Sorry for not being crystal clear, but I wanted to put things as polite as possible. Although I have not read the Brookings report, basically I was trying to ask what Jesse9252's first sentence says. I obviously accept that they need to be ptrotected, my only question is what "added value" do PMCs have over military personnel.
BTW not-being a native speaker what do these principals exactly do? Are they a sort of senior diplomats?
Last edited by UrsaMaior; 09-28-2007 at 05:35 PM.
Nihil sub sole novum.
Good Evening from the Baltics !
I won't pretend to know just who the principals are, nor just how senior they are and what they're doing in Iraq. I normally do not defend State on any level, but I will herein fully concur with the post from Koyuavci.Originally Posted by UrsaMaior
That is, those folks are beyond a doubt out of their element and scope of work.
Regards, Stan
Post of the thread. Thanks for the info -
Likewise, it is my understanding that the DOS/DSS also has very specific requirements for those seeking to contract under the WPPS program.
Blackwater fired 122 guards in Iraq
By Chicago Tribune and The Associated Press, Tuesday, October 2, 2007
House Oversight Committee Report released MondayWASHINGTON — The controversial private security firm Blackwater USA has fired 122 of its guards in Iraq for a laundry list of problems. Among those terminated, 28 were fired for weapons-related incidents, 25 for drug and alcohol violations and 16 for inappropriate or lewd conduct.
More at both links...State Department Responses. Documents provided by the State Department raise serious questions about how State Department officials responded to reports of Blackwater killings of Iraqis. In a high-profile incident in December 2006, a drunken Blackwater contractor killed the guard of Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi. Within 36 hours after the shooting, the State Department had allowed Blackwater to transport the Blackwater contractor out of Iraq. The State Department Charge d'Affaires recommended that Blackwater make a "sizeable payment" and an "apology" to avoid this whole thing becoming even worse." The Charge d'Affaires suggested a $250,000 payment to the guard's family, but the Department's Diplomatic Security Service said this was too much and could cause Iraqis to "iry to get killed." In the end, the State Depafment and Blackwater agreed on a $15,000 payment. One State Department offrcial wrote: "We would like to help them resolve this so we can continue with our protective mission." The State Department took a similar approach upon receiving reports that Blackwater shooters killed an innocent Iraqi, except that in this case, the State Department requested only a $5,000 payment to "put this unfortunate matter behind us quickly."
They're kidding, right? Remain at the scene? Clearly the author(s) of this report does not understand the difference between Iraq and the US. It would be a very poor PSD indeed that hung around the scene of a shooting in Iraq. That is just BEGGING to get killed by the bad guys.In the vast majority of instances in which Blackwater fires shots, Blackwater is firing from a moving vehicle and does not remain at the scene to determine if the shots resulted in casualties.
SFC W
Weenies and Mercs
You guys wait here, I'm going down that side street over there to check for blood - I think I hit that guy running that way
Any man that can do the work has a prima facie cover sheet in the book that can be 'adjusted' to meet the immediate need(s) and there is always a "other duties as required" clause in the book. I'll bet a pair of Russell boots: http://www.russellmoccasin.com/boots...lachunter.html
that when some of the 'dismissed' lads are done with their whoring and drinking, they'll do another hitch in the 'raq, but that's just MO. These crews and the spooks and hillbillies that ride with them have been around for centuries and aren't going anywhere anytime soon, again IMO.
In today's news they talked about the PMC that just killed 2 women and wounded the kids. Here are some things we considered when decided how to use force. In the end its a complicated decision process with lots of things influencing your decision and it all happens in secondsThey're kidding, right? Remain at the scene? Clearly the author(s) of this report does not understand the difference between Iraq and the US. It would be a very poor PSD indeed that hung around the scene of a shooting in Iraq. That is just BEGGING to get killed by the bad guys.In the vast majority of instances in which Blackwater fires shots, Blackwater is firing from a moving vehicle and does not remain at the scene to determine if the shots resulted in casualties.
1) I always looked for who was in the car - in general families don't do SVBIEDs - SVBIEDs are generally solo affairs, and drive by shootings are generally 3-4 males in an Opal - there might be 1-2 additional vehicles. The "drive by" is not generally a good thing to try on US convoys - too many MGs and mean dudes. Occasionally you might see a AIF vehicle which tries to get in front and slow you down to make you a better target for the IED overwatch - but mostly those tactics are employed against ISF. Bottom line - there are things you watch for that help you decide what is going down and what you need to do.
2) SVBIEDs will often sit along MSRs at Intersections - also true with IEDs, and complex ambushes - it just improves the chance of hitting your target - my point is that the AIF know where to try and hit you, and you generally know where they are trying to hit you - this should allow you to increase your Force Pro posture. If you are going into a new area- coordinate and find out and provide the info so somebody can facilitate your move.
3) Increased traffic patterns of all types indicate a certain amount of health returning to the city. When we first got there we were very aggressive and often "drove it like we stole it" - we were a small element and often had trailers full of crap we were taking back to our COP from the FOB. We also only knew the MSR routes and were not wired into the atmospherics. This eventually changed as we got more comfortable and understood the city and its neighborhoods. The way we did this was by getting out in the city with combined IA and CF patrols and with unilateral IA patrols. If all you do is go from a FOB to some other place, you never really understand any of this - things never change- and every neighborhood looks bad and every car is an SVBIED. You also probably never see the Iraqis as anything but an impediment between your start point and your destination.
4) Toward the end we just understood that if you want people to act normal and see you as someone on their side you have to stop scaring the crap out of them. Trust me an 1114 or even a big SUV is damn near the biggest thing on the road - and while people are stubborn you still have lots of flexibility - ever drive in NY or D.C.?
5) As such we installed the biggest damed horns we could find - the type that have sirens on them - its an attention getter and wakes people up. It was the best tool we put on the trucks. We had augmentees early on who like to throw water bottles and potatoes - we had to correct their actions - because they had not lived among the population, they did not understand their actions - the augmentees saw it a less then lethal alternative that also provided them an indicator of intent. They did not understand that it made the team less safe since we had to operate under a different set of circumstances then they had been accustomed to.
6) We kept the crew served weapons up and loaded, but the weapon of choice in the turret was the M4 and M9. The pistol has a psychological effect there that is difficult to convey, the M4 allows you to put a weapon into action quickly and selectively. If you are unsure you don't necessarily need to put a belt from the M240/M2/GPMG/PKC into the car - you can put a couple of 5.56 into the air, or into the engine block.
In regards to leaving the scene - if you can't secure the scene - then ensure you do a battle handoff with someone who can. Not reporting it to the MSC so it can get handed off to ISF is non-starter and indicative of doing something wrong. This is one of those issues that can put a small element’s actions at odds with our larger goals - this is a problem. If the actions of small PMC elements are out of step with our larger goals then we have to weigh their benefit to us in that light.
As always everybody's experiences are going to differ, but those are the things we thought about as we moved to this place or that within the context of doing our mission which was much broader than just getting there.
Best Regards, Rob
Generally yes, this true but the bad guys know this also. That is not something I am willing to bet my life on this one. As for drive bys, did these guys have gun trucks or were they in the usual contractor standard up-armored SUVs? Everybody knows that an SUV means contractors and they don't have gun turrets.
We had rifles in the turret also but I preferred a shot gun. It makes a hell of a bang and get attention but still gives you a lethal option in your hands if you need it. I'm not really sure what 5.56 MM into an engine block will do, not much I am guessing but if it comes to the point that I am no longer firing warning shots I am not going to shoot at the vehicle. I am going to shoot the driver, or whatever the percieved threat is.2) SVBIEDs will often sit along MSRs at Intersections - also true with IEDs, and complex ambushes - it just improves the chance of hitting your target - my point is that the AIF know where to try and hit you, and you generally know where they are trying to hit you - this should allow you to increase your Force Pro posture. If you are going into a new area- coordinate and find out and provide the info so somebody can facilitate your move.
3) Increased traffic patterns of all types indicate a certain amount of health returning to the city. When we first got there we were very aggressive and often "drove it like we stole it" - we were a small element and often had trailers full of crap we were taking back to our COP from the FOB. We also only knew the MSR routes and were not wired into the atmospherics. This eventually changed as we got more comfortable and understood the city and its neighborhoods. The way we did this was by getting out in the city with combined IA and CF patrols and with unilateral IA patrols. If all you do is go from a FOB to some other place, you never really understand any of this - things never change- and every neighborhood looks bad and every car is an SVBIED. You also probably never see the Iraqis as anything but an impediment between your start point and your destination.
4) Toward the end we just understood that if you want people to act normal and see you as someone on their side you have to stop scaring the crap out of them. Trust me an 1114 or even a big SUV is damn near the biggest thing on the road - and while people are stubborn you still have lots of flexibility - ever drive in NY or D.C.?
5) As such we installed the biggest damed horns we could find - the type that have sirens on them - its an attention getter and wakes people up. It was the best tool we put on the trucks. We had augmentees early on who like to throw water bottles and potatoes - we had to correct their actions - because they had not lived among the population, they did not understand their actions - the augmentees saw it a less then lethal alternative that also provided them an indicator of intent. They did not understand that it made the team less safe since we had to operate under a different set of circumstances then they had been accustomed to.
6) We kept the crew served weapons up and loaded, but the weapon of choice in the turret was the M4 and M9. The pistol has a psychological effect there that is difficult to convey, the M4 allows you to put a weapon into action quickly and selectively. If you are unsure you don't necessarily need to put a belt from the M240/M2/GPMG/PKC into the car - you can put a couple of 5.56 into the air, or into the engine block.
Did they not report this? If they did not report it at all then that is a definite nogo but I certainly wouldn't fault them for not trying to secure the scene. Again, they probably don't have gun trucks and, in any case, their first responsibility is to the principal.In regards to leaving the scene - if you can't secure the scene - then ensure you do a battle handoff with someone who can. Not reporting it to the MSC so it can get handed off to ISF is non-starter and indicative of doing something wrong. This is one of those issues that can put a small element’s actions at odds with our larger goals - this is a problem. If the actions of small PMC elements are out of step with our larger goals then we have to weigh their benefit to us in that light.
As always everybody's experiences are going to differ, but those are the things we thought about as we moved to this place or that within the context of doing our mission which was much broader than just getting there.
Best Regards, Rob
Shifting back to legalities for a minute...
This just showed up on CBC.ca today.
....The problem with trying contractors for crimes in other jurisdictions is: whose rules apply?
Lawyers who discuss this issue often look at existing military or civilian law. They say that if a contractor is charged with a crime and appears in a non-military court, all the rules of evidence normally applicable in that court would apply. If, for example, a contractor appeared in U.S. Federal Court, they say it would be difficult to obtain a conviction there for an event that happened in another country. And, if a civilian contractor appeared before a court martial, the lawyers could argue over jurisdiction.
There is, however, an example from a relatively recent era — the years after the Second World War – that could help clarify the issue.
From the 1930s to the defeat in 1945, the Imperial Japanese Army employed thousands of gonzoku, which roughly translates as the now-familiar term "civilian contractor."
After the war, many gonzoku were charged, tried and convicted for war crimes, mainly for the abuse of Allied prisoners of war. That means there are strong precedents that civilian contractors are subject to international humanitarian law and prosecution for war crimes, including murder and crimes against humanity.
More...
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
I don't know about money, but one thing's for sure. A government paycheck won't attract or keep people who do SIGINT these days, and those it does can't keep up with the private sector. My impression is that the government simply contracts certain lines of crypto and search innovation into secrecy.
Last edited by Presley Cannady; 01-11-2008 at 11:07 PM.
I'm Not Sure How I Feel About This
I'm getting some love in the latest Blackwater newsletter.
All in all - a pretty good approach to educating the work force. I'm impressed, and I think if read and discussed it could help them integrate with us on the ground - kind of like "here is what is important to the boss right now". I wonder if they have gone as far as implementing some kind of continued education program?
Rob
Monicker
Steve, would you prefer that they disagree with you? I'd be delighted to see my prose highlighted. As my friend Michael Ledeen said to me once (to encourage me to continue), "The goal of writing is to change someone's mind, we know not whom."
By the way. I took note of your dapper new look ... hat, glasses, Gamecocks rag behind you (to convince us that you are, um, the young collegiate type?). You banking on the ladies visiting the SWJ?
I don't care whether they agree or disagree...so long as the magazine is out of their weapon at the time.
More potential book buyers.
Could this be outsourcing of COIN airpower?
Article today on Fox News:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,361322,00.html
Looks like Blackwater may be getting a COIN aircraft - a Super Tucano (really not a "Fighter Jet" as Fox labeled the headline).
This deal was previously reported when the order was made back in Aug '07. Sounds like it has now been approved by the Brazilian govt based on a USG request.
Wonder whose pilots they are going to train? Reports in '07 had a spokeswoman claiming "only US" pilots would be trained.
Interesting implications no matter who it ends up being...
Mercenaries, folks from "other" govt agencies, or the AF?
Anyone out there have more info?
V/R,
Cliff
Just that we are going back in history. We did this in the Congo in the 1960s with merc air using ex-pat Cuban pilots. Some good things some bad. Notably however it was an air suppression centric rather conventional flying ground column operation with mercs, foreign advisors (Belge and US), and piss poor ANC troops. The Cuban pilots got paid by rounds expended so guess what? They never brought any rounds back.
If it was me on the ground, I'd rather have mortars and artillery.
Tom
Tom-
Were they Cubans who left post Castro? Is there more info on this somewhere? Just wondering - thanks!
V/R,
Cliff
Ciff,
They were "Bay of Pigs" Cubans hired by the CIA through a front company called WIGMO which operated out of Miami. They flew B-26K Invaders, T-6s, and T28s. See LP 14
Here is an excerp from my end notes on this effort:
In attempting to forestall a complete ANC collapse, the CIA established a covert air force. Using front organizations- the Western International Ground Maintenance Organization in Lichenstein and the Caribbean Marine Aero Corporation in Miami, Florida- the agency hired ground maintenance personnel and Cuban exiles to pilot the force. American officials were careful to disassociate the United States government from these operations by maintaining that the Cubans were hired by the Leopoldville government. This policy collapsed in June when the news media documented that American pilots had been flying combat missions. Faced with this embarrassment, the State Department was forced to promise to prohibit such future activities. Ironically, the American officials on the scene, who shortly afterward became distressed by Tshombe's use of white mercenary troops, never considered these contract pilots in the same light. Regardless of such fine distinctions, the instant air force was soon in full operation using T-6s against Muléle's rebels. These aircraft provided air cover sorties for UN evacuation operations around Kikwit during early 1964; UN pilots, glad to have the T-6s around, turned a blind eye to the nature of the pilots. As the year progressed, the CIA continued to expand this operation and others to meet rising demands. By one account, the agency had a Cuban force of 200 infantry, around 30 pilots, and 60 ground personnel in the Congo by 1965. Some of these infantry were to have a critical role in support of Dragon Rouge. Still, this covert support was not intended to secure the Congo; the only way to accomplish that objective was to retrain the ANC. State, "Congolese Rebellion of 1964," pt. 1, 2-6; LBJ-NSF-CF: Congo, Container 81, Memos and Miscellaneous, vol. 1, 11/63-6/64; U.S. Department of State, Memorandum for Governor Harriman, Subject: Chinese Communist Involvement in Congolese Involvement in Congolese Insurrections, 11 August 1964, LBJ-NSF-CF: Congo, Container 81, Memos and Miscellaneous, vol. 3, 8/64; Vandewalle, L'Ommengang, 63-64; Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 136; Message, STATE 336 to AMEMBASSY Leopoldville, transmitted 4:09 p.m., 15 August 1964, LBJ-NSF-CF: Congo, Container 81, Congo Cables, vol. 3, 8/64; Fred E. Wagoner, DRAGON ROUGE: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo (Washington, DC; National Defense University, 1980), 29; and Barbara A. Wilson, "The Congo (Republic of the Congo- Leopoldville) Since January 1964," in Research Notes on Insurgency Potential in Africa South of the Sahara (Washington, DC: American University, August 1966), 77-78.
OPINION: Prince is composed, direct - and wrong about The N&O
I really don't know enough to make any judgement about Erik Prince or Blackwater, but I thought this was amusing:
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2008/07/13/3543928.htm
In the meeting, Prince and Gary Jackson, Blackwater's president, said our May 18 story, "Blackwater survives rough time," contained three errors:
--We reported that Presidential Airways, a sister company to Blackwater, had received a $91 million contract for air charter work in Guam. Prince said it was much smaller. When we provided documents, Blackwater responded that The N&O was "not as misguided as we thought."
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