How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?

[DGreen]

Well, the first thing is to not/not refer to it as a surge. The surge is now inextricably linked to a significant increase in security in Iraq that has subsequently been maintained by generally competent security services. So, when the surge in Afghanistan takes place and the troops eventually go home, you are preparing yourself for failure by establishing expectations that were never realistic to begin with because Afghan security forces are not ready to take up the mantle of security. Additionally, we have not eliminated the safe haven of Pakistan, the Afghan state is simply not up to the task, and the tribes are no where as well organized and competent as Iraq's tribes. We have to approach Afghanistan informed by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them, and be careful about using terms and concepts that worked in one theater and transplanting them in another.

[Entropy]

...but agree with all of his concerns. For me the first and principle problem came in the third paragraph:

The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.

They have wrongly defined the problem. Defining the problem this way DOES lead one to conclude that a "surge" is needed, but I find the problem as they've stated it completely wrong.

Later in that same paragraph:

Although the goal of executing a surge in Afghanistan would be similar in nature to that of Iraq, the challenges presented by a larger, rural-based population with unique tribal dynamics, a harsher geography, and an enemy operating from bases outside the country will require a different focus and force structure.

Count me skeptical that the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan will only change focus and force structure of a "surge" and not something more fundamental. Combined with the problem statement above, the authors are laying a sandy foundation for the rest of their arguments.

[Eden]

I wish I had answers. All I have is the three paradoxes of Afghanistan that bedeviled me as a planner and make achievement of an 'acceptable end-state' there, well...impossible?

Paradox #1. You can't eliminate the military threat posed by the insurgents without destroying their sanctuaries in Pakistan...but you can't destroy their sanctuaries in Pakistan without creating a much larger and more dangerous situation (now with nukes!). Effective action against the sanctuaries would turn Pakistan into...well, Afghanistan.

Paradox #2. The more you build effective governance, the more opposition you generate. The majority of local and regional power brokers in Afghanistan have little stake in a strong central government. Why is the north quieter than the south? Because the Germans, Italians, and Spanish are so ineffective at interfering with their various satrapies. Want to see an increase in violence around Herat? Send in some Marines.

Paradox #3. The more achievable your strategic end-state, the less likely NATO will support it. I predict that most of our allies will have abandoned the field by 2011 in the best case. Scaling back your goals will only accelerate the process -and adding more US troops will also accelerate NATO withdrawals, as anyone who has attended a force gen conference can attest.

[Entropy]

Great points Eden, especially #1 and #2

[Ken White]

What he said...

[Rank amateur]

Paradox #1. You can't eliminate the military threat posed by the insurgents without destroying their sanctuaries in Pakistan...but you can't destroy their sanctuaries in Pakistan without creating a much larger and more dangerous situation (now with nukes!). Effective action against the sanctuaries would turn Pakistan into...well, Afghanistan.

The solution is centuries old.

Paradox #2. The more you build effective governance, the more opposition you generate. The majority of local and regional power brokers in Afghanistan have little stake in a strong central government. Why is the north quieter than the south? Because the Germans, Italians, and Spanish are so ineffective at interfering with their various satrapies. Want to see an increase in violence around Herat? Send in some Marines.

Then don't build central government. Build/reinforce/co-opt/local governments/tribal leaders/warlords.

Paradox #3. The more achievable your strategic end-state, the less likely NATO will support it. I predict that most of our allies will have abandoned the field by 2011 in the best case. Scaling back your goals will only accelerate the process -and adding more US troops will also accelerate NATO withdrawals, as anyone who has attended a force gen conference can attest.

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

[Ken White]

The solution is centuries old.

Good plan! A wall that took 20 years and the lives of a couple of million to build can be replicated today in two years with less than a 1,000 dead -- but it'll cost about $75B -- who pays?

More importantly, who provides the troops to man your wall -- then tech or high tech; it'll still have to be watched or it'll get breached. Unless they use the Manchu solution and buy someone to open a gate or two...

Then don't build central government. Build/reinforce/co-opt/local governments/tribal leaders/warlords.

Good idea. Could you broach that at the next NATO Foreign Ministers Conference? See how it flies with them?

Better yet, try it with our moralistic new Congress and see how it flies...

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

Heh, yeah, messenger...

We'll see what happens when the message meets reality. You may nor have noticed but Europeans can be just as or more fickle than Americans. Eden said by 2011 -- it'll probably be us the Dutch, the Poles and the Romanians doing the fighting. France may stick but I wouldn't bet on it. The Canadians insist they're leaving then, the Brits are problematic at best. I suggest you not make heavy wagers on Europe following the messiah.

As for different, of course it's different. Europeans are different. So are Americans. Different from Europeans. Both are different compared to Afghans...

[Schmedlap]

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

We will believe that at our own peril. Support for Obama was the ultimate gesture of disapproval with President Bush. It was not an endorsement of anything that he will do in office. Once Obama gets sworn in, he will be - simply by virtue of being President of the US - at odds with all of those naive young unemployed college students who swooned at the rally in Germany. As for the leaders of Europe, their actions are generally more favorable to our interests than their rhetoric and than the blustering nonsense of their people.

[jmm99]

Since Astan is probably going to get much more attention, you might be interested in the Afghanistan News Service - Afghan news archives since January 1998 with more than 50,000 articles. Site is maintained by Fawad Ahmad Muslim, who worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from January 2002 to June of 2006 - recently opened his own IT company, the Jahaan Technology Corporation.

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...hive_2008.html

Ran into it when looking up background for "Defending Hamdan".

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Whether you want to build the Great Wall of Pashtunistan, or engage in PCE, TCE or a mix of both, it might help to consider the world as seen by the Pashtuns, without the artificial border. So, an overlay on the map in the article, which illustrates what Eden said.

[Uboat509]

The solution is centuries old.

]

Didn't work all that well then either.

Then don't build central government. Build/reinforce/co-opt/local governments/tribal leaders/warlords.

And create Somalia. No central government. Lots of warlords squabbling over control of resources. Complete lawlessness. Fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalists. AQ would love for the government of Afghanistan to fail.

Different messenger: different reaction from Europeans.

Lets see how long that honeymoon lasts.

SFC W

[jmm99]

Once "Pashtunistan" and "Baluchistan" are stripped away from Pakistan, the narrowness of Pakistan becomes apparent. So, it has been very logical for the Pakis to ally as much as possible with the Pashtuns. Another outstanding geographic feature is the nearness of Islamabad to the hot spots - sort of a forward command bunker.

Currently, the Paki focus is on military operations against its Pashtun allies - not in Pakistan's best interest from an historical standpoint.

Leaving aside Chinese and Russian interests in the region, the major player is India - which traditionally has allied with the Non-Pashtun Afghans. The animosity between India and Pakistan runs deep and has lasted throughout my lifetime.

The symbolic region where that animosity has been focused is Kashmir - which conveniently is located at the confluence of the Non-Pashtun Afghan, Pashtun, Pakistani and Indian areas. Since Kashmir is symbolic, its "solution" would require a real solution of the problems between Pakistan and India.

Based on the geography, our problem in Astan and "getting AQ" is a Pashtun problem, which will be only partially addressed by our efforts in Astan itself - no matter how well they are carried out. The largest part of "Pashtunistan" sits in Pakistan (as does the Taliban "government in exile" and AQ "HQs").

Since the present Afghan government (Karzai and some aside) is regarded as Non-Pashtun and an Indian ally, extension of its governance over Pashtun areas would be contrary to Pakistan's historical policies based on prevention of Indian influence in Astan. Which brings us back to the problems between India and Pakistan, symbolized by Kashmir.

[reed11b]

So perhaps we have a connection between the Pak and India conflict after all. Perhaps the best way to help Pakistan is to facilitate diplomacy between them and India? Wheres Bob's World? I would love to hear his thoughts on this one.
Reed

[datroy]

So, when the surge in Afghanistan takes place and the troops eventually go home, you are preparing yourself for failure by establishing expectations that were never realistic to begin with because Afghan security forces are not ready to take up the mantle of security.

Not advocating any position discussed here, but it's worth noting that the Iraqi security forces were not ready to take up the mantle of security in Iraq in late 2006 - something we should have recognized much sooner - which is why we changed strategies. Also, there's a big difference between getting the security forces to do the "clear" part vs. the "hold" part. The Iraqi security forces now seem to be able to to hold areas already cleared by the Americans, but are they at the point where they could take on the insurgency themselves if it were to begin anew? I'm not so sure.

And if Afghan security forces are not yet ready to take up the mantle of security in Afghanistan (an argument with which I agree), the idea going around (O'Hanlon in the WSJ earlier this week) to intensify building and training the Afghan army seems a recipe for disaster. You'd think we learned from almost four years that simply training indigenous forces may be an exit strategy, but if all you're interested in is getting out, then why bother even sticking around at all? There will be mass bloodshed either way, whether you go home right away or stay around a little while longer to train an Army in order to convince yourself that that is the answer. Either way, it may be an exit strategy, but its not a strategy for "winning" (however you define winning)