dissertation help please! US military culture and small wars.

[Schmedlap]

The Utility of Force by General Rupert Smith

[xander day]

thanks for all of your replies guys! each is very helpful!
reading the amazon book review for The Utililty of Force as linked by Schmedlap, the author of said review says the following:

a year ago, an outraged British brigadier wrote a slashing (and according to some American officers, deeply unfair) critique of the U.S. Army's conduct of the Iraq War, attacking everything from its jargon to its general officer culture, something remarkable happened. The U.S. Army published the piece in its premier tactical journal, Military Review, and the Army's chief of staff passed the article around to our general officers.

anyone know who this brigadier was and where i could get his critique (and responses if anyone knows where they are) other than in the Military Review?

also, Selil, you are my hero! thanks for all of those bib references, i am sure that they will be incredibly helpful.

in regard to fourth generation warfare, what does this term actualy mean? some authors seem to treat the subject as something removed from purely unconventional / small warfare, whereas others appear to use the terms interchangabley.

thanks!

[William F. Owen]

in regard to fourth generation warfare, what does this term actualy mean? some authors seem to treat the subject as something removed from purely unconventional / small warfare, whereas others appear to use the terms interchangeably.

Ahhhh... welcome to our world!

a.) 4GW is highly controversial. I know and respect both TX Hammes and Bill Lind, as intellects - and nice guys, but I will have nothing to do with 4GW. Some folks swear by it, but it is full of wholes, and states opinions as facts.

b.) The words "Small War" and "Unconventional" are not academically or doctrinally precise. 4GW refers to a "generation of warfare." If you think that's rubbish (which I do) then don't get caught up in the semantic slugfest which dogs the study of war and warfare.

if you look at 4GW like I, and others here, do then 4GW is not something you come across either in the study of war, or warfare, as it does not survive rigour in either discipline.

[slapout9]

Jeffery Record from the Air War College has written quite a bit about this. He even did a whole book about it (have not read it) go to the Air University Link for his recent book review...."How David Beats Goliath".....or something like that.

[slapout9]

Link from the SWJ Library to Jeff Records on article on why culture stops America from winning small wars.

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640

[Ken White]

You'll note that the linked article he provides mirrors your beliefs to a great extent. I believe that reflects the common wisdom of academia, the political classes and the media -- however I and others disagree with that on several counts.

I'll use Record's words and give my counterpoint. I say 'my' because these words are mine however I've found a large number of people all over the country -- not members of the academy or media -- who essentially agree.

Quoth the abstract of Record's essay:

"Americans are averse to risking American lives when vital national interests are not at stake. Expecting that America's conventional military superiority can deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success, Americans are surprised and politically demoralized when confronted by Vietnam- and Iraq-like quagmires."

I strongly agree with his first point and more strongly disagree with his second. SOME Americans feel that way and they tend to move in the social circles in which Jeffrey moves; more Americans, I think are disappointed (not demoralized) that the armed forces have not succeeded and they are generally not surprised. The 'wisdom of crowds' syndrome applies; most are less surprised at failure or tedium than are the political and chattering classes.

"...Since the early 1940s, the Army has trained, equipped, and organized for large-scale conventional operations against like adversaries, and it has traditionally employed conventional military operations even against irregular enemies.

He's showing his ignorance -- that's been true since 1787; that Prussian influence...It has been particularly true since 1900-17.

Having said all that, he's correct in his inference:

"Barring profound change in America's political and military culture, the United States runs a significant risk of failure when it enters small wars of choice, and great power intervention in small wars is almost always a matter of choice. Most such wars, moreover, do not engage core U.S. security interests other than placing the limits of American military power on embarrassing display. Indeed, the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation.

but wrong, IMO, on three counts in the way he arrived at that inference; (1) his attribution of the risk aversion of the public is wrong as I stated above; (2) he does not understand or state all the drivers for the Army's predilection for avoiding small wars -- quite simply, they're very messy, very tedious and hard on the troops. That simple. Congress aids in this because of their misperception that the public is vehemently opposed (they are not, the 1/3 and two year rules apply) and their, Congress', desire to fund the big ticket procurement items as opposed to necessary training as vote buyers; (3) the statement that "the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation." is a left leaning ideological statement that is highly arguable if not downright ludicrous.

He ends with:

"The United States should abstain from intervention in such wars, except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing U.S. national security."

I agree with that and again say he got the correct result but for the wrong reasons.

The real reason to avoid such wars aside from the fact that they're messy and tedious (the Army position) is that we Americans are too impatient to prosecute them properly (the two year rule), too politically diverse and / or divided to develop unity of purpose in most cases (the 1/3 rule) and that most of them are, indeed, not necessary to secure US interests (Record's first and only accurate point...). IMO, of course.

[John T. Fishel]

Peter Feaver, a Prof of Political Science at Duke and a Naval Reserve officer, has done a lot of survey research on American public attitudes toward military interventions. Summarizing much of that, Feaver found that the American public is more than willing to sustain casualties in a conflict that they believe is important and that is being prosecuted effectively. Feaver's research tends to support the overly simplistic, but accurate in practical terms, 1/3 and 2 year rules (of thumb). But note that the public is willing to support a war longer and more willingly if the two stated conditions obtain.

Cheers

JohnT