Getting the Basics Right in Afghanistan

[SWJED]

Getting the Basics Right
A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan
by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott and Colonel John Agoglia, Small Wars Journal

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

This paper has been prepared by the Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan. The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things. This analysis and requisite change is essential if we are to employ additional incoming ISAF units in the most effective manner. Comments/objections/counter-arguments can be sent to trent.scott@us.army.mil or john.agoglia@us.army.mil.

Events in Afghanistan are not going according to plan. There is a growing perception among local Afghans and within the international community that the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing stronger and more influential by the day. A spate of recent Western media reporting decrying the killing of innocent Afghans and Pakistanis as a result of the alleged over-judicious use of ISAF/OEF-controlled air power, the very public death of nine US soldiers in eastern Afghanistan followed almost immediately by the killing of just under a dozen French soldiers in central Afghanistan, and the widespread public belief that the central Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) under Hamid Karzai is institutionally corrupt, have contributed to the groundswell of local and international voices calling for a radical change to the way things are currently done in Afghanistan. Change is required, it must begin at the tactical level, and it needs to be led by ISAF. This is our war just as much as it is the Afghan’s war.

Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan, such as developing a comprehensive border strategy, eliminating corruption, developing an effective and functioning government, defining the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) – the list goes on – it is at the tactical level, at Regional Commands (RC), Task Forces (TF), Battlegroups, Companies and Coalition mentoring teams that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact. Conducting comprehensive, best practice operations designed to defeat the insurgency from the grass roots up is imperative if ISAF is to halt the consolidation of the insurgent’s influence in rural Afghanistan, establish the legitimate rule of law, and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space – literally and figuratively – for the key stakeholders at the strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long term stability...

[Rob Thornton]

I, and I’m sure others in the communities of practice and interest, greatly appreciate the thinking that COL Agoglia and Lt Col Scott put into this paper to help us better understand the environment and the problems we face in Afghanistan. Such efforts are paying off by informing the broader communities and establishing relevance to a contemporary, real world issue. They are both helping to shape our choices now, and inform us on important related issues as they apply to possible future strategic and institutional concerns.

One of the things that I think the paper does very well is establish the linkage between strategic and institutional guidance and values with the tactical actions on the ground. In reference to the institutions which generate capabilities to meet the requirements incurred by policy objective(s) and environmental conditions, cogent pieces such as this present uniformed and civilian leaders with the consequences of institutional rigidity and/or institutional lurches as they relate to strategic, operational, tactical and institutional risk both in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In reference to the generation of policy and strategy in a complex, interactive environment such as Afghanistan I thought the observation in the paper that:

“A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.”

reflects a much better understanding of a USG endstate that is feasible, and with the will of an Afghan government sustainable. This type of understanding results in what Secretary Gates recently qualified as a “Positive Outcome”, one that may be initially tolerable to the participants and stakeholders, and which can be built upon over time. This is not to say that this should be the outcome we expect at the conclusion of the campaign as we know it in Afghanistan, but that this is an objective that the USG should consider as a long term goal that will transcend our immediate involvement and ultimately be carried forward by US Country Teams yet to come (with continued Title 10 support.) It also qualifies the immediate role of all the USG and Multi-National partners of getting that objective to a point where it can transition to a point where it can be carried forward by different means.

The article further articulates that in order to increase effectiveness, and by extension I think long term efficiencies, and in order to decrease the risk to the over-arching policy objective to which means have been committed, our implementation efforts must be comprehensive and integrated. This generates a requirement for shared understanding of the environment that is reflected in the planning and execution of all our actions. This takes us back to the institutions which generate capabilities, the leaders who make policy and strategy, and the civil legislation which governs the creation, sustainment and increase/decrease of means.

The linkage is through and through, and we have to understand that what can happen on the ground is to a great degree made possible by how we understand those requirements at the tactical and operational levels, and respond to them from the NCR (meaning the USG writ large) with an eye toward communicating our efforts to the domestic and international audiences. Listening (not just hearing) and thinking about what COL Agoglia and Lt Col Scott are saying is paramount to being able to make good decisions. I would encourage all to take the time to read their article and to think about today – consider it a Veteran’s Day obligation.

Best Regards, Rob

[Schmedlap]

The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things.

I just read Bing West's article in the Nov/Dec 08 issue of The National Interest. One passage in particular really stuck out: "[W]e expect our military to destroy al-Qaeda by killing its members. The American military mission is not nation building. If poverty and poor government were the causes of insurgencies, most of the countries in the world would be at war. To prevent more recruits for the Islamic extremists, we'd like to have a tolerant democracy and a thriving economy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But if we make that a precondition for crushing al-Qaeda, we will be in Afghanistan for decades."

So, are we doing the right things? Reading that passage, my impression of West's suggestion is that we should worry less about whether Afghanistan has a functioning government. Just destroy the terrorist networks and be on our way. The lack of government in Afghanistan did not create al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was simply drawn to the lack of governance.

Should our mission be to stand up a democratic government in Afghanistan? Or should we be focused on purging Pakistan's tribal areas of Taliban? It seems that if we accomplish the latter, then the former will be of much less consequence and, if we choose to pursue it, could be achieved with far less American blood.

[jmm99]

article is here.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20122

[William F. Owen]

So, are we doing the right things? Reading that passage, my impression of West's suggestion is that we should worry less about whether Afghanistan has a functioning government. Just destroy the terrorist networks and be on our way. The lack of government in Afghanistan did not create al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was simply drawn to the lack of governance.
.

So the UGS policy is wrong, useless or never going to work? You may well be right. Your observation is annoyingly accurate and useful.

...but the requirement is still to make the stupid policy work.

The bit of COIN thinking that seems to be missing, is what activity US/NATO Forces security effort protecting and why? I've often asked this an no one (even an Afghan diplomat I met in London) seems to have a useful answer.

If military force cannot provide effective security - and thus break the will of the insurgent, what use is it?

[Rex Brynen]

. The lack of government in Afghanistan did not create al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was simply drawn to the lack of governance.

There was no lack of governance in Afghanistan when al-Qa'ida was at its zenith there—the Taliban was in control of most of the country, and exerting far more effective government control than anyone else had managed since 1992 (or earlier).

This isn't to say that ungoverned spaces aren't a problem (see Pakistan, FATA), only that the rise of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan doesn't quite fit that model.

[Entropy]

This is a very important paper and I second Rob's call for everyone to read it. The authors, in my view, understand many of Afghanistan's intricacies and peculiarities more than most. I also think Rob quoted the central thrust of the paper, which I'll quote as well for effect:

A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.

One striking aspect of this piece is that while it does focus on tactics, it implicitly points to another way at the policy/strategy level. And I think this may explain some of the dissonance I see in the piece. To give one example, the author's note:

This may prove problematic for coalition forces operating in the Pashtun heartlands, where the local populace naturally views foreigners with a degree of xenophobia that makes it more challenging to positively influence their perceptions. In this case, coalition forces need to encourage, persuade and teach ANA and ANP to operate in and amongst the people in order to generate a thorough understanding of the environment. To be effective, this will depend on robust information sharing procedures between coalition forces and the ANSF at the tactical level.

The problem here is that in many cases in Afghanistan, anyone outside the local area is considered a "foreigner" which would likely include any ANP or ANA. There still exists in many areas of Afghanistan little recognition of ANY authority outside what the authors call "informal" structures. It's one thing to get a group of locals to recognize one central authority over another - it's quite another thing to get them to recognize ANY central authority to begin with when they've never recognized any such authority. In some cases I think the coalition might have mistaken a desire for independence from any central authority as support to our opponents and created enemies unnecessarily.

This ties into another concern I have that the focus should be on protecting the population. While this is clearly needed in many areas, in others the people don't want protection, particularly from outsiders. Not coincidentally, many of these areas overlap with those with a xenophobic bent. So what should be done in those areas where the people do not want protection and simply want independence from all outside authority? I think the author's cogent advice and #1 consideration to intimately understand the local operating environment is apt, but once those conditions are understood the application of something other than "population-centric" COIN may be in order. I'm glad the authors focus on the very important consideration that the conflict in Afghanistan is diverse and that local environments differ significantly. I might suggest, therefore, that the solutions in those localities may be equally diverse and should not be limited to one set of COIN "best practices" or principles nor even COIN itself. For example, sometimes the best tactic may include doing nothing at all and at other times it may include conventional means. My point here is that Afghanistan is too diverse to place too many doctrinal limits on options at the local level.

And that ties into a final concern, based on this line (emphasis added):

The current operating environment in Afghanistan is extraordinarily complex, lethal and diverse; it is more than simply an insurgency.

It is much more than an insurgency. As the authors point out, the coalition is not very good at figuring out what actions are insurgency and which are something else (criminality, local disputes, etc.). Although probably beyond the scope of this paper, I think those areas of the conflict that lie outside of our notions of insurgency need close examination and study if we are to achieve any kind of desirable end state in Afghanistan. In some areas insurgency may not be the problem, so using COIN tactics to attempt to solve those problems could be counterproductive.

Despite these minor criticisms, this is a very important piece of work that should be required reading for anyone with interest in, or deploying to, Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

Well, along with Wilf...

I'm not at all sure the article adds much to the discussion of the problem. I see the same thing lacking in it I do in most discussions of Afghanistan -- what is the goal, the desired end result? Seems to me that lacking a stated goal and more importantly one that is realistically achievable, it is rather difficult to prescribe cures.

Schmedlap quoted Bing West "...To prevent more recruits for the Islamic extremists, we'd like to have a tolerant democracy and a thriving economy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But if we make that a precondition for crushing al-Qaeda, we will be in Afghanistan for decades." I believe that is quite accurate -- and I'm not sure I see a desire on the part of any other nation (other than perhaps Pakistan, mayhap Russia and India to an extent) to stay in Afghanistan for that extended period.

Wilf's question

"The bit of COIN thinking that seems to be missing, is what activity US/NATO Forces security effort protecting and why? I've often asked this an no one (even an Afghan diplomat I met in London) seems to have a useful answer."

is pertinent and valid -- I also have seen no answer to that question.

Rex Brynen made the comment that:

There was no lack of governance in Afghanistan when al-Qa'ida was at its zenith there—the Taliban was in control of most of the country, and exerting far more effective government control than anyone else had managed since 1992 (or earlier).

That's not totally correct -- there were significant exceptions to the rule of the Talib from Ismail Khan to Massood; several areas whre their footprint was quite light -- but it's close enough to actuality to qualify and is a very pertinent comment. It raises the specter that a 'western' approach to governance there may be a lot of wishful thinking.

Entropy adds as always some sensible commentary and very importantly points out:

I might suggest, therefore, that the solutions in those localities may be equally diverse and should not be limited to one set of COIN "best practices" or principles nor even COIN itself. For example, sometimes the best tactic may include doing nothing at all and at other times it may include conventional means. My point here is that Afghanistan is too diverse to place too many doctrinal limits on options at the local level. (emphasis added / kw)

I'd simply add that Afghanistan is too diverse also to accept the probable desired end state the western nations involved would most like to see and that some realistic expectations and goals would seem to be a priority requirement...