McGregor Briefing to Danzig????

[Ski]

I enjoyed this briefing a great deal. As a 50A, I have pondered many of the same concepts - and some that are even more radical - to combine not only the USMC and USA, but to combine all the branches into Strategic, Operational and Tactical units.

I could care less where people publish their work - CDI is just fine, as good as any other think tank - to get new ideas introduced.

[Ken White]

I could care less where people publish their work - CDI is just fine, as good as any other think tank - to get new ideas introduced.

Hmmm, Bad example -- how 'bout Toyotas and Hondas? Choices, it all about choices, yours, mine, those who write.

They can certainly pick their think tank -- I, OTOH, think all Think Tanks need to be tanked, I trust none of them and am skeptical about their products. I think CDI in particular is not helpful -- and I'm a senior cynic; they're a deliberate step or two beyond cynical...

YMMV -- Obviously does and that's cool.

[Ski]

No doubt Ken. One must understand where the money comes with the "think" tanks. Then you can get a sniff of an agenda.

I think McGregor's stuff is very good and if he has to use CDI as an outlet so be it. I for one don't like 99% of the stuff coming out of AEI but it doesn't mean I won't read it.

[Ken White]

newspapers and the punditocracy -- and put little faith in any of them. I do a lot of checking...

If you meant that good writing or a good sensible article remained that, good, no matter where it was published or by whom, we can agree. OTOH if you meant what you said to start that thought by you:

"I could care less where people publish their work - CDI is just fine, as good as any other think tank - to get new ideas introduced."

We can disagree. Like I used to have to tell my kids, "you're judged by the company you keep..." That probably should not be true -- but it is.

My point is that MacGregor hurts his own credibility with many due to that association -- and that adversely impacts his ability to get his message across. No more.

I still think that, as I said, he's got the right idea and that it's a good briefing.

[William F. Owen]

Fixing Battalion and below are for the weirdos like Wilf and myself (I believe Mr. Odam also had a fairly complete small unit concept as well). There is some justification to focusing on big unit echelons since we seem to do well in small unit engagments, but I feel change needs to go from bottom up, not top down. I believe Wilf feels the same.
Reed

Doug and I have had some long chats about fixing Battalions. Recently I have started to address the Bn level from an arbibaritly fixed man power level to test some organisational concepts. Seems to work. I may be presenting it to the IDF Staff College.

b. Offering IDF modeling against the Egyptian forces of 1973 as another sample is just as empty, The IDF won 73 militarily; Sadat won politically.

c. More central to the discussion of military force structure is the start point. If we are to truly discuss joint, combined, modular forces with flattened C2 arichecture as a central instrument for strategic power then we must include air, naval, and other elements of power.

b. Yes, Saddat got the Sinai back, but Israel also got a US backed peace with Egypt and Jordan (something Israel wanted, but no evidence Sadat did) - none of that invalidates the need for military power in the shape of highly competent land warfare formations.

- but I agree, the the use and abuse of the IDF's 67 and 73 operations are not helpful to current discussions, if for no other reason than US and IDF command and leadership cultures are very different.

[Tom Odom]

Fair eneogh. Glad to see the language is less hostile. Perhaps we should both go to the "Hug it Out" Thread
Reed

You get what you give.

Tom

[Siddhi]

hi guys, stumbled on the post through the link in danger room - not that I was not aware of the blog, of course.

The link to MacGregor's post/ ppt seems to be down - could anyone put up a copy of the pres?

In exchange, i can offer official wonk insights to the Euro CFSP - and probably can stomach most of the abuse this offer will generate reg. the Battlegroup and Helsinki forces

ah, there we go, now the link works - but the offer still stands!

[gute]

My comments are directed at those who have much more knowledge about combat formations - the current modular BCT.

Was limiting the BCT to 2 maneuver BLTs simply a manpower/numbers/deployment move? I've read comments by officers who like the new brigades - is this "don't rock the boat" talk or are the current BCTs a step in the right direction?

I would think having only 2 maneuver BLTs limits the number of boots on the ground for stability ops so is the current BCT better suited for offensive operations such as the March Up during OIF?

I have read MacGregor's books Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire. It is very clear where he stands on the size of the BCT and how the its formed. Question: What's the real skinny on the Stryker? I've read its great, I read it sucks - WTF. 6-8 MacGregor Airborne-Air Assault Groups seems like a lot. How practical are large scale airborne ops in todays world?

Carlton Meyer, G2mil - I like a lot of his ideas, but I do not know a lot about him except his politics are left of mine. What's your take on him?

Obviously I great deal of interest in the military and want to ensure that I am reading material by sane people. Thanks.

[Fuchs]

Maybe you're one of the few here who paid attention to me - you might then know that I'm the lost guy here, entirely wrong in a small wars forum because I'm no small wars guy. That's because I'm a "no small wars!" guy.

I'm still paying attention to major war theory, and one such work is Douglas MacGregor's "Breaking the Phalanx" of 1997.

I read it years ago and marked only three pages for useful quotes (and even those are mediocre).
It was basically a book about a brigade-centric army reorganization (an idea that was at that time at least 50-60 years old) with some remarks about air and sea power as well.

I was not impressed, and am still seeking an answer to this old question of mine:

Why did "Breaking the Phalanx" get so much (it seemed so to me) attention (till the next fashion, COIN)? What was so special or advanced about it?

I have absolutely no idea, as it looks to me like a quite orthodox re-labeling of the old brigade-centric army idea that was discussed as early as in the 60's (probably not in the U.S.).
Some meant to me that hew as thinking out of the box, but I have difficulties to accept that re-labeling of existing ideas should be considered as thinking out of the box. That would be a very damning statement about his army.

I hope that dozens military theory-interested Americans in one place might be able to finally answer this old question of mine.

[Ken White]

...one such work is Douglas MacGregor's "Breaking the Phalanx" of 1997...It was basically a book about a brigade-centric army reorganization (an idea that was at that time at least 50-60 years old)...Why did "Breaking the Phalanx" get so much (it seemed so to me) attention (till the next fashion, COIN)? What was so special or advanced about it?

Nothing was special about it in the in the pure sense; he just surfaced an idea that has been floating around in the US Army (and the Marines) for a good many years -- since about 1793 thanks to the US Legions (LINK) -- Not the first effective combined arms Brigades, Gustavus Adolphus did that, but Wayne improved the idea a bit. The idea was surfaced frequently over the next 200 years. Many pointed out over the last 70 years or so that almost all our actual fighting was conducted by Brigades, Regimental Combat Teams or Combat Commands (all essentially the same thing), only in North Africa 1942-3 and the 1991 Gulf War did the US really have Divisions fighting instead of loosely controlling and supporting. So many proposed Brigades before MacGregor but never got any traction for one reason:

It would do away with the Division as a command echelon and that would call for the elimination of a number of Major General slots. Noty a good idea, according to many Major Generals -- and aspiring Brigadier Generals. nor did the Personnel community look upon it with favor as it would spoil their flow charts.

So MacGregor wasn't positing anything new or advanced but he was speaking truth to power and he did it in a published book that civilians could buy. Not all that daring in some places but while not daring, it has rarely been done by serving US Armed forces persons. That was the real 'special' thing about it.

Some meant to me that hew as thinking out of the box, but I have difficulties to accept that re-labeling of existing ideas should be considered as thinking out of the box. That would be a very damning statement about his army.

He wasn't thinking out of the box, all that had been discussed in professional journals and forums here for years -- but he sure published out of the box. Possibly retired as a Colonel because of it.

I hope that dozens military theory-interested Americans in one place might be able to finally answer this old question of mine.

I hadn't seen you ask before...

BTW, asking without being sarcastic and dismissive might help you get answers. You ask good questions but the surly, know it all tone doesn't help.

COIN is indeed the current fad -- we tend to do fads here; after all we gave the world the Hula Hoop. Like you, I could do without the COIN foolishness but it seems to have attracted fans...

[Rifleman]

It would do away with the Division as a command echelon and that would call for the elimination of a number of Major General slots. Noty a good idea, according to many Major Generals -- and aspiring Brigadier Generals.

I believe you're likely correct but it seems to me that it could also work to an officer's advantage for having a chance at getting a command.

There would be less slots for MGs in the Army but all these commands would opening up for Brigadiers in these big brigades, combat groups, legions (strength and honor? ), whatever.

Since some make Brigadier that won't make MG it seems like it would be appealing from the standpoint of a lot of people that are now wearing oak leaves.

What am I missing?

[Ken White]

...but all these commands would opening up for Brigadiers in these big brigades...What am I missing?

in the GOMO and a few irate MGs who believe what they're doing is important. That's all you're missing...

Obviously, a fairly simple restructure would fix it but the US army -- and the US Congress -- don't do 'fairily simple.'

Plus, as you noticed, all those Bdes are commanded by COLs, not BGs. That's 'cause the Army is statutorily limited on the number of GOs and covering those 45 or so AC Bdes/BCT (A BCT was a Battalion Combat Team until the geniuses in the Pentagon screwed that up) would mess up current assignments and plans. You gotta get your priorities straight, warfightin' is not as important as organizational orthodoxy...


The current Bde/BCT is too small to rate a BG. Now, if they get a third maneuver Bn/Sqn, plus an Arty or 'Fires' Bn for MCO, they'll probably get BGs. Until then -- and until the support and sustainment problems that mean Divs are handy and the Hq in being that is a Div which can serve as an intermediate Hq for theaters ala Afghanistan and Iraq. All in good time, I expect...

[Fuchs]

BTW, asking without being sarcastic and dismissive might help you get answers. You ask good questions but the surly, know it all tone doesn't help.

COIN is indeed the current fad -- we tend to do fads here; after all we gave the world the Hula Hoop. Like you, I could do without the COIN foolishness but it seems to have attracted fans...

You should look at that differently. People from Northern Germany are blunt and direct and don't hide their opinion as much as most people. You may be unused to it, but honesty has its advantages - especially in communication.

Btw, my sarcasm looks differently.


So he merely wrote down in a pleasantly readable format what many agreed to be necessary and his book became more of a rallying point and reference than it was a an innovation?

That's sad, because this was one of the relatively few published works on conventional war theory that got much attention post-90.

[Kreker]

The current Bde/BCT is too small to rate a BG. Now, if they get a third maneuver Bn/Sqn, plus an Arty or 'Fires' Bn for MCO, they'll probably get BGs. Until then -- and until the support and sustainment problems that mean Divs are handy and the Hq in being that is a Div which can serve as an intermediate Hq for theaters ala Afghanistan and Iraq. All in good time, I expect...

The Comprehensive Lessons Learned White Paper of TF 120 (ARCIC) mentions the need to add a third maneuver battalion to the modular brigade combat team (BCT) design.

[Copperhead]

The current Bde/BCT is too small to rate a BG. Now, if they get a third maneuver Bn/Sqn, plus an Arty or 'Fires' Bn for MCO, they'll probably get BGs. Until then -- and until the support and sustainment problems that mean Divs are handy and the Hq in being that is a Div which can serve as an intermediate Hq for theaters ala Afghanistan and Iraq. All in good time, I expect...

Ken, just one minor quibble: all three BCT types (Heavy, Infantry, Stryker) have Artillery Battalions: IBCT = 105s; SBCT = M777 155s; HBCT = Paladin.

The need for a third maneuver battalion has always been a glaring weakness. In the current fight the BCT's CAV Squadron usually fills in as an ad hoc third maneuver unit. No doubt this wouldn't be wise in a MCO since you would actually need to use the CAV Squadron for its intended purpose.

It should be noted that the Stryker BCTs have always had three maneuver battalions. Only the IBCT and HBCT are limited to two.

[Ken White]

Ken, just one minor quibble: all three BCT types (Heavy, Infantry, Stryker) have Artillery Battalions: IBCT = 105s; SBCT = M777 155s; HBCT = Paladin...It should be noted that the Stryker BCTs have always had three maneuver battalions. Only the IBCT and HBCT are limited to two.

I was thinking on the Fires Bns... Old age? Late night? Dunno...

On the Strykers, I didn't know they had three Bns. That's good, the others will get there I'm sure. I suspect the modifications required to the OPD pattern were as much responsible for the replacement of the 3d maneuver elm with the RSTA Sqn as opposed to merely adding it as were gross strength constraints.

[Old Eagle]

it's hard to do 2 up & 1 back if you have only 2 maneuver bns.

[Ken White]

You should look at that differently. People from Northern Germany are blunt and direct and don't hide their opinion as much as most people. You may be unused to it, but honesty has its advantages - especially in communication.

The problem is that this medium of communication doesn't allow the easy back and forth of verbal communicarion so a mildly disparaging comment accompanied by a smile and a shrug comes across in print as an attack if one isn't careful...

So he merely wrote down in a pleasantly readable format what many agreed to be necessary and his book became more of a rallying point and reference than it was a an innovation?

That's sad, because this was one of the relatively few published works on conventional war theory that got much attention post-90.

Published for broad public sale, true. A lot of good material rarely makes it to that level -- but it does get digested and discussed and the public never sees it. MacGregor's book just hit at the right time.

The fall of the Wall, followed by the 1991 Gulf War caught the US and the Army in a "Okay... Now what do we do?" moment. No one had a clue what to do or how to structure but the bureaucracy went to work on it. Bureaucracy is slow, so no movement was apparent to most. Then along came Macgregor with some solid and practical ideas -- not innovative in the grand sense but innovative from the perspective of a very conservative US Army. No real mystery that it got wide acclaim. I imagine Saxe's 'Reveries' was not realized as anything special when it was first published because a lot of people shared his experience. Only later did the simple prescriptions become recognized as classical.

He has some really good ideas and his later efforts have also been practical and bear study and implementation. He makes more sense than do most of the Think Tanks...

But then, my five year old Granddaughter makes more sense than do most Think tanks...

[Ken White]

it's hard to do 2 up & 1 back if you have only 2 maneuver bns.

One up and two back. Much, much better most of the time. One up and three back is even mo' better. Seriously...

[Rifleman]

(A BCT was a Battalion Combat Team until the geniuses in the Pentagon screwed that up)

Exactly. I had the good fortune to be in the one we had when one was all we had.

"Ciao bella, sonno un Paracadutista Americano."

Suave bunch, huh?

Ah, Vicenza. What a good experience!