McGregor Briefing to Danzig????

[Kreker]

Supposedly COL Doug McGregor, USA, Ret, briefed Richard Danzig (possible SecDef)the following presentation found at http://web.me.com/steelgunner1977/Co...%20Keynote.swf.
Best,
Kreker

[jkm_101_fso]

I think there is compelling evidence and reasons to do away with the division.

I believe there would be incredible resistance...at the highest levels.

I'd like to see the complete MTOE breakdown for the ICG, CMG, LRSG & STRG.

[reed11b]

I am having difficulty getting the link to load, but I an very familiar with Mr. MacGregor’s Combat Group Concept. Regardless of how you feel about the total concept, there are really good ideas tucked into it. Flattening the command chain, a separate expeditionary combat support group, instead of trying to shoehorn everything into the BCT, rotational readiness (that’s one of my soap boxes btw) and a focus on capability. The main negative is a strong focus on conventional war fighting, but that has some justification as well. My main disagreements with Col Mac are on the nuts and bolts TO&E issues, not the main concept philosophy.
UPDATE: it loaded, looks like he has fixed and improved his concepts quite a bit. I thought the quote "Some wars simply should not be fought" was telling. Too bad he is still using those ridiculous Clancy like hypothetical operations to show concept viability. I noticed an increase in infantry in his concept, this is good. I question his "rapid prototyping and fielding" concept and some other aspects, but overall I like what he has to say
Reed
P.S. anyone mind if I invited Col Mac to the forum?

[Rifleman]

I see that Col. MacGregor is now including the Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the combat group concept. That seems like a good idea but can abandoning the Marine Division in favor of permanent MEBs happen through executive power? I thought the USMC was directed to maintain three divisions by congress?

[jkm_101_fso]

My main disagreements with Col Mac are on the nuts and bolts TO&E issues

Do you have the MTOE concept for the Battle Groups, down to the platoon level? I'd like to see it.

P.S. anyone mind if I invited Col Mac to the forum?

Heck no! Bring him in!

[reed11b]

Do you have the MTOE concept for the Battle Groups, down to the platoon level? I'd like to see it.

I 'll have to dig around and see if I still have the PPT. Changes are mostly at Battalion and above. Fixing Battalion and below are for the weirdos like Wilf and myself (I believe Mr. Odam also had a fairly complete small unit concept as well). There is some justification to focusing on big unit echelons since we seem to do well in small unit engagments, but I feel change needs to go from bottom up, not top down. I believe Wilf feels the same.
Reed

[Ken White]

I like the thrust; agree that Divisions need to go and that BCTs do not have enough maneuver strength. The organizations he proposes are sound -- more so than the current versions -- and the concept will work.

He's correct on one item -- the laws (down with DOPMA!!! Revisit Goldwater-Nichols) will have to be changed and longer tenure for the CofS,A and CMC will be needed or else the bureaucracy will in fact wait them out. Problem also is that powerful Congress critters will oppose this citing it's their business ('raise Armies') and for other, more, uh, personal and concrete reasons...

Of course, the Navy and thus the Marines are the Executive's bailiwick so the fix could be applied to the Corps which would force the Army to keep up...

Added: Rifleman makes a good point on the three division statutory requiremnt but I think the executive could finesse that on raw strength grounds.

The existing power structure will also be opposed for a variety of reasons, mid grade Officers will object, the troops will grumble and the government employee unions will see problems. That said, something along this line is really needed...

I disagree with him on some organizational issues:

1. He desires 16 AC CM"' and only 2 ARNG CM"' -- bad ratio. Nine and nine would be better IMO.

2. He posits 11 IC"' (+12 MarC"') AC apparently all light and triple capable; parachute, airmobile or various vehicle mountings. I'd add four more but do strongly agree that the capability to provide those 11 (or 15), all multi capable exists and needs to be accomplished.

3. He suggests 20 RC IC"' apparently all w/ LAV/Stryker. Not sure I understand the rationale for that -- and I am not a Stryker fan. Sorry, Rob, I know it's a good vehicle and state of the art; I just think the need has been known for long enough that we should be a little further advanced in vehicle choices -- but I acknowledge we are where we are. In any event, I suspect the AC will want /need some...

I also think his exemplary scenario is not ideal but that's just me. He did not address the flaws in Goldwater-Nichols but I know that's a separate issue -- it will have an effect on his recommendations, though...

Other than that, I think he's outdone "Breaking the Phalanx," a great idea that Pete Schoomaker got partly done -- as much as the bureaucracy would allow. Well done, BZ and 25,000 Attaboys...

I also note his cavalry background is quite obvious. Not a problem IMO, that's one parochial slant I agree with.

Lastly and importantly, I have long contended that we needed better trained and more capable units; purpose designed equipment and a better personnel structure that flattened the rank structure and that emphasized tactical and operational decision making and flexibility. Further, that we got a wake up call with the Tehran Embassy seizure and our great but failed attempt -- due to a lack of all the foregoing items and that we failed for 20 plus years to rectify those shortfalls -- and are STILL failing. Colonel Macgregor summed all that up beautifully and far better than I have ever been able to:

"Mobile dispersed warfare demands the tactics of infiltration be elevated to the operational level of war."

Exactly. I'd also say the obvious future requires it...

[reed11b]

Just got an email for Mr. MacGregor. He says that the PPT was intended for Mr. Danzig, but that he has not seen it yet. He also stated that he will not be able to participate in the forum at this time due to business constraints. I told him the invite remained open however, perhaps we will see him in the future.
Reed

[Rifleman]

If anyone is interested, Col. MacGregor's briefing appears to be based on a chapter he co-authored with Col. G.I. Wilson in a book called America's Defense Meltdown. The intended audience is "President Obama and the New Congress."

The book is available on a PDF document here: http://www.cdi.org/program/document....e=../index.cfm

The book also includes chapters on national strategy, personnel, and air and naval reform.

Yep, Mr. Lind also gets some print time in the book.

[Ken White]

I hoped that Macgregor had distanced himself from CDI. Guess not...

Sigh.

[Tom Odom]

I hoped that Macgregor had distanced himself from CDI. Guess not...

Sigh.

Agreed. Consider

And what of the great victories in the Persian Gulf, the 1991 war to liberate Kuwait and the 2003 invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein’s hostile regime? Don’t those U.S. operations prove our armed forces’ historic superiority? America did quickly beat Iraq’s armed forces in 1991, and in the early phases of the 2003 invasion, but those victories were both incomplete and against forces best characterized as grossly incompetent – perhaps even the “most incompetent in the world.”1 Against the best of Saddam Hussein’s forces, the so-called Republican Guard, America’s military commanders
in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 failed to capture or destroy the Guard as the single prop to Saddam’s regime that enabled him to survive the war. In 2003, the Army’s most senior commanders again made fundamental tactical, operational and strategic errors, and in one situation virtually panicked when faced with an enemy that was virtually immobilized by its own incompetence.2

If you have to go to overstatement to make your point in a preface then your analysis is most likely bent. McGregor is great on some issues; on others he is in left field. I would put the plan to take Baghdad with 50,000 troops over the fence in leftfield.

The architects of the current war in Iraq slickly proclaim victory in sight thanks to the success of the “surge” there. Politically motivated to their very core, they studiously ignore the internal dynamics in Iraq and the region that have been inestimably more powerful in lowering the violence there. Blind as the proverbial bat, they and even opponents to the Iraq misadventure now proclaim that more of the same in Afghanistan will rescue the collapsing situation there. As Pentagon wags used to remark inside the building, “it’s data-free analysis and analysis-free decisions” that are driving U.S. policy.

That would be the proverbial pot calling the kettle out...

[Tom Odom]

Along with Ken I see much merit here while I also share many of the same concerns.

But my central concerns are as follows:

a. At the theoretical level, he assumes that national strategic thought is a rational process versus an emotional reaction. Suggesting that it is in our interest to avoid long term conflicts makes a great slide because it is attractively simple. I just do not see a historical case on which to build such a theory--unless you go back to a Weinburger/Powell model of only using overwhelming force.

b. Tied to the above concern, I remain sceptical of a "two week and we're home for XMas" scenario. Offering IDF modeling against the Egyptian forces of 1973 as another sample is just as empty, The IDF won 73 militarily; Sadat won politically.

c. More central to the discussion of military force structure is the start point. If we are to truly discuss joint, combined, modular forces with flattened C2 arichecture as a central instrument for strategic power then we must include air, naval, and other elements of power. Developing a briefing that discusses how to organize the Army and the Marines to fight in keeping with a new strategic paradigm as claimed by the author is anachronistic to begin with and ultimately limiting.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Fixing Battalion and below are for the weirdos like Wilf and myself (I believe Mr. Odam also had a fairly complete small unit concept as well). There is some justification to focusing on big unit echelons since we seem to do well in small unit engagments, but I feel change needs to go from bottom up, not top down. I believe Wilf feels the same.
Reed

Doug and I have had some long chats about fixing Battalions. Recently I have started to address the Bn level from an arbibaritly fixed man power level to test some organisational concepts. Seems to work. I may be presenting it to the IDF Staff College.

b. Offering IDF modeling against the Egyptian forces of 1973 as another sample is just as empty, The IDF won 73 militarily; Sadat won politically.

c. More central to the discussion of military force structure is the start point. If we are to truly discuss joint, combined, modular forces with flattened C2 arichecture as a central instrument for strategic power then we must include air, naval, and other elements of power.

b. Yes, Saddat got the Sinai back, but Israel also got a US backed peace with Egypt and Jordan (something Israel wanted, but no evidence Sadat did) - none of that invalidates the need for military power in the shape of highly competent land warfare formations.

- but I agree, the the use and abuse of the IDF's 67 and 73 operations are not helpful to current discussions, if for no other reason than US and IDF command and leadership cultures are very different.

[Siddhi]

hi guys, stumbled on the post through the link in danger room - not that I was not aware of the blog, of course.

The link to MacGregor's post/ ppt seems to be down - could anyone put up a copy of the pres?

In exchange, i can offer official wonk insights to the Euro CFSP - and probably can stomach most of the abuse this offer will generate reg. the Battlegroup and Helsinki forces

ah, there we go, now the link works - but the offer still stands!

[gute]

My comments are directed at those who have much more knowledge about combat formations - the current modular BCT.

Was limiting the BCT to 2 maneuver BLTs simply a manpower/numbers/deployment move? I've read comments by officers who like the new brigades - is this "don't rock the boat" talk or are the current BCTs a step in the right direction?

I would think having only 2 maneuver BLTs limits the number of boots on the ground for stability ops so is the current BCT better suited for offensive operations such as the March Up during OIF?

I have read MacGregor's books Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire. It is very clear where he stands on the size of the BCT and how the its formed. Question: What's the real skinny on the Stryker? I've read its great, I read it sucks - WTF. 6-8 MacGregor Airborne-Air Assault Groups seems like a lot. How practical are large scale airborne ops in todays world?

Carlton Meyer, G2mil - I like a lot of his ideas, but I do not know a lot about him except his politics are left of mine. What's your take on him?

Obviously I great deal of interest in the military and want to ensure that I am reading material by sane people. Thanks.

[Fuchs]

Maybe you're one of the few here who paid attention to me - you might then know that I'm the lost guy here, entirely wrong in a small wars forum because I'm no small wars guy. That's because I'm a "no small wars!" guy.

I'm still paying attention to major war theory, and one such work is Douglas MacGregor's "Breaking the Phalanx" of 1997.

I read it years ago and marked only three pages for useful quotes (and even those are mediocre).
It was basically a book about a brigade-centric army reorganization (an idea that was at that time at least 50-60 years old) with some remarks about air and sea power as well.

I was not impressed, and am still seeking an answer to this old question of mine:

Why did "Breaking the Phalanx" get so much (it seemed so to me) attention (till the next fashion, COIN)? What was so special or advanced about it?

I have absolutely no idea, as it looks to me like a quite orthodox re-labeling of the old brigade-centric army idea that was discussed as early as in the 60's (probably not in the U.S.).
Some meant to me that hew as thinking out of the box, but I have difficulties to accept that re-labeling of existing ideas should be considered as thinking out of the box. That would be a very damning statement about his army.

I hope that dozens military theory-interested Americans in one place might be able to finally answer this old question of mine.

[Ken White]

...one such work is Douglas MacGregor's "Breaking the Phalanx" of 1997...It was basically a book about a brigade-centric army reorganization (an idea that was at that time at least 50-60 years old)...Why did "Breaking the Phalanx" get so much (it seemed so to me) attention (till the next fashion, COIN)? What was so special or advanced about it?

Nothing was special about it in the in the pure sense; he just surfaced an idea that has been floating around in the US Army (and the Marines) for a good many years -- since about 1793 thanks to the US Legions (LINK) -- Not the first effective combined arms Brigades, Gustavus Adolphus did that, but Wayne improved the idea a bit. The idea was surfaced frequently over the next 200 years. Many pointed out over the last 70 years or so that almost all our actual fighting was conducted by Brigades, Regimental Combat Teams or Combat Commands (all essentially the same thing), only in North Africa 1942-3 and the 1991 Gulf War did the US really have Divisions fighting instead of loosely controlling and supporting. So many proposed Brigades before MacGregor but never got any traction for one reason:

It would do away with the Division as a command echelon and that would call for the elimination of a number of Major General slots. Noty a good idea, according to many Major Generals -- and aspiring Brigadier Generals. nor did the Personnel community look upon it with favor as it would spoil their flow charts.

So MacGregor wasn't positing anything new or advanced but he was speaking truth to power and he did it in a published book that civilians could buy. Not all that daring in some places but while not daring, it has rarely been done by serving US Armed forces persons. That was the real 'special' thing about it.

Some meant to me that hew as thinking out of the box, but I have difficulties to accept that re-labeling of existing ideas should be considered as thinking out of the box. That would be a very damning statement about his army.

He wasn't thinking out of the box, all that had been discussed in professional journals and forums here for years -- but he sure published out of the box. Possibly retired as a Colonel because of it.

I hope that dozens military theory-interested Americans in one place might be able to finally answer this old question of mine.

I hadn't seen you ask before...

BTW, asking without being sarcastic and dismissive might help you get answers. You ask good questions but the surly, know it all tone doesn't help.

COIN is indeed the current fad -- we tend to do fads here; after all we gave the world the Hula Hoop. Like you, I could do without the COIN foolishness but it seems to have attracted fans...

[Rifleman]

It would do away with the Division as a command echelon and that would call for the elimination of a number of Major General slots. Noty a good idea, according to many Major Generals -- and aspiring Brigadier Generals.

I believe you're likely correct but it seems to me that it could also work to an officer's advantage for having a chance at getting a command.

There would be less slots for MGs in the Army but all these commands would opening up for Brigadiers in these big brigades, combat groups, legions (strength and honor? ), whatever.

Since some make Brigadier that won't make MG it seems like it would be appealing from the standpoint of a lot of people that are now wearing oak leaves.

What am I missing?

[Ken White]

...but all these commands would opening up for Brigadiers in these big brigades...What am I missing?

in the GOMO and a few irate MGs who believe what they're doing is important. That's all you're missing...

Obviously, a fairly simple restructure would fix it but the US army -- and the US Congress -- don't do 'fairily simple.'

Plus, as you noticed, all those Bdes are commanded by COLs, not BGs. That's 'cause the Army is statutorily limited on the number of GOs and covering those 45 or so AC Bdes/BCT (A BCT was a Battalion Combat Team until the geniuses in the Pentagon screwed that up) would mess up current assignments and plans. You gotta get your priorities straight, warfightin' is not as important as organizational orthodoxy...


The current Bde/BCT is too small to rate a BG. Now, if they get a third maneuver Bn/Sqn, plus an Arty or 'Fires' Bn for MCO, they'll probably get BGs. Until then -- and until the support and sustainment problems that mean Divs are handy and the Hq in being that is a Div which can serve as an intermediate Hq for theaters ala Afghanistan and Iraq. All in good time, I expect...

[Fuchs]

BTW, asking without being sarcastic and dismissive might help you get answers. You ask good questions but the surly, know it all tone doesn't help.

COIN is indeed the current fad -- we tend to do fads here; after all we gave the world the Hula Hoop. Like you, I could do without the COIN foolishness but it seems to have attracted fans...

You should look at that differently. People from Northern Germany are blunt and direct and don't hide their opinion as much as most people. You may be unused to it, but honesty has its advantages - especially in communication.

Btw, my sarcasm looks differently.


So he merely wrote down in a pleasantly readable format what many agreed to be necessary and his book became more of a rallying point and reference than it was a an innovation?

That's sad, because this was one of the relatively few published works on conventional war theory that got much attention post-90.