COIN Perspectives From On Point

[SWJED]

COIN Perspectives From On Point
Lessons Learned in Iraq
by Sergeant Michael Hanson, USMC

COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)

Tanks and artillery don’t defeat Insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantrymen are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".

This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) and advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best equipment for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.

So then how have small groups of rag tag insurgents with no complex war machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and home made weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?

[Surferbeetle]

Hell of an article.

[Bill Moore]

The author effectively addresses several serious flaws in our operational and tactical strategy, and he proposes a daring course of action.

After reading the article, it trigger the following thoughts:

1. Our military is still overly focused on Force Protection, and it limits our ability to take the fight to the enemy effectively. This is a case where political considerations (casualty rates) have once again won over the correct tactical employment of our forces to win this type of war.

2. His high risk proposal of deploying numerous small units to saturate an area is classic, but unforunately too daring for our military. I have to disagree with one of his points though, he said said the terrorists wouldn't know where we're at, they would just know that we could be everywhere (paraphrasing), so their freedom of movement would be severely limited. U.S. military forces in an urban environment for he most part would still be identified by the locals, and that information could be relayed to the enemy by suportive locals. This tactic is still sound, but we can't assume invisibility in an urban environment. Another option to expand upon his concept to develop local forces that are capable of using this strategy.

3. We're overly focused on the IED and IED cell/network. We're spending billions of dollars to protect ourselves from this threat as he pointed out, yet in doing so we are in many ways making the IED more effective. Sometimes I see parallels in our response to the IED problem to our response to the German submarine threat during WWII. The submarine threat was a much greater strategic threat than the IED, and there was considerable effort put forth to develop technologies to mitigate this threat. It was an appropriate effort in this case. Developing new armors, jamers, etc. to counter IEDs should be pursued in a similiar effort, but it shouldn't be the main effort.

If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED we would have a much greater impact on reducing IED attacks (as noted in the relatively secure areas). It seems to me we're looking at the IED as though this something completely new, yet it has been around forever. We used to call them booby traps and mechanical ambushes. We developed tactics to pacify an area, thus we defeated this threat by defeatng the enemy, not their tactic. Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.

Great article.

[Ken White]

1. Our military is still overly focused on Force Protection...

True.

2. His high risk proposal of deploying numerous small units to saturate an area is classic, but unforunately too daring for our military...This tactic is still sound, but we can't assume invisibility in an urban environment. Another option to expand upon his concept to develop local forces that are capable of using this strategy.

Probably correct that it is too 'daring' at this time -- though I submit we've done it many times before in many wars, it works and it isn't really all that daring -- it just assumes some risk. I for one do not think it is high risk; a risk? Sure; but not high -- not with halfway decent training which we can do.

You're of course correct that it will not generally work for us in an alien urban environment and that the HN folks will have to do it in such a locale -- but it will work in rural areas. In all cases, the factors of METT-TC apply...

3. We're overly focused on the IED and IED cell/network... Developing new armors, jamers, etc. to counter IEDs should be pursued in a similiar effort, but it shouldn't be the main effort.

True dat. Defeat the tactic, not the weapon. Where is the Joint RPG Task Force????

If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED... Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.

Great article.

It is that.

Good job, Sergeant Hanson

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Roger, unit saturation has been utilised. COL McMaster perfected it for OIF at Tal Afar, much to our Army's chagrin. Pentagon was in no mood to be told that the best COA would be the 1000 man per square kilometer terror supression tactic.

I for one supported the Colonel, who would go on to be passed over for promotion to BG despite being one of the most qualified Colonel's in our Army. His planning was strategically sound, politically sensitive & historically congruent.

I appreciate the multi-faceted questions brought to bear here. Many of the solutions are only impractical due to force projection limitations and manning requirements.

[Ken White]

"...Many of the solutions are only impractical due to force projection limitations and manning requirements...

is the answer to this:

...Pentagon was in no mood to be told that the best COA would be the 1000 man per square kilometer terror supression tactic.

Yes, McMaster got passed over; however, he later was selected so all's well that ends well as someone said.

All of which leads to my no more than idly curious question; what is your point?

[Cavguy]

I for one supported the Colonel, who would go on to be passed over for promotion to BG despite being one of the most qualified Colonel's in our Army. His planning was strategically sound, politically sensitive & historically congruent.

You do know that he is now a BG?

[SWJED]

Sgt Hanson and SWJ have been back and forth on this article - he put his heart and soul into the writing - even with our nags about this and that and stuck with it - job well done Marine!

[William F. Owen]

Gotta applaud this guy for his effort. What I find frustrating is that what he is saying has been being said by many people for a great many years, yet still nothing is done.

Anyone who has studied the current set of infantry problems, knows how to solve them. All the equipment and TTP answers are out there, and have been for many years. Infantry science is mostly "doctrinal archaeology".

The fire team is the decisive unit at this stage of the war. 4-6 men are much more likely to make contact with the enemy, draw the enemy into an open fight where we can destroy them with superior weapons and training. Imagine:

• 98 fire teams per battalion vs. 36 squads per battalion
• 36 fire teams per company vs. 12 squads per company
• 9 fire teams per platoon vs. 3 squads per platoon

Historically, and doctrinally a fire team is actually 3-5. 6 men is two 3 man fire teams (or "glued" cells).

36 fire teams just breaks the span of control, so does 9, so some intermediate command level is needed. Lots of research in this area. Platoons are not military inventions. They are products of human nature.

However if you flexibly task organise platoons as 3-6 fire teams, or use sub task 2-3 teams into sections, you are getting to what the Australians, Brits and Israelis do in practice. It works. This also loves a lot of weight issues as well.

... I think we may have discussed this all before somewhere...

[slapout9]

Gotta applaud this guy for his effort. What I find frustrating is that what he is saying has been being said by many people for a great many years, yet still nothing is done.

Anyone who has studied the current set of infantry problems, knows how to solve them. All the equipment and TTP answers are out there, and have been for many years. Infantry science is mostly "doctrinal archaeology".



Historically, and doctrinally a fire team is actually 3-5. 6 men is two 3 man fire teams (or "glued" cells).

36 fire teams just breaks the span of control, so does 9, so some intermediate command level is needed. Lots of research in this area. Platoons are not military inventions. They are products of human nature.

However if you flexibly task organise platoons as 3-6 fire teams, or use sub task 2-3 teams into sections, you are getting to what the Australians, Brits and Israelis do in practice. It works. This also loves a lot of weight issues as well.

... I think we may have discussed this all before somewhere...

Wilf, I have beeen waiting for you to comment on this Of course it is a good paper it was written by a Sergeant!

[Dr Jack]

Sgt Hanson and SWJ have been back and forth on this article - he put his heart and soul into the writing - even with our nags about this and that and stuck with it - job well done Marine!

Congratulations! Great contribution.

[Ron Humphrey]

An easy to read and IMHO accurate article, Good Job.

I do have maybe one quibble or concern as it might be.

Although breaking down into smaller yet still effective groups would likely be effective however how much consideration should be taken of the fact that it also leaves those particular forces open not only to ambushes by larger enemy force but on another note possibly much more susceptible to percieved or enemy IO driven accusations with little actual capability to protect themselves from the aforementioned.

This would seem more probable in places other than the west.

How do you make sure that your "good works" don't end up misconstrued by those who constantly seek to see things other than they are already?

[reed11b]

If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED we would have a much greater impact on reducing IED attacks (as noted in the relatively secure areas). It seems to me we're looking at the IED as though this something completely new, yet it has been around forever. We used to call them booby traps and mechanical ambushes. We developed tactics to pacify an area, thus we defeated this threat by defeatng the enemy, not their tactic. Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.

Great article.

That is something that I have long felt, though I have not been able to articulate it. Same thing goes for attack helicopters doing specific anti-MANPADS missions or Stryker counter-mortar ambush missions. I have always looked at these as manpower intensive for limited reward and more of a "reactionary" measure then an actual plan. I have also always told myself that the people making these decisions are far more experienced and trained then I am and that perhaps I am wrong, so it is nice to see my opinions validated.
Reed

[Steve Blair]

What is really depressing to a history type like myself is how much of this is familiar. We keep seeing the same problems over and over, and have to relearn the same lessons (empower our NCOs...don't carry tons of gear...etc.) each time.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

hit several nails right on the head.

Bill said:

I have to disagree with one of his points though, he said said the terrorists wouldn't know where we're at, they would just know that we could be everywhere (paraphrasing), so their freedom of movement would be severely limited. U.S. military forces in an urban environment for he most part would still be identified by the locals, and that information could be relayed to the enemy by suportive locals.

I believe that the crux of Sgt Hanson's point was that by saturating an area with numerous fire teams operating as stealthily (tactically) as possible, vice squads moving in the open acting more as a ‘presence,’ that some would always be undetected. Granted in urban areas the more locals you operate around the greater the chance of being dimed out by them, but with enough fire teams operating in an area some would inevitably escape observation or detection (e.g. by infil and exfil at night). So eventually the bad guys would never be absolutely 100% sure they were not about to take a round in the back while planting an IED or operating freely in what was once a secure area. In COIN when we dance to their tune, they win. It's time we started setting a new tune of our own. And not a technical tune that has some gazillion dollar price tag attached (JIEDDO and MRAP come to mind).

Of course this would mean a major paradigm shift in the way our infantry operates and leadership thinks, the grunts would have to operate less like a ground pounder and more like SF. Boy oh boy, SOCOM would be in a tizzy then.

There are many who have made the fatal mistake of underestimating the intellectual prowess of Marine NCOs.

[William F. Owen]

I believe that the crux of Sgt Hanson's point was that by saturating an area with numerous fire teams operating as stealthily (tactically) as possible, vice squads moving in the open acting more as a ‘presence,’ that some would always be undetected.

The UK did this all the time in Northern Ireland. "Bricks" - UK Fire teams - would alternate between open patrolling and "lurking", while co-operating with other "satellite" patrols.

Of course this would mean a major paradigm shift in the way our infantry operates and leadership thinks, the grunts would have to operate less like a ground pounder and more like SF. Boy oh boy, SOCOM would be in a tizzy then.

It is really not useful to distinguish between SF and Infantry when it comes to small unit tactics. WHY the differentiation and antagonism persists is a mystery

There are many who have made the fatal mistake of underestimating the intellectual prowess of Marine NCOs.

The intellectual powers of ENLISTED Marines have never worried me.....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

It is really not useful to distinguish between SF and Infantry when it comes to small unit tactics. WHY the differentiation and antagonism persists is a mystery

I believe it may stem from the belief that one portion of the service is stepping on someone else's "turf." Unfortunately there are some in SF who feel that the tactic of "lurking" is their purview alone, just as there are conventional infantry folk who feel "lurking" is beneath them.

Plus there might be a protectionist aspect to it all. If the average GI was suddenly able to do all those things SF tout they solely do then SF wouldn't be so "special."

[Entropy]

Link.

The Pentagon this week approved a major policy directive that elevates the military's mission of "irregular warfare" -- the increasingly prevalent campaigns to battle insurgents and terrorists, often with foreign partners and sometimes clandestinely -- to an equal footing with traditional combat.

The directive, signed by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England on Monday, requires the Pentagon to step up its capabilities across the board to fight unconventionally, such as by working with foreign security forces, surrogates and indigenous resistance movements to shore up fragile states, extend the reach of U.S. forces into denied areas or battle hostile regimes.

The policy, a result of more than a year of debate in the defense establishment, is part of a broader overhaul of the U.S. military's role as the threat of large-scale combat against other nations' armies has waned and new dangers have arisen from shadowy non-state actors, such as terrorists that target civilian populations.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

to finally formally recognize the prevalent mission that the Army and Marines have been performing for the last couple hundred years...