I agree completely. Go back to the days of the Free Companies in the 100 Years War for "PMCs"; the reasons states have a "lock" on violence are many.Originally Posted by Major Strickland
Any force that can be hired, can be bought.
Tom
I agree completely. Go back to the days of the Free Companies in the 100 Years War for "PMCs"; the reasons states have a "lock" on violence are many.
Any force that can be hired, can be bought.
Tom
Outsourcing the will of the international community
I'd like to throw out a few bits to chew on...
When we talk about Blackwater's providing UN peacekeeping forces, we need to keep in mind their use is subject to the will of the international community, and not just the US. We need to remember not to always conflate international will w/ US goals. For a PKO, a SC decision needs to be made, otherwise we need to frame the discussion around the politics of that other group. My comments focus on the UN engaging Blackwater and not NATO, AU, or some ad hoc coalition, let alone solo state commission.
I suggest we consider what I argue is the mercenarial aspect of present pko's (a very controversal suggestion I know). If we look at PKO contributors as of December 2005, the top three contributors to PKOs -- Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India -- contributed over one-third of ALL UN Peacekeeping Forces, including police, military observers and troops. Meanwhile, the permanent members UN Security Council contributed only 3.7%, with China contributing more than the UK, US, and Russia combined.
As most know, these sub-contractor nations, notably those not on the SC, contribute the bulk of the forces and receive +/- $1000 per man per month for their contribution. Their participation is further subsidized when considering they rarely have their own transport and too often are in need of equipment. In practice, these are truly sub-contractors, contracting to the UNSC which established and mandated the mission -- the GA has no real roll in this. The SC clearly already uses money to mitigate a deficit of political will today. On its current trajectory this will continue and deepen as Western states continue to downsize and do not prioritize the need to participate and thus will not have the forces to contibute.
A significant point of discussion should hit on the perception of the force, whether it is a military, milob, or police force. In the US, we frequently disregard or ignore the perception of contractors and consider them expendable and deniable. However, in the AO and beyond this is simply not true. Their death or abuse reflects back onto the contracting state, perceived or real, and is amplified by the media (although generally not by US media). One purpose of PKOs, of course, is participation in the global sphere and we cannot forget this.
One reason the sub-contractor nations are involved in PKOs their state as TCNs. Blackwater, in promoting its well-known roster of Western former-SF and similar, most notably American (including the big and brawny / physically intimidating), may not be optimial in an especially polarized environment like this Administration has created today. The 'American' may not be seen as a peacekeeper but as lightening rod (perhaps that's good as the combantants cease fighting each other in the short-term). BW is likely to be seen as an American force under some cover. Lest we forget they may be 'tagged' as OGA, perception of the force is reality. Their reputation in Iraq, by they Iraqis, is critical. Their reputation in the US means nothing, they aren't peacekeeping in the US (well, they are / did along with other PSCs, but that's not under the UN).
Of course, further to this is as a private company continues to build up a capability, the need to use this capacity expands. Unlike a state that subsidizes military (and police) force through indirect means (i.e. taxes), the PSC only has direct means (i.e. contracts).
Just some thoughts for the worthy discussion we're having on this.
I neglected to add some further food for thought...
The increase in Chinese participation in PKOs is directly related to their desire to increase their profile and, I wonder if / might this inhibit SC hiring of a "third party corporation (TPC vs TCN).
Also, remember that Blackwater would have to be specifically licensed to participate in the PKO under existing US laws. Therefore, the US must have the desire for them participate... perhaps that how we do actually conflate US policy with international community's policy...
Excellent Points
I applaud your points as they are very relevant to discussions of deploying any forces--national, UN or multinational like the MKO, or contract--into zones of conflict.
The reality of UN PKOs often surprises those who have not been on the ground with them. LTG Dallaire's shock and dismay over the uneven quality of his troops--especially the Bangaldesh Battalion and regrettably the Belgian Paracommandos--speaks volumes. The Canadians are the instutional memory and highest practioners of UN peacekeeping. General Dallaire had trained Canadian troops for such missions but had never been a participant. His experience in Rwanda was to say the least less than positive.
My own experience in UNTSO as an observer was similar. Individual observers were quite good, regardless of nationality. But there were definable blocks of marginal quality observers. And much of that had to do with the benefits and pay offered by the observers' countries for such duty. Some like the Swedes and Austrians spent years in the mission area because they received substantial tax breaks and other benefits.
The Fijian battalion in UNAMIR was essentially a contract force; the country would raise an entirely new battalion and send it to Sinai as part of the MFO. Then it would stand down from the MFO and transfer to UNIFIL. After that tour, it returned home (at least on paper) and a new unit began standing up.
UNAMIR 2 in Rwanda was much the same. Some contingents like the Canadians were professional soldiers who came fully equipped. But the slowness in putting UNAMIR 2 on the ground because many countries offered troops expecting to get "free" equipment. Ironically, the best and most effective contingent on the ground was the Ethiopian Battalion; they were also the worst equipped contingent. That opinion is shared by the Force Commander LTG Tousignant, the SRSG Ambassador Khan, Ambassador Rawson, the RPA Commnader/Defense Minister/Vice President, and yours truly. The reason for the Ethiopians effectiveness was they were: non-French speaking Africans which made them acceptable to the RPA; they were former rebels themselves and that made the RPA respect them; and they would shoot when necessary and ask later which made the RPA love them. Their "garrison" skills when it came to neatness and field sanitation would and did make Western soldiers shudder. But they did control their area and they worked well with the RPA.
When it came to policing the camps in Zaire, no one would take that mission. I have mentioned in this discussion my suggestion to go contract--one that ultimately was taken. The UN looked at using UNAMIR 2 to do the job; that was still born. Another company run by Brits looked at it; I ran into their negotiator on a UN flight in Nov 94. I knew him from Zaire and considered him to be a friend. He had another Brit with him who had retired SAS stamped on his forehead. I told them both to make sure that their statement of work allowed them to shoot people. They grinned and said they had asked for an "aggressive ROE". They did not get the job; it went to an element of the Zairian Army that was tied to the Israeli contractor I brought out to Goma. It was a bandaid on a sucking chest wound at best but it was the best we could come up with at the time.
Finally in 1996 the US and the Brits looked seriously at the issue and began planning the MNF as a way of prying the refugees out of the Zairian camps. But Ambassador Gribbin's stance that the MNF had to be able to shoot was not taken to heart. Fortunately the RPA "solved the problem" by clearing the camps even as the MNF HQs began its initial operations.
Despite all that I have said above, I still believe in UN PKOs as the best solution for problems like Rwanda and the camps in Zaire. Using UN forces puts a UN stamp on the problem, something that is most useful. That is not to say that UN peacekeeping and indeed the UN in general needs a dramatic overhaul if not a complete rebuild. Maybe if PMCs are the coming thing, then peackeeping/peace enforcement would be a good fit. In some ways that is already happening; the Canadian flight detachment in UNAMIR 2 was a purely commercial contract. They had all flown in UNISOM before coming to Rwanda.
Enough said fer now,
Tom
I'm not sure that Executive Outcomes (EO) or any PMC would have made much difference in the Rhodesian civil war (1960s to 1980). The Rhodesians (depending on the stats) had a 1:17 or 1:43 kill ratio against the Marxist rebels. An incredible kill ratio. The Rhodesians had mercenaries (a couple thousand). Yet they still lost.
The SADF guys who formed EO are really a direct descendent of the Rhodesian military forces in many ways. After the Rhodesians lost, many of them joined the South African Defense Forces (SADF). They influenced the SADF special forces concepts, counter-insurgency and warfare tactics. South Africa’s counter-insurgency policy wasn’t exactly successful either. Probably because they didn’t learn anything from the failure of the Rhodesian experience. They continued to use the failed practices that their Rhodesian brothers taught them.
If EO was around and had to fight in the Rhodesian war, I highly doubt they would have made any difference against the Marxist rebels. Primarily because they were/are a reflection of the same Rhodesian forces that fought and lost in that war. Racking up a high kill ratio doesn’t cut it in counter-insurgency. Ian Beckett succinctly described the Rhodesian’s main problem:
it has been suggested that the apolitical nature of the Rhodesian armed forces prevented them from seriously coming to terms with the political aspects of guerrilla insurgency. There was never any real attempt at political indoctrination or instruction within the Rhodesian armed forces and to the end of the war guerrilla insurgency tended to be regarded as a military rather than a political problem to which military solutions alone should be applied.
http://members.tripod.com/selousscou...79%20part1.htm
I think the same could be said of the SADF and military oriented solutions to the counter-insurgency strategy of South Africa.
Check this website for articles and other great info on the Rhodesian civil war.
http://members.tripod.com/selousscou...l_overview.htm
These articles below detail some of the ways Rhodesian forces influenced the SADF.
O'Brien, Kevin A. "The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South Africa's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy 1979-1992." (Parts I and II) Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 86-105 and 13, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 107-142.
'Brien, Kevin A. "Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 27-59.
When Executive Outcomes first appeared on the scene in the 90s, they said they were anti-communist and would never serve a communist cause. Yet they helped the marxist MPLA defeat the anti-communist UNITA faction in Angola. The EO mercs were the same guys that trained and fought alongside UNITA against the MPLA just a few years earlier. UNITA and the MPLA are/were corrupt, butchers etc... But UNITA led by Joseph Savimbi was our ally during the Cold War. Ronny Reagan called Savimbi the “George Washington of Africa.”
Many pro-PMC advocates look to EO's role in Angola as something divine. Why should I dance for joy at the thought that EO helped to bring about the downfall of UNITA? A one time U.S. ally who fought the communist Cubans and MPLA.
EO's role in Angola proved one thing, that mercs can be in it for the profit, not the politics. The EO SADF staff turned on the people who they helped train and fought for the people who ten years earlier they were trying to destroy. Classic mercs.
How are Rhodesian, South African and Israeli mercs trained in political assassination and viewing all solutions in war as "military" going to turn the tide against non-state actors?
It is true that many of the Rhodesians did join the SADF. It is also equally true that most of them did not stay for all that long. There is an abundance of evidence to support this claim.
The claim that they had a large effect on strategy is unsubstaniated. They did have an effect on TTP, but The RSA grand strategy was well and truly decided before Rhodesia 'fell'. Any half decent read of the publically available material shows that the 'Total Strategy' was well and truly in place before '79 / '80.
One also needs to distinguish between the willingness to incorporate willing and available troops at the tactical level (which, cynically could be viewed as newly stateless, and hence [especially when compared to RSA white conscripts from Stellenbosch or Capetown] 'cannon fodder') and adoption of Rhodesian strategy.
In fact, it would be fair to say that at the highest levels of the apartheid era white minority government in South Africa that Smith and the Rhodesians were regarded as strategically naive, albeit useful buffers to the 'frontline' states.
The minority South African's ultimately failed strategically for pretty much the same reason that the Rhodesians did - a lack of strategic rectitude. We all know of the importance of 'legitimacy' in COIN. There was never any hope (in anyone truly awake) that a policy such as apartheid would , in the long run, be acceptable. There is evidence to suggest that, in the end, the leadership of the SADF came to an awareness of this, and were fighting to buy time in order to allow the politicians time to realise this and negotiate an appropriate end to the 'insurgency'.
Arguably, the current nation of the Republic of South Africa is proof that they were at least successful in this aim.
This, perhaps, introduces one of frequently unexplored / under discussed 'truisims' of COIN 'victory' (I also include in this category rectitude and multiple interagency lines of operations) - ''compromise'. But, I digress.... that is another thread .. one day.
In summary, the role of Rhodesians in the RSA COIN strategy can be very easily overstated. (If you have any further doubt, do some research on how the Boers running the aparthied era minority government truly viewed 'rooineks' or (don't have the afrikaans word at hand) 'salt dicks'.
PS an interesting point for Australians, we have a federal act of parliament, The Foreign Incursions Act that makes it a crime against Commonwealth Law for an Australian Citizen to be a mercenary. It would be interesting to see how this would play out in the courts if an Aussie citizen was to be employed by Blackwater in their 'Brigade' in a foreign country,
Last edited by Mark O'Neill; 05-27-2007 at 11:23 PM. Reason: spelling
Perhaps the best evidence of South Africa's cynicism with regards to Zimbabwe's white population can be seen in its support for the "Super ZAPU" insurgency in Ndebeleland which specifically targeted white Zimbabwean farmers.
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