Ok. Clearly what you know is both complete, and completely right. I believe it was that same mindset that blinded the many Eurpoean military observors who reported back upon returning home from America that there was nothing new to learn here...
Ok. Clearly what you know is both complete, and completely right. I believe it was that same mindset that blinded the many Eurpoean military observors who reported back upon returning home from America that there was nothing new to learn here...
I may be wrong.
Absolutely not. I am very willing to consider any evidence to the contrary. If you can show me how the European commanders cognisance of the strategies of the civil war could have altered WW1, I would be extremely interested. I may be entirely wrong.Originally Posted by Bob's World
I just don't see how the conduct of two tiny, barely "post Napoleonic armies" with almost infinite manoeuvre space, usefully informs the conduct of 3-4 massive European industrial age armies, with comparatively very small battle space, and entirely different weapons capabilities.
The European Generals of 1914, were mostly skilled military men. ..but all - German, French, Russian and British, ... were all wrong footed by the conditions that prevailed.
As to Rohr, I will concede he is an important figure in the development of combined arms theory, but he is not the originator of modern minor dismounted tactics.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, look at the casualty figures in the CW for assaults on entrenched positions and the telling effect of small increases firepower capabilities (minnie bullet and improved cannon technology) and the limitations of railroads for strategic manuever. I may be wrong, but I believe that's a start.
Reed
The Strategic lesson of the Civil War, I believe, is that Grant caught onto the fact that wars between nations (vice Kingdoms) could no longer be won by strategems aimed solely at the defeat of the other side's Navy or Army, nor by capturing their capital. Wars now required the strategic goal of defeating the other sides entire populace's collective will to continue the conflict. This is why he very deliberately sent his two most trusted Lieutenants, Sheridan to the Shenandoah and Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas, to specifically target Southern will. Meanwhile he stayed with and closely supervised a capable but less trusted Meade in a critical supporting effort of defeating Lee's Army and capturing Richmond. All the focus of those who observed the campaign was on Lee, the superior tactician, and the strategic brilliance of Grant was clouded by the brutal realities of his relentless pursuit and constant re-engagement with Lee's retreating Army; and the horror at what it required to crush a populaces will to fight.
My point is that the Europeans DID NOT apply this strategy in WWI. Instead they focused on destroying each other's armies and attempting to sieze each other's capitals. German will was left intact, and was possibly even strengthened by the allied victory and the peace terms forced upon their undefeated populace.
Now, at the operational/tactical level the Europeans did indeed learn the lessons of the values of the technologies of the Civil War: Railroads, telegraph, aerial observation, and not least of all the devastating effectiveness of rifled barrels. But this is not strategy.
No one is challenging the skill of the European Generals. They waged war as they understood it. They had knowledge. What they lacked was that next level of mental activity, understanding.
Knowledge is easily acquired by hard study and rote memorization of what others think (what). Understanding requires a thoughtful application of that knowledge to unique factual circumstances (why). Perhaps next would come wisdom, which would be knowing when to continue to engage, and when the wiser course is to simply walk away (when). And with that, I will walk away from this particular topic. I always try to seek understanding, but still struggle with wisdom...
Last edited by Bob's World; 11-23-2008 at 11:27 AM.
In 1870, five years after the US Civil War, Prussia defeated France, by defeating it's Army and surrounding it's capital. Moreover I submit, had the Germans got to Paris in 1914, France would have collapsed. What worked in one war cannot be universally applied to another.
The allies tried to circumvent the Western Front, with the "Eastern Strategy" as early as 1915, aimed at knocking most of Germany's allies out of the war and causing them to sue for peace, without the destruction of their army or the occupation of their capital.
In fact Foch's and other writing of circa 1904 shows that no one was intent on the destruction of armies any more, as they were simply too big. European tactical and strategic thought was centred decisive action at key points to inflict defeat.
The Europeans, had fought the Crimean War ten years before the US Civil War. It saw the use of rifles, telegraph, and railways, all to an extent that European militaries were aware of and had planed for their greater use in future wars.Now, at the operational/tactical level the Europeans did indeed learn the lessons of the values of the technologies of the Civil War: Railroads, telegraph, aerial observation, and not least of all the devastating effectiveness of rifled barrels. But this is not strategy.
What they lacked was the experience of something that had never before happened in military history, and study of the US Civil War would not have prepared them for. I submit that only detailed study of the Russo-Japanese War would have given them any insight.No one is challenging the skill of the European Generals. They waged war as they understood it. They had knowledge. What they lacked was that next level of mental activity, understanding.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Trotsky
Reading some of Trotsky's observations on the principles of war, he makes a very good argument as to why they are actually technology and epoch specific, and why they are mostly useless. This is pretty much summed up in the way Soviets list their own "principles of War."
If anyone has any references to a commentary on Trotsky writings by any western inter-war writer, I would be fascinated to see it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
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