dissertation help please! US military culture and small wars.

[xander day]

As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating. It will concentrate upon several distinct areas; technology, denial and self validation. In regard to technology the section will look at how such developments do not help the fighting of small wars. To do this it will look at a number of different authors arguments on the subject as well as drawing conclusions from previously successful irregular wars. Part of this will also look at the arguments for and against the relevancy of the current (disputed) revolution in military affairs (RMA), many critiques of which will prove useful not only for this section, but for the dissertation as a whole. The idea of self validation will look at how the first Gulf War ‘proved’ the relevancy of conventional warfare to the military leadership and is related to the previous assessment because the first Gulf War was enabled by technological superiority and is given by many as the evidence for the existence of the current RMA. This section will illustrate how the success of the Gulf War paradoxically weakened American military power and also how it relates to the military’s forgetfulness in regard to irregular war: President George H.W. Bush’s speech in which he claimed that America had finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome is the centrepiece for this argument and is a grand instance of denial.
The final section of my dissertation will be a discussion of the changes that are taking place within the American military, such as the ‘Modular Force’ concept, and their, and its, relevancy. This section will, like so many others, be intentionally brief so as to not dominate the piece, but must be included if my essay is to be an accurate account. It will feature a summary of the proposed changes and their foreseen effects, with particular reference to the culture of individual units of the Army and how this culture will be altered with the implementation of these changes. The marine corps shall serve as the personification of this change because of their developed unit culture and individual lexicon.

particular focus is upon the vietnam syndrome and the conventional warfighting stance of the U.S.

for those that have spent the time reading this and helping me out, i thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Xander

[Ken White]

might be "Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?" I suggest that because I'm unsure that what you've posted here justifies your thesis. In any event, some thoughts for you:

Is the British model superior and if so what recent proof exists of that?

You might wish to be careful with "the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans..." The former was an aberration and a political miscalculation due to another political miscalculation; the latter was due to the misplaced belief that Europe could and would take care of a European problem of little concern to the US. I.e. both events were due to political -- not military -- errors and thus have little bearing on your thesis.

While this is true and deserves mention "...power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars." you should also consider that the US Congress has as much or more say in that seeming and nominal 'complex' than do the military and the industrialists.

Caution is needed with this as well: "This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades..." while that may historically be marginally correct; need it be that way? I'd say no.

Same here: "It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect." Unprofessional or just undertrained and poorly focused (for counterinsurgency small wars; one presumes you did not mean to apply that to large wars as well -- else you'll have a dichotomy... ) -- the two are not at all synonymous. I do not disagree at all with your preferred paradigm statement but I do think the Viet Nam syndrome and bodybag effect can be and are overdone. The One Third Rule applies. I also believe that if you talk to the British Army today, they will not concur that the US army today (as opposed to five years ago) is either unprofessional or inexperienced with regard to small wars.

This statement: "and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns." is subject to serious question on many levels. For example if X force for Y years is minimal, then is X force for (Yx4) years still minimal? Far more importantly, be very sure you consider the fact that in both those operations, Britain WAS the government; a situation the US has not been involved with since the Indian wars of the 19th Century and the Philippine involvement in the early 20th. It makes a difference. A big difference. I think you need to be rather careful in the assumptions on this one...

When you complete your dissertation, I look forward to reading your treatment of this: "As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating."

My overall perception is that your effort is based on common wisdom (Heh) and perceptions. They're not totally incorrect but they do bear a great deal more thought than they seem to have been given thus far. Good luck.

I suspect you might attract a few more responses after the US Thanksgiving holiday -- which essentially lasts until next Monday. Gian may stop by...

[John T. Fishel]

for me, I would be telling you to NARROW YOUR FOCUS! A common fallacy among new thesis writiers is to try to do too much. The second thing I would tell you is that you clearly believe that you know what the answer is so you should be developing this as a hypothesis to be tested. By testing I mean that you must state your tentative conclusion in a form such that you can collect and analyze data so that it could prove your hypothesis false or wrong. If you can't disprove your hypothesis then it will stand as a firmer conclusion.

In the case of your topic, the evidence is all over the map. There are cases which support your thesis and other cases which tend to disprove it. All the caveats theat Ken mentioned apply. Here are a few sources you could look at: the 4 colonels report on El Salvador, Schwartz's Rand study of the same, Chapter 7 of Max Manwaring and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which refutes both studies of El Sal, my 1995 article in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Also see John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Richard Downie, Learning From Conflict.

Good luck

Cheers

JohnT

[RTK]

I agree with Dr. Fishel. You've thrown a lot of red meat on the grill. I wouldn't call it a disertation, I'd call it an epic novel.

[xander day]

guys, i am amazed by both the speed of your replies and also the effort that you have all put in to help me with this! thanks so much!

Oh, before going any further, I am sorry about the unprofessional and inexperienced comment. This was a statement taken from an analysis of American experience in small wars, the inexperienced part was because of the lack of doctrinal information regarding small wars available to U.S. servicemen and women (at the time of writing, which I believe was the start of the 1980s). The unprofessional part (I groaned when I re-read that) was referring to the differences between the British Regulars and the American draftees of Vietnam and the high turnover of recruits – DEFINATELY not in any way trying to say that the U.S. Army is in any way unprofessional.

on to business:

one of the problems that I have with this dissertation is in sourcing material. I do not, unfortunately, have access to the most up to date books and journals, and as such I am having to rely upon many useful, but old, sources- of which the university library only has a limited number. Hence why what I have outlined may well sound re-hashed or done before. Also, being a 21 year old student, I rely upon firsthand accounts, and so the quotes that I use and my writing in general will reflect the points raised by their authors. Please note however that I am using only accounts from the most long-serving and respected men and women.
Since writing that outline (and it is very basic, for that I apologise) I have come across some more information to add in. Carnes Lord describes the role of Congress too, but the message of his article was rather confused; on the one hand he described how Congressional interference adds another voice to a large number of powerful voices and so splits small-war efforts (gave the CIA, Defence, Treasury and State Departments as other instances), but on the other presented the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Board as an area where Congressional ‘interference’ has helped America to wage low-intensity wars. He then later on described how (in 1992) the LIC was a ‘dead letter’ department and was essentially useless. Given that he is the only author that I have read so far that has talked about the role of congress in small warfighting, I am rather confused as to how in fact it does influence American capacity to wage such wars.
The Vietnam Syndrome will be, I think, the central area of my essay. I recognise totally the need for constant evaluation and questioning of authors comments and I am going to evaluate the significance and actual impact of the Syndrome using different viewpoints. Robert M. Cassidy raises the idea that the Syndrome had more of an impact on military leaders than Vietnam actually had upon the American people: that decision makers were so scared of the Syndrome that they treated it with more trepidation that it infact needed to be. I will evaluate this argument, but from what I have read, his argument seems valid and easily supportable, especially in relation to the pullout from Somalia after the ambush of the Quick Reaction Force.
Ken, what is the One Third Rule please?
Finally guys, I recognise that you are the experts about this. Alot of you seemingly have had first-hand experience and/or write books on the issue that I am but glimpsing and accordingly I am sorry if anything of what I have said in this outline sounds... well... ridiculous. But I am a student: being wrong and having those with experience tell me in detail how and why I am is what I do, and it is how I will make this piece of writing better, so please PLEASE keep it up (in particular any authors or works that may be useful), you have already been incredibly helpful.

[William F. Owen]

Xander Day,

Having read what you have provided, I think you may be making a number of assumptions about the UK and COIN that are simply not supported by the historical and operational record.

Comparing US and UK performance, with reference to the US conduct of the Vietnam War(S) and UK colonial anti-terrorist operations is, in my opinion, an intellectual dead end. There are no useful grounds for comparison, bar that which is simplistic.

Why the US does not actually practice it's own doctrine and listens to the wrong folks may be a subject worthy of examination. IMO, US military thought is only applicable to the US and does not travel well.

However the same could be asked of the UK. Our post 1945 performance being far from stellar.

Having said that, well done for studying war and hopefully warfare as well.

[xander day]

Mr Owen, could you go into more depth as to what parts of my planning are incorrect. From what you said it seems like you know a lot of information that I would find very helpful, and it seems as though I might have missed these ideas in my reading!
Thanks!
Xander

[Ken White]

...Carnes Lord...described how Congressional interference adds another voice to a large number of powerful voices and so splits small-war efforts (gave the CIA, Defence, Treasury and State Departments as other instances), but on the other presented the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Board as an area where Congressional ‘interference’ has helped America to wage low-intensity wars. He then later on described how (in 1992) the LIC was a ‘dead letter’ department and was essentially useless.

The LIC Board is a beautiful example of how our essentially dysfunctional Congress interferes with good intentions that go astray. Congress directed the board br formed in the NSC, it was -- but it was overcome by events as USSOCOM was activated and the Assistant SecDef for SO and LIC was established. It was an approach that was probably not needed.

The bigger impact of Congress is in the funding of the Army. While they really fund all of DoD, they hang their hat on the clause in the Constitution that charges them with the responsibility to raise Armies. They use that clause to force single year appropriations all too often for purchases even though billions could be saved by going to multi-year contracting (this allows them to tinker with the budget every year and write in obscure clauses that direct certain things -- like the LIC Board that was not needed); they do not like to fund training very heavily -- training does not provide financial benefit to more than a very few of the various States and Congressional electoral Districts.

Congress can force the purchase of major items of equipment (i.e. big war stuff like Tanks) which produce jobs for the voters in many districts. It is said, only partly in jest, that the C-130 has sub-contractors in every Congressional district. It's more about them buying votes than it is about what's really required. In fairness, they do force some good things on occasion but I'd guess that's about a fourth or less of the time.

The Vietnam Syndrome will be, I think, the central area of my essay...Cassidy raises the idea that the Syndrome had more of an impact on military leaders than Vietnam actually had upon the American people: that decision makers were so scared of the Syndrome that they treated it with more trepidation that it infact needed to be.

It is my firm belief that Cassidy is absolutely correct -- and that the concern over bodybags also permeates the Armed Forces leadership to far too great an extent; we over emphasize force protection at the expense of mission accomplishment.

Ken, what is the One Third Rule please?

Simply, it states that in the US for any given war, about 1/3 will support it, 1/3 will accept it OR oppose it based on how well it is going at the time (i.e. they're fickle) and the remaining third will strongly oppose it. While there are those that dispute it, it is historically borne out. I'd also suggest that the 1/3 in opposition is composed of a hard core of true anti-war types but many will go to that end of the spectrum depending solely upon ideology. Here in the US, many Republicans opposed the Democratic Administration's forays into the Balkans while many Democrats opposed both Bush Republican Administration's entries in the ME.

There is also a two (some say three) year rule -- Americans will support a war for two or three years and then just want it over so they can get on with other things. Many also dispute that but again, it is historically validated -- even in WW II, by early 1944, everyone was tired of it. We are an impatient bunch and just want to get it fixed and get back to barbecueing in the back yard.

I personally am strongly convinced both 'rules' are valid and that this has a significant effect on your hypotheses. I also believe that the US can and should avoid small wars if at all possible for those reasons. That does not mean we should not know how to conduct them; we must and should be prepared to do so -- but they are not the US way of doing business so we should try to stay out of them if able. My sensing is that many in the US instinctively share this view but may not be able to or wish to articulate that.

[BayonetBrant]

one of the problems that I have with this dissertation is in sourcing material. I do not, unfortunately, have access to the most up to date books and journals, and as such I am having to rely upon many useful, but old, sources- of which the university library only has a limited number. Hence why what I have outlined may well sound re-hashed or done before.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/periodicals/dodelecj.htm


That links gives you a pretty comprehensive listing of US military professional journals. At a minimum, it should help alleviate the source material problem.

[Steve Blair]

Linn's recent book "The Echo of Battle" gives a good, general overview of what he sees as US military culture. It's general, and I do have some quibbles with some of his points, but he does speak concisely to why the US military may appear to be poorly prepared for LIC in some instances.

[selil]

my 1995 article in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night."

Go ahead and JUST TRY and get that article (or journal). I've been plying our electronic sources librarian with adult beverages for two years and Purdue isn't exactly a small school.