or her out of transiting career wicket X, necessary if the officer is to remain competitive for brigade command and a possible star.

The Army has taken a laudable principle-getting officers off their duffs, out of their offices and down with troops where they can master their branch skills and learn to operate in the field-and implemented it with such compulsive zeal that those officers now arriving at the top know nothing but the field.

An exaggeration? Yes, but there is no question that the present system has produced a lopsided general officer corps infinitely more comfortable with practice than with reflecting on practice.

Several of the Army's brightest and most articulate captains and majors of the early 1990s survived their outspoken forays into the world of contending ideas and are doing well in their careers as they climb toward their first star. Unfortunately, however, they read the career tea leaves and have now clammed up. Their lately developed reticence recalls to mind Liddell Hart's observation concerning young British uniformed intellectuals:
Ambitious officers, when they came in sight of promotion to the generals' list, would decide that they would bottle up their thoughts and ideas as a safety precaution until they reached the top and could put these ideas into practice. Unfortunately, the usual result, after years of repression for the sake of their ambition, was that when the bottle was eventually uncorked the contents had evaporated.

The Army is doubtless correct in insisting on the man of action as the predominant model for the combat commander-let there be no mistake about that. But it is dead wrong in assuming that uniformed intellectuals-- simply because they have not negotiated every wicket in a general officer qualification course that could only have been devised by Genghis Khan's G3-cannot be men and women of action and hence are unqualified to command the higher line echelons. Moreover, the Army is on questionable ground in assuming that those who have been anointed by a zero-defects performance at each of the stations of the cross are thereby fit to serve in every general officer slot, even those for which they obviously lack the necessary intellectual qualifications. Rather than denigrating and marginalizing the uniformed intellectual, the Army should hearken to President Bush's call for a "renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps." It should implement the necessary promotion and assignment adjustments to assure that the intellectual potential of the officers' corps is identified, cultivated and exploited in optimal ways, which would include service at the highest echelons.

It is time finally to acknowledge that the Active Man and Contemplative Man do merge in many versatile people, and that the Army has as much need for the qualities of the latter as for the former. The intellectual man-and woman-have a vital role to play in all professional endeavor, not least military endeavor, and it is thus a fool's game to squander precious intellectual capital on the basis of a historical anti-highbrow shibboleth. The army that rejects seminal thinkers, thereby depriving itself of innovative ideas and the instruments for continuous intellectual self-renewal, will ultimately be a defeated army, vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more wisely and quickly to the ever-evolving art and science of war.

More in the links. Thoughts?

[Shek]

Cavguy,

I think the opening quote captures the sense of anti-intellectualism beautifully.

Crossing the Plains on an expedition to Utah [in the 1850s], Major Charles A. May searched the wagons in an effort to reduce unnecessary baggage. When he reached the wagons of the light artillery battery, Captain Henry J. Hunt proudly pointed out the box containing the battery library. "Books," May exclaimed in astonishment. "You say books? Whoever heard of books being hauled over the plains? What in the hell are you going to do with them?" At that moment Captain Campbell of the Dragoons came up and asked permission to carry a barrel of whiskey. "Yes, anything in reason, Captain, you can take along the whiskey, but damned if these books shall go."

If given the choice of books vs. whiskey (in the absence of a General Order #1, of course ), what would the most popular choice be today? If I were a betting man, my money would be on the whiskey. As an interesting omission, the author doesn't mention that Captain Hunt would go on to be Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac and instrumental in the repulsing of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg.

Also, while not part of the article, I'd be curious to see others' reaction to the following quote from COL Mansoor in his book.

In the future, U.S. Army officers must spend as much time in the library as they do in the gym, or risk defeat in this kind of war.

-COL(R) Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise (p. 345)

While I agree with his statement now, prior to Iraq, I would have laughed at such a statement - why would you want to spend a handful of hours each week reading? Hopefully the current generation of company grade officers can see the folly of my previous thinking.

[patmc]

It may have been unique to FA, but I could probably count on one hand the number of FA officers I met that were more prone to lift a book than open it. Most of my classmates at OBC were sharp, well read, and informed. In the firing battery, our commander gave us readings, and we talked about history, politics, stategy, tactics, music, movies, anything to generate debate and discussions (though our Top 5 Best Bass Players of the 1970s discussion probably helped us slightly less than debating gun truck formations). My roomate and I in Iraq had a hobby of raiding MWR libraries for good books, and we spent the year trading. My last BN CDR assigned readings to all unit officers and senior NCOs to get them thinking for a deployment. He and the XO read and discussed OIF/OEF/COIN books, and asked us (the staff) for opinions during PT. We were expected to be strong, smart, and effective.

From the junior officers I know, there is hope.

[reed11b]

I certainly was referred to as "book smart" as a negative while I was in. Most officers were open to learning from non-army course work, but the NCO corp seemed to be of the opinion that they would be issued any knowledge they needed. Of course I was active from '93 to '97 (Not exactly banner years for the Army) and in the NG '01 to '06 (A time of severe transition for the guard) so my experiance may very little to do with current active duty NCOs. I would have to guess that the majority of the E6 and E7's I have meet through my job w/ the VA have been very intelligent, profesional and open. These soldiers were all my peers when I was on active duty, so perhaps I was part of a time of transition myself.
Reed
Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

[Shek]

Point: Anti-Intellectualism seems to be a defensive mechanism of individuals, not an institutional bias. Encouraging additional openess in the military will help extiguish the phenominon quicker.

Reed,

There is an institutional bias, at least with regards to the officer promotion and selection system. On the path to battalion command, time in a muddy boots assignment post-company command is rewarded while a graduate school assignment is often considered a career killer. If you can make it to battalion (i.e., you "survived" despite going to graduate school), then your liability can turn into a capability, but it makes for a tough field grade hurdle.

Now, graduate school does not equal intellectual, and one can be an intellectual without graduate school, so don't read too much into that example, but I think it is sufficient to signal a bias.

[Rob Thornton]

At the SWJ get together last night at Sines we were laughing about the latest CAD FILEs cartoon in which the closing remark is "getting the most out of that online degree". The cartoon well characterizes the position we've placed ourselves in. Online degrees and combination programs like those with CGSC/ILE that combine to allow leaders to earn a degree while continuing to work a day job or while attending PME seem to offer a way address our education deficits in light of OE requirements.

However, as one of those working to complete an online degree on the side, I'm under no illusions about the limits of what such degrees can provide. While distance learning has gotten better and while it does get me a degree, the quality of interacting with a professor and fellow students in a real environment is absent. With the caveat that not all classroom environments are created equal, what I mean is that the time which is set aside to discuss the issues under scrutiny and build context is hard to replicate on discussion boards. The number of natural competitors which interrupt the building of context and understanding are numerous in the online degree program. It could be family concerns, the work load at the day job etc. As such, I'd qualify the education received through such programs as online and accelerated degree programs as inferior to being able to dedicate time almost exclusively to the thinking, writing and discussion that accompanies time set aside to attend a resident university program.

Now having said all that, I'm glad there are online degree programs as it gives me (and those like me) the opportunity to pursue a degree at a pace I can manage no matter if I'm TDY (currently), at home watching kids to give the wife a break, or at lunch. I did quit using TA as I was tired of incurring ADSOs while still paying for 20% and books while doing it on my time. I would not want to try and pursue a PhD in this manner, and am currently looking for options in that regard if that is the direction I decide to go.

Last week there was a good discussion about the requirements of the OE and the differences between training and education. Both are very important, however they are different. The best description I've heard is that training is better positioned to prepare us for the "known-knowns" and some of the "known-unknowns", while education is better positioned to prepare us for the unknown in terms of helping us think about things. The two are complementary, but some roles and responsibilities are characterized by requiring more of one then the other.

The discussion about complex, interactive environments at this weeks seminar turned to some of the deficiencies we are discovering in our DOTMLPF approaches. Note - Education is the unseen "E" and falls in behind the "L" in DOTMLPF. One senior mentor offered that it was "time to put an "E" as the first letter of TRADOC. Some joking occurred as it was mentioned that this might make it look like "E-Trade". The senior mentor, undaunted, said "we should spend less time worrying about how our acronyms sound and more about making sure the components and the relationship between the components are correct."

Ultimately I think the value we place on education must be articulated and accepted as it relates to the value it provides to the missions we undertake. This, like other related issues must be related back to elements of success or failure in terms we can acknowledge and which are visible. To really institutionalize it, we must resource it and reward it.

Best, Regards, Rob

P.S. Shek - I've got something I've been meaning to send you, and will try and get it to you this afternoon.

[John T. Fishel]

institutionalized the anti-intellectual bias, at least in regard to Army FAOs. By single tracking FAOs, OPMS 21 made the FAO career more predictable. No longer would I and others be giving advice to would be FAOs that you need to be prepared to consider retiring as a Major a "successful" career because OPMS 21 made it all but certain that the successful FAO would make LTC and many would make COL. But because it took FAOs entirely out of branch competition it made it all but impossible for a FAO to command anything but a MILGP or DAO and certainly not a battalion or brigade. Thus, the only FAO generals we will ever see in the future will be products of the Fairy Godmother Office of PERSCOM - which you all know gives her favors entirely at random and very, very rarely. Put in concrete terms the days of Generals Abizaid, Valenzuela, Woerner, and Loeffke, among others, are gone to come no more - until or unless we change the personnel system to make FAOs competetive for GO rank.

A question arises from this that, I think, is more central to the thread: Are the leadership skill sets reuired for command at the unified combattant command the same as those required at lower levels of command? Does being an effective BN, BDE, DIV, and Corps commander translate into being a successful and effective COCOM? ( A little "wht if" history here: If Fred Woerner had been given 90 more days as CINCSO - as he requested - rather than 60 days, would the Oct 3, 1989 coup have succeeded and rendered Just Cause unnecessary? In other words, were Woerner's FAO skills more useful than Thurman's more traditional command and bureaucratic skills?)

Cheers

JohnT