Matters Blackwater (Merged thread)

[shloky]

The arguments presented thus far are based on the assumption that the state has a monopoly on violence and PMCS's are extraneous to legitimate and effective forms of utilizing violence. (That is the impression I've gotten anyway)

That is true -currently PMC's are tools to be utilized by nation states, few others can afford or have a requirement for a brigade.

But if we look to the future we see current PMC's are innovators on the adoption curve because their target customer base is so small (marked in yellow). They've been at this stage for quite some time, but as this article illustrates, they're attempting to get better at what they do.



As the PMC market evolves we'll see the positive attributes Zenpundit highlights become points/areas of competition. (Marked in red)

The major impact made by private security market will come as the state evolves (market state, decentralization driven by security concerns etc), which will increase its customer base, amount of primary participants and
competition.

Just some food for thought. It is not my intention to hijack the thread.

Regards,
Shlok

[Strickland]

Do we want a military force attempting to influence a people or battlespace based on their desire to satisfy pol/mil objectives, or due to a desire for continued profit? Call me cynical; however, private companies motivated by profit and the idea of economy of force missions do not seem to mesh.

[GS]

Maj Strickland brings up a good point, but I think that a PMC ISO of a commercial interest in Economy of Force to the nth degree. They attempt to accomplish the objective with the smallest force possible, require no investment in infrastructure, and go away when hostilities have ended.

[Tom Odom]

Do we want a military force attempting to influence a people or battlespace based on their desire to satisfy pol/mil objectives, or due to a desire for continued profit? Call me cynical; however, private companies motivated by profit and the idea of economy of force missions do not seem to mesh.

I agree completely. Go back to the days of the Free Companies in the 100 Years War for "PMCs"; the reasons states have a "lock" on violence are many.

Any force that can be hired, can be bought.

Tom

[MountainRunner]

I'd like to throw out a few bits to chew on...

When we talk about Blackwater's providing UN peacekeeping forces, we need to keep in mind their use is subject to the will of the international community, and not just the US. We need to remember not to always conflate international will w/ US goals. For a PKO, a SC decision needs to be made, otherwise we need to frame the discussion around the politics of that other group. My comments focus on the UN engaging Blackwater and not NATO, AU, or some ad hoc coalition, let alone solo state commission.

I suggest we consider what I argue is the mercenarial aspect of present pko's (a very controversal suggestion I know). If we look at PKO contributors as of December 2005, the top three contributors to PKOs -- Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India -- contributed over one-third of ALL UN Peacekeeping Forces, including police, military observers and troops. Meanwhile, the permanent members UN Security Council contributed only 3.7%, with China contributing more than the UK, US, and Russia combined.

As most know, these sub-contractor nations, notably those not on the SC, contribute the bulk of the forces and receive +/- $1000 per man per month for their contribution. Their participation is further subsidized when considering they rarely have their own transport and too often are in need of equipment. In practice, these are truly sub-contractors, contracting to the UNSC which established and mandated the mission -- the GA has no real roll in this. The SC clearly already uses money to mitigate a deficit of political will today. On its current trajectory this will continue and deepen as Western states continue to downsize and do not prioritize the need to participate and thus will not have the forces to contibute.

A significant point of discussion should hit on the perception of the force, whether it is a military, milob, or police force. In the US, we frequently disregard or ignore the perception of contractors and consider them expendable and deniable. However, in the AO and beyond this is simply not true. Their death or abuse reflects back onto the contracting state, perceived or real, and is amplified by the media (although generally not by US media). One purpose of PKOs, of course, is participation in the global sphere and we cannot forget this.

One reason the sub-contractor nations are involved in PKOs their state as TCNs. Blackwater, in promoting its well-known roster of Western former-SF and similar, most notably American (including the big and brawny / physically intimidating), may not be optimial in an especially polarized environment like this Administration has created today. The 'American' may not be seen as a peacekeeper but as lightening rod (perhaps that's good as the combantants cease fighting each other in the short-term). BW is likely to be seen as an American force under some cover. Lest we forget they may be 'tagged' as OGA, perception of the force is reality. Their reputation in Iraq, by they Iraqis, is critical. Their reputation in the US means nothing, they aren't peacekeeping in the US (well, they are / did along with other PSCs, but that's not under the UN).

Of course, further to this is as a private company continues to build up a capability, the need to use this capacity expands. Unlike a state that subsidizes military (and police) force through indirect means (i.e. taxes), the PSC only has direct means (i.e. contracts).

Just some thoughts for the worthy discussion we're having on this.

[MountainRunner]

I neglected to add some further food for thought...

The increase in Chinese participation in PKOs is directly related to their desire to increase their profile and, I wonder if / might this inhibit SC hiring of a "third party corporation (TPC vs TCN).

Also, remember that Blackwater would have to be specifically licensed to participate in the PKO under existing US laws. Therefore, the US must have the desire for them participate... perhaps that how we do actually conflate US policy with international community's policy...

[Tom Odom]

I applaud your points as they are very relevant to discussions of deploying any forces--national, UN or multinational like the MKO, or contract--into zones of conflict.

The reality of UN PKOs often surprises those who have not been on the ground with them. LTG Dallaire's shock and dismay over the uneven quality of his troops--especially the Bangaldesh Battalion and regrettably the Belgian Paracommandos--speaks volumes. The Canadians are the instutional memory and highest practioners of UN peacekeeping. General Dallaire had trained Canadian troops for such missions but had never been a participant. His experience in Rwanda was to say the least less than positive.

My own experience in UNTSO as an observer was similar. Individual observers were quite good, regardless of nationality. But there were definable blocks of marginal quality observers. And much of that had to do with the benefits and pay offered by the observers' countries for such duty. Some like the Swedes and Austrians spent years in the mission area because they received substantial tax breaks and other benefits.

The Fijian battalion in UNAMIR was essentially a contract force; the country would raise an entirely new battalion and send it to Sinai as part of the MFO. Then it would stand down from the MFO and transfer to UNIFIL. After that tour, it returned home (at least on paper) and a new unit began standing up.

UNAMIR 2 in Rwanda was much the same. Some contingents like the Canadians were professional soldiers who came fully equipped. But the slowness in putting UNAMIR 2 on the ground because many countries offered troops expecting to get "free" equipment. Ironically, the best and most effective contingent on the ground was the Ethiopian Battalion; they were also the worst equipped contingent. That opinion is shared by the Force Commander LTG Tousignant, the SRSG Ambassador Khan, Ambassador Rawson, the RPA Commnader/Defense Minister/Vice President, and yours truly. The reason for the Ethiopians effectiveness was they were: non-French speaking Africans which made them acceptable to the RPA; they were former rebels themselves and that made the RPA respect them; and they would shoot when necessary and ask later which made the RPA love them. Their "garrison" skills when it came to neatness and field sanitation would and did make Western soldiers shudder. But they did control their area and they worked well with the RPA.

When it came to policing the camps in Zaire, no one would take that mission. I have mentioned in this discussion my suggestion to go contract--one that ultimately was taken. The UN looked at using UNAMIR 2 to do the job; that was still born. Another company run by Brits looked at it; I ran into their negotiator on a UN flight in Nov 94. I knew him from Zaire and considered him to be a friend. He had another Brit with him who had retired SAS stamped on his forehead. I told them both to make sure that their statement of work allowed them to shoot people. They grinned and said they had asked for an "aggressive ROE". They did not get the job; it went to an element of the Zairian Army that was tied to the Israeli contractor I brought out to Goma. It was a bandaid on a sucking chest wound at best but it was the best we could come up with at the time.

Finally in 1996 the US and the Brits looked seriously at the issue and began planning the MNF as a way of prying the refugees out of the Zairian camps. But Ambassador Gribbin's stance that the MNF had to be able to shoot was not taken to heart. Fortunately the RPA "solved the problem" by clearing the camps even as the MNF HQs began its initial operations.

Despite all that I have said above, I still believe in UN PKOs as the best solution for problems like Rwanda and the camps in Zaire. Using UN forces puts a UN stamp on the problem, something that is most useful. That is not to say that UN peacekeeping and indeed the UN in general needs a dramatic overhaul if not a complete rebuild. Maybe if PMCs are the coming thing, then peackeeping/peace enforcement would be a good fit. In some ways that is already happening; the Canadian flight detachment in UNAMIR 2 was a purely commercial contract. They had all flown in UNISOM before coming to Rwanda.

Enough said fer now,

Tom

[War Hammer]

I'm not sure that Executive Outcomes (EO) or any PMC would have made much difference in the Rhodesian civil war (1960s to 1980). The Rhodesians (depending on the stats) had a 1:17 or 1:43 kill ratio against the Marxist rebels. An incredible kill ratio. The Rhodesians had mercenaries (a couple thousand). Yet they still lost.

The SADF guys who formed EO are really a direct descendent of the Rhodesian military forces in many ways. After the Rhodesians lost, many of them joined the South African Defense Forces (SADF). They influenced the SADF special forces concepts, counter-insurgency and warfare tactics. South Africa’s counter-insurgency policy wasn’t exactly successful either. Probably because they didn’t learn anything from the failure of the Rhodesian experience. They continued to use the failed practices that their Rhodesian brothers taught them.

If EO was around and had to fight in the Rhodesian war, I highly doubt they would have made any difference against the Marxist rebels. Primarily because they were/are a reflection of the same Rhodesian forces that fought and lost in that war. Racking up a high kill ratio doesn’t cut it in counter-insurgency. Ian Beckett succinctly described the Rhodesian’s main problem:

it has been suggested that the apolitical nature of the Rhodesian armed forces prevented them from seriously coming to terms with the political aspects of guerrilla insurgency. There was never any real attempt at political indoctrination or instruction within the Rhodesian armed forces and to the end of the war guerrilla insurgency tended to be regarded as a military rather than a political problem to which military solutions alone should be applied.

http://members.tripod.com/selousscou...79%20part1.htm

I think the same could be said of the SADF and military oriented solutions to the counter-insurgency strategy of South Africa.

Check this website for articles and other great info on the Rhodesian civil war.

http://members.tripod.com/selousscou...l_overview.htm

These articles below detail some of the ways Rhodesian forces influenced the SADF.

O'Brien, Kevin A. "The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South Africa's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy 1979-1992." (Parts I and II) Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 86-105 and 13, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 107-142.

'Brien, Kevin A. "Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 27-59.