JFQ - Point - Counterpoint - SWJ Early Exclusive

[SWJED]

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has been closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile and our guest commentators here on Small Wars Journal. For SWJ newcomers or the uninitiated - this debate has centered on the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats.

Colonel Gurney has kindly – and we greatly appreciate this – granted SWJ permission to post a Nagl-Gentile “point-counterpoint” that will appear in the December issue of JFQ.

Without further ado here it is:

POINT: Let’s Win the Wars We’re In by John Nagl

A stunning if predictable development in the military community over the past 2 years has been the backlash against the promulgation of counterinsurgency learning in the midst of the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare. These changes are hard-won: they have been achieved only after years of wartime trials and tribulations that have cost the United States dearly in money, materiel, and the lives of its courageous Service-members.

Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.” He is not alone in his views. Three brigade commanders in the Iraq War wrote a white paper warning about the degradation of seldom used field artillery, declaring that the Army is “mortgaging [its] ability to fight the next war” by neglecting the requirements for combined arms operations. The Army Secretary, Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff, General George Casey, both assert that the Army is “out of balance” in part because of “a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities.” Prominent civilian thinkers in the academic community have presented similar arguments. With such dire warnings, one might forget that there’s a war on right now...

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

COUNTERPOINT: Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars by Gian Gentile

The U.S. Army officer corps has not seriously debated the content of the many doctrinal field manuals (FM) published over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–0, Operations, and FM 3–07, Stability Operations and Support Operations). Though these manuals have been successfully pushed through the bureaucratic lines of the Army’s senior leadership, few other officers raised questions about the wisdom of employing American military power to build nations where none exist or where an American military presence is not wanted. Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a process that proposes its use as an instrument of nationbuilding in the most unstable parts of the world. Nationbuilding, rather than fighting, has become the core function of the U.S. Army.

The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous - with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The implication of this doctrine is that the Army should be transformed into a light infantry-based constabulary force designed to police the world’s endless numbers of unstable areas. The concept rests on the assumption that the much- touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over...

Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA, is Director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy.

[Bill Moore]

I have a lot of respect for both these officers, at least their well thought out positions; however, I have yet to have seen an intelligent response to COL Gentile's challenge:

The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The concept rests on the assumption that the much touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over.

I share COL Gentile's concern that we are re-designing our Army to engage in endless irregular conflicts around the globe to accomplish what exactly? We have very few cases where our nation building efforts have been successful (unless it was after the conflict like Germany and Japan), I can't recall any where we successfully built a nation while fighting. I think much of the doctrine is based on loosely supported assumptions, rather than historical precedent. That doesn't mean it's incorrect, but it should at least prompt a caution light before we drive through this intersection. The so called new doctrine should support policy and its subsequent strategy to achieve that policy, and it should take into consideration that policy and strategy are shaped by our political culture and the international opinion. Going where we're not wanted to engage in a protracted, ambiguous and continuous conflict generally not well tolerated by our citizens. It can be terribly expensive on many levels (financially, politically, and a major drain on the military). The strategy can be right in a miltary sense, but if it isn't politically supportable, then it isn't feasible. In my opinion at least part of the debate should discuss the costs versus the "potential" gains? We should be able to clearly state why it is in our national interest to get engaged in these conflicts and to transform the Army to fight them (and assume the risk regarding our ability to fight other types of wars).

Irregular warfare has always been the most common form of warfare, what is may be new is our desire to intervene in it. It is almost like a desire to solve world hunger. A very noble pursuit, but is it realistic? If we have a choice, and the part of the question is "if", do we want get involved in these conflicts? If we do, what can the military realistically accomplish? These questions still haven't been answered. I have seen a lot of discussion on the way it should work, the whole of government, etc., but very little discussion on the limits of reality.

I disagree with COL Gentile's comment below:

The concept rests on the assumption that the much touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over.

GEN Petraeus's strategy did work, and it was the appropriate response to the problem at hand; however, the military can only succeed at providing a degree of security, which can present a window of opportunity to achieve some degree of political success, which in turn will allow us to remove the security blanket without the situation falling apart. If Iraq fails it won't be due to GEN Petraeus's strategy, without his strategy it would have failed already. This does get back to his original argument though, do we want to get involved in protracted and ambiguous conflicts? If there isn't a clear, achievable political objective in sight, then why try to build a nation?

I'm sitting on the fence on this debate, I see the merit of both arguments and think there must be an acceptable balance. I also think it would be foolish to assume that the OIF's and Afghanistan's are going to be the new norm. If they are, then maybe we're learning the wrong lessons from these conflicts.

[Ron Humphrey]

The one primary lesson everyone military or not hopefully gets is that no matter what kind of war we're in, We Dont want to have to do it and should spend a large amount of intellectual effort in how to keep from having to.

In regards to the concerns that both Nagl and Gentile express it really seems to be an exercise in futility to argue the value's of one form of warfare over the other if for no other reason than the discussions always end up with comparison's between pieces like cost, resources, personnel, etc. Not that these aren't valid but rather that they perhaps tend to detract from the larger discussion that Bill addressed above.

Should or shouldn't we, and why, and what requires that we do or don't go to war. How should we percieve what happens elsewhere in regards to our Nat Sec in both human and fiscal terms. That particular discussion would seem to be more likely to result in a common and at least more acceptable WOG approach to future military use.

I wholeheartedly agree with the statement that the "SURGE" was carried out in what was probably as good a way possible and for all intensive purposes did serve to bring forth the opportunity for Iraqi's to get it right. As to what right will look like for them and whether or not we(WESTERNERS) percieve it as such is as yet to be seen. I do think though that when the Govt of Iraq really starts acting in what it sees as its countries best interests, there will be a plethura of those throughout the international community who feel the need to complain, point fingures, say "I told you so" etc, and it should be no surprise that many enemies will use this in order to put forth their own agendas.

As to the specific statement by Col Gentile:

The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The concept rests on the assumption that the much touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over.

Yes it would seem to be common sense that if you learn to cook rather than joust than you may end up being a great chef for your new masters after the heavy attack. I'm not sure though that I have really heard from many of those who have been over there that they don't know how nor that they don't want to kick some &^%. There are frustrations with differing missions and this does need to be addressed but in training not strategy. If you limit your planning to only those areas with which you are comfortable than of course when the enemy decides to play to the areas where you are uncomfortable things will probably not be pretty.

Long and Short-

Do we need to get back to the basics in training some of the more heavy fighting skillsets, sure. Not sure that I've seen anyone disagree with that.

Should we focus on COIN soley of course not, and I know I've not seen anyone expect that

Do we choose not to work dilligently at being the best we can at COIN,NB, etc simply because we fear that it will end up being a self-fulfilling prophecy.
No , we do however figure out how to do both HIC and LIC be good as possible at both and work hard as hell to avoid either.

IT's not a competition between the two whether we like it or not it requires both, and in the end we only get so much say on which or when it happens.

The Enemy has a vote too

[120mm]

I see the merits in both arguments. COIN is here to stay, and it will do the Army no good whatsoever to ignore its existence yet again. However, the purely kinetic fight is the best use of the military. DoD needs to get out of the business of being our primary instrument of foreign affairs.

What we need is to amp up and rebuild (build?) our non-military elements of national power, and if it becomes necessary to intervene globally, to do so using those elements first, and reserving the military for the actual and appropriate violence as an end to policy and to bail our butts out when we inevitably screw up.

[Entropy]

Like 120mm, I see merits in both arguments, though I tend to be more of a "Gentilist" than a "Naglite."

One thing I don't often see discussed is the question of scale. While I agree to a certain extent with the Nagl view that a lot of future conflict is likely to be irregular, where I differ is in terms of scale - how much manpower and resources such conflicts are likely to take. In my particular crystal ball, I see our interventions, nation-building efforts and stability operations as more limited affairs once our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down. My judgment on the mood of the American people indicates to me they are not likely to send us to any more Iraq's or Afghanistans anytime soon. Still, predicting the nature, scope and opponent(s) in future conflicts is usually a humbling enterprise, so that's why I personally support a full-spectrum force as a hedge against uncertainty. In this regard, though, I personally think Nagl swings the pendulum too far from a balanced force in favor of an irregular capability.

[Cavguy]

I share COL Gentile's concern that we are re-designing our Army to engage in endless irregular conflicts around the globe .

I am curious to this assertion. At the institutional (not operational) level, what whave we redesigned for IW? What permanant changes have we made?

I am hard pressed to find anything that isn't related to every BCT being committed to Iraq or A-Stan.

That has been my issue. Yes, the OPERATIONAL force has gone 100% COIN/IW, because EVERY BCT we have is needed in Iraq or Afghanistan. The INSTITUTION has not significantly changed.

Last week here at CAC there was a conference regarding how future maneuver rotations at the CTC's would be executed. Hardly a re-design of the army for IW.

Niel

[Ken White]

As I understand it:

One side says "We will will be involved in FID and COIN and must be prepared at the same time to have some major war capabiility."

Other side says "We must be prepared for major wars but do need some FID and COIN capability."

I think that is broadly correct. Thus, it seems to me they effectively cancel each other out and both are in agreement that the United States does need full combat spectrum capability.

Is that about right?

Then I agree. So why argue? Let's just point that way and move out.

Huh? Oh, the SYSTEM has not made up its mind. I see, So this argument is an attempt to influence the senior leadership to go with one priority or the other, perhaps. Makes sense. Sort of...

I see one problem. The senior leadership of Armed Forces are unlikely to be on the cutting edge of anything. That is not a slam as it appears, it is a simple statement of fact; the system will not allow people to do that ordinarily. Perhaps it shouldn't be that way but it is. Further, that system defaults to warfighting -- and that includes both ends of the spectrum as we have recently been reminded -- so seems to me that both sides will get their wish and we will have some semblance of balance between the poles. That ought to be okay.

It seems to me that the new crowd coming in will have some say and effect and that Congress will have significant impact through their power of purse and that both those two batches of folks would be more likely to listen to a unified voice rather than two opposing camps. But maybe not...

On balance, I'm in agreement with Cav Guy and 120mm and Ron and Bill --and I strongly suspect, the vast majority of serving people. I think that that comes close to being one a them consensual things. er, consensus...

[SWJED]

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right
So What Do We Do Now?
by Robert Haddick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Small Wars Journal readers are no doubt familiar with the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile about the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats. (See Shawn Brimley’s excellent summary of the argument for a refresher.)

I have concluded that both men are right; their arguments are not mutually exclusive. But if both men are right, how should the U.S. organize, train, and employ its ground forces?

The purpose of this paper is to explain how to succeed against irregular adversaries, while restoring a more credible deterrence against conventional high-intensity threats.

Main Points

1. The Long War, characterized by persistent tribal and ethnic conflicts, is a reality. Some of these conflicts will threaten U.S. interests. John Nagl is correct when he argues that the U.S. needs military forces that are specially adapted for success in persistent irregular warfare.

2. But Gian Gentile is also right – the U.S. has an interest in maintaining its military resource commitment low and its strategic flexibility high. The U.S. should not drain away its limited endurance, prestige, and resources on open-ended medium-intensity engagements in the Islamic world or anywhere else.

3. The answer is to create Nagl’s Combat Advisor Corps and use it to for Phase 0 and 1 operations – prevention, shaping, and deterrence. The more attention the U.S. gives to Phase 0-1 operations, the fewer Phase 2-4 operations America’s general purpose forces will have to fight.

4. Making a greater commitment to Phase 0-1 operations will allow the U.S. to seize the initiative in the irregular warfare domain, control US operational tempo, and regulate U.S. military resource usage.

5. Advisor Corps Phase 0-1 operations are an economy-of-force mission. When successful, they will allow the rest of the U.S. military, including the large majority of U.S. ground combat power, to prepare for major combat contingencies, thus enhancing strategic deterrence.

6. A professional and well-trained Advisor Corps will also have the mission of establishing relationships with sub-national ethnic and tribal groupings. These relationships will provide U.S. decision-makers with greater flexibility when dealing with future irregular conflicts...

[Ken White]

Mr. Haddick says:

"I have concluded that both men are right; their arguments are not mutually exclusive..."

and I totally agree with that portion of his conclusion. He further says:

But if both men are right, how should the U.S. organize, train, and employ its ground forces?"

I strongly disagree with his answer to that, specifically:

"The answer is to create Nagl’s Combat Advisor Corps and use it to for Phase 0 and 1 operations – prevention, shaping, and deterrence. The more attention the U.S. gives to Phase 0-1 operations, the fewer Phase 2-4 operations America’s general purpose forces will have to fight."

I disagree on practical grounds -- the Army and Marines flat cannot afford it, Dollar wise or personnel spaces wise and, as I've pointed out before, John Nagl's Advisor Corps may take four Brigades worth of people -- but the grade and specialty structure will be totally unlike a Brigade and it will take six Brigades worth of people to feed that four...

I also disagree on strategic grounds. Why does everyone assume we must be involved in FID and / or COIN. I do not question that we may be and should be prepared to do so but I strongly disagree that we should seek that mission -- and I assure you based on 45 years of doing and 15 more watching this stuff if you create an Advisor Corps it will get used.

My point is that there are better ways to handle many situations than to go barging in to 'fix' it -- our track record at that is not stellar and mayhap we should just stop digging and pursue alternative strategies.

I disagree on Operational grounds; commitment to another nation for FID or a COIN effort effectively constitute the operational level of war -- thus by default, DoD will take over the effort and we'll get to again do something that neither out national psyche nor our form and model of government is prepared to sustain.

I disagree on tactical grounds. I have been a unit adviser, in peace and in war. I have served with many others doing that job. My observation is that the ability to truly influence the HN forces is limited at best; thus we are confronted with taking a lot of experienced and presumed competent combat power and putting it in positions of marginal effectiveness. That is not to say that Adviser will not be needed in the future -- if we're smart, they will not be but we aren't always smart so they may well be needed. We certainly should be prepared for it. The effort can be ad hoc and work adequately well; the Mission does not require exemplary performance so to waste effort preparing many people for it in best practice terms seems questionable at best.

Mr. Haddick further says, in his Conclusion:

"John Nagl’s description of a chaotic world rife with irregular wars is accurate. He is correct that the U.S. needs to develop a new tool, an Advisor Corps, to operate successfully in this world.

It may be accurate, it may not. Regardless, there is no reason to assume the US HAS to go into the FID mode in large scale.

But Gian Gentile is also correct when he warns against squandering U.S. prestige and military resources on numerous open-ended, medium-intensity conflicts. He is also correct when he warns against reshaping most of America’s ground forces into solely irregular warfighters at the sacrifice of conventional high-intensity capabilities. Although seemingly a remote probability, an American defeat in a future high-stakes, high-intensity conflict could be a crushing blow to America’s prestige, strategic position, and economy.

I agree -- and a 'crushing blow' ferociously outweighs 'numerous open-ended, medium-intensity conflicts.'

America’s potential adversaries have been watching and calculating. Will one of these adversaries conclude, correctly or incorrectly, that the U.S. has run down its options to respond to either irregular or conventional contingencies?

We have not even explored the possibility of other ways of responding to such provocations.

We received over 50 probes from the ME from 1979 until 2001. That's 22 years under five administrations from both parties and who knows how many batches of senior leaders, in uniform and not at DoD and ALL the services that never even gave it a thought. Our reaction to the Iranian Hostage debacle showed a pressing need for several things; we instituted a small portion and promptly forgot about the rest. We need to asssess what we are doing and, far more importantly, what we can and should do.

Forming an Advisor Corps will assure that we do not make such an assessment, will detract from combat capability, will adversely affect the personnel structure and will effectively insure that we do in fact get involved in:

"...Phase 0-1 missions will accelerate the buildup of friendly indigenous military capacities. The Advisor Corps will also establish relationships with mutually beneficial allies.

in other words, it will insure that we do get involved in what was initially said that we should avoid:

...The U.S. should not drain away its limited endurance, prestige, and resources on open-ended medium-intensity engagements in the Islamic world or anywhere else.

[Bill Moore]

Ken wrote,

My point is that there are better ways to handle many situations than to go barging in to 'fix' it -- our track record at that is not stellar and mayhap we should just stop digging and pursue alternative strategies.

I disagree on Operational grounds; commitment to another nation for FID or a COIN effort effectively constitute the operational level of war -- thus by default, DoD will take over the effort and we'll get to again do something that neither out national psyche nor our form and model of government is prepared to sustain.

My observation is that the ability to truly influence the HN forces is limited at best; thus we are confronted with taking a lot of experienced and presumed competent combat power and putting it in positions of marginal effectiveness.

While open to persuasion, I tend to agree with Ken's position. I think we're grossly over reacting to the situation in Iraq, which is a situation of our own making due to poor planning and faulty assumptions. That sure as heck doesn't mean it is the future of warfare, unless we're incapable of learning.

The fix in this case isn't more combat advisors, but an appropriate strategy. I can think of very few situations where U.S. advisors were decisive (nor should they be), and the most effective U.S. advisors in true COIN scenarios (not armed nation building like we're doing Iraq and Afghanistan) have normally been very, very few in number (Lansdale in the Philippines, a hand full of advisors in Greece, etc.). A Bde size element of advisors implies we're looking at doing more than advising, it almost appears that we'll be doing the job for them. (O.K. homeboys you stand down now and we'll assume all responsibility because we're the experts, just do what I say).

Not only is that dangerously arrogant, the general trend is the more folks you put on the ground the harder it is to extract yourself from the problem because those you're advising are now dependent upon you. At that point you extended your role past that of an advisor.

As Bob's World implied in the discussion titled "how to win", if the Host Nation government cannot win over their own population, then there is very little chance that they'll win the conflict with or without our help. Sending a few advisors to attempt to help the host nation gives us the option to withdraw honorably if that government is not willing to do what is necessary to defeat the threat and mobilize its populace to its side. That isn't an American loss, it was lost because the host nation wouldn't step up to the plate and do the right things. At that point, depending on our national interests we either take over the fight (not sure we ever won one doing this) or we quietly leave and cut our losses. We didn't win them all during the Cold War, but we still won the Cold War.

Ken makes a good point about the limits of our national pscyhe and the inability to endure in a conflict for extended periods of time due to our political system and processes. We don't have to like it, we just need to recognize that is part of our reality and ensure we address it in our decision making process. We can commit money and a handful of advisors for a long, long time, because it isn't very sexy and while it may be transparent, it is below the interest level of the media. News about Paris Hilton is more important than our operations in the Trans Sahel, and in many ways that is a good thing.

Furthermore, if we're honest with ourselves we'll admit that Ken is absolutely right. Most advisors don't have limited impact on the behavior of those they're advising, because it is difficult to overcome their cultural norms and their ingrained decision making processes (and their filters on how they perceive the problem). We still have influence, but let's not overstate the situation.

I would propose considering revisiting our past (with some modifications) to address the challenges we face today. Some considerations:

- Get Special Forces back in the advisory role. For tactial level training and advisory support to host nation security forces, there is no better force. They already exist, they're already trained, and they have the command structure to support these operations on the cheap (relatively speaking). Is there really a requirement for conventional forces to create a Bde's worth of advisors, which equates to robbing the Army of a Bde's worth of experienced NCOs and Officers, which will have long term second order effects on the overall force?

- Conventional Forces will still have to provide numerous specialists and experienced combat arms leaders. We don't need an unit of advisors to support this, rather we need a mechanism to prepare the many good NCOs and Officers we have in the conventional ranks for this duty. They already know their job, and they know how to train, they just need to learn the many nuances of training foreigners and combat advising. Not that many years ago the Institute of Military Assistance (IMA) at Ft Bragg filled this role. Individuals should be carefully screened, then adequately prepared (at the new IMA), and sent upon their way (and once deployed they should have a reach back system to allow them to tap into a wide range of experts and mentors to help them surmount any obstacels they run into).

- For larger scale missions like Afghanistan, the same courses of action as above would exist, but obviously the problem is beyond the scale of our current structure. It is also beyond the scale of Bde's worth of advisors. However, many of the problems we face today are the result of poor training and inadequate eduation in the full spectrum of war. As my previous commander was fond of saying, winning the force on force fight only gets you to the 50 yard line, you still have to win the phase IV and V fight to get a touchdown, so as Ken stated both Nagel and Gentile are right (what are we debating?). A somewhat simple fix is to extend our professional development process and ensure the study of COIN and stability operations is mandatory in all officer and NCO professional develop courses. We need an Army that knows how to run touchdowns, not just get the ball to the 50 yard line.

It can be argued that many units didn't have a clue in 2002-2004 on how to conduct COIN and stability operations, thus many of the problems we're facing today are not due to a lack of advisors, but rather a lack of understanding on where we were going and how to get there. If leaders understand COIN and Stability Operations from the Platoon level up, then it is unlikely we'll allow ourselves to let the situation deteriorate to the point we did in Afghanistan and Iraq.

- Don't forget contract trainers and advisors (MPRI did amazing work throughout Africa and the Balkans during the 1990s), partner nations and the UN. I know we're using all these in the current fight, but think about the capacity needed post Iraq. Again due we need a Bde of advisors?

I'm not proposing anything new, just suggesting that we collectively take a deep breath before we decide to form a Bde's worth of advisors. Is there really a need for it?

Shame on us for dropping COIN training from our schools to begin with, and I for one applaud the efforts of the Army and Marines to update the old doctrine and get into our education system. That in itself will go a long, long way to helping us deal with the future.

[Bob's World]

Perhaps a larger issue than that of if the active force is designed to conduct IW activities vs MTO activities, is how we aportion those respective capabilities between the active and the reserve force. The truth of what we should do here causes claxons to sound in the halls of the Pentagon, as the Army and Air staffs scramble to defend their Cold War positions.

Prior to the Cold War, America had always been a nation that believed in a small standing military to handle the misc. peacetime tasks; to man small outposts at home and abroad, to write doctrine, to form a nucleous of a mobilized warfighting force, and to keep the lights on at the Academy. The Soviet threat in Europe forced us to abandon that model, as there would be no time to mobilize our traditional warfighting force of Citizen Soldiers to counter that threat. OK, we all know this, but we also all grew up in the current model of a large, standing military that sees itself as the nations primary warfighting force. Hell, the Air Force NEVER existed in the previous model at all.

I would argue that it is time to go back to the future. The real debate should not be if we train, organize and equip to deal with IW or MTO, it should be what portion of our warfighting capability do we shift back into the reserve component, and how do we train, organize and equip the active component to deal with IW (ie, the new, enduring messy peace of this post-Cold War world).

This means that the bulk of the latest warfighting kit needs to go to the RC (Deliver those F-22s to the Air Guard, please), and that when the Army sits down to design what active duty Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will look like, they do so knowing that their primary purpose is to conduct IW. Likewise, when they design RC BCTs they need to do so with the recognition that their primary purpose is to mobilize for MTO, not to use as supplements to ease peacetime enagement OPTEMPO.

There are more and more senior voices coming on line to take the position that we are not at war, that the environment we are facing is not irregular; that in fact we are simply dealing with the new, and enduring "normal," i.e., Peace.

This is not unlike the era following the American Civil War. The nation was comfortably at peace, while the drastically reduced military was running reconstruction in the South, securing nation-building activities in the West, while also waging COIN (taking over and running the Indian reservation system) and CT (capture/Kill operations against those bands that refused to adapt to the white, American system of governance being mandated to them).

We will destroy the RC if we continue to use them as a primary part of the peacetime engagement rotation; and we will not be able to meet our peacetime engagement requirements effectively if we do not force the Services to conform to meet that mission.

So, for my 2 cents, let us refocus the debate. Clearly the military must be able to wage both IW and MTO. The real emotional issue is what portion of that goes back into the RC, and what goes into the AC. The friction is that the AC will want to remain the warfighter, and that is just not their primary job any more (and once again).

[Entropy]

Excellent comments, Ken and Bill.

[slapout9]

The fix in this case isn't more combat advisors, but an appropriate strategy. I can think of very few situations where U.S. advisors were decisive (nor should they be), and the most effective U.S. advisors in true COIN scenarios (not armed nation building like we're doing Iraq and Afghanistan) have normally been very, very few in number (Lansdale in the Philippines, a hand full of advisors in Greece, etc.). I would propose considering revisiting our past (with some modifications) to address the challenges we face today. Some considerations:

- Get Special Forces back in the advisory role. For tactial level training and advisory support to host nation security forces, there is no better force. They already exist, they're already trained, and they have the command structure to support these operations on the cheap (relatively speaking). Is there really a requirement for conventional forces to create a Bde's worth of advisors, which equates to robbing the Army of a Bde's worth of experienced NCOs and Officers, which will have long term second order effects on the overall force?

Key points in the above quote. This was an issue brought up at Colonel Warden"s SMART Wars workshop I went to last year.

[Ken White]

A few follow-ons. Bill said:

"the most effective U.S. advisors in true COIN scenarios (not armed nation building like we're doing Iraq and Afghanistan) have normally been very, very few in number (Lansdale in the Philippines, a hand full of advisors in Greece, etc.)."

"Most advisors don't have limited impact on the behavior of those they're advising, because it is difficult to overcome their cultural norms and their ingrained decision making processes (and their filters on how they perceive the problem). We still have influence, but let's not overstate the situation."

Both true.

One problem I've noted in the Advising business is the impact of our tour system on the Advisees. Guys in the advice business who rotate out after seven months or a year -- or even two -- are not going to be nearly as effective as those who stay longer. The American approach to things and life is quite different than is that of most nations; we're short term operators...

Bob's World said:

"The real debate should not be if we train, organize and equip to deal with IW or MTO, it should be what portion of our warfighting capability do we shift back into the reserve component, and how do we train, organize and equip the active component to deal with IW (ie, the new, enduring messy peace of this post-Cold War world)."

I strongly disagree. He has a point and we need to do what he suggests but the REAL debate is over how, not where, to prepare for the future. For example, he says

"...when the Army sits down to design what active duty Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will look like, they do so knowing that their primary purpose is to conduct IW."

Who says? WHY should their primary purpose be to conduct IW -- what if they gave an IW and no one came? What if they gave a surprise MCO and no one was ready...

The Armed Forces of the US must be prepared for the total spectrum of warfare. I have said on this board several times that the bulk of the Heavy Divisions / Brigades should be in the RC (mostly but not all ARNG) and that the RC should be larger than the AC; the USAR needs to have some combat units and several other things. So Bob and I are in agreement partly. I strongly disagree with him that the AC converts to an IW force.

We need to be total spectrum, that includes the AC and the RC but the AC alone must be able to deploy to any theater reasonably rapidly and conduct the type of operations required. No one can predict with any degree of certainty what that requirement will be.

"Probably" isn't good enough.The US Armed forces from 1975 until 2003 effectively thought they probably would not do IW. How did that work out?

Probably isn't nearly good enough...

"So, for my 2 cents, let us refocus the debate. Clearly the military must be able to wage both IW and MTO..."

Agree.

"...The real emotional issue is what portion of that goes back into the RC, and what goes into the AC."

It is or will be emotional and that needs to occur -- but the REAL issue is how to recruit, equip and train the total force for full spectrum combat.

"...The friction is that the AC will want to remain the warfighter, and that is just not their primary job any more (and once again)."

Wrong. "Back to the future" was a movie. Fiction. Illusion. Bad fiction at that...

You cannot write doctrine for warfighting and assist in training the RC for that mission unless you know how to fight a war. Warfighting is a cognitive and intuitive skill, it CANNOT be learned from a book or from most training activities; you have to actually do it...

[Bob's World]

Like I said, this is an emotional issue. It is a political issue too. Throw into the mix a economy that is in the tank. DoD will take budget cuts. With the auto industry on the ropes, Congress will be unlikely to want to cut spending for big ticket defense items. So with an overall smaller budget, but with next generation warfighting kit still coming on line, how do we find a balance that allows us to meet the mission before us as well as being able to fight and win our nation's wars?

The first war not fought with reservists and draftees was Desert Storm. Today's military laydown is the anomoly, not the norm. The BIG question that everyone is churning on is what the new norm needs to look like. I simply suggest that it probably looks a lot more like the pre-Cold War model than the current. During the last drawdown the AC tried to put all of the support into the RC and keep all of the warfighting in the AC. That plan was crushed by the political might of the National Guard, resulting in the Army Reserve becoming pure support and warfighting being split between the RA and the NG. It was a short-sighted plan, and we have been suffering the consequences of it throughout the high-optempo that began with the Bosnia campaign and has not let up.

Some sacred cows are going to get gored on all sides.

For what it is worth, my boss sees any IW capabilities as being [I]additive[I] to what we need for warfighting. To make things more complex, ask someone what he needs to buy to wage IW, and you get a shrug. It just does not drive big ticket industrial programs.

So, I stand on my original point: We must rebalance the mission and the capabilities between RC and AC, and the RC must be weighted toward warfighting and not required for every little deployment the AC does; while the AC must be weighted to contend with the day to day missions of a peacetime force (the new messy peace of today and the projected future), while sustaining the ability to repspond quickly and decisively to wage traditional combat as well.

Throughout GWOT the services called every item they wanted "GWOT" to get it funded; Today they are calling everything "IW" for the same purposes. They treat it like it was a big game and competition between the services to see who can get their pet rocks funded. This isn't a game, and it would be nice to see "self-less Services" who are a little more focused on the big picture. F-22's are no more IW then SSGNs were GWOT, yet both the Air Force and the Navy made those arguments with a straight face. This is the ugly underbelly of Defense.

[Ken White]

Is that I've seen it and heard it all before...

Like I said, this is an emotional issue. It is a political issue too. Throw into the mix a economy that is in the tank. DoD will take budget cuts. With the auto industry on the ropes, Congress will be unlikely to want to cut spending for big ticket defense items. So with an overall smaller budget, but with next generation warfighting kit still coming on line, how do we find a balance that allows us to meet the mission before us as well as being able to fight and win our nation's wars?

Nothing new in any of that; we've been there after every war, WW II, Korea, Viet Nam (DS/DS doesn't count; that wasn't a war, it was an FTX with live ammo)

...Today's military laydown is the anomoly, not the norm.

Nah.

...The BIG question that everyone is churning on is what the new norm needs to look like.

True but a tremendous amount of that is pure parochiality -- and your ugly underbelly coming into play.

I simply suggest that it probably looks a lot more like the pre-Cold War model than the current.

True with the caveat as modified by current conditions, domestically and internationally which are quite different from 1946.

During the last drawdown the AC tried to put all of the support into the RC and keep all of the warfighting in the AC. That plan was crushed by the political might of the National Guard, resulting in the Army Reserve becoming pure support and warfighting being split between the RA and the NG. It was a short-sighted plan, and we have been suffering the consequences of it throughout the high-optempo that began with the Bosnia campaign and has not let up.

If you mean the post Viet Nam drawdown and Abrams plan and a volunteer force, you're wrong; if you mean the Post DS/DS 'peace dividend' mini-drawdown initiated by Carl Vuono and Binny Peay, you're correct. That's from the same crowd that brought you the post-1975 "we do the nations big wars" stupidity. They were wrong.

BTW, having been peripherally involved in that as a DAC at the time, I think the 'political might' of that Guard is massive overstatement and obscurational. The thing that killed it was that it was dumb and the Army was arrogant and clumsy about it. It deserved it's death. the lesson in that for today is the Army needs to get its act together and be smart. In that vein respect to all the then mantra of all MCO,

Now is not the time to err in the other direction.

For what it is worth, my boss sees any IW capabilities as being [I]additive[I] to what we need for warfighting. To make things more complex, ask someone what he needs to buy to wage IW, and you get a shrug. It just does not drive big ticket industrial programs.

I think your Boss is correct and the question "What do you need to buy for IW?" is not a smart question at all -- because the answer is 'no hardware of note, simply better training,' which the Army can do without Congressional tinkering (well, sorta...). The downside is that training is expensive and it does not put jobs in multiple districts like the big ticket items do but that's not an insoluble problem. The Army can get pretty much what it wants and needs IF it gets its act together, speaks with one voice and gets realistic about its needs. FCS anyone? Lotta money there. ARH? Whoops...

So, I stand on my original point: We must rebalance the mission and the capabilities between RC and AC, and the RC must be weighted toward warfighting and not required for every little deployment the AC does...

I can agree with that.

...while the AC must be weighted to contend with the day to day missions of a peacetime force (the new messy peace of today and the projected future), while sustaining the ability to respond quickly and decisively to wage traditional combat as well.

That seems like an adjustment from your initial statement Regardless as you now State it, I can agree.

The AC must be a small well trained full spectrum force which can execute most probable missions world wide and requiring a large strategic reserve for a major war.

Throughout GWOT the services called every item they wanted "GWOT" to get it funded; Today they are calling everything "IW" for the same purposes.

Nothing new in that, in the 50s the catchword was "Nuclear." In the 60s it was "Counterinsurgency." in the 70s it was "MCO." Who was it that said there is nothing new under the sun?

They treat it like it was a big game and competition between the services to see who can get their pet rocks funded. This isn't a game, and it would be nice to see "self-less Services" who are a little more focused on the big picture. F-22's are no more IW then SSGNs were GWOT, yet both the Air Force and the Navy made those arguments with a straight face. This is the ugly underbelly of Defense.

Again, there's nothing new; revolt of the Admirals, uncertain trumpets and all that -- and it's not really all that ugly though it is not at all smart. It is however, reality.

I'd also posit that the F-22 and the SSGN are sensible and valuable acquisitions regardless of any posturing. I think you're criticizing a symptom and not the problem -- which is Congress...

Been watching it for 50 plus years; it's amazing that things work as well as they do. I put it down to good people, doing what they can to keep it together. Heck of a way to run a Country -- but it's better than any alternative I've seen.

[ipopescu]

Bill wrote:

I think we're grossly over reacting to the situation in Iraq, which is a situation of our own making due to poor planning and faulty assumptions. That sure as heck doesn't mean it is the future of warfare, unless we're incapable of learning.

The fix in this case isn't more combat advisors, but an appropriate strategy. I can think of very few situations where U.S. advisors were decisive (nor should they be), and the most effective U.S. advisors in true COIN scenarios (not armed nation building like we're doing Iraq and Afghanistan) [emph. added] have normally been very, very few in number (Lansdale in the Philippines, a hand full of advisors in Greece, etc.).

120mm wrote:

I see the merits in both arguments. COIN is here to stay, and it will do the Army no good whatsoever to ignore its existence yet again. However, the purely kinetic fight is the best use of the military. DoD needs to get out of the business of being our primary instrument of foreign affairs.

What we need is to amp up and rebuild (build?) our non-military elements of national power, and if it becomes necessary to intervene globally, to do so using those elements first, and reserving the military for the actual and appropriate violence as an end to policy and to bail our butts out when we inevitably screw up.

Ken wrote:

I also disagree on strategic grounds. Why does everyone assume we must be involved in FID and / or COIN. I do not question that we may be and should be prepared to do so but I strongly disagree that we should seek that mission -- and I assure you based on 45 years of doing and 15 more watching this stuff if you create an Advisor Corps it will get used.

My point is that there are better ways to handle many situations than to go barging in to 'fix' it -- our track record at that is not stellar and mayhap we should just stop digging and pursue alternative strategies.

I disagree on Operational grounds; commitment to another nation for FID or a COIN effort effectively constitute the operational level of war -- thus by default, DoD will take over the effort and we'll get to again do something that neither out national psyche nor our form and model of government is prepared to sustain.

This is a really brilliant thread. I doubt I can add much to the excellent conversation above, but there is one thing that I'd like to draw to your attention and see if it makes sense to you. My reading of this debate leads me to wonder whether the difference between the two sides really comes down to how they see the Long War playing out in the near to medium future.

If the Bush administration was right to argue that the main threats to US security will come from "failed" and "failing states", then I believe it makes sense to allocate risk accordingly and reduce investment in the procurement of advanced platforms to pay for increasing the number of troops. (I referred here particularly to the money issue as I believe that's the big issue where there WILL have to be tradeoffs; in areas like education and training, I agree with the others who argued for a flexible training program that would create a force more capable of operating across the full spectrum, and I don't believe there is as much a zero-sum game as in allocating fiscal resources). So, IF fixing (or at least improving, or preventing from collapse) weak states in important strategic places will become a common mission, then I think the military will continue to be assigned these tasks because no one else in the government has the resources to do it at least in the short-to-medium term.

I think most people on the other side of the debate doubt most of the assertions from the previous paragraph. Maybe, as Andy Bacevich wrote, they really disagree with the whole strategic framework in which the administration put the "war on terror", or maybe the just disagree with the realism of the proposed responses offered by the administration. However, I don't agree with his implication that this is really a strategy debate that ultimately belongs to the civilian leaders. If strategic planning is about matching means with ends, it follows that both civilian and military leaders ought to have input on both ends of planning. Hopefully the next administration will understand this better than the current one did during Rumsfeld.

I think it's hard to disagree that the US military needs to conduct Full Spectrum Operations. Having said that, it often seems to me that the "spectrum" of some people is way bigger than that of others. Bill makes an interesting distinction above between traditional COIN and "armed nation building". Their requirements may be an order of magnitude different, depending mainly I would imagine on the level of capacity if the local government. I'm also tempted to believe that the latter would describe more accurately what members of the administration think it may be needed in order to deny safe haven to al-Qaeda types in places like Afghanistan.

[Ken White]

...My reading of this debate leads me to wonder whether the difference between the two sides really comes down to how they see the Long War playing out in the near to medium future.

That's part of it, it is also internally a bit parochial -- what hardware items get priority; which Branches will grow or shrink; where does money get spent and so forth.

If the Bush administration was right to argue that the main threats to US security will come from "failed" and "failing states", then I believe it makes sense to allocate risk accordingly and reduce investment in the procurement of advanced platforms to pay for increasing the number of troops...

Not just the Bush Admin, a lot of folks make that argument, even people like T.P.M. Barnett who disagree with the Bush Admin on many things. My personal belief is that presumption is not proven and, more importantly even if true the question that must be asked is "Is there a a better way? No one wants to ask that -- or very few do - because it would obviate a lot of semi-sacred cows... Thus:

...So, IF fixing (or at least improving, or preventing from collapse) weak states in important strategic places will become a common mission, then I think the military will continue to be assigned these tasks because no one else in the government has the resources to do it at least in the short-to-medium term.

is a true statement BUT you wisely emphasized your IF. I suggest that 'if' should also apply to 'is it necessary' as well as to 'to send the armed forces.'

Maybe, as Andy Bacevich wrote, they really disagree with the whole strategic framework in which the administration put the "war on terror", or maybe the just disagree with the realism of the proposed responses offered by the administration.

I'm not a Bacevich fan and disagree with him about many things but he is correct to question the 'strategic framework.' I do also (although on practical and realistic and not ideological grounds ). What I said earlier and you copied bears repeating one more time: "" Why does everyone assume we must be involved in FID and / or COIN. I do not question that we may be and should be prepared to do so but I strongly disagree that we should seek that mission."" The problem as I see it is no one wants to look at alternatives because it's (a) different and we've never done that before; and (b)affects those Sacred Cows and their rice bowls.

However, I don't agree with his implication that this is really a strategy debate that ultimately belongs to the civilian leaders. If strategic planning is about matching means with ends, it follows that both civilian and military leaders ought to have input on both ends of planning. Hopefully the next administration will understand this better than the current one did during Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld was not the problem; well, not all of it anyway, nor even most of it. No Administration in my fairly long lifetime has truly consulted the military except for Reagan's -- and they only did that fairly well. However, you're correct, it has to be a mutual undertaking. Sometimes difficult when the civilian master thinks everyone with short hair is a dummy.

...I'm also tempted to believe that the latter would describe more accurately what members of the administration think it may be needed in order to deny safe haven to al-Qaeda types in places like Afghanistan.

Which Administration?

That's the problem; "...deny safe haven to al-Qaeda types in places like Afghanistan." That really sounds simple here and now, easy to say or write -- but doing that is impossible. Not difficult, impossible. The Dutch ruled what is now Indonesia for 300 years with the whip and the gun -- and they were surprised when they got tossed out. How long do you want to stay in Afghanistan? Think about it for a bit.

As I said, no Bacevich fan -- but we do need to strongly curb our arrogance. Or egos. Probably the latter. Thus my "which Administration."

We live in interesting times.

[max161]

This is in response to the OPED entry on the SWJ Blog:
"Nagl and Gentile are Both Right
So What Do We Do Now?"
by Robert Haddick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Thought I would drag this over to this thread for some more discussion:

Rob Thornton said on the SWJ Blog in response to the entry:

Quote: "You have to consider not only what it takes in term of time and effort to get them to that point, but the experience sets that got them there e.g. if you are going to advise on how to paint, you need to be a pretty good painter yourself. Getting those skills and keeping them current must be considered, or what you get is people who have very basic skills, learned to paint exclusively by watching someone else paint, or stayed a t a Holiday Inn Express."

This is exactly why we should not develop a separate, stand alone adviser corps. First, the combat skills that you need to be advising a friend, partner, or ally on will atrophy and while you might have a great cultural understanding you might not possess the tactical skills needed to be able to advise on. And this applies from the tactical to the so called "enterprise" or ministerial level advisers (those who are helping to establish the government institutions such as the ministry of defense, interior, etc).

Second, to be a credible adviser you must have the bona fides that establishes credibility with the "advisee". If you have no recent and relevant experience in combat units (or combat support or combat service support depending on the skill set required for the advisory mission) then you are at a disadvantage when dealing with counterparts because they want a "proven" adviser - an expert Soldier, Sailor, Airmen or Marine - vice an expert adviser.

With all due repsect to our great FAOs out there one of the drawbacks (to the Army program) is the single tracking of FAOs from Captain onward. While this is great for personnel management, career development, and education, the loss of "operational" FAOs (those who rotate between operational and FAO assignments) means we are going to have future attaches and security assistance officers who know the FAO and Security Assistance business inside and out (read foreign military sales, etc) but who have no real credibility with their military host nation partners because they have not been in an operational assignment (combat or not) since they were Captains. Our "adviser corps" will be the same way.

And of course I have yet to see any critical analysis of requirements for a 20,000 man "adviser corps" for requirements beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. Yes we have have to succeed in those countries (note I say succeed vice win - because we can only help the Iraqis and Afghans win - we cannot win ourselves). We will end up with 4 X BCTs of senior level personnel who are looking for work, whose promotions will be stagnated, and when the decision is finally made to disband the adviser corps" for lack or work, we will have a huge morale problem within our force.

The way expertise is gained for tactical to enterprise level advising is by being a member of units and organizations that actually execute the tasks and missions that an adviser will be advising and assisting on. If we put 20,000 personnel in a separate stand alone "adviser corps" we will have 20,000 personnel with no credibility with host nation forces and no relevant expertise to share with counterparts (but they will wear the coveted "advisor" tab!!!)

What we need to be able to do is properly task organize to meet mission requirements. We need to conduct the proper and thorough mission assessment (which includes most importantly the requirements of the host nation) and then apply the right force (or combination of forces to accomplish the mission) Unfortunately this means being able to find the right people with the right skill sets and that could mean talking people from exist modular organizations.

What should be considered when determining the force is the right combination of GPF and SOF. If we could break the rice bowls and understand what is required for the mission then we could properly task organize to accomplish the mission. We need a combination a great GPF and SOF and not one or the other. And as we look to the future I think we need to strongly consider that we will face the Hybrid Threats that Frank Hoffman has articulated so well. And to defend against those threats we will need a highly capable, agile and flexible combat force combined with the ability drawn from that force to advise and assist friends, partners, and allies against, subversion, terrorism, insurgency, lawlessness as well as external threats to a nation's sovereignty.
V/R
Dave

[Ken White]

Never object to a stealing or copying a good idea! This comment with minor grammatical corrections is also added here from a previous post on the Blog.

Dave is on target again. BZ.

The Advisor Corps is a very bad idea.

He mentioned one item that triggered several recollections:

...to be a credible adviser you must have the bona fides that establishes credibility with the "advisee". If you have no recent and relevant experience in combat units (or combat support or combat service support depending on the skill set required for the advisory mission) then you are at a disadvantage when dealing with counterparts because they want a "proven" adviser - an expert Soldier, Sailor, Airmen or Marine - vice an expert adviser.

I can recall numerous occasions while advising two separate and quite different host nations seeing their Officers seek the advice of those Advisers with recent experience regardless of rank while merely politely listening to those with cultural credibility and affinity, strong language skills and equal or greater rank and no recent combat, command or leadership experience. They very much preferred to socialize with the latter -- but they listened to the former...