Classic Principles of War

[Bill Moore]

Posted by William Owen

Sorry, but I profoundly disagree with this assertion. The "Europeans" studied the US Civil War in great detail - but saw nothing that new, bar the use of telegraph and railways, and were not short on their own combat experience from the Crimea. The war that was improperly studied, and could have aided some thinking was the Russo-Japanese War.

I think some key historians would disagree with you. The theory I seen was that the wars in Europe prior to the American Civil War were wars between kingdoms and the focus was on defeating the other side's military. On the other hand, the American Civil War was focused on the society as a whole, not just against one another's Armies. Some called it the first total war in the Modern Age.

Agree or disagree, and I'm simply voting present on this one. I think the argument is relevant, because the principles of war are very applicable to Napoleon's Day where great Armies determined the outcome of the conflict. To some extent that held also held true through the Great World Wars, but in WWII there was considerable coercion conducted against the civilian populations (carpet bombings, Hiroshima, etc.) where the center of gravity shifted from fieled forces to the opponent's national will to continue, verus the material means to continue.

Since the nature of war has changed, it would seem that the principles would have to be adjusted accordingly. It is more than adjusting to the information age, we now have enemies that we cannot mass against, that do not have a center of gravity, etc. Great Armies will not determine the outcome of asymmetrical conflicts.

A principle by definition means it should never be violated. Using that as a standard, and using the Global War on Terrorism or Long War as the model, it should be relatively easy to see what principles apply and what ones don't. Furthermore, if the principle applies in one situation (like Desert Storm), but not in another like our current fight, is it still a principle?

Does it even matter in the long run?

[AmericanPride]

Since the nature of war has changed

I disagree with this assumption. The nature of war remains the same: the use of violence towards the realization of some desired political object. Strategy, which is dependent on time, place, resources, technology has certainly changed. I will also preempt the common assertion that the development of strategy over time is somehow progressive (that 'modern' strategy is inherently better and more effective than 'ancient' or 'classic' strategy). This too, I think, is false. The "principles" of warfare, therefore, should originate from and reflect the inviolable nature of war and not the various strategies which come to use from time to time.

[Cavguy]

I disagree with this assumption. The nature of war remains the same: the use of violence towards the realization of some desired political object. Strategy, which is dependent on time, place, resources, technology has certainly changed. I will also preempt the common assertion that the development of strategy over time is somehow progressive (that 'modern' strategy is inherently better and more effective than 'ancient' or 'classic' strategy). This too, I think, is false. The "principles" of warfare, therefore, should originate from and reflect the inviolable nature of war and not the various strategies which come to use from time to time.

Have to agree with you. The nature of war has not changed since inception. Tactics, methods, tools all change, but not its nature as a fundamentally human endeavor - as much psychological and physical.

[Bill Moore]

The nature of war remains the same: the use of violence towards the realization of some desired political object.

AmericanPride if this true, then simply apply my proposed test for the principles listed and see if works. Maybe the nature of war is the wrong choice of words, but how we and our "conduct" war is clearly different, and I don't "think" the principles apply equally, and sometimes not all based on the "nature" of the conflict.

Bill

[William F. Owen]

I think some key historians would disagree with you. The theory I seen was that the wars in Europe prior to the American Civil War were wars between kingdoms and the focus was on defeating the other side's military. On the other hand, the American Civil War was focused on the society as a whole, not just against one another's Armies. Some called it the first total war in the Modern Age.

OK, fair point, but what lessons should the Europeans have taken from the US Civil War to inform the conduct of WW1? I can't see any, having come across this assertion before. The Russo-Japanese War made predicting some of the operational conduct of the Western Front marginally predictable, but I can't how any of the relevant points being present in 1865.

[William F. Owen]

I will also preempt the common assertion that the development of strategy over time is somehow progressive (that 'modern' strategy is inherently better and more effective than 'ancient' or 'classic' strategy). This too, I think, is false. The "principles" of warfare, therefore, should originate from and reflect the inviolable nature of war and not the various strategies which come to use from time to time.

My major concern about the so called "Principles" is we are discussing those feature in FM-100.5 or FM-3.0 and not those which originated the concept. This assumes a supremacy in US military thought, which the historical record does not readily support.

...and, are there "Principles of Psychology?" Does anyone list the "Principles of Engineering?" - so why can we list "Principles of War" and assume they are accurate and useful?

[AmericanPride]

AmericanPride if this true, then simply apply my proposed test for the principles listed and see if works. Maybe the nature of war is the wrong choice of words, but how we and our "conduct" war is clearly different, and I don't "think" the principles apply equally, and sometimes not all based on the "nature" of the conflict.

I would assert that all conflict has the same nature: violence for the achievement of a political objective. Whether or not the "conduct" between opponents through different time periods and from different locations is not the same does not change that said belligerents are striving, through conflict, to attain a desired end-state. That 'end-state', when stripping away the particular identity of the combatants, also fundamentally requires the submission of the enemy. There is no "right" way to reach this end so long as it is accomplished. The principles which ostensibly lead one to success do so on the basis of the nature of war; therefore guiding (or determining), not originating from, its conduct. If principles were to be based on a particular "conduct", then they would be relevant only so far as that conduct wins wars.

My major concern about the so called "Principles" is we are discussing those feature in FM-100.5 or FM-3.0 and not those which originated the concept.

I share the same concern. It is currently 0430. I will attempt to mount a defense of the US Principles of War later in the day.

[AmericanPride]

I think the only questionable US principle of war in relation to the general nature of conflict is "mass". The idea of massing combat power at a decisive time/place in order to gain victory in a short period of time is not, I believe, applicable to war in general; but specific to conventional armies fighting similar opponents.

[Ken White]

LINK.

LINK.

LINK.

These were all successful, none are literally 'conventional armies fighting similar opponents.' There are many more examples though few US available for study due, principally, to excessive caution (a US trademark), our distressing tendency to overclassify everything and too many senior US people sharing your incorrect view of the principle. One noteworthy thing about all Cited actions is that there were no General officers involved in the actual operations...

The intent of the principle is to provide adequate combat power (people, firepower, activity) at a decisive point to achieve temporary superiority over the opponent for long enough to achieve a favorable result. Further action may or may not be necessary or desirable.

One should use some care in the use of the words 'victory, 'defeat' and their synonyms -- those words can paint a false picture in the minds of many.

[Bob's World]

To adddress Bill Moore's sage observation, perhaps the only problem, or at least the primary problem, with the Principle's of War is the last word of their Title. These were developed in an age, and adopted by America in an age, where "War" was defined as this clash between states and their respetive militaries.

When one opens the aperture on their definition of war the principles start to get fuzzy. In a war where one is dealing with an insurgency, to try to apply these tactics to defeat of the insugent force without having an effective holistic COIN program that addresses the entire spectrum of Populace, Governance, and the Insurgent, will leave you in a quagmire that you will not likely emerge from victorious.

As to WILF's steadfast assertion that there was nothing for European's to learn from the Civil War, it seams that he always switches to talking tactics, when the assertion was made in regard to strategy. The major advance in tactics came from a German Captain, and we all still use those squad tactics today. (One of my greatest admiration's for the German military is that they would in mid-war listen to and adopt such a major change coming from so junior of an officer).

But the real lesson of the Civil War is at the Strategic level, that you could no longer win by simply destroying armies and navies, or capturing capitals. In wars between nations you must defeat the will of the other side's populace or what will follow the fighting will either be a tenuous and temporary peace (WWI), or a follow-on Insurgency (many examples, with Iraq being the most recent). As I asserted in my original post on this issue, most American historians miss this lesson to this day. The cult of Lee, and the love of fire and maneuver blinds leaders to this day as to what the true nature of war is, and what the true measure of victory is as well.

It's all about the people. We forget or neglect that to your peril.

[AmericanPride]

Ken,

Good examples. Instead of saying to what 'mass' is only applicable, I should have pointed out where I think it's inapplicable. When conducting a strategy of insurgency, the aim, as I understand it, is to avoid massing (people, effects, etc) in the first place, as it presents oneself as a vulnerable target to a superior enemy. It is not always necessary for the insurgency to mobilize "adequate combat power at a decisive point to achieve temporary superiority" because the physical destruction of the enemy is not the goal. Thoughts?

[Ken White]

My wife says it's the result of too much bourbon over too many years.

However, do recall these are principles, not rules -- therefor the interpretation is broad. In your scenario, I suggest it IS necessary for the insurgents to mobilize (their peculiar type of combat power) at a decisive point and time to achieve temporary superiority. An example would be the massing of local citizens in Afghanistan to protest US air strikes insuring that foreign TV cameramen were present while doing so -- no intent to destroy the opponents forces but only to influence opponents actions by swinging public opinion. Another is the disruptive fights and tactics in the Iraqi Parliament to protest possible acceptance of the SOFA.

Yet another is the currently favored massive use of IED and suicide bombers to achieve not a temporary military superiority or an expected physical destruction of the enemy but to psychologically convince the voters of nations involved in operations to withdraw their troops simply due to upset and annoyance at the loss of even small numbers of troops with little apparent progress. Since each strike is by itself inconclusive, they mass the number of strikes in an attempt to obtain a conclusive result.

All those provide or seek a temporary superiority of one sort or another over their opponents by the application of more than ordinary effort at a point or time when it is believed advantage may be accrued. Of course, if the insurgents are engaged in any combat operations, then the more directly attributable and combat power related 'mass' -- more people (or firepower) at one point than the COIN effort can muster -- applies.

[William F. Owen]

As to WILF's steadfast assertion that there was nothing for European's to learn from the Civil War, it seams that he always switches to talking tactics, when the assertion was made in regard to strategy. The major advance in tactics came from a German Captain, and we all still use those squad tactics today.

A. I certainly was not limiting my comments to the tactical level, but I fail to see how the "Strategy" of the WW1 was informed by the US Civil War. If it was, then whose strategy?

B. Do you mean Captain Wilhelm Rohr? If so, again I strongly disagree. The French had developed their own minor tactics doctrine as had the British.

[Bob's World]

Ok. Clearly what you know is both complete, and completely right. I believe it was that same mindset that blinded the many Eurpoean military observors who reported back upon returning home from America that there was nothing new to learn here...

[William F. Owen]

Ok. Clearly what you know is both complete, and completely right. I believe it was that same mindset that blinded the many Eurpoean military observors who reported back upon returning home from America that there was nothing new to learn here...

Absolutely not. I am very willing to consider any evidence to the contrary. If you can show me how the European commanders cognisance of the strategies of the civil war could have altered WW1, I would be extremely interested. I may be entirely wrong.

I just don't see how the conduct of two tiny, barely "post Napoleonic armies" with almost infinite manoeuvre space, usefully informs the conduct of 3-4 massive European industrial age armies, with comparatively very small battle space, and entirely different weapons capabilities.

The European Generals of 1914, were mostly skilled military men. ..but all - German, French, Russian and British, ... were all wrong footed by the conditions that prevailed.

As to Rohr, I will concede he is an important figure in the development of combined arms theory, but he is not the originator of modern minor dismounted tactics.

[reed11b]

Wilf, look at the casualty figures in the CW for assaults on entrenched positions and the telling effect of small increases firepower capabilities (minnie bullet and improved cannon technology) and the limitations of railroads for strategic manuever. I may be wrong, but I believe that's a start.
Reed

[Bob's World]

The Strategic lesson of the Civil War, I believe, is that Grant caught onto the fact that wars between nations (vice Kingdoms) could no longer be won by strategems aimed solely at the defeat of the other side's Navy or Army, nor by capturing their capital. Wars now required the strategic goal of defeating the other sides entire populace's collective will to continue the conflict. This is why he very deliberately sent his two most trusted Lieutenants, Sheridan to the Shenandoah and Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas, to specifically target Southern will. Meanwhile he stayed with and closely supervised a capable but less trusted Meade in a critical supporting effort of defeating Lee's Army and capturing Richmond. All the focus of those who observed the campaign was on Lee, the superior tactician, and the strategic brilliance of Grant was clouded by the brutal realities of his relentless pursuit and constant re-engagement with Lee's retreating Army; and the horror at what it required to crush a populaces will to fight.

My point is that the Europeans DID NOT apply this strategy in WWI. Instead they focused on destroying each other's armies and attempting to sieze each other's capitals. German will was left intact, and was possibly even strengthened by the allied victory and the peace terms forced upon their undefeated populace.

Now, at the operational/tactical level the Europeans did indeed learn the lessons of the values of the technologies of the Civil War: Railroads, telegraph, aerial observation, and not least of all the devastating effectiveness of rifled barrels. But this is not strategy.

No one is challenging the skill of the European Generals. They waged war as they understood it. They had knowledge. What they lacked was that next level of mental activity, understanding.

Knowledge is easily acquired by hard study and rote memorization of what others think (what). Understanding requires a thoughtful application of that knowledge to unique factual circumstances (why). Perhaps next would come wisdom, which would be knowing when to continue to engage, and when the wiser course is to simply walk away (when). And with that, I will walk away from this particular topic. I always try to seek understanding, but still struggle with wisdom...

[William F. Owen]

My point is that the Europeans DID NOT apply this strategy in WWI. Instead they focused on destroying each other's armies and attempting to sieze each other's capitals. German will was left intact, and was possibly even strengthened by the allied victory and the peace terms forced upon their undefeated populace.

In 1870, five years after the US Civil War, Prussia defeated France, by defeating it's Army and surrounding it's capital. Moreover I submit, had the Germans got to Paris in 1914, France would have collapsed. What worked in one war cannot be universally applied to another.

The allies tried to circumvent the Western Front, with the "Eastern Strategy" as early as 1915, aimed at knocking most of Germany's allies out of the war and causing them to sue for peace, without the destruction of their army or the occupation of their capital.

In fact Foch's and other writing of circa 1904 shows that no one was intent on the destruction of armies any more, as they were simply too big. European tactical and strategic thought was centred decisive action at key points to inflict defeat.

Now, at the operational/tactical level the Europeans did indeed learn the lessons of the values of the technologies of the Civil War: Railroads, telegraph, aerial observation, and not least of all the devastating effectiveness of rifled barrels. But this is not strategy.

The Europeans, had fought the Crimean War ten years before the US Civil War. It saw the use of rifles, telegraph, and railways, all to an extent that European militaries were aware of and had planed for their greater use in future wars.

No one is challenging the skill of the European Generals. They waged war as they understood it. They had knowledge. What they lacked was that next level of mental activity, understanding.

What they lacked was the experience of something that had never before happened in military history, and study of the US Civil War would not have prepared them for. I submit that only detailed study of the Russo-Japanese War would have given them any insight.

[William F. Owen]

Reading some of Trotsky's observations on the principles of war, he makes a very good argument as to why they are actually technology and epoch specific, and why they are mostly useless. This is pretty much summed up in the way Soviets list their own "principles of War."

If anyone has any references to a commentary on Trotsky writings by any western inter-war writer, I would be fascinated to see it.