Why do we desire to win?

[Ken White]

I believe it conjures up a sense of zero-sumness toward humanity, which this crowd finds vulgar and anathema to their world view.

I certainly agree with that one...

On the other, I partly agree but this segment

...But I think the "enlightened" crowd will "get it" when explained in non-zero terms.

however, I question.

Based on my admittedly limited but even today ongoing (have two neighbors who are Profs at a local University) contact with Academics, I believe many are so enamored of the communitarian and one world approach and so convinced of the inherent goodness of humankind that they will reject any absolutes or even near absolutes regarding those two issues -- which may be what you meant -- but, more importantly, will be offended at a minimum by any anyone espousing a different view. Indeed, some get downright hostile... (which I find very interesting and which seems hypocritical at least...)

IOW, their bias gets in the way of their common sense. Lot of that going around.

I think, on balance, the basic question and the several answers thus far point to the fact that people are different, which we all know -- and that some are (I think genetically) inclined to, or accepting of, violence and absolutes while others eschew or dislike both those things in an effort to seek universal collegiality.

I'm not sure many in the world really appreciate the tremendous depth of misunderstandings and problems caused by that latter difference. Or that many can accept that difference as a very real problem in human relations and discourse...

[120mm]

Where I think the slippery slope really starts to get icy, is when we start discussing "addressing (meaning correcting) root causes".

Isn't addressing root causes a form, however slight, of ceding victory?

Is it possible to fight a successful COIN campaign by effectively surrendering to the insurgents, or will the insurgents' human nature automatically make them "twist the knife" because of perceived weakness of the COIN forces?

[marct]

Where I think the slippery slope really starts to get icy, is when we start discussing "addressing (meaning correcting) root causes".

Isn't addressing root causes a form, however slight, of ceding victory?

Hmmm, I don't think that is has to be, although it may be in some cases. Do you think if Britain had granted the US colonies representatives in the House of Commons that would have been a "defeat"?

I think where the real problem comes in is with a set of popular perceptions as to which group, the "loyalists" or the "rebels" has the greater likelihood of solving a root problem. One (obvious) measure is whether or not the rebels win or loose militarily, but there is also another one in in general belief in problem solving ability, capacity and willingness. The ideological side of a COIN fight is crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the differing sides proposed "solutions" and, in some cases, their individual definitions of what are the "root problems".

[Ken White]

Hmmm, I don't think that is has to be, although it may be in some cases. Do you think if Britain had granted the US colonies representatives in the House of Commons that would have been a "defeat"?

Not in the eyes of Anglicans, Catholics or possibly even many Methodists, the majority of whom would've welcomed such representation to avoid a fight and achieve comity. In the eyes of the larger crowd of Baptists around at the time (or today ), only slightly possibly if that. In the eyes of the Scotch Irish Presbyterians -- who really fomented the Revolution part of the discontent -- absolutely not. It would have been a defeat and one they almost certainly would not have accepted...

Thus, I believe we have an example of a relatively small group of 'hard core' insurgents, a minority group, not necessarily dragging an entire nation or nation-to-be behind them to a destructive war but almost certainly, once that war had started, refusing to surrender and return to an earlier state. Sound familiar?

I think where the real problem comes in is with a set of popular perceptions as to which group, the "loyalists" or the "rebels" has the greater likelihood of solving a root problem. One (obvious) measure is whether or not the rebels win or loose militarily, but there is also another one in in general belief in problem solving ability, capacity and willingness....The ideological side of a COIN fight is crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the differing sides proposed "solutions" and, in some cases, their individual definitions of what are the "root problems".

I somewhat agree but would point out that (a) the ideal 'solution' to the problem may take quite different guises dependent upon ones views and biases. (b) Re: the insurgents, their ideas and what they say OR you or we think their ideas are may be quite different things, thus 'legitimacy' may be quite difficult to establish (not to mention that 'legitimacy' can, again, be different things to different observers, much less the participants). (c) The 'root problem' also may be perceived quite differently by various observers. i.e. I may want no or quite limited government or governance; another person may aspire to strong, honest, open and pervasive government.

I think that both items put us smack at the difference between people...

[marct]

Hi Ken,

Good points all. BTW, I think that it is a good exercise for us to occasionally tie the discussion back to your Revolution; not (solely ) because I'm UEL, but because I suspect most Americans don't really have an easy time of intuitively thinking as if they were the insurgents.

BTW, I agree with you totally on the (probable) differences in both problem set and solution potential. Part of the reason I positioned the "general populace" as playing off the sides on the issue goes back to Bolivia where Che's revolution dissolved once the land reforms went through. In hat instance, the land tenure system was perceived by most of the population as the root problem.

So, by way of extension, what do the Afghans (in general) perceive the "root problem" to be? The Taliban are selling a problem-solution set that is quite old (it's technically called a Revitalization Movement and it's been used thousands of times). What is the government selling? What does the population want? Split out by which segments? At the same time, are those wants acceptable to US, NATO and Afghan politicians?

Sorry, my head is in theoretical clouds at the moment...

Marc

[Ken White]

...because I suspect most Americans don't really have an easy time of intuitively thinking as if they were the insurgents.

I'm quite sure you're correct in that. I, OTOH, having been a rabble rouser for over 70 years -- and particularly so while in uniform -- am quite conversant with the thinking process, it's instinctive...

So, by way of extension, what do the Afghans (in general) perceive the "root problem" to be? The Taliban are selling a problem-solution set that is quite old (it's technically called a Revitalization Movement and it's been used thousands of times). What is the government selling? What does the population want? Split out by which segments? At the same time, are those wants acceptable to US, NATO and Afghan politicians?

Truly excellent question -- but, no derogation intended -- one couched in western terms. I believe the Afghan perception of root problems is extremely transitory and imminently fungible, that it will vary not only from week to week but also from district to district. More importantly, from tribe or clan to clan or tribe and is based on perceived need at the time. There are some exceptions, obviously -- security of a sort (not the western norm but a lesser variant the west is loth to accept, a separate problem within itself... That's really sort of important...) being one that's fairly obvious and certain -- but broadly it's a dynamic. That it is a dynamic is a factor that makes Afghanistan a tremendously complicated conundrum for the west.

I suggest that your excellent and pertinent question appeals to logic and western norms and deserves an answer but that most Afghans would not fully understand it, would answer with what they thought you wished to hear -- or with what they wanted to occur (and that could / would vary frequently) and that this dichotomy is large part of the problem with achieving understanding in the west for things occurring in the east... Thus I think you asked a fair question that we cannot answer and that no one is likely to answer accurately and honestly in the western sense of those terms.

Note the foregoing applies to Afghanistan. Iraq was and is very different. The Philippines are even more different. An African nation, as a further but theoretical example, would be again quite different from either of those three. My belief is that the bulk of western perceptions on what should happen in any of those nations would roughly coincide. Not possible, I think...

My personal belief is that the norm of all western desires or goals for Afghanistan will not be achieved to the satisfaction of most; those for Iraq will be partly achieved to the satisfaction of most; the Philippines will be achieved to the satisfaction of almost all but that will take much longer than Iraq; and that the African nation, as a theoretical is not predictable at this point. Those difference are due to environmental (in small part and to include external -- i.e. western -- impingements) and local human factors (mostly) variations.

Sorry, my head is in theoretical clouds at the moment...

Me too, as always...

[marct]

Truly excellent question -- but, no derogation intended -- one couched in western terms. I believe the Afghan perception of root problems is extremely transitory and imminently fungible, that it will vary not only from week to week but also from district to district. More importantly, from tribe or clan to clan or tribe and is based on perceived need at the time. There are some exceptions, obviously -- security of a sort (not the western norm but a lesser variant the west is loth to accept, a separate problem within itself... That's really sort of important...) being one that's fairly obvious and certain -- but broadly it's a dynamic. That it is a dynamic is a factor that makes Afghanistan a tremendously complicated conundrum for the west.

You know, Ken, I really have to get you up here to do a guest lecture on the real meaning of "cultural relativity" . All I can say now, is spot on!

This very problem lies at the heart of most of my criticism of "state building". Besides the pretty obvious perception of "state building" as extremely paternalistic and smacking of 19th century justifications for civilizing the savages, it also highlights the problem that all sides are speaking radically different languages (actually, using radically different epistemologies and conceptual languages that hardly map onto each other at all).

I was chatting with an old friend who is Afghan about this last week, and she make the observation that being given handouts, in this case being told how to govern themselves, was a major infuriation. The analogy she used was like having some moralist someone living down the street kick in your front door during a family disagreement, beat the snot out of a couple of people and then stick around with a good squad while the moralized and the kids misbehaved and were alternately rewarded or smacked based on how well the sucked up to the party line.