Matters Blackwater (Merged thread)

[Tom Odom]

Bill and all,

The issue of using mercs is one of those that depends on the where and the why. My own experience in dealing with this issue came about in researching the 1964 Congo Hostage Crisis. Leavenworth Paper #14 resulted. Many have read Mike Hoare's Congo Mercenary and it was nomninally the basis for the film, The Wild Geese. Both are works of fiction; the film is more honest about its romanticizing than Hoare. The mercenary operations in the Congo were multi-level:

The Ground Force: the real organizer of the ground op was Colonel Vandewalle who had been the last head of security in the Belgian Congo before independence. He was Belgium's man in organizing the Katangan Secession under Mosie Tshombe with a variety of mercenaries including Hoare and Roger Trinquier. When Tshombe came back in the 1964 crisis so did Vandewalle and he ultimately lead the mercenary column into Stanleyville from the south to link up with the Belgian Paracommandos.

The Air Force: the CIA and the USAF set up a Congolese Air America using T-6s, T-28s, and A26s (AKA B-26s) and Bay of Pigs Cuban pilots to fly close air support.

The Covert Force: there was also a merc/black element attached to Vandewalle's column to extract key personnel from Stanleyville.

All of this worked and then it did not. The Stanleyville and Paulis ops did save a large number of hostages. But more hostages were killed elsewhere in the next year. The mercenaries ended up revolting against the new Mobutu government and fought their way out via Bukavu.

In 1994 I raised the idea of contractors to secure the refugee camps in eastern Zaire, given the large number of ex-Rwandan army and militia members active in those camps. I suggested the Israeli-Zairian security company SOZAIS and even had the retired Isaraeli colonel who ran the company come out to Goma to do a site survey. SOZAIS used active soldiers from the DSP (the Mobutu regime guaranteors trained by Israel) to provide contract security to businesses and indiividuals. Ultimately a form of what I proposed did take place when the UNHCR hired a force of nearly 1000 DSP soldiers with "advisors" to help improve security in the camps. This helped the international workers but did nothing about the larger security issues in those camps; the ultimate fall out was the 1996 clearing of the camps and the 1997 and 1998 invasions of Zaire with a current death total in excess of 3 million.

Perhaps a merc force could have sopped the geoncide if someone had had the will to deply such a force. But I would say that the world did have a force capable of doing just that (UNAMIR) on the ground with a Commander willing to do it and nothing was done. I doubt seriously that the RPA (the rebels) would have accepted a merc force on their turf because they were already dealing with the French intervention and French assistance to the former government. Later when the RPA did move on the camps in 1996 using client militias, the former government and the militias had hired Serbian mercenaries to help train and lead their forces. They fared poorly against the RPA; I suspect any merc force interjected into this cauldron in 1994 would have shared a similar fate.

the closest thing to standing merc force in the world is the Foreign Legion. It allows France to do things that the French public and the regular military would not accept. Sometimes that is good as in the case in Kolwezi in 1978. Sometimes it is not: French activities in supporting and training genociidal killers in Rwanda are well documented. The 1st REPs rebellion in Algeria was another case where the use of forces loyal only to themselves caused France great problems.

And we have used mercs from time to time as an extension or lead for our own policy. The Flying Tigers in China were true mercenaries, drawing bounties for each Japanese plane shot down. That is not to take away from the valor or reputation of the AVG; Read Pappy Boyington's book for a warts and all view of the AVG.

My take on mercs is always measured against our national interests. If it is sufficiently in our interests to get involved militarily, then it should be sufficienty important to use our established forces.

best
Tom

[Jones_RE]

Mercenaries can provide several things to their employers:

1) Expertise. Mercenary soldiers may be better trained or more experienced than national forces. This probabably doesn't obtain in the US (with some possible exceptions).

2) Deniability. Mercenary soldiers may be hired in order to conduct military activities that the national forces do not wish to be held accountable for. This doesn't help the United States in our current conflicts - international media is more than capable of pinning a "contractor's" actions on the United States government. It's questionable whether mercenaries provide even a shred of deniabililty in the modern, information rich environment.

3) Expendability. National forces may be sensitive to their own casualties, but not to those of the mercenaries. The United States might make effective use of this trait, but for the fact that most of our private military companies are staffed by Americans. It was the gruesome murder several Blackwater employees that initiated the First Battle for Fallujah, for example.

4) Numbers. National forces may simply lack sufficient bodies to accomplish a mission and mercenary units can fill out the roster effectively. This is why the US employers PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan - there is an extreme demand for infantry who can conduct security operations of many different sorts. This demand is so high that jobs that would ordinarily go to riflemen or MPs are outsourced at six figure salaries.

I'm afraid that as long as there is a shortage of effective foot soldiers, and mercenary units are available (both financially, legally and politically) then the US military will make use of their services.

A "healthier" use of mercenary formations would be places in South Korea, where forces are unlikely to see ground combat. Similarly, using contract soldiers to accomplish various non combat tasks, such as security and maintenance duties at US bases, might free up individual soldiers who could be re trained as infantry.

[Tom Odom]

Mercenaries can provide several things to their employers:

1) Expertise. Mercenary soldiers may be better trained or more experienced than national forces. This probabably doesn't obtain in the US (with some possible exceptions).

2) Deniability. Mercenary soldiers may be hired in order to conduct military activities that the national forces do not wish to be held accountable for. This doesn't help the United States in our current conflicts - international media is more than capable of pinning a "contractor's" actions on the United States government. It's questionable whether mercenaries provide even a shred of deniabililty in the modern, information rich environment.

3) Expendability. National forces may be sensitive to their own casualties, but not to those of the mercenaries. The United States might make effective use of this trait, but for the fact that most of our private military companies are staffed by Americans. It was the gruesome murder several Blackwater employees that initiated the First Battle for Fallujah, for example.

4) Numbers. National forces may simply lack sufficient bodies to accomplish a mission and mercenary units can fill out the roster effectively. This is why the US employers PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan - there is an extreme demand for infantry who can conduct security operations of many different sorts. This demand is so high that jobs that would ordinarily go to riflemen or MPs are outsourced at six figure salaries.

I'm afraid that as long as there is a shortage of effective foot soldiers, and mercenary units are available (both financially, legally and politically) then the US military will make use of their services.

A "healthier" use of mercenary formations would be places in South Korea, where forces are unlikely to see ground combat. Similarly, using contract soldiers to accomplish various non combat tasks, such as security and maintenance duties at US bases, might free up individual soldiers who could be re trained as infantry.

All "good" business arguments. And many of which work counter to training, fielding, and maintaining a national military force that reflects the national society.

Tom

[Jones_RE]

I wholeheartedly agree. Note that mercenary strengths are only useful in the face of national weakness. A well trained, politically supported, and sufficiently large national force does not require mercenary help. Sufficient use of mercenaries, however, would naturally tempt policymakers to believe that there is no need to correct deficiencies in their force structures. Our current reliance on private military companies stems directly from a failure to pay attention to intangible factors in the national defense: soldier pay, recruiting and information operations as well as errors in the composition of the force (i.e. too much reliance on reserve and national guard forces, incorrect allocations of light units, etc).

[shloky]

The arguments presented thus far are based on the assumption that the state has a monopoly on violence and PMCS's are extraneous to legitimate and effective forms of utilizing violence. (That is the impression I've gotten anyway)

That is true -currently PMC's are tools to be utilized by nation states, few others can afford or have a requirement for a brigade.

But if we look to the future we see current PMC's are innovators on the adoption curve because their target customer base is so small (marked in yellow). They've been at this stage for quite some time, but as this article illustrates, they're attempting to get better at what they do.



As the PMC market evolves we'll see the positive attributes Zenpundit highlights become points/areas of competition. (Marked in red)

The major impact made by private security market will come as the state evolves (market state, decentralization driven by security concerns etc), which will increase its customer base, amount of primary participants and
competition.

Just some food for thought. It is not my intention to hijack the thread.

Regards,
Shlok

[Strickland]

Do we want a military force attempting to influence a people or battlespace based on their desire to satisfy pol/mil objectives, or due to a desire for continued profit? Call me cynical; however, private companies motivated by profit and the idea of economy of force missions do not seem to mesh.

[GS]

Maj Strickland brings up a good point, but I think that a PMC ISO of a commercial interest in Economy of Force to the nth degree. They attempt to accomplish the objective with the smallest force possible, require no investment in infrastructure, and go away when hostilities have ended.

[Tom Odom]

Do we want a military force attempting to influence a people or battlespace based on their desire to satisfy pol/mil objectives, or due to a desire for continued profit? Call me cynical; however, private companies motivated by profit and the idea of economy of force missions do not seem to mesh.

I agree completely. Go back to the days of the Free Companies in the 100 Years War for "PMCs"; the reasons states have a "lock" on violence are many.

Any force that can be hired, can be bought.

Tom

[SWJED]

Lecture notes from the Foreign Policy Research Institute (w/ video) - Private Military Companies and the Future of War by Deborah Avant.

The topic “private military companies and the future of war” is a big one. Both parts of the title—“private military companies” and “the future of war”—are phrases that can be disputed. In my recent book, which examines the privatization of security and its impact on the control of force, I label these companies “private security companies” (PSCs) specifically because they provide a range of services, some of which are hard to categorize as military, per se. And while PSCs are integral to war efforts—more than 1 of every 10 people the U.S. deployed to the Gulf in the lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom were PSC employees—some of the more controversial uses of private security have been in the aftermath of the “war.”

While all might agree that infantry soldiers should not be contracted out, in the midst of the insurgency in Iraq some PSCs have provided services that are nearly indistinguishable from what an infantry soldier would do. So it is in the grey area between what we would all describe as war and other violent settings that we can find the most interesting grist for thinking about the role of PSCs in the future of security. Indeed, PSCs have been in the news of late not because of their activities in Iraq, but because of their activities in New Orleans. Below I will offer a brief description of the market, discuss some of the benefits and risks it poses and suggest that their impact on the future of war depends, in part, on the strategies the U.S. and others undertake to manage the risks. I will end with what I see as the best avenue for moving forward...

Hat tip to Zenpundit

[SWJED]

Humanitarian Affairs Review - Should Humanitarians Use Private Military Services? by Peter Singer.

Private military services have taken part in conflicts from Bosnia to Iraq, supporting the work of governments, corporations and NGOs. Is this a healthy development? Peter W. Singer, from the Brookings Institution, warns the humanitarian community to be business-savvy before they take the privatisation plunge.

[SWJED]

From Josh at The Adventures of Chester blog - Let Blackwater Loose in Darfur.

The executives of one of the most well-known private security firms, Blackwater, have offered to provide a brigade of peacekeepers in Darfur, if only someone will pay for it...

A few weeks ago, at an international special forces conference in Jordan, Black announced that his company could deploy a small rapid-response force to conflicts like the one in Sudan. ''We're low cost and fast," Black said, ''the question is, who's going to let us play on their team?"

In other words, the private security firms need something other than cash to pay for their peacekeeping; they need some sort of legitimacy. But legitimacy for what? Invasions? The establishment of private empires of sorts?...

Blackwater though, seeks to insert itself due to one particular detail of the particular externality of Darfur. Namely, no powerful state in the world has any inherent national interest in preventing the killing there, except solely out of a sense of altruism. Blackwater offers to solve the problem for them, if only someone will pay for it all.

Here's several ways that Blackwater can raise the capital necessary to fund the Darfur peacekeeping mission, and really score a PR coup at the same time...

Follow the link for discussion on the various options...

[SWJED]

23 April Boston Globe - Peace Corp.

Three years of fighting in the Darfur region of Sudan have left an estimated 180,000 dead and nearly 2 million refugees. In recent weeks, both the UN and the US have turned up the volume of their demands to end the violence (which the Bush administration has publicly called genocide), but they've been hard pressed to turn their exhortations into action. The government in Khartoum has scuttled the UN's plans to take control of the troubled peacekeeping operations currently being led by the African Union, and NATO recently stated publicly that a force of its own in Darfur is ''out of the question." Meanwhile, refugee camps and humanitarian aid workers continue to be attacked, and the 7,000 African Union troops remain overstretched and ineffective.

But according to J. Cofer Black, vice chairman of the private security firm Blackwater, there is another option that ought to be on the table: an organization that could commit significant resources and expertise to bolster the African Union peacekeepers and provide emergency support to their flagging mission.

A few weeks ago, at an international special forces conference in Jordan, Black announced that his company could deploy a small rapid-response force to conflicts like the one in Sudan. ''We're low cost and fast," Black said, ''the question is, who's going to let us play on their team?"

Private security companies like Blackwater have thrived in Iraq, where the US military has relied on them for everything from guarding convoys to securing the Green Zone. But these companies recognize that the demand for their services in Iraq will eventually diminish, and Blackwater, for one, is looking for new markets. It's not alone in seeing peacekeeping as a growth area. Competitors such as Aegis and Dyncorp have also realized that while conflicts like the one in Darfur may not bring them profits on the order of Iraq, there's no shortage of them. And if such companies are able to help the international community succeed in peacekeeping, it could improve the image of an industry that hasn't enjoyed much support from the press or the public.

Private military companies have had a hard time convincing the international community that privatizing peacekeeping would be as good for Darfur, and for the rest of the world, as for their industry. In part that's because of the mixed reputation their work in Iraq has earned them and because the explosive growth of the industry has raised fears that security contractors working for the US government in Baghdad (and post-Katrina New Orleans) could become bona fide armies for hire. But the discomfort also has deeper roots, in the complicated history of private intervention in these kinds of conflicts. When Kofi Annan was UN undersecretary general for peacekeeping, he explored the option of hiring the South African private military company Executive Outcomes to aid in the Rwandan refugee crisis. He ultimately decided against the option, declaring that ''the world is not yet ready to privatize peace."...

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

23 May Associated Press - Amnesty Urges U.S. on Iraq Contractors.

[SWJED]

19 May Heritage Foundation paper - When Should the Government Use Contractors to Support Military Operations?.

Military contractors are currently assisting militaries around the world with missions that range from training and supply chain management to fighting in battles. Military contractors are seen as having inherent advantages over militaries in resource constraints, manpower, and flexibility. Yet relying on military contractors has its share of risks, including potential shortfalls in mission success, concerns over the safety of contractors, loss of resources because a capability is outsourced, loss of total force management, and problems of compliance with administrative law.

With the increased use of military contractors and the advent of privatized military firms, the question is how to determine the right force mix to complete a task or mission in the most effective and efficient manner. Sometimes, military contractors may be the best choice; however, they are not a perfect fit for every mission or the right solution for all skill and manpower shortages.

When considering the use of military contractors, U.S. military leaders should assess the risks of employing the various options and then choose the best one. The Department of Defense (DOD) should adopt comprehensive guidelines for making these decisions, using a risk-based approach...

[SWJED]

31 May Los Angeles Times commentary - Send in the Mercenaries by Max Boot.

...Pieces of paper, no matter how promising, require power in order to be enforced. The question is: Who will provide that power in Darfur? The African Union force deployed in 2004 has proven woefully inadequate. Its 7,000 soldiers lack the numbers, training and equipment to patrol an undeveloped region the size of France. They don't even have a mandate to stop ethnic cleansing; they are only supposed to monitor the situation.

If you listen to the bloviators at Turtle Bay, salvation will come from the deployment of a larger corps of blue helmets. If only. What is there in the history of United Nations peacekeepers that gives anyone any confidence that they can stop a determined adversary?...

But perhaps there is a way to stop the killing even without sending an American or European army. Send a private army. A number of commercial security firms such as Blackwater USA are willing, for the right price, to send their own forces, made up in large part of veterans of Western militaries, to stop the genocide.

We know from experience that such private units would be far more effective than any U.N. peacekeepers. In the 1990s, the South African firm Executive Outcomes and the British firm Sandline made quick work of rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone. Critics complain that these mercenaries offered only a temporary respite from the violence, but that was all they were hired to do. Presumably longer-term contracts could create longer-term security, and at a fraction of the cost of a U.N. mission.

Yet this solution is deemed unacceptable by the moral giants who run the United Nations. They claim that it is objectionable to employ — sniff — mercenaries. More objectionable, it seems, than passing empty resolutions, sending ineffectual peacekeeping forces and letting genocide continue.

[sgmgrumpy]

Inside The Pentagon
August 3, 2006

DOD, State To Launch New Counterterrorism Work In Asia And Africa

The Pentagon is poised to shift as much as $100 million to the State Department for an effort to hire private contractors charged with enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of foreign militaries in 14 nations across Africa, Asia and Latin America, according to a senior Defense Department official.

The program, which involves an unorthodox sharing of resources, won the approval of Congress last year only after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a big push for it. It is designed to fulfill a key objective of the U.S. strategy for the global war on terrorism -- bolstering the capabilities of partner nations to fight terrorists within and around their borders.

Eight aid packages, each worth $10 million to $30 million, have been constructed to boost the maritime and land-based counterterrorism operations of military forces in Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, Senegal, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Some of the aid packages fund efforts in more than one nation; additional aid packages for other nations may be approved soon.

“This program is designed to give them the training and equipment so that they can take on common enemies and prevent terrorist sanctuaries in their territories that are a problem for them and for us,” Jeb Nadaner, deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations, said in an interview. “This is [a Bush] administration program to get ahead of problems before they get full-blown.”

The security assistance packages are the product of programs nominated and coordinated by geographic combatant commanders and top diplomats at U.S. embassies. In general, the packages consist of relatively low-tech equipment -- no major weapon systems are in the offing -- designed to provide each nation with a better picture of activities within its borders and on the seas near its shores...

The long-term goal, he said, is to create a layered series of capabilities around the world among U.S. allies and partner nations so that they can undertake their own defense against terrorists...

The equipment sets include radar, surveillance tools and sensors, Global Positioning System navigation devices, communications equipment, computer systems and programs, small boats, small trucks and trailers, and spare parts for vehicles, said Nadaner.

Mark Garlasco, senior military analyst with Human Rights Watch and a former Pentagon intelligence analyst, said this aid might be useful in the war on terror. “But we have to understand that they might use the equipment in ways that the United States might not want it to be used,” in violation of international law, he said...

Peter Singer, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry,” said that to the extent the U.S. government hires private firms to conduct training of foreign militaries it misses an opportunity to develop an important, if informal, tool -- military-to-military relationships that might be called upon in a future crisis...

Of the eight military aid packages, three involve groups of nations. Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe are grouped in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Program, designed to provide more effective control of certain West African waters through improved coastal surveillance and operational capabilities. Morocco, Algeria, Chad, Senegal, Tunisia and Nigeria are grouped together into an effort called the Multinational Information Sharing Initiative, which aims to build the capacity of these nations to share data about activities in the region.

Individual programs for Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka are focused on improving each nation’s maritime operations, particularly the strategic sea lanes in Southeast Asia.

With U.S. forces stretched thin by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld and Rice last year sought and secured permission from Congress to use Pentagon operation and maintenance funds for State Department foreign military training programs run by private firms...
-- Jason Sherman