I applaud your points as they are very relevant to discussions of deploying any forces--national, UN or multinational like the MKO, or contract--into zones of conflict.

The reality of UN PKOs often surprises those who have not been on the ground with them. LTG Dallaire's shock and dismay over the uneven quality of his troops--especially the Bangaldesh Battalion and regrettably the Belgian Paracommandos--speaks volumes. The Canadians are the instutional memory and highest practioners of UN peacekeeping. General Dallaire had trained Canadian troops for such missions but had never been a participant. His experience in Rwanda was to say the least less than positive.

My own experience in UNTSO as an observer was similar. Individual observers were quite good, regardless of nationality. But there were definable blocks of marginal quality observers. And much of that had to do with the benefits and pay offered by the observers' countries for such duty. Some like the Swedes and Austrians spent years in the mission area because they received substantial tax breaks and other benefits.

The Fijian battalion in UNAMIR was essentially a contract force; the country would raise an entirely new battalion and send it to Sinai as part of the MFO. Then it would stand down from the MFO and transfer to UNIFIL. After that tour, it returned home (at least on paper) and a new unit began standing up.

UNAMIR 2 in Rwanda was much the same. Some contingents like the Canadians were professional soldiers who came fully equipped. But the slowness in putting UNAMIR 2 on the ground because many countries offered troops expecting to get "free" equipment. Ironically, the best and most effective contingent on the ground was the Ethiopian Battalion; they were also the worst equipped contingent. That opinion is shared by the Force Commander LTG Tousignant, the SRSG Ambassador Khan, Ambassador Rawson, the RPA Commnader/Defense Minister/Vice President, and yours truly. The reason for the Ethiopians effectiveness was they were: non-French speaking Africans which made them acceptable to the RPA; they were former rebels themselves and that made the RPA respect them; and they would shoot when necessary and ask later which made the RPA love them. Their "garrison" skills when it came to neatness and field sanitation would and did make Western soldiers shudder. But they did control their area and they worked well with the RPA.

When it came to policing the camps in Zaire, no one would take that mission. I have mentioned in this discussion my suggestion to go contract--one that ultimately was taken. The UN looked at using UNAMIR 2 to do the job; that was still born. Another company run by Brits looked at it; I ran into their negotiator on a UN flight in Nov 94. I knew him from Zaire and considered him to be a friend. He had another Brit with him who had retired SAS stamped on his forehead. I told them both to make sure that their statement of work allowed them to shoot people. They grinned and said they had asked for an "aggressive ROE". They did not get the job; it went to an element of the Zairian Army that was tied to the Israeli contractor I brought out to Goma. It was a bandaid on a sucking chest wound at best but it was the best we could come up with at the time.

Finally in 1996 the US and the Brits looked seriously at the issue and began planning the MNF as a way of prying the refugees out of the Zairian camps. But Ambassador Gribbin's stance that the MNF had to be able to shoot was not taken to heart. Fortunately the RPA "solved the problem" by clearing the camps even as the MNF HQs began its initial operations.

Despite all that I have said above, I still believe in UN PKOs as the best solution for problems like Rwanda and the camps in Zaire. Using UN forces puts a UN stamp on the problem, something that is most useful. That is not to say that UN peacekeeping and indeed the UN in general needs a dramatic overhaul if not a complete rebuild. Maybe if PMCs are the coming thing, then peackeeping/peace enforcement would be a good fit. In some ways that is already happening; the Canadian flight detachment in UNAMIR 2 was a purely commercial contract. They had all flown in UNISOM before coming to Rwanda.

Enough said fer now,

Tom