Classic Principles of War

[Bill Moore]

I don't disagree with any of Bob's points, they are all applicable in irregular warfare. However, and this has always been my beef with those to dogmatically embrace so called principles, his definitions, or more accurately his interpretations of the principles, have nothing to do with their real definition as intended when they were written. This is a classic case of a blind love affair. Again I like what he came up, but call it what it is, a whote of government approach isn't mass, it's a WOG approach. Developing a network isn't maneuver, its developing a network. It's a size tennis shoe, yea you cram you size 10 foot into it, but it won't make it a size 10.

Mass: Ensure that the whole of government is engaged, or at least considered for engagement, for any action to assist the COIN activities of a Host Nation; and absolutely applied for those engagements that have been identified as decisive.

Maneuver: Ensure you have access to engage everywhere necessary, regardless of national borders, in order to fully address the situation that you have deployed American forces into theater for in the first place.

[John T. Fishel]

Be very, very careful using acronyms! As I told Rob in a private email when he introduced me to WOG for Whole of Govt, the acronym already exists and it is a very derogatory Britishism meaning "Worthy (or Westernized) Oriental Gentleman" used in the statment that, "The WOGs begin at Calais."

Cheers

JohnT

[Eden]

To answer the original question that started this thread - there are more hijackers around here than you find in the average North Carolina border town - our number one violation of the principles of war in Afghanistan has been Unity of Command. It is why very little progress will continue to be made by CENTCOM/DOS/NATO/ISAF/EU and all the other private, governmental, and international satrapies that have planted their flagpoles here. The funny thing is, everybody agrees we've dorked it up, but nobody seems to be able to do anything about it.

[Ken White]

...The funny thing is, everybody agrees we've dorked it up, but nobody seems to be able to do anything about it.

and ain't politics and turf grand? Not...

[Bob's World]

It seems that based on how people think they either find greater value in the detailed writings of Clausewitz, or they prefer the distilled down simplicity of Jomini. Both participated in and studied the Napoleonic wars as the foundation of their respective work. I've always respected the main points made by Clausewitz, but never understood why he chose to bury them in reams of rambling text. I may be off base on this, but I believe he is the military theorist who is most often quoted, but least often read.

I believe I think more like Jomini when it comes to breaking down a problem. Keep breaking it down until you find the simple, fundamental truths that lie at the heart of it. This works for me, but again, recognize that for many it does not. They find themselves with a concept that is too pure, and that they are unable to apply to an operational environment. Wilf is not the first theorist to take shots at Jomini's work, and won't be the last. I will say this, though, about the principles of war that he developed and that have been so central to US military doctrine for generations; I have encountered plenty of officers who could rattle them off by rote, but had little grasp of what they really meant or how to apply them effectively.

Won't say which is better, don't know that one is. Just know what is better for me. So, I read both, but find Jomini's approach easiest to work with.

[William F. Owen]

It seems that based on how people think they either find greater value in the detailed writings of Clausewitz, or they prefer the distilled down simplicity of Jomini. Both participated in and studied the Napoleonic wars as the foundation of their respective work. I've always respected the main points made by Clausewitz, but never understood why he chose to bury them in reams of rambling text. I may be off base on this, but I believe he is the military theorist who is most often quoted, but least often read.

Yep, CvC did like to ramble, but he deserves sticking with. Personally I think CvC needs an almost Talmudic method of study. Unfortunately this is a complete anathema to the modern military mind, which wants a disturbing degree of certainty and conformity.

I believe I think more like Jomini when it comes to breaking down a problem. Keep breaking it down until you find the simple, fundamental truths that lie at the heart of it.

When it's done well, this is powerful stuff. The struggle to do this is the most worthy endeavour of military thought.

Wilf is not the first theorist to take shots at Jomini's work, and won't be the last.

I will admit to not being as well read in Jomini, as I am Clausewitz - so my "shots" at Jomini may be more based on the my perceived usefulness of Clausewitz than any actual complaint with the old Swiss soldier.

[jkm_101_fso]

Won't say which is better, don't know that one is. Just know what is better for me. So, I read both, but find Jomini's approach easiest to work with.

I once had a Prof say that he imagined that Clausewitz was the kind of guy that could explain to a commander all the ways he could lose a battle; and Jomini was the kind of guy who would tell you how to win the battle. Not sure if there is any truth to that.

[Ken White]

Jomini was a little too orderly for my taste; war ain't orderly...

[Bob's World]

Jomini also is really more tactical than strategic, from an age when good tactics equaled good strategy in large part.

My favorite strategist (and U.S. General) was Grant, BUT THAT is a huge debate for an entirely different forum! BLUF is that he was the first military leader in the age of nations (vs. Kingdoms) to realize that no longer was ulitmate victory found in simply destroying the other side's Army or Navy, or in capturing a capital. Victory now required destroying the will of the other side's populace (damn, there is that pesky populace rising up again) to fight. His letter to his subordinate commanders upon assuming overall command of Union forces is a lesson in genius. Recognition of the Decisive Point (defeat of the will of the confederate populace) and sending his two most able and trusted commanders (Sherman and Sheridan) against it. Recognizing the most critical supporting effort (defeat of Lee's army and the capture of Richmond) and the need to position himself with a capable, but less tuned to his style and intent, commander of the Army of the Potomoc (Meade). And yes, I am quite comfortable in being at odds with those who worship at the church of Robert E. Lee, and who misunderstand the nature of Grant's larger campaign and choose to focus on Meade's campaign instead.

Too bad the European's ignored the lessons of that war, certainly WWI would have been fought much differently and perhaps WWII avoided if they hadn't. Instead they continued to play "destroy the army" and "capture the flag," with a generation wasted for no strategic effect.

I hope we are learning the right lessons from the current conflicts, because the world continues to change in ways that are as significant as changes born of the American and French revolutions.

But as to Jomini and the principles of war, I realize I did a quick bastardization to apply them to PCE, but I think they have a universal value that makes them helpful to buinessmen, salesmen, coaches and even students figuring out how to manage their study time. Obviously not all apply to every situation, but simple checklists help us all stay on track when the optempo of life starts to overwhelm our decision making capacity. On the otherhand, when your "mental position" is being overrun, that is no time to pick up "On War" for little quick guidance....

[Bob's World]

(Oh, and I realize Grant did not task Sheridan with the Shenandoah valley campaign originally. Forget the name of the commander of that army that he chose to keep in place for continuity, but later replaced with Sheridan when he failed to grasp what was needed of him.)

[Ken White]

...I hope we are learning the right lessons from the current conflicts, because the world continues to change in ways that are as significant as changes born of the American and French revolutions.

True; it's the changes, particularly (obviously?) the subtle ones that get overlooked, that trip people...

Obviously not all apply to every situation, but simple checklists help us all stay on track when the optempo of life starts to overwhelm our decision making capacity. On the otherhand, when your "mental position" is being overrun, that is no time to pick up "On War" for little quick guidance....

The aviators and artillerists would certainly agree; us dumb grunts can't read so we tend to ignore checklists -- and books that don't fit in jacket pocket...

[reed11b]

The aviators and artillerists would certainly agree; us dumb grunts can't read so we tend to ignore checklists -- and books that don't fit in jacket pocket...

If at first you don't succeed, your not using enough firepower.
Reed

[jmm99]

I've followed this thread, not from the standpoint of Ken's class 1 person (cuz I can't); but from the interface of his class 2 person, from the other side of the lens (cuz I read). The following seems wise to me.

(from Ken - Anti-Intellectualism Thread)

First priority will always be to win in combat -- that takes a certain mentality, mental toughness and willingness to take risks, make decisions (for better or worse...) as well as a degree of physical toughness and stamina to cope with the demands of campaigning (I like that word). This ability is a cognitive skill and requires some study but much practice. It is effectively an experience derived skill requiring considerable personal discomfort and sacrifice. It has little relationship to any civilian pursuits. Not everyone is equipped to do it or wishes to.

Second priority is to be intellectually superior to all possible opponents. This requires a great deal of study in many fields, some of which have little apparent benefit to warfighting. It also requires an ability and desire to move easily back and forth between a military oriented world and the broader civilian and academic worlds. It too entails much sacrifice in sometimes similar but mostly quite different measures than the field campaigner. Not everyone is equipped or wants to do that either.

Now, what does this have to do with spear tips, and plans & strategies ?

What follows is something I've been dwelling on for a couple of months - so, it won't be a long post.

A WWII poster (quoted by Summers in his foreward to Shelby Stanton's The Rise and Fall) read:

"At the end of the most grandoise plans and strategies is a soldier walking point."

Know of three battles that are personalized to me since they were the major battles of my dad's battalion (1/117INF). All were tip of the spear situations, where it gets very messy.

1. Mortain. 1/117 received the tip of the spear (SS armor) and broke it. Very fluid situation with one effective INF company left, backed up to the regt. arty where the German tanks were stopped.

2. Aachen. 1/117 lead battalion to punch through Siegfried Line. It broke through the first day, but with very heavy losses to the lead assault company (happened to be my dad's).

3. Stavelot. 1/117 again received the tip of the spear (SS armor; same unit as at Mortain). Pretty much one sided and the German spear tip was broken again (no tears, it had just come from Malmedy).

Each of these battles has had its share of books, with neat maps of pincer movements (planned, thwarted or executed), etc. All of that is very sterile, which is as it should be.

The thought that gets to me is that the First Principle of War is really:

"... a soldier walking point."

It seems it has always been that way. Don't know whether the following is a "tactical plan" or an "after-action report". It comes from the Neolithic, a cave painting in Spain, and may have been painted before the event as anticipatory magic, or after the event as a celebratory offering.

I think the men in the painting would fit in well with the soldiers who are having this discussion.

[William F. Owen]

Too bad the European's ignored the lessons of that war, certainly WWI would have been fought much differently and perhaps WWII avoided if they hadn't. Instead they continued to play "destroy the army" and "capture the flag," with a generation wasted for no strategic effect.

Sorry, but I profoundly disagree with this assertion. The "Europeans" studied the US Civil War in great detail - but saw nothing that new, bar the use of telegraph and railways, and were not short on their own combat experience from the Crimea. The war that was improperly studied, and could have aided some thinking was the Russo-Japanese War.

Prior to WW1 all European Armies trained to for wars of movement and encounter battles. WW1 trench deadlock was unavoidable, and a very rapid progression of military thinking that saw it go away within 3 years of fighting. WW1 was not created by stupid Generals, or poor leadership. Many Generals were extremely skilled men.

But as to Jomini and the principles of war, I realize I did a quick bastardization to apply them to PCE, but I think they have a universal value that makes them helpful to buinessmen, salesmen, coaches and even students figuring out how to manage their study time.

I strongly recommend you read Robert Leonhards, "Principles of War for the Information Age."

[slapout9]

It seems it has always been that way. Don't know whether the following is a "tactical plan" or an "after-action report". It comes from the Neolithic, a cave painting in Spain, and may have been painted before the event as anticipatory magic, or after the event as a celebratory offering.
I think the men in the painting would fit in well with the soldiers who are having this discussion.

jmm yeah Ken knows the caveman that did the drawing

[Ken White]

Will no one rid me of these meddlesome priests...

[Rob Thornton]

he was on the cutting edge of technology and thought even then

[Ken White]

................ :d

[Bill Moore]

I noted your clean shaven retired photo on the bottom left, but you're obviosuly dying your hair.

[Ken White]

Sticks and Stone, etc .etc. HA! What, me worry...

BTW, for all those engaging in this abuse, I will magnamanusslie (or whatever that word is) provide this LINK.

Your turn will come...