dissertation help please! US military culture and small wars.

[xander day]

thanks for all of your replies guys! each is very helpful!
reading the amazon book review for The Utililty of Force as linked by Schmedlap, the author of said review says the following:

a year ago, an outraged British brigadier wrote a slashing (and according to some American officers, deeply unfair) critique of the U.S. Army's conduct of the Iraq War, attacking everything from its jargon to its general officer culture, something remarkable happened. The U.S. Army published the piece in its premier tactical journal, Military Review, and the Army's chief of staff passed the article around to our general officers.

anyone know who this brigadier was and where i could get his critique (and responses if anyone knows where they are) other than in the Military Review?

also, Selil, you are my hero! thanks for all of those bib references, i am sure that they will be incredibly helpful.

in regard to fourth generation warfare, what does this term actualy mean? some authors seem to treat the subject as something removed from purely unconventional / small warfare, whereas others appear to use the terms interchangabley.

thanks!

[William F. Owen]

in regard to fourth generation warfare, what does this term actualy mean? some authors seem to treat the subject as something removed from purely unconventional / small warfare, whereas others appear to use the terms interchangeably.

Ahhhh... welcome to our world!

a.) 4GW is highly controversial. I know and respect both TX Hammes and Bill Lind, as intellects - and nice guys, but I will have nothing to do with 4GW. Some folks swear by it, but it is full of wholes, and states opinions as facts.

b.) The words "Small War" and "Unconventional" are not academically or doctrinally precise. 4GW refers to a "generation of warfare." If you think that's rubbish (which I do) then don't get caught up in the semantic slugfest which dogs the study of war and warfare.

if you look at 4GW like I, and others here, do then 4GW is not something you come across either in the study of war, or warfare, as it does not survive rigour in either discipline.

[slapout9]

Jeffery Record from the Air War College has written quite a bit about this. He even did a whole book about it (have not read it) go to the Air University Link for his recent book review...."How David Beats Goliath".....or something like that.

[slapout9]

Link from the SWJ Library to Jeff Records on article on why culture stops America from winning small wars.

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6640

[Ken White]

You'll note that the linked article he provides mirrors your beliefs to a great extent. I believe that reflects the common wisdom of academia, the political classes and the media -- however I and others disagree with that on several counts.

I'll use Record's words and give my counterpoint. I say 'my' because these words are mine however I've found a large number of people all over the country -- not members of the academy or media -- who essentially agree.

Quoth the abstract of Record's essay:

"Americans are averse to risking American lives when vital national interests are not at stake. Expecting that America's conventional military superiority can deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success, Americans are surprised and politically demoralized when confronted by Vietnam- and Iraq-like quagmires."

I strongly agree with his first point and more strongly disagree with his second. SOME Americans feel that way and they tend to move in the social circles in which Jeffrey moves; more Americans, I think are disappointed (not demoralized) that the armed forces have not succeeded and they are generally not surprised. The 'wisdom of crowds' syndrome applies; most are less surprised at failure or tedium than are the political and chattering classes.

"...Since the early 1940s, the Army has trained, equipped, and organized for large-scale conventional operations against like adversaries, and it has traditionally employed conventional military operations even against irregular enemies.

He's showing his ignorance -- that's been true since 1787; that Prussian influence...It has been particularly true since 1900-17.

Having said all that, he's correct in his inference:

"Barring profound change in America's political and military culture, the United States runs a significant risk of failure when it enters small wars of choice, and great power intervention in small wars is almost always a matter of choice. Most such wars, moreover, do not engage core U.S. security interests other than placing the limits of American military power on embarrassing display. Indeed, the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation.

but wrong, IMO, on three counts in the way he arrived at that inference; (1) his attribution of the risk aversion of the public is wrong as I stated above; (2) he does not understand or state all the drivers for the Army's predilection for avoiding small wars -- quite simply, they're very messy, very tedious and hard on the troops. That simple. Congress aids in this because of their misperception that the public is vehemently opposed (they are not, the 1/3 and two year rules apply) and their, Congress', desire to fund the big ticket procurement items as opposed to necessary training as vote buyers; (3) the statement that "the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation." is a left leaning ideological statement that is highly arguable if not downright ludicrous.

He ends with:

"The United States should abstain from intervention in such wars, except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing U.S. national security."

I agree with that and again say he got the correct result but for the wrong reasons.

The real reason to avoid such wars aside from the fact that they're messy and tedious (the Army position) is that we Americans are too impatient to prosecute them properly (the two year rule), too politically diverse and / or divided to develop unity of purpose in most cases (the 1/3 rule) and that most of them are, indeed, not necessary to secure US interests (Record's first and only accurate point...). IMO, of course.

[John T. Fishel]

Peter Feaver, a Prof of Political Science at Duke and a Naval Reserve officer, has done a lot of survey research on American public attitudes toward military interventions. Summarizing much of that, Feaver found that the American public is more than willing to sustain casualties in a conflict that they believe is important and that is being prosecuted effectively. Feaver's research tends to support the overly simplistic, but accurate in practical terms, 1/3 and 2 year rules (of thumb). But note that the public is willing to support a war longer and more willingly if the two stated conditions obtain.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

The 1/3 and two year rules are of course nothing but very simplistic rules of thumb, shorthand for American diversity / divisiveness and impatience. I know the psych-folks say there's no such thing as a national trait. Perhaps, but those two things come close to disproving that idea...

The 'rules' are a convenient and concise way to express two phenomena for which as you say there is evidence -- and there's certainly some practical accuracy there, subject as always to the exceptions. My general observation has been that a majority of Americans will support the effort for far longer if they perceive it is being prosecuted as well as can be expected and see a real American interest in the outcome.

I'm also convinced that most Americans are little affected by bodybags -- provided they see a return or prospect of one for the loss. ADDED, for Xander -- that's the great unwashed, the American public. Politicians and Academia are affected by them; the former for unreasoning fear of voter turnoff, the latter due to ideological persuasion. The media here in the US will affect sadness and dismay while they revel behind the scenes at the thought of greater sales; "if it bleeds, it leads" being their watchwords.

The thing that has always bothered me is not the fickleness of that 1/3 of the public in the center who vacillate depending on how well things seem to be going (though they're mildly annoying; either the effort is worthwhile or it is not) but the large ideological component of either Yea or Nay sayers.

I am unable to understand people or politicians (not the same thing, I think...) who put party loyalty or personal ideology above the needs of the nation. I understand that 'good' is a relative and viewpoint dependent judgment but it seems to me that a large number of good and bad determinations pertaining to a particular war or military operation are based mostly upon political affiliation or leaning...

Allowing ideology to affect ones choices I can understand -- if one is inclined to dislike war, then non-support of most or all wars is understandable and even correct IMO -- to like this or that war dependent upon which party started it is particularly pathetic and borderline indefensible IMO.

[CR6]

Feaver found that the American public is more than willing to sustain casualties in a conflict that they believe is important and that is being prosecuted effectively. Feaver's research tends to support the overly simplistic, but accurate in practical terms, 1/3 and 2 year rules (of thumb). But note that the public is willing to support a war longer and more willingly if the two stated conditions obtain.


JohnT

This article by William Darley supports that contention, viewed through the lens of the effect of media on popular support for US military operations. It also includes decent end notes that Xander may find of use.