starting with:

from JFT
Do we really trust judges to decide facts like who is supporting whom?
Assuming this is a rhetorical question, please tell us who should be deciding this case, or for that matter, the "War Crimes" cases. We're open to any concrete proposals. In fact, you can provide us with a new Article III for the Constitution, spelling out who should decide matters of law and fact.

And with

Part of the problem - sorry about this JMM - is that lawyers actually write legislation.
Again, tell us who should draft laws. I personally have no vested interest in having lawyers draft laws. In fact, I expect lawyers would be better off financially if all laws were drafted by non-lawyers. At least that has been my experience with wills, trusts, deeds and contracts drafted by non-lawyers - yum, yum $ $.

and with

Thus it makes darn little difference what Sen. Sessions intended; it is only important what the legislation actually says.
OK, the first rule of legislative construction is to apply the plain meaning of the text. But, what if the text is ambiguous ? So, a secondary rule is to look to the legislative history. Also true that rule can be abused since it can lead to "judicial legislation" (J. Scalia has pointed that out in several cases; but he is also one to pound legislative history when it supports his result).

The alternative is to apply a strict and absolute plain meaning test - if there is not a plain meaning, the statute is void for vagueness. Perhaps, that is the rule we should adopt and rigidly adhere to - it would get rid of a hell of a lot of laws. So, please provide us with a draft of your constitutional amendment to do just that.

and with

One question that I have - goes back to Polar Bear's point - is why we couldn't simply try these guys for the violation of the Law of Land Warfare.
Tell us which law of land warfare you are proposing. There are a hell of a lot of laws governing land warfare. Which one would you use to prosecute this particular case. Saying we should use the "Law of Land Warfare", or should or should not use the "Rule of Law", may mean something to you - but those terms mean nothing to me, except as generalities.

and with

Moreover, American legal tradition does not require a statute law to prosecute - violations under the common law can also be prosecuted, at least within recorded American history.
Not in Federal courts since the War of 1812. I'd have no real problem with the common law as the basis for criminal prosecutions - as propounded in Bill Crosskey's 2 vol. set Politics and the Constitution (1953), which I pull from the shelves to read for pure enjoyment - good stuff, available here.

When the first two volumes of William Crosskey's monumental study of the Constitution appeared in 1953, Arthur M. Schlesinger called it "perhaps the most fertile commentary on that document since The Federalist papers." It was highly controversial as well. The work was a comprehensive reassessment of the meaning of the Constitution, based on examination of eighteenth-century usages of key political and legal concepts and terms. Crosskey's basic thesis was that the Founding Fathers truly intended a government with plenary, nationwide powers, and not, as in the received views, a limited federalism. ...
Please note: if you want to go to a complete and pure common law system, I'd not object. But, common law is explicitly and wholly "judicial legislation" - and, if we cannot "trust judges to decide facts", do you really want that common law system ?

All of your points are good ones for discussion in the context of this case. However, he who pleads against a position has the obligation, if anything is to be learned, to also plead the specifics of the alternative position.