Anything I said above or anywhere else is not targeted at the individual, ZDFG, when it comes to PMCs. My target is again the decision maker who makes a decision to:

A. Accept risk in manning and equipment

B. When that risk proves severe, fill it as a shortfall with contractors

C. AND DOES NOT BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE ORIGINAL NEED WITH LONG TERM SOLUTIONS

When that last block gets checked, it becomes a self-licking ice cream cone, one with potentially great effects elsewhere. For instance, your listing of qualifications highlights one clear effect: creating these type PMCs sucks talent out of the standing forces.

I am not unfamiliar with decisions like this: I am at least partially responsible for one of the strangest use of PMCs in recent history: that of the UNHCR hiring a PMC drawn from the armed forces of a host nation to protect NGOs from genocidal maniacs on the territory of the host nation.

Why am I responsible? Because I thought of it and set events in motion.

Was it a short term fix? Yeah, as in placing a bandaid on a sucking chest wound.

Did it address --or allow someone else to address--the origin of the problem when it went from "short term" to "long-term"? Yes and No.

Yes in that it kept a lid on open violence against NGOs and that was my intent.

No in that neither the UN nor the key international players in the crisis were willing to take effective action until it was too late.

The result: the Rwandan Civil War morphed iinto what has been called the "African World War" and killed at more than 3 million people in the process (not counting those slaughtered in the genocide).

Best

Tom