John Robb's "The Switch"

[slapout9]

What's this love affair with the Italian Mob all about? Were you on their payroll when you were in Miami Vice?

I have no love affair with the Mob, Bill. No I wasn't on their payroll and didn't expect a comment like that from some one of your statue Bill. I don't call you crack smoking stupid because you want to legalize drugs do I?The points were in reference to the article YOU posted by John Robb about Market Oriented Guerrillas and to make some points about how there are such organizations but they are not true insurgencies, but they will use their tactics, but it is all about the money to them. Many of your later posts just support this in my opinion, look at points 1,2,3 to start. All The Way, Sir

[Entropy]

Entrophy, no one in their right mind would argue your points on Afghan's history. That isn't the issue, the issue is that our objective is to establish a viable Nation-State, and if it can't control the economy (at least more than it influences now), is our objective feasible?

I've argued elsewhere that our objective isn't feasible. I've suggested the best that might be achieved is a state like Pakistan which only has effective control over 1/3 of its supposedly sovereign territory with the remainder being run more like a colony than anything else. I also tend to think we should be trying to coopt the opium trade instead of trying to get rid of it - at least for the time being. There are more important things to accomplish than moralizing about opium, IMO. Opium production is a long-term problem that can't be solved until other things happen first.

I don't think state control of the economy is at all necessary. Just look at the early USA - the economy was almost completely controlled at the local level and the further in the boonies you got, the more local the control. For a largely agrarian country like Afghanistan with a diverse ethnic character, I don't think centralized control of the economy is either desirable or possible, particularly given the difficulties that already exist attempting to get some kind of centralized political control/authority.

And one can consider the opposite case. I've been reading a bit about the Baluchs recently. It turns out that pretty much all of the major economic activity that takes place in the Baluch areas of Pakistan are controlled by the central government (resource extraction, major construction projects, etc.). Even workers are imported. Not surprisingly, this activity benefits the punjab majority next door almost exclusively and provides very little to the Baluchs. Not a good situation and some believe another major Baluch insurrection is only a matter of time.

In this part of the world, too much state control is often a bad thing because the state is rarely fair. The state favors certain groups at the expense of others. The Baluchs are only one example. In the case of a strong Afghan central government I don't think the result would be much different.

Just my 2 cents.

[wm]

As Chairman Deng said regarding ideology: "It does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice."

It is also important to consider the pragmatic point about cat ownership that is left unsaid in this quotation from Mao. Some owners could care less about the cat's efficacy as a mouser. In some instances, the color of the cat is all that matters to its owner. To rephrase the Chairman, "It matters not whether a cat can catch mice, only whether it is calico."

A couple of points about this whole "raison d'etre" for rising against an installed government:
1. Governments’ primary focus ought to be to secure their people from invasion/assault by other people. In a world in which such invasions are much less likely, governments switch to other items of business (AKA ideologies) to justify their existence—such as establishing a more ”just” economic infrastructure.
(BTW, I suspect that the debate about what kind of force structure we need falls into this same category—Defense needs to justify a military organization whose primary mission has traditionally been to secure the country from invasion. The odd thing is that the only time the US was truly threatened by such an invasion, the Army was unable to prevent it—look up the Battle of Bladensburg.)
2. Things like the drug trade and prostitution could be legalized and taxed, but they would still lend themselves to an illicit underground operation—take a look at the smuggling of tobacco products from the South to the North to avoid high taxes. The numbers racket still flourishes even in states with lotteries too. Another "ideological" consideration here is the “moral” aspect that such a legalization would indicate—American society at least (and probably a host of other countries’) seems unable to tolerate government support for “immoral’ activity—sex and drugs being strong examples.

Regardless of how well governments do whatever it is they do, folks will not get all of their needs satisfied. So they will seek to satisfy those needs from non-licit sources. The move to "black" markets is motivated by many reasons--lower cost, less regulation, less social stigma, better customer service, to name a few. However, I submit black markets will alway exist.

In light of the above, establishing a valid government in Afghanistan is an inappropriate end state—particularly if that “valid” government is supposed to be one that “fixes” what are identified by we Westerners as the economic woes of the country. Even if some old "itches" are removed, new ones will arise that will require an underground/alter government (like the Mafia; the Taleban; the Crips; or Bingo, Beano, and the Dominican and Franciscan Orders) to scratch them.

[Ken White]

...So, while I would agree that our focus on ideology is currently terribly wrong; to suggest that it, and more aburdly politics (insurgency is politics) are no longer relevant offers nothing helpful to the debate.

It also seems to me we are starting to revisit our focus. One can only hope...

[Bob's World]

Galula's book (which is far and away the best breakdown of insurgency that I've read) looked at Mao's approach to insurgency and ideology. Mao changed ideology 4 times, continually keeping a finger on the pulse of the situation and the concerns of the populace and changing messages and themes accordingly. He understood that his goal was political, and that the ideology was just a tool to motivate the populace to aid in his political campaign. At the end of the day the Chinese populace never got what Mao promised, but Mao got the political change he sought.

Its easy to lose sight of the big picture when the peripheral issues can be so overwhelming, and when voices of motivated novices can be so loud. I find it is best to take the advice of Henry David Thoreau on this:
"There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root."

Ideology is a "branch", as is Bin Laden himself and any other key leader. The roots lie within the populace, and each populace is unique.

This is my soapbox, and I will stay on it until sounder logic can push me off.

[William F. Owen]

At the end of the day the Chinese populace never got what Mao promised, but Mao got the political change he sought.

Yep. Pure Clausewitz, and the same is true of organised crime. Criminals use violence to create political change - essentially one where they control the who they need to, to do what they want. Look at Pablo Escobar.

This is my soapbox, and I will stay on it until sounder logic can push me off.

I have one or two boxes myself. When sounder logic is apparent, the box crumbles. No one needs to push you off.

[slapout9]

Link to the Mafias 10 commandments.


http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...Godfather.html

[Bob's World]

I see a lot of talk about the growth of international crime networks, and how often there are connections between these profit motivated organizations and politically motivated organizations. These "strange bedfellows" type of arraingement make a lot of sense, but they don't in turn blend the purposes of the organizations. There is a significant community within the military that want to take the war to the criminal organizations because they can make such linkages to AQ or Hezbollah, etc. This is dangerous ground.

We must be careful to resist the urge to make easy conclusions and stay focused on what an organizations primary purpose for action is when determing how to best engage them. Otherwise we risk expanding the war to defeat AQ far beyond its actual parameters, and risk actually lending credence to Bin Laden's propaganda and dragging otherwise disenterested populaces into the fight that prior to our engagement were simply out to make a buck.

If I ran AQ, I would absolutely want to use existing drug networks to raise cash through the sale of Afghan opium, and more importantly to gain covert access to the U.S. Similarly, if I ran a Latin American drug cartel, I would want access to quality, inexpensive opium, and also to leverage source of personnel who are willing to assume tremendous personal risk in delivering my product to market. This does not in any way change or blend the original primary purpose for either organizaiton. They are just maximizing their common ground.

[slapout9]

If I ran AQ, I would absolutely want to use existing drug networks to raise cash through the sale of Afghan opium, and more importantly to gain covert access to the U.S. Similarly, if I ran a Latin American drug cartel, I would want access to quality, inexpensive opium, and also to leverage source of personnel who are willing to assume tremendous personal risk in delivering my product to market. This does not in any way change or blend the original primary purpose for either organizaiton. They are just maximizing their common ground.

Exactly!

[slapout9]

Link to Danger Room interview of John P. Sullivan of the L.A. Sheriff's Dept. A number of articles by John have been put up on the SWJ Blog spot. Very good article by John.

http://blog.wired.com/defense/

[MikeF]

Gentlemen,

Over the course of the last three weeks, my thesis research on Iraq has been distracted by a more pressing situation in Salinas, CA- the home of John Steinback. I believe that my observations are particularly relevant for this thread, and y'all may find the topic interesting and compelling for further discussion.

Salinas, along with many cities in Northern California (NorCal), are facing what they perceive to be as a gang problem. Levels of violence, drug use, and other criminal activity metrics have increased exponentially throughout the last decade. Some neighborhoods of Salinas are deemed no-go zones or ungovernable. Despite $5m invested by Congress to establish an anti-gang task force created to serve as "the local model for national level anti-gang task forces," Sen Boxer Press Comment progress is fleeting.

Local officials are exasperated. Local law enforcement is exhausted. In their own words, the situation is dire.

Just like in Iraq circa late 2006. The frightening realization is that I've walked this dog before. Even more frightening is that this problem is now in my own backyard, and we seem somewhat oblivious to it. It took us many years of fighting in Iraq to collectively realize that AQI was merely a symptom of a greater problem.

From my initial observations, I do not believe that Salinas has a gang problem-the gangs are merely symptoms of a larger problem that includes transnational terrorism, the drug trade, illegal immigration, prison reform, civil rights and equality, education, and poverty. As the world "flattens," Salinas is an example of the negative side effects of globalization.

Before I explain a portion of the greater problem that transcends the local government of Salinas and potentially leads further south to Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, I would like to introduce local recruitment tools and propaganda used throughout NorCal: Generation of United Nortenos. In this video, you'll notice that they've successfully recruited Elmo and Mickey Mouse to become gangstas. In other videos, the children recruited are reminicent of the children we captured in AQI training camps in Diyala Province.

Switching gears...

As noted in a previous post, Plan Colombia has effectively demobilized the AUC and marginalized the FARC. We have had tremendous success in lower levels of violence in the country (95% decrease in kidnappings, 50% decrease in homicides, 70% decrease in oil pipeline attacks, and 80% increase in trafficability along roads). Furthermore, the big media success was the hostage rescue.

However, the drug production and exports are still escalating- the primary focus of the original Plan Colombia is a failure. Additionally, the Colombia military continues to be plagued with an image problem through continued Alleged Human Rights Abuses. CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS

Throughout Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, etc...), outside of the regular issues of governance, the mayan population continues to remain disenfranchised, second-class citizenry.

In Mexico, we're seeing a significant rise in drug wars- the national police force is either penetrated, corrupted, or marginalized and the army is doing the fighting. As linked throughout this thread, the drug wars are threatening the stability of the government as the gangs are allegedly reinforced and trained by transnational islamic groups (AQ, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc..).

Back to Salinas...

Maybe none of this is related. Maybe Salinas just has a gang-problem.

Or maybe it is all inter-connected. I don't know. I'm just putting it out there for discussion. I read the original constitution (circa 1968) of the Norteno familia, one of the gangs in Salinas. What I read was 2/3s Che Guvera, 1/3 Chairman Mao sprinkled with some Ghandi.

The original organization was not a gang or shadow government. Originally, it was a community organization focused on the social, political, and economic progress of the perceived disenfranchised latino/hispanic community.

During the 1980's, ex-Vietnam vets joined the famila and militarized it using the hard fought lessons learned in their war.

I've adapted a Kilcullen quote on Afghanistan to summarize this thread...

Well, I doubt that an Anbar-style “awakening” is likely in Salinas. The enemy is very different from Al Qaeda in Iraq and, in any case, Salinas’ gangs have a very different makeup from Arab tribes. So even if an awakening happened it would likely play out differently from Iraq. Rather than talking about negotiations (which implies offering an undefeated gang a seat at the table, and is totally not in the cards)

I would prefer the term “community engagement.”

The local families, neighborhoods, and communities in some parts of Salinas have been alienated by poor governance and feel disenfranchised...This creates a vacuum, especially in terms of rule of law, dispute resolution, and mediation at the neighborhood level, that the gangs have filled. Rather than negotiate directly with the gangs, a program to reconcile with local communities who are tacitly supporting the gangs by default (because of lack of an alternative) would bear more fruit. The gang movement itself is disunited and fissured with mutual suspicion...

I'm interested in y'alls thoughts. While I'm stationed in NorCal, I think I'm gonna try to provide some help to the local officials.

v/r

mike

[Bill Moore]

I don't call you crack smoking stupid because you want to legalize drugs do I?

If I wasn't crack smoking stupid, I would probably assume you just did. Hey brother, I said legalize it, I didn't say I smoked it! I have a two beer limit and even that is on rare occassion.

YOU posted by John Robb about Market Oriented Guerrillas and to make some points about how there are such organizations but they are not true insurgencies, but they will use their tactics, but it is all about the money to them. Many of your later posts just support this in my opinion, look at points 1,2,3 to start.

Unfortunately this thread is becoming one of the more popular ones I created, unfortunate in that I have become the council's whopping boy, probably started by PCE himself Bob's World, which in fact is a 20th Century World that he knows well. I want to kick his ideological soapbox out from underneath him, and bring you back from the dark side airborne. I can't do it in one post, so I'll practice the subtle art of subversion. You know the subtle art of surreptitiously eroding people's beliefs systems and turning them against their governments (or other people or organizations). I'll give Bob credit, not only for his excellent article, but he indirectly addresses subversion when he speaks of ideology, but there are other ways to accomplish subversion than attempting to mobilize a population using a population using ideology. The true war being waged in the shadows is often the decisive war, not the maneuver war, so understanding subversive activities is critical to defeating the threat. If you take Bob's approach, you focus on the population and do what exactly? If their grievance is that the government can't protect them, then there are appropriate responses to that, responses we generally have failed to make (we've started trying in Iraq, but my experience was that the war in the shadows was still going on under our noses in many places, so the legal system was corrupted, business contracts were controlled by the insurgents, and politicians were coerced or bought). If the grievance is that the criminal economic system provides more than any legal economic system authorized, do you give in, or crush the criminals and the society dependent upon them? It is a much tougher problem set, and I'm not sure how the PCE approach plays out in this case. I'm sorry, but growing wheat isn't going to fetch as much money as poppy.

By the DoD definition of insurgency you're right, "most" criminal organizations are not insurgencies because they are not attempting to over throw the constituted government. Pardon my french, but the DoD defnition sucks. It only fits Bob's view of the world, but not the reality of today's world. Through subversion criminal organizations have taken control of areas (rarely the entire country), and they have in fact become the government in those areas. By the DoD definition it isn't an insurgency, but this isn't your grandfather's mafia either. Many of today's organized criminal groups present a serious challenge to many governments for control, and like insurgents they use a combination of armed conflict (thugs on steriods) and subversion. Intimitation of government officials, buying government officials, initimitating civilians, etc. are all forms of subversion, because they prove to those under this influence that the government doesn't have the power to protect them, or the money speaks louder than any State based ideology.

The argument that this is nothing new is weak and dismissive, much like the emerging threat of Islamic Extremists was largely dismissed in the 90s as nothing really new. You can look at it like a disease, such as drug resistant tuberculosis. Its been around a long time, and when we may attention to it and take the proper actions we control it. When we ignore it, it has a chance to morph into a tougher strain, which once again requires an urgent response to get it under control. The longer we wait, the more dangerous the problem becomes and harder it will be to get it back in the box.

This problem got much worse after the Cold War for a number of reasons well known to this council, and I would argue it got worse after 9/11 when we took our eye off the ball and shifted more focus to terrorism. The sky isn't falling, because the problem is still manageable if we act quickly, firmly and collectively with the international community.

[Bill Moore]

Some interesting links that further inform the discussion.

http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache...lnk&cd=4&gl=us

New Challenges and OldConcepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency, STEVEN METZ

Contemporary insurgencies are less like traditional war where the combatants seek strategic victory, they are more like a violent, fluid, and competitive market.

In contemporary complex conflicts, profitability often is literal rather than metaphorical. There is an extensive body of analytical literature that chronicles the evolution of violent movements such as insurgencies from “grievance” to “greed.”7 The idea is that political grievances may instigate an insurgency but, as a conflict progresses, economic motives may begin to play a greater role.

Conflict gives insurgents access to money and resources out of proportion to what they would have in peace time. As Paul Collier, one of the pioneers of this idea, explains: Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance. If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from the conflict and these groups, therefore, have some interest in initiating and sustaining it.

Internal wars “frequently involve the emergence of another alternative system of profit, power, and protection in which conflict serves thepolitical and economic interests of a variety of groups.”11 Hence the insurgents, criminals, militias, or even the regime have a greater interest in sustaining a controlled conflict than in attaining victory

much more in the article, and Dr. Metz carries a high degree of credibility unlike Robb.

http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0...lications.html

Wars in Sierra Leone and Somalia have been categorised as 'criminal insurgencies'. Similar to some South American wars, namely those in Colombia and Peru, the 'rebellions' had no clear political aims or known spokespersons with the goal of gaining political power. The 'strategy' of the insurgents was to spread terror amongst the population so denying the government the ability to govern. The rebel gangs were thus able to rule their own territories to their own physical and economic advantage, Unfortunately government forces have been known to act as atrociously as the rebels in their efforts to suppress the insurgents' lawlessness. (4) The resultant violence and human rights abuses have often received world-wide media coverage.

The majority of African wars, which are thus best described as unconventional, seem to have made insurgency or revolutionary war doctrine irrelevant, at least for the present. They can best be described as intra-state 'ethno-political' and/or criminal conflicts. Unfortunately they tend to be very prolonged and come to no definite resolutions.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14632

For-Profit Terrorism, Dr. Justine A. Rosenthal

For-profit terrorists are not pure ideologues (though some may remain more true to the cause than others), and they aren’t purely criminals—because they continue to use political rhetoric as a front for their illegal activities. For the most part, for-profit terrorists start out with some real (and sometimes valid) political motivations. But when they shift their priorities and become pure profit-seekers, they turn into this new breed of terrorist.

There are three main catalysts that transform terrorists’ motivations from the political to the financial: destruction of the leadership structure; political changes that debunk the ideological basis of the group; and opportunities for financial gain so great that they subsume ideological motives.

This post is much more serious, and I'll end by diatribe here by pointing out what I think are the limitations to Bob's Populace Centric Engagement (PCE) strategy. In some, if not many cases, if you give the populace what they want it will simply make the situation worse. This is true where criminal insurgencies have established a degree of popular controll, and it is true when the bulk of a target populace wants to pursue a hate agenda (Rwanda). That said I trust he didn't want us to swallow his concept hook, line and sinker, but to use it as applicable, and I think it is applicable in many cases, and I still applaud the article, but I also think there are situations where a PCE strategy could fall short, and for these situations we need to go back and reassess the strategy.

[Bill Moore]

After this post, I'll lay off for a few days.

I've argued elsewhere that our objective isn't feasible.

Please withdraw that statement, I never said that was "my" objective.

I don't think state control of the economy is at all necessary. Just look at the early USA - the economy was almost completely controlled at the local level and the further in the boonies you got, the more local the control.

Excellent point, and one I can't respond to intelligently without further study, but I believe early America (before Statehood) and shortly after independence was an immature and struggling nation. One could argue that we didn't truly become an effective nation until well after the Civil War in many respects, and as our country and economy matured, the need for a centralized economy largely controlled by government regulation became apparent.

At this point it turns into a philosophical debate, and I would be an unarmed opponent on this topic, but it begs the question what role should a nation serve in today's world? What roles should the nation be willing to give up? The answers may inform our policies, which in turn drive our strategies.

[slapout9]

I have been doing some research and there may be something to John Robb's post after all. The Orange County (Fl.) Sheriff's Department is talking about a new kind of gang. They are mixed in race and backround, the one thing that binds them togather is making money by crime any crime....drugs,theft,murder dosen't matter. More as I find out.

See this post on other thread on gangs or rather Hybrid Gangs.
http://www.nagia.org/Gang%20Articles/Hybrid%20Gangs.htm

[bourbon]

I have been doing some research and there may be something to John Robb's post after all. The Orange County (Fl.) Sheriff's Department is talking about a new kind of gang. They are mixed in race and backround, the one thing that binds them togather is making money by crime any crime....drugs,theft,murder dosen't matter. More as I find out.

Hey Slap, that meritocracy of crime part reminds of a quote I have saved from Charles Bowden's Down by the River: Drugs, Money, Murder, and Family (an excellent book, btw):

Juarez is one of the world centers of this vigorous business. It is a model of the New Economy, stateless, borderless, global. It rewards merit, ignores class origins, hires and fires at will. It despises regulations and ducks tariffs. It is color-blind and judges the work, not the skin color.

Two thirds of the streets in Juarez are unpaved.

Bowden, Charles
Down By The River

This process happened years ago in Mexico.

[Ski]

Bill

I think you've done yeoman's work here and I am left with many unanswered questions after reading John's article.

I think that we are seeing as much in the way of new elements of crime as we are in the changing of warfare. There is more than a single nexus between these two as well.

[slapout9]

Hey Slap, that meritocracy of crime part reminds of a quote I have saved from Charles Bowden's Down by the River: Drugs, Money, Murder, and Family (an excellent book, btw):


This process happened years ago in Mexico.

bourbon, I will have to get that book. In the mean time looks like they have a theme song....Drugs, War and Crime.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9JkEKmRN20

[slapout9]

I have been doing some research and there may be something to John Robb's post after all. The Orange County (Fl.) Sheriff's Department is talking about a new kind of gang. They are mixed in race and backround, the one thing that binds them togather is making money by crime any crime....drugs,theft,murder dosen't matter. More as I find out.

See this post on other thread on gangs or rather Hybrid Gangs.
http://www.nagia.org/Gang%20Articles/Hybrid%20Gangs.htm

Could not get the video I wanted so this will have to do. Orange County, Fl. Sheriff's department gang unit.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bOmZ3q7l4E4