The LIC Board is a beautiful example of how our essentially dysfunctional Congress interferes with good intentions that go astray. Congress directed the board br formed in the NSC, it was -- but it was overcome by events as USSOCOM was activated and the Assistant SecDef for SO and LIC was established. It was an approach that was probably not needed.Originally Posted by xander day
The bigger impact of Congress is in the funding of the Army. While they really fund all of DoD, they hang their hat on the clause in the Constitution that charges them with the responsibility to raise Armies. They use that clause to force single year appropriations all too often for purchases even though billions could be saved by going to multi-year contracting (this allows them to tinker with the budget every year and write in obscure clauses that direct certain things -- like the LIC Board that was not needed); they do not like to fund training very heavily -- training does not provide financial benefit to more than a very few of the various States and Congressional electoral Districts.
Congress can force the purchase of major items of equipment (i.e. big war stuff like Tanks) which produce jobs for the voters in many districts. It is said, only partly in jest, that the C-130 has sub-contractors in every Congressional district. It's more about them buying votes than it is about what's really required. In fairness, they do force some good things on occasion but I'd guess that's about a fourth or less of the time.It is my firm belief that Cassidy is absolutely correct -- and that the concern over bodybags also permeates the Armed Forces leadership to far too great an extent; we over emphasize force protection at the expense of mission accomplishment.The Vietnam Syndrome will be, I think, the central area of my essay...Cassidy raises the idea that the Syndrome had more of an impact on military leaders than Vietnam actually had upon the American people: that decision makers were so scared of the Syndrome that they treated it with more trepidation that it infact needed to be.Simply, it states that in the US for any given war, about 1/3 will support it, 1/3 will accept it OR oppose it based on how well it is going at the time (i.e. they're fickle) and the remaining third will strongly oppose it. While there are those that dispute it, it is historically borne out. I'd also suggest that the 1/3 in opposition is composed of a hard core of true anti-war types but many will go to that end of the spectrum depending solely upon ideology. Here in the US, many Republicans opposed the Democratic Administration's forays into the Balkans while many Democrats opposed both Bush Republican Administration's entries in the ME.Ken, what is the One Third Rule please?
There is also a two (some say three) year rule -- Americans will support a war for two or three years and then just want it over so they can get on with other things. Many also dispute that but again, it is historically validated -- even in WW II, by early 1944, everyone was tired of it. We are an impatient bunch and just want to get it fixed and get back to barbecueing in the back yard.
I personally am strongly convinced both 'rules' are valid and that this has a significant effect on your hypotheses. I also believe that the US can and should avoid small wars if at all possible for those reasons. That does not mean we should not know how to conduct them; we must and should be prepared to do so -- but they are not the US way of doing business so we should try to stay out of them if able. My sensing is that many in the US instinctively share this view but may not be able to or wish to articulate that.
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