Quote Originally Posted by xander day View Post
To the valued members of the small wars journal community.
i am currently in my third year studying war in Swansea, Wales, and am writing my dissertation. the title that i have chosen is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'
I was wondering if anyone would care to help me with ideas / book proposals/ suggestions. anything would help! i need particular help in relation to how the american military is changing to deal with the increasing prevalence of small wars - i have read ALOT about everything else, but can find very little about the current policies (force modularity?).
It is unclear to me in what field you're writing your dissertation. That piece of information is crucial in regards how one assess your thesis statement.

Regardless of the field, two recently published works that may be of interest to you are Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (ISBN-13: 978-0700615780) and Henry Cole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (ISBN-13: 978-0813125008). Dr. Trauschweizer addresses convincingly some of your points and may provide a good point of departure for additional discussion (this is, if you're looking for a historiographical framework).

The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so. The dissertation will show how this preference is a result of cultural biases and will extrapolate the various themes that feed these biases.
Although the dust is starting to settle, "culture" remains a highly contested term and basis for analysis in historical studies as well as other fields. I don't think one has to master this literature to write about culture intelligently. Still, it may be worth your while to develop your definition of "culture" and place it within the broader debate over the term. This suggestion is aimed at positioning your work so it can reach a broader audience.
The essay will centre upon how the American military’s preferred paradigm of conventional war is incompatible with the context of a small war and begin with a summary of why this is so. It will also look at the history of the American Army, and so will comment on the traditional division between the civilian sector and the military. It will outline this split and will look at how it came to exist, with particular reference to Upton’s ‘reforms’ of the Army in the wake of the civil war.
In regards to Upton, his reforms, and the "traditional division" in civil-military relations, I advise the utmost caution. The late Russell Weigley offered some observations on Upton and his reforms which were expanded by the late Stephen Ambrose in his biography of that troubled man. In tandem, the two raised questions about the efficacy of Upton's proposed reforms. I have explored some of those questions in my own research (as well as adding one or two of my own). The short version of my findings is that I do not believe that the U.S. Army's official account of Upton's reforms or of civil-military relations during the Gilded Age are supported by the documentary evidence.

If my interpretation is correct (I have evidence and a hunch that may lead me to a 'smoking gun'), many modern basic assumptions about civil military relations as well as the professionalism of the Army's officer corps may have to be re-examined.

As this project is well over the horizon, I think you will do well enough if you consult carefully Weigley's works on the U.S. Army and be wary of works that reference works by Upton, his biographer and friend Peter Michie, and, especially, Samuel Huntington. (I advise using Ambrose's biography of Upton guardedly. Regrettably--because he inspired me to study military history--Ambrose was exposed as a plagiarist towards the end of his life. As his lapses of judgment spanned his career, it is difficult to know which paragraphs of which of his books are reliable. Until that gets sorted out, why take unnecessary risks?)

In regards to your 'big war' versus 'small war' comparison, have you considered the preference you attribute to the U.S. Army (a conclusion with which I'm inclined to disagree) as a side effect of the quest for decisive battle?

HTH