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Thread: Anti-Intellectualism In The Army

  1. #21
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Try challenge.

    Amazing how well that works -- but generally only on the right kind of people...

    And that's a good thing.

    Added: Whoops, Ol' Reed snuck in ahead of this slow hunt and pecker. Yes.

    The 'challenge' was directed at Schmedlap's comment above and was to be issued to guys with really short hair to get 'em to go to Princeton and to guys with a Doctorate in Scorpolostopical Studies to get them to learn to enjoy yelling 'Hooah!'

    That, a challenge, will work with a lot of good guys -- though not with all. Further, as Reed says:
    "...You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. "
    That is a very true statement -- if the force is to be manned at current levels or if an increase is possible or needed.

    Cut the size of the force (a possibility but certainly another thread) and you can get enough masters of all things but I do not believe it possible at current strengths.
    Last edited by Ken White; 11-10-2008 at 10:05 PM. Reason: Addendum

  2. #22
    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    In my drill life, I teach ILE for reservists. This year, the good folks who write Phase II have removed all the "intellectual" classes to distance learning, except for the class which is intended to demonstrate that History, as well as other "soft" sciences, are undervalued in today's society.

    Instead, we get to spend 16 hours on transformation.

    How cool is that?

  3. #23
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Sounds like a Scorpolostopical topic

    to me. Er; I thought we'd already transformed -- except for the FCS, of course...

  4. #24
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    I would go further (as implied in my previous comment) that there are some who are good combat commanders but not so good theater commanders.
    John, you bring up an interesting point, perhaps made more so by the types of operational requirements being taken on at the 05 and 06 levels. For some this may be back to the future, for many this is something they did not anticipate. Some of these requirements look an awful lot life "force generator" functions. From my perspective we are getting a look at the dual nature of even FG commands, where a least some of the requirements and qualities we once assigned to 2, 3 and 4 star commands are being both pushed down, and growing from the bottom up based on conditions.

    I thought Ken's post #16 was superb in that it outlined the competing priorities. I'd say its worth considering that while they can sometimes be viewed in conflict, as priorities they seem to be converging on commanders in the field (John and Ken can ref. COL T's opening remarks in the case study interview).

    As we go down the road of SC MAGTFs and SC BCTs, as well as functional based CJTFs designed to support a comprehensive USG approach and integrate MNPs to achieve political purposes in complex interactive environments, the consequences of the institution emphasizing one priority at the expense of the other 2 may prove acute and put the policy objective at risk. Consider that while there may be less institutional risk in full spectrum, multi-function organizations than say building specialized force structures which may prove unsustainable, mitigation of that risk is contingent upon reconciliation to an acceptable level those competing priorities which can help you bridge the operational requirements gap.

    A recent discussion at a seminar I was at last week serves as another illustration of competing priorities and requirements - and references Shek's post #8. The issue was relative to achieving Unity of Effort through better shared understanding during the planning and implementation of comprehensive USG efforts. The discussion was that the USG develop "Gold" planners - i.e. those educated and trained in the assessment, design and planning methodologies of DoD and the broader Inter-Agency (as built around S/CRS). I'd caveat this by saying it was qualified as beneficial that the USG have multiple perspectives/approaches because each has strengths that very depending on the OE. However, to facilitate unity of effort, there is a need to have folks literate and functional on both processes / languages. All good up to this point.

    However, when we went down the road of establishing a standard for a Gold Planner it brought up other questions. Consider the ways we articulate the requirements for "Joint Qualified" officers. There is a JPME standard and Joint billets are mandated by law. If you go down the purple road to find your way on the gold one, the legislation and programmatic lines have some interesting DOTMLPF implications (more perhaps for the non-DoD agencies). While as an institution we value command (leadership with responsibility and authority) above all other positions, the requirements for staff officers in support of CDRs with new requirements would also seem to have grown.

    It seems that just as our policies and strategies are emphasizing different approaches to achieve our FP objectives based on what we perceive as relevant experience, our understanding of what is required from the institution to meet those requirements has to be questioned as well, or the institution risks its relevancy. This may be hard for us to swallow, and make for a rough road. It is interesting how this could become a test of wills between the institutions and the Executive's appointed civilian leadership. I think Secretary Gates has set an interesting precedence in "being heard" by the DoD bureaucracy while still making it palatable for the institution(s) - leadership defined. How his successor (assuming there is one) will manage it will be interesting. With regard to transformation we may indeed be in Kansas Toto


    Sidebar discussion:

    Since I brought up the "Gold Planner" - consider the requirements on the other USG agencies - they have no THC (Transportation, Hospital and Convalescent) accounts of the type that make PME as we know and enjoy it possible. In order for them to produce Gold planners on the scale that would make them relevant, they will need to grow considerably, or be augmented in a way that makes it possible (such as LTG Caldwell offering the Inter-Agency to put some ACU faces to their spaces so they could attend ILE). If the requirement for Gold Planners were to get codified in any new legislation - it almost has to go along with a significant increase in numbers and ($$$) to make it possible.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 11-10-2008 at 11:52 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    You can not have every officer be good at everything. It is part of the problem of the current officer promotion system. More productive would be getting the "egg-heads" to the jobs that they excel at, and having them available and valued as advisors and leaders.
    I'm not arguing for or against that. Dr. Wong's concern seemed to be not enough cross training between tactical leadership and educational self-actualization. My observation was simply that - if that is his goal - his solution probably will not achieve it.

    Sorry for the confusion - I worded it poorly so that it sounded like I was stating a general opinion, rather than an opinion about his opinion.

  6. #26
    Council Member Van's Avatar
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    Default Anti-intellectual or anti-political hack?

    What I got out of COL Matthews article was that the intellectual and the political hack are often regarded as interchangable, and graduate degrees are a tool for promotion in lieu of military competence. He cited many examples of senior leaders with remarkable intellectual accomplishments who denigrated the "intellectual officers" coming from things like White House fellowships.

    It almost came across as a cop-out; 'I can't slam political hacks 'cause there is one (or more) in my rating chain, so I'll slam their achievements (and ignore my three masters degrees).' Rather than take people to task for being suck-ups, attack them for being thinkers not doers.

    I suggest that the U.S. Army does have intellectuals, but unless they want to get tarred with the careerist/politician brush, they are forced to conceal it (much like telling the young MI 2LT to go to the gym so combat arms guys will be more inclined to listen to him.)

    [rant] This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan. (BTW - excellent sources report the Air Force has the same problem.) And in the Army's infinite wisdom, CAS3 has been dismantled and passed to the branches, where it is not a priority... [/rant]

    There's still hope, if we can pressgang GEN Caldwell and GEN Patreus to stick around for five or eight more years, we might be able to hold onto some of the gains in appreciation of intellectual achievement by soldiers.

  7. #27
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    Default amen

    Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
    [rant] This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan. (BTW - excellent sources report the Air Force has the same problem.) And in the Army's infinite wisdom, CAS3 has been dismantled and passed to the branches, where it is not a priority... [/rant]
    rant 2:
    Agree completely, having just come off a year and a half of Battalion Staff. Even though I was branch detailed to MI, when I made promotable I was put in S4. After 7 months of deployment prep (deployment cancelled), I was finally sent to S2 for a year. I did all the admin security jobs, but no intelligence work. Because I was now MI, I was passed over for battery and the support company command, which went to FA officers. I was assigned all the fun additional duties, etc. The batteries ignore staff guidance until after there is a problem, then complain when things go wrong. The experience taught me a lot, but definately left a bad taste in my mouth. I honestly have little desire to go back to staff, and it will likely sway my future plans. MI is moving away from commands, so there is little reward, despite constant assurances that "all KD jobs are equal." Next assignment will likely include a deployment, where missions have meaning, so that may make the staff suck worth it.

  8. #28
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default At the risk of up setting everyone

    I can't say I have any real concerns about anti-intellectualism in the US Army. Not my game and none of my business.

    BUT - as someone who takes military theory and science, very (way too?) seriously, I have another directly related concern, that covers ALL, not just US, military writing.

    The percentage of what is written that passes the "so what" test is not as high as I think we might collectively hope for. A lot (not all) of what is currently written by soldiers needs to be held to far greater rigour. - something I have already alleged with the wide acceptance of Manoeuvre Warfare.

    Essentially there is a good percentage of what is written is not held to a a greater enough degree of "Intellectual Rigour" - so I guess there is some anti-intellectualism in that sense.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 11-11-2008 at 06:21 AM.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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  9. #29
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    Default A more thorough Brigadier General Selection Process

    We all know GEN Petraeus chaired the last BG board this past summer http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...f-us-army-coi/

    As one previous post stated, we hope to keep the likes of LTG Caldwell and GEN Petraeus around for the next 5 or 8 years to institute real change and support intellectuals in the Army.

    If we looked "behind the curtain" into the Wizard's control room and changed the way we picked BGs, then we may send a message to rest of the Army that is good for muddy boots AND intellectuals, doers and thinkers, men of Action and Contemplative men.

    If we were to allow officers to pursue their passions in the career field that they truly excel, we would have the best FAOs, infantrymen, signaleers, and strategists that the Army has ever seen. Then, we would thoroughly screen these COLs for selection to BG, with little or no prerequisites. They would not necessarily need "sponsors" in the board room. Like, "I know McMaster and he is a Cavalryman and an author and I need him for ARCIC." (Although that was a perfect pick and definitely from Petraeus). With a more thorough selection process, those that pursued their passions would rise to the top and they would be evident. With only 400 BGs in the Army and an Army in Persistent Conflict, we will need to shape the future BGs by looking at the selection process differently. Selecting those who are focused on the future Army Requirements, can establish a vision and get things done in the best interests of Soldiers.

    Great discussion!
    Last edited by Multi-skilled Leader; 11-11-2008 at 05:26 PM.

  10. #30
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Multi Skilled and I have differed in the past but here, he's absolutely correct

    I believe. I agree totally with what he says.

    I do, however, have a somewhat pertinent but mildly off topic point to make based on one small item:
    "...With only 400 BGs in the Army..."
    Use of the word 'only' possibly implies; a small number; there could or should be more; or a similar thought.

    I'd throw out that the Army -- all the services -- are over-Officered. That is to say the ratio of Officers:Enlisted persons is too highly tilted toward the former. I strongly question that a Flag Officer strength that prevailed with 12+ million people in uniform in 1945 is needed when there are less than 2M today...

    We should acknowledge that part of this overstrength is due to Branch / Service infighting and parochialism. Part is due, I think, to a cultural bias that is slow to change and I certainly acknowledge that part is based on a perceived real need. There are other minor reasons but all things considered, over 45 years of observation at all levels from Rifle company to walking the hallowed halls of 'E' ring, from Private to reasonably senior DAC have led me to strongly question the urgency and reality of that need.

    I do understand that a critical part of the rationale is a potential and needed mobilization hedge but I submit that there are other and better ways to achieve that aim. The selected method, in part Congressionally imposed, provides much 'excess' and allows or forces the Army to put many competent people into mind destroying, make work staff jobs. (Note: been on a lot of staffs, watched even more. Have seen several that probably were not needed, some that existed only to justify a Flag slot, never served on or saw one that at TOE/TDA strength was not IMO bloated. My sensing is also that the Army is not alone in this less than desirable methodology). See also other comments on the topic by serving Officers on numerous other threads on this board...

    That in turn, drives many competent people out of the Army (and Navy and Marines, speaking from personal knowledge; don't know about the AF). I can think of well over 20 good officers with great potential I've personally known over the years who departed as CPT / Lt or MAJ / LCdr due to that problem. Give it some thought...

  11. #31
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    Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
    [rant] This is closely tied to the problems with staff work in the Army; staff officers are treated with contempt, staff assignments are considered ugly chores at best but more often looked at as punishment, most folks strive to minimize staff time, no job on staff is considered as hard or as important to professional development as command at an equal rank, but leaders whine that noone can do good staff work. Yeah, treat staff poorly, put your high-speed best people in command, then wonder why staff work isn't of the best quality; great plan...[/rant]
    That is nothing like my impression of staff time. While nobody enjoys it, I don't know of anyone who viewed it as punishment or anyone who viewed staff officers with contempt just because they were staff officers. Staff was regarded as one of those unpleasant tasks that we all need to endure during our careers. When someone did the job well (meaning that they made life easier on the companies) then they were tremendously appreciated. If they had a lousy attitude about the job and half-assed it and contributed nothing, then they were viewed with contempt - but it was due to performance, not duty position. I also never observed a bias towards putting particular people in staff versus command. It was an objective command-queue. If anything, it was too objective in that people who were not fit (or certainly less fit) for command went on to take command because it was "their turn" while someone much better qualified had to wait it out on staff for another year (even if this meant sending a company of Soldiers into Iraq with a lackluster commander, so as to not deviate from the command queue).

  12. #32
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That tracks far better with my observations

    and recollection than the Staff as punishment meme. Purgatory for some, yes; punishment? No. I'd add that even the 'purgatory' bit was, in some cases, just pro-forma griping.

    Also my perception that competence and good performance are respected, regardless of rank, job or pertinence thereof or location and that sloppy work is broadly condemned. Griping is sacrosanct and respected by all; cross the very fine line into whining and you'll be nailed or ignored by most.

    Most folks I've seen or known in the services seem to instinctively know the raw truth of that old cliché; "Anyone can do well what they enjoy, it's how well you do the things you don't want to do that tell what kind of person you are."

  13. #33
    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    I'm torn about this particular issue: Intellectual knowledge is often inferior to intuitive knowledge or talent, imo.

    Some of the most talented military minds I've seen, could not be even remotely described as "intellectual". On the other hand, some of the most intellectual minds I've met couldn't lead kindergartners to the candy store.

    It's kind of like the sociopath picking up the sex therapist's wife; One knows, while the other does.

    I will tell you this; attempting to cross the line between the execution level of the military and academia leads to a rocky road, full of gut-wrenching pitfalls, where an individual becomes perceived as being "neither fish, nor fowl, nor good red meat" for just about anyone....

  14. #34
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default So does that...

    Track with my long term observations, I mean...

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I can't say I have any real concerns about anti-intellectualism in the US Army. Not my game and none of my business.

    BUT - as someone who takes military theory and science, very (way too?) seriously, I have another directly related concern, that covers ALL, not just US, military writing.

    The percentage of what is written that passes the "so what" test is not as high as I think we might collectively hope for. A lot (not all) of what is currently written by soldiers needs to be held to far greater rigour. - something I have already alleged with the wide acceptance of Manoeuvre Warfare.

    Essentially there is a good percentage of what is written is not held to a a greater enough degree of "Intellectual Rigour" - so I guess there is some anti-intellectualism in that sense.
    Wilf, I disagree. Military writing is designed for the end user and needs to be readable by a very wide base. I feel that military writing is successful in this. Holding military writing to a more formal discourse will create an environment were the process of writing the article takes precedence over the content. If you truly believe that Psychology and Medical and Historical and Engineering journals are lacking in "so what" articles, I would recommend some time in the local university library reading journals and enjoying ridiculously small sample groups, re-hashes of existing studies, and pure opinion driven articles. If what you mean is more research based writing, then heck yeah, I agree. However, I fail to find large numbers of research grants available for military theory outside of weapons testing, so how do you propose to support that change?
    Reed
    P.S. kinda feels weird to disagree with Wilf.
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    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Default # of GOs, meritocracy

    Correction, there are only about 400 total GOs in the US Army through 4-star. It seems like Marshall was able to find a balance between the active man and contemplative man when picking his GOs, then we went to a centralized board and got fixated on what officers have done and how much time they spent in units. Degrees and getting published were not additions to an officers file but many times considered liabilities. "Why was he in that fellowship, when he could have been a Deputy BDE CDR waiting for his BN Command?"

    The centralized board was supposed to create a true meritocracy, but Jefferson's West Point was too. So we're stuck with what we have. Nepotism through the ranks from West Point to the Brigadier General's board. "If you look like me and do what I do, then you will get promoted." "If the Army wants you to think out of the box they will send you to get a degree...etc." and other euphemisms.

    So how does an officer culture change? Through senior leaders, board results, board makeup? Of course, many officers get over the issue of actually making GO when they are afforded time for degrees and contributing intellectually.

    Looking forward to hearing your ideas...and thank you for stimulating these.
    Last edited by Multi-skilled Leader; 11-13-2008 at 02:46 AM.

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    Default Note to Schmedlap

    I think the biggest problem here is how to make sure this results in well-rounded officers who have a combination of solid leadership experience and educational experience. I suspect that the gung-ho Ranger types will flock to Regiment and the egghead types will flock to Princeton.

    Many gung ho Ranger types see the value of education. The 75th Ranger Regiment has sent at least four Battalion and Regimental Commanders off to Harvard for fellowships recently, and I am the third field grade officer participating in a program the Regiment has developed with the School of Advanced Military Studies here at Leavenworth.

    I think your comments about balancing contemplation with action are accurate, and the Army as an institution needs to foster that. I do not believe that balancing dilutes our field leaders, it more accurately broadens the force. Multi Skilled gets at the essence of the discussion by talking about leader selection -

    If we looked "behind the curtain" into the Wizard's control room and changed the way we picked BGs, then we may send a message to rest of the Army that is good for muddy boots AND intellectuals, doers and thinkers, men of Action and Contemplative men.

    Leader development, and diversification in leader development, is the other component that the Army needs to address.

  18. #38
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Heh, true. Actually closer to 300 overall, IIRC

    Quote Originally Posted by Multi-skilled Leader View Post
    Correction, there are only about 400 total GOs in the US Army through 4-star.
    Knew that but my claim was / is still accurate; the raw number of GOs is about what it was at the end of WW II and the end strength is far, far less. While total Officer strength is down, there are still a slew and the ratio of leaders to led has gone from about 1:10 during late WW II to about 1:5+ today. As stated, I know why; I just think it is not helpful...
    The centralized board was supposed to create a true meritocracy, but Jefferson's West Point was too.
    Heh, yes we are -- and it isn't a meritocracy...
    So how does an officer culture change? Through senior leaders, board results, board makeup? Of course, many officers get over the issue of actually making GO when they are afforded time for degrees and contributing intellectually.
    In order, I'd say the first item as it sets the other two; and yes, they do.
    Looking forward to hearing your ideas...and thank you for stimulating these.
    Well, I'm a Jack Singlaub fan; stand outside the entrances to the Pentagon at Five o'clock (until ten to catch most but not all the ActionOs who work late...) and fire every other person who walks out the door. I'd add move to all staffs and do the same. Well, that may be a little extreme .

    I do seriously believe that many benefits will accrue from a thorough review of all TOE/TDA with a view to a 15-20% reduction in overall officer spaces. Even 10% would be good, save money, increase quality, etc. Of course, I lived through a couple of periods when actual officer strength in even high priority units was at 60% or so of authorized -- and, amazingly, everything got done with minimal hassle...

    Others will differ, of course...

  19. #39
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    Wilf, I disagree. Military writing is designed for the end user and needs to be readable by a very wide base. I feel that military writing is successful in this. Holding military writing to a more formal discourse will create an environment were the process of writing the article takes precedence over the content.
    While I concur that the writing needs to be applicable to a very wide base, I don't see how that would reduce the need for rigour. I submit, that it's use by the end user means it should be held to the up-most rigour. I junk a lot of writing with that in mind.

    If what you mean is more research based writing, then heck yeah, I agree. However, I fail to find large numbers of research grants available for military theory outside of weapons testing, so how do you propose to support that change?
    Not necessarily research, but true study yes. A lot of what the military wants people to study, or supports the study of, seems driven by funding agendas. - and if Medicine and Engineering are the same, (which I don't believe they are) then I submit we can do better.

    P.S. kinda feels weird to disagree with Wilf.
    Do it more often. It'll get to feel better the more you do it.
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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    A couple of years ago, someone at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) decided that advanced degrees would be masked for promotion. Fortunately, that only lasted one cycle, I believe. Still, for the AF at least, the biggest determinants for reaching O6 and above appears to be attending PME in residence along with ratings in the top 10% among peers in terms of performance.

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