How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?

[SWJED]

Afghanistan: What Lessons to Apply from Iraq? - SWJ Blog

Last month the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) solicited feedback concerning a statement made by General David Petraeus (Commander, US Central Command) as quoted by the New York Times:

People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.

Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.

The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the CO - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

And in a note: the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"

[Ken White]

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy. (emphasis added / kw)

It is easily the most important point raised.

Afghanistan is too large geographically, too demographically large and diverse and the terrain is too inhospitable -- particularly on and near the critical border with Pakistan -- to achieve much using COIN strategy and current techniques unless well over 8 to 12 BCT, possibly more, are moved in-country and retained there for several years. That is obviously not possible.

We do not have the troop strength; most of NATO is neither inclined nor does it have many more troops available in any event and other nations have not shown much interest in providing personnel.

It is equally critical that everyone realize that Afghans are not Iraqis and there are significant cultural and behavioral differences so different techniques are necessary. I'm not at all sure that is fully realized...

Hopefully, someone is working on Plan B.

[Ken White]

and that no response to the COIN Center apparently addresses is the unity of command problem in Afghanistan. Tangle may be a better word...

How does Commander ISAF get a handle on NATO troops who engage; those who do not and the SOCOM assets in theater? How does he mitigate staff interference from CentCom?

Anyone have any ideas on how to crack those nuts?

[Entropy]

Anyone have any ideas on how to crack those nuts?

IMO those nuts are uncrackable.

[SWJED]

CAC CG Response to SWJ Blog Post “Afghanistan, What Lessons to Apply from Iraq” by Frontier 6

Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, Response to Small Wars Journal Blog Post, “Afghanistan, What Lessons to Apply from Iraq”

The discussion unfolding here and on the COIN Center’s blog is an important one, since the situation in Iraq continues to improve while in Afghanistan it deteriorates. As ideas of an Afghan “surge,” similar to the course of action adopted in Iraq, circulate among decision makers, the nuances of the Afghanistan situation remain particularly relevant. GEN Petraeus recently noted in a New York Times interview, “The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture.” In light of these remarks, what are the peculiarities and strategic nuances inherent in the Afghanistan situation?

The Army Field Manual, FM 3-07, “Stability Operations,” states, “Understanding is fundamental to planning. Without understanding, commanders cannot establish the situation’s context.” Adopting a “Comprehensive Approach” that includes understanding regional dynamics is central to crafting any kind of successful Afghan strategy. Pakistan, seeking strategic depth, has systematically sought influence within Afghanistan for decades. If the Kashmir conflict was resolved and tensions reduced between India and Pakistan, the latter would no longer need to pursue the strategic depth Afghanistan could provide. Reconciling regional conflicts should be a part of any Afghan strategy.

Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a strong central government. The kind of government NATO helps Afghanistan build is of paramount importance. Perhaps a federal system with much more power vested in regional and even local entities would allow tribal structures the autonomy they have historically enjoyed. As COL Roper noted, the bottom up method of building security was one of the keys to success in Iraq. That being said, building governmental capacity is also important. Afghanistan throughout its governing structures needs the kind of mentoring PRTs can provide. The Vietnam-era CORDS program is an example of the kind of interagency cooperation and unity of effort required to build governmental capacity down to sub-district levels.

GEN Petraeus has also noted that reconciliation must become a key line of effort. The Army’s new Stability Operations doctrine emphasizes the roles that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration play in security sector reform. Again, the diverse capabilities inherent in PRTs could assist training and reforming Afghan security forces, while legal assistance might strengthen the Afghan judiciary. Long term stability will emerge only when Afghan police forces protect Afghan citizens and enforce the rule of law through a functioning Afghan court system.

Finally, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure must remain a priority. More money is spent each month in Iraq than has been spent on Afghanistan infrastructure since 2001. The judicious use of CERP funds is a start. However, as some commentators noted in the COIN Center blog, training Afghanis in various trades is a necessary part of building Afghan capacity and enhancing employment opportunities. Human resource development is one of the main elements of capacity building, as emphasized in the Stability Operations doctrine.

Frontier 6 is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

[sapperfitz82]

IMO.

I remember our company being replaced by a battalion in 03, our battalion by a brigade in 06. Now we are saying if only we had divisions instead of brigades.

This doesn't seem to be a question of mass. It seems to be a broader problem, maybe one of direction.

Frontier 6 is exactly right to bring the larger, regional picture into this. It is also exactly why the DOS should probably have lead on these sort of endeavours. Another can of worms.

All the small solutions (ditching weight, dismounted patrols, longer presence, imbed with locals, focus on SWEAT-MS, and PRT) have been identified and in my experience we have been implementing them by half measure for a while.

Some of this is best viewed through the locals perspective. How long will it take a very backward and primitive people to accept these newer institutions? What benefit can we show a federal Repulic has for the traditional Afghani, what good is an appelate judicial system for one who sees no lack of justice in the Talibs administration? Remember there are still Indians on reservations in the US, they didn't all get on board given the chance.

There have been a great many comparisons to previous insurgencies, but I think the most apt and overlooked are the wars with the Plains Indians. For the most part, the more warlike tribes had to be defeated by force and they had to be starved onto a reservation to do that. There were many other methods tried, to include improving their quality of life, offering our instituions of health and justice, among others. These carrots largely failed without the judicious use of the stick.

One thing in to keep in mind about this is the Army end strength during this time, about 27,000. Given our vastly increased lethality, intelligence gathering abilities, and mobility as related to our enemy, and given the scale of the American West as compared to Afghanistan with that increase in commo and trans capability, when we start saying we need more troops in country now than we had in the Army then, my eyebrow goes up.

[Rex Brynen]

Afghanistan could see 30,000 new U.S. troops
JASON STRAZIUSO
The Associated Press

Globe and Mail
December 20, 2008 at 6:15 PM EST

KABUL — The Pentagon may double the number of American troops in Afghanistan by next summer to 60,000 – the largest estimate of potential reinforcements ever publicly suggested, the top U.S. military commander said Saturday.

Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said between 20,000 and 30,000 additional U.S. troops could be sent to Afghanistan to bolster the 31,000 already there.

[ODB]

20,000-30,000 more troops to do what? Unlike Iraq there are very few major population centers to secure. Now if you want to completely cordon the country go for it. Nothing in nothing out. We can't even make that happen here, so much for that COA.

A major problem we seem to have as of late is not using the right forces to do the right jobs. Unfortunately everyone wants to be everybody else, instead of looking at the capabilities units have and using them in ways that meet their capability. I am still having a very, very hard time swallowing the latest and greatest COIN manual. I'll leave that for another thread one day.

Can anyone tell me how an additional 20,000-30,000 troops would be utilized? Where are they going to come from since according to some we are bringing the troops home. Oh wait all we are doing is robbing Iraq to pay Afghanistan. How are we going to do this under NATO? Are we going to send them packing and take full control again? One only has to look at the effectiveness of NATO operations in country and there is no question as to why things have declined in my opinion. Additionally we all know what happens when you take your eye off the ball.

Finished typing this then came across this, I think it is spot on as to waht is happening politically within the services. This is the number one problem all over........stop playing politics and start playing soldier.

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/1...surge_122908w/

[jkm_101_fso]

Not sure this will be proper employment of ODAs...

A Surge Of Special Forces For Afghanistan

Defense officials say it will fill urgent gaps but Special Forces officers are skeptical.

By Gordon Lubold, Staff writer

Washington - The Pentagon is likely to send up to 20 Special Forces teams to Afghanistan this spring, part of a new long-term strategy to boost the Afghan security forces' ability to counter the insurgency there themselves.

The "surge" of elite Special Forces units would represent a multiyear effort aimed at strengthening the Afghan National Army and police units that the US sees as key to building up Afghanistan's security independence, say defense officials who asked to remain anonymous because the controversial decision has not yet been announced. The US already plans to send thousands of additional conventional forces to Afghanistan sometime next year. But it is hamstrung by limited availability since so many of those forces are still in Iraq.

The deployment of the Green Berets, the independent, multifaceted force skilled at training indigenous forces, could fill critical gaps in Afghanistan almost immediately, defense officials say.

There are currently about 31,000 US troops in Afghanistan. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this weekend on a trip to Afghanistan that as many as 30,000 additional American troops could be deployed there within the next year or so.

On Monday, the Pentagon formally announced that about 2,800 members of the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division will be sent to Afghanistan this spring as part of the conventional forces deployed there. Once he assumes office, Barack Obama is expected to receive recommendations about how fast a drawdown can occur in Iraq – and how many forces can be sent to Afghanistan.

The deployment of the additional Green Berets has not yet been approved, but a senior defense official indicated it was very likely and would be finalized next month.

The deployment would be relatively small, probably only a few hundred individuals at first. Ultimately, other special operations forces, such as marines from Special Operations Command, Air Force special operators, and Navy Seals could be deployed under the plan.

The initial deployment of the Green Berets would expand the size of the Special Forces contingent there by 30 or 40 percent, defense officials say, and represent a significant new commitment to developing and expanding Afghan security forces.

MUCH MORE HERE:

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1223/p01s01-usfp.html

[milnews.ca]

"NATO member countries apparently not toeing US line"
Voice of Jihad, via theunjustmedia.com, 17 Jan 09
Link to full statement

....The American announcement to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan is possibly a war gimmick because other NATO member countries have not pledged to send even ten soldiers to Afghanistan in 2009. To compensate for this failure and at the same time, play out the despondency attached with this obvious fiasco, the USA has launched propaganda of dispatching thousands of her troops to Afghanistan. The American claim to send thousands of her troops to Afghanistan is also doubtful from another perspective because American themselves are trying to devolve the responsibility of war on the shoulders of the Afghans and are resorting to the creation of tribal militias....

My favourite attempt at colloquial English in this one....

....The Empire of Obama will fall smithereens like other empires crumbled in Afghanistan....

[Ron Humphrey]

"NATO member countries apparently not toeing US line"
Voice of Jihad, via theunjustmedia.com, 17 Jan 09
Link to full statement (.pdf attached if link doesn't work, or if link is firewalled)



My favourite attempt at colloquial English in this one....

Of the term when their operations start getting blown to smithereens

[Surferbeetle]

From today's BBC, Russia offers Afghan defence help

Russia has said it is ready to help Afghanistan's defence sector by supplying equipment to the nation's armed forces.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Moscow was responding to a request from his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai.

A spokesman for the Afghan presidency said that despite the request, Afghanistan was committed to its ties to US and Nato-led forces.

Soviet forces fought a bitter war of occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Complaints

A statement from Mr Medvedev said Russia was "ready to provide broad assistance for an independent and democratic country that lives in a peaceful atmosphere with its neighbours".

He added: "Co-operation in the defence sector... will be effective for establishing peace in the region."

The Afghan presidency said Russia was also prepared to provide any other assistance that would help bring peace.

There have been complaints in Afghanistan that despite the huge Western presence its armed forces have not been properly equipped.

The US has pledged to send up to 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan in 2009, adding to the 32,000 troops already there.

[Bob's World]

to the extent that he can share them with us.

A few thoughts (mine) on Afghanistan and U.S. involvement there:

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

3. We helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban, but I don't recall the people of Afghanistan then signing on to help the US wage our war on terror. Somewhere we twisted "we are here to help you" into "we are here so you must help us." We need to back up 10 yards and reassess why we are there before we just plow ahead with executing the current mission harder and faster.

4. Finally, we can't "fix" Afghanistan. Particularly if our definition of fixed is that they look just like us. One, they don't want fixed. Two, its none of our business. As I have always said, insurgents and terrorists do not find sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, they find it within poorly governed populaces. Seems to me we are being damn hard on the populace of Afghanistan in the name of fixing the governance of Afghanistan. Sounds a lot like we might be creating the very sanctuary we are trying to eliminate simply because we have misidentified what makes up a sanctuary in the first place.

[Eden]

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

Excellent points which illustrate the fundamental paradoxes that will plague our efforts in Afghanistan until we 'change the game'. Our end-state right now is an effective central government. I think we are smart enough to have scaled back what we would accept as effective central governance - we're never going to turn this place into Switzerland - but the very concept of ECG places us at odds with a number of players in the region who would otherwise have little in common.

Neither the various insurgents nor the narcotic traffickers want ECG, for obvious reasons. There are also powerful regional figures - what the press normally refers to as 'warlords' - who have no desire for it either. And there are many local power groups to whom 'effective central governance' merely means more money picked from their pockets and less influence for them. Even some in the central government are happy for it to remain ineffectual, or at least unable to interfere with peculation, graft, and influence peddling.

Unfortunately, setting a lower goal for all the blood and treasure we're expending risks eroding political (and ultimately military) support. "Make Afghanisatn safe for warlords" is not likely to be much of a clarion call.

As for your comment on 'controlling the border', it is just another example of how applying standard COIN wisdom in Afghanistan can have as many negative as positive consequences. Not that I think we can do it, regardless of how many troops we ship over there - it would be like closing down the Appalachians from Harper's Ferry to Chatanooga, if the Appalachians were as tall and rugged as the Rockies. But even making the effort might be misguided, as you say, if it further exacerbates our problems with the Pashtun.

We have to rethink what we are doing. I will be very interested to see the results of the current CENTCOM review of our effort in Afghanistan. Anybody have any idea what it might contain?

[Ron Humphrey]

A few thoughts (mine) on Afghanistan and U.S. involvement there:

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

It does seem like everytime you turn around theres something or someone new in the mix. However not quite sure that it can be laid completely at the feet of IC. Although it might seem so unfortunately a lot of it seems to actually be coming out of the woodwork so to speak almost as if there were efforts to overwhelm the operational capacity of coalition forces.

Can't imagine why anyone would want to do that

That said IMHO the biiigger problem we do face is the seeming necessity to GIT er Dun now, today This not only placing more and more requirements on less and less forces but generally stunts their ability to step back long enough to see the forest for the trees. That means a lot of hip pocket solutions which although sometimes effective in the long run equate to more trouble.

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

Seems like yourself, Ken, and others have made it fairly clear from their experiences exactly how effectively any borders can or can't be controlled, so no arguments there. How then does one work out ways to restrict traffic of the "bad guys" while still facilitating commerce and social engagement among the populace. Perhaps the answer is that you don't really do either but rather find ways to recognize each and interact accordingly. Adding to that the fact that as oft as possible (less-is-more) can be much more comfortable for both the CI and the populace.

Are the rules really changing or has it just taken some of us a long time to realize that the rules we thought we knew weren't quite what we thought they were?

3. We helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban, but I don't recall the people of Afghanistan then signing on to help the US wage our war on terror. Somewhere we twisted "we are here to help you" into "we are here so you must help us." We need to back up 10 yards and reassess why we are there before we just plow ahead with executing the current mission harder and faster..

If we aren't saying (help us, help you) why exactly are we still there?

4. Finally, we can't "fix" Afghanistan. Particularly if our definition of fixed is that they look just like us. One, they don't want fixed. Two, its none of our business. As I have always said, insurgents and terrorists do not find sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, they find it within poorly governed populaces. Seems to me we are being damn hard on the populace of Afghanistan in the name of fixing the governance of Afghanistan. Sounds a lot like we might be creating the very sanctuary we are trying to eliminate simply because we have misidentified what makes up a sanctuary in the first place.

Agreed and would add FWIW Exactly what Poorly Governed looks like is not something that I've yet found an acceptable definition for in regards to Afghanistan with its particular dynamics.

Think of it this way- Can you define without a doubt what well governed will look like there yet if not than isolating and "fixing" whats wrong is still hiding out there in the ether somewhere.

[Fuchs]

I'd like to check something that maybe I don't understand:

The central state is weak, corrupt and without strong traditions in Afghanistan, but the regional/local institutions succeed at governing the country.
The COIN strategy will likely pay tribute to this in the future and aim to make local powers more effective, respected and resilient to Taliban (if they aren't Taliban or reliable Taliban allies themselves).

Some problems;

a)
Doesn't that exactly create a "failed state", something that we want to avoid?
b)
Aren't local powers historically dominoes in Afghanistan who change sides if the other team does some impressive power projection?
c)
Doesn't decentralized governance require a simple law code like Sharia that does not require a professional justice system?
d)
Doesn't decentralized power mean more drug production and more warlords in the future?
e)
On the other hand - why aren't we willing to stage a democratic coup and get rid of the central government and its discredited puppets for a 2nd attempt with the central approach?


Finally I'm interested in how the hell our stupid politicians had the idea to occupy the country with the most terrible occupation military history of mankind, but that's another issue.

[jmm99]

in hearing your answers and solutions to the questions and problems you cite.

Given Germany's experience with decentralized and centralized governance over the last 1000 years, a German perspective on these issues should be better informed than most.

Were all the big, medium and small "states" that made up Germany during the later HRE era all that bad ? Was what ensued from Westphalia all that good ?

[Fuchs]

The decentralized Germany had monarchy-like regimes, not comparable to what the Afghans have/could have on the local level afaik.
The greatest problems of the 18th century Germany were tariffs every few miles and an inability to resist foreign, unified powers (that's how France took some border regions in the 18th century. This is again not applicable to Afghanistan afaik. Afghanistan's problems with a decentralized governance would be a lack of modernization and infrastructure projects.


The only half-promising route (that I recognize) to a so-called "win" in Afghanistan may offer a formal victory for the history books, but would not lead to our war aims.

I would revisit our aims and attempt to set them shorter.

Let's recall our situation in 2000: We didn't care much about the Taliban. They blew up some statues, we regretted that, nothing else. We didn't care about what we're supposed to care about today; social life in Afghanistan.

The key problem with the Taliban is still that they didn't chase away AQ immediately - they didn't (afaik) because of Pashtun hospitality and because OBL claimed to be innocent of 9/11.
Both reasons don't apply any more (although intermarriage might be a new reason).
We could again approach the Taliban and simply offer to withdraw from Afghanistan if they get rid of AQ (forever).
Imagine a well-done diplomatic campaign around this - it might work. Win-win.
The nation-building aims were mostly discredited and are extremely difficult to accomplish imho.

The other problem is the internal pressure in Pakistan; it might help Pakistan in the short term if the Taliban focus on Afghanistan a bit more for some years - in a predictable continuation of the Afghan civil war (not so much against the government than against factions).


I'm no expert on Afghanistan, but I know that almost all wars in human history were quickly concluded once one side accepted its powers and its aims are no match.

Among the worst that could happen is that we fight till the end just "to win", forgetting our rationale and probably even achieving a "win" that hurts us more than a withdrawal and maybe wouldn't include our war aims anyway.

Consider also that our societies have a great need of internal reform; we have many really big problems (the current economic crisis is a smaller one) that deserve attention, effort and treasure - competing with warfare and the military in general.


Btw, I still don't know whether a) to e) were wrong perceptions or not.

[jmm99]

This seems the crux of the matter. What are Germany's war aims in Astan ?

In short, why are your troops there (obviously they were so ordered) as a matter of German national strategic policy ?

Our (US) war aims in Astan are not clear in my mind - and from reading other threads here, not so clear at DoD and the NSC.

My war aim in Astan is quite simplistic - kill UBL, Zawahiri and whatever AQ types get in the way. Yes, simply a matter of revenge (payback for 9/11) - a concept which most Pashtuns understand very well. I don't care how that is done - and probably it is best that I don't know the details.

I expect that the Obama national strategic policy for Astan will be far more complex. Then, we here will deal with and discuss the situation we have, not the situation we believe we might like to have.

[Fuchs]

This seems the crux of the matter. What are Germany's war aims in Astan ?

In short, why are your troops there (obviously they were so ordered) as a matter of German national strategic policy ?

If I only knew...

The official texts tell about the mission (basically to buy time for and to assist the government there), but don't explain why the heck it's in our interest.

The usual suspects are

- to carress inter-Atlantic bonds (NATO): initially relevant
- to gain/keep 'weight' in international politics
- to defend us at the Hindukusch (that's the part when politicians get laughed at)
- to keep up to the inappropriate article 5 NATO treaty thing (which is actually quite irrelevant in the context and non-binding)
- to do good to the Afghan people (that's the PR spin)

It seems to me as if AQ and Taliban are pretty unimportant for us. AQ is a topic for BND and police mostly.
Here's a feeling that the affair there should be sorted out somehow and that we (=our politicians) don't want to appear to be unreliable.

Most other distant military missions were rather designed to increase the foreign political weight, maybe up to a permanent UNSC seat (that was apparently given up some years ago).

A majority of the population is against the war, but we've got a chairman of the CDU (biggest party) who turned out to be a war hawk and they are in a federal-level coalition with the SPD, the party that launched the mission.
Both parties lose voters and the SPD even broke apart (the left wing left it) - both big parties don't really listen to the voters, that's what happens if you do so in a democracy.
The Left and the greens win many votes and oppose the war.
The liberals (F.D.P., real liberals - liberalism, you know) would neither stem for nor against it as long as the CDU invited them into a coalition as junior partner. The F.D.P. wins votes as well for unrelated reasons.

We basically don't really know why we're in that war (and officially its none for us anyway), we just happen to have a stupid constellation in politics and are somehow stuck in that war.


Here are of course many rather primitive-minded people who would agree to bomb and occupy pretty much any Muslim nation, but they're rare, just loud trolls on the internet.
Just in case you think that said people were the far right - wrong. Our far right (who change their parties faster than I keep up with that) is extremely confusing. They oppose Muslims in Germany, but ally with them in international matters - crazy people. Well, every nation seems to have 5% nuts - and we distribute them evenly to far left and far right where they neutralize each other.